The virtual farmer. Past, present, and future of the Dutch peasantry by Ploeg, J.D., van der
The virtual farmer 
Past, present, and future of the Dutch peasantry 
Jan Douwe van der Ploeg 
2003 » R O Y A L VAN GORCUI 
© 2003 Royal Van Gorcum B.V., P.O. Box 43, 9400 AA Assen, The Netherlands 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, 
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, 
or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Publisher. 
NUR 740 
ISBN 90 232 3892 3 
Translated byjoek Roex, Cardiff 
LEEUWENBORCHBIBUOTHEEK 
Hottancteewag 1 
P O 8 * X Ä 8 1 3 0 
6700 EW Wageningen 
DTP: Ans van der Lande, Wageningen. 
Printing by: Royal Van Gorcum, Assen, The Netherlands. 
Table of Contents 
Preface IX 
PART I: INTRODUCTION 1 
1 Past, Present, and Future 3 
1.1 Types of social cohesion 5 
1.2 Time, structure, and the social sciences 10 
1.3 Actors, projects, co-production, convergence, and distantiation 27 
1.4 Agriculture as empirical object 34 
1.5 Storylines 40 
Notes 43 
PART II: DISTANTIATION: CREATING RESOURCES 49 
2 Dancing through Time * • 51 
2.1 Hemmema's memorandum book: back to the 16th century .,,•. ..... 54 
2.2 About farming freedom and agricultural development 61 
2.3 The height of the dunging passage and other episodes 68 
2.4 Kreas or rûch: the Nijboer of the Lycklemastate 77 
2.5 Daniel fan Kuken: rûch buorkje 81 
2.6 Daniel's downfall: gender relations in agriculture 85 
2.7 Collective memory as part of cultural repertoire 89 
2.8 Into the future 95 
Notes 97 
3 Farming Styles as Socio-Technical Networks 101 
3.1 Farming styles in contemporary Frisian dairy farming: an 104 
introduction 
3.2 Towards a specification of farming style as construction of 111 
congruence 
3.3 Exploring farming styles 119 
3.4 Farming styles as socio-technical networks 125 
3.5 The driving forces behind various socio-technical networks 130 
3.6 Differential developments through time 137 
Notes 142 
VI The Virtual Farmer 
PART III: UNFOLDING: THE UTILISATION AND DEVELOPMENT 145 
OF RESOURCES 
4 Capturing the Intangible 147 
4.1 The multiple malleability of farming 147 
4.2 The uncaptured peasantry 150 
4.3 The Cartesian theatre 151 
4.4 The 'farming systems' approach 162 
4.5 The empirical variation in input-output relations 166 
4.6 A methodological intermezzo 171 
4.7 The fourth quadrant: strategic and ordering of the labour and 178 
production processes 
4.8 Operating strategically in the first quadrant 180 
4.9 Operating strategically in the third quadrant 189 
4.10 Conclusions 197 
Notes 201 
5 The Economy as a Set of Differentiable Relations 206 
5.1 Substitution curves, expansion paths, and farming styles 208 
5.2 Again, dancing through time or the indefinable nature of farm 216 
development 
5.3 From malleability to disciplining 222 
Notes 225 
PART IV: DISCIPLINING: THE FUTURE DOMINATING THE 227 
PRESENT 
6 Expert System and Modernisation Project: Controlling the Future 229 
6.1 The need for faith: the importance of local cultural repertoires 233 
6.2 From faith to trust: the rise of the Ministry of Agriculture as 238 
expert system 
6.3 State and market: driving structural development 243 
6.4 Rural exodus as structural outcome of structural development 249 
6.5 Black swans, or the micro-macro problem in agricultural 253 
economics 
6.6 The commodity fiction 258 
6.7 Interim summary: the pillars of the expert system and the 265 
modernisation discourse 
Notes 269 
7 Redundancy as Contemporary Drama and the Production of Myths 274 
7.1 Influx 276 
7.2 Outflow 278 
7.3 On which farms does outflow occur? 283 
7.4 Succession: the big enigma 289 
7.5 What else happens within the category of'winners'? 290 
7.6 From farms to employment: another paradox 291 
7.7 Resistance capacity: a differentiated fact 293 
7.8 There is none so blind as those who will not see: the danger of 298 
myths 
Notes 302 
Table of Contents VII 
8 Structural Involution and the Erosion of Trust 306 
8.1 The specificity of scale enlargement as contemporary episode 312 
8.2 Why does scale enlargement occur anyway? 317 
8.3 The erosion of trust 323 
8.4 'Tripartite world' 331 
Notes 335 
9 The Battle for the Future: Current and Countercurrent 339 
9.1 The new current 339 
9.2 A quantification of rural development 348 
9.3 The why and how of rural development 356 
9.4 The impact of rural renewal revisited 363 
9.5 The Ministry of Agriculture as non-agency: a case study 366 
9.6 The countercurrent 371 
9.7 Is juxtaposition possible? 373 
9.8 Current and countercurrent: unmanageable tension 376 
9.9 Landscape as ordering principle 379 
9.10 The immanent decline of Dutch agriculture 383 
Notes 384 
PART V: ACTOR AND STRUCTURE 393 
10 Structure, Time, Knowledge, and Power 395 
10.1 What is structure? 397 
10.2 The ordering elements of today: distrust and discongruity 401 
10.3 On time, power, and social practices 402 
Notes 404 
References 408 

Preface 
It has become generally accepted that Dutch agriculture faces many 
problems. Various contradictory theories and stories are doing the rounds 
about the nature and possible causes of these problems. Over time, these 
theories and stories have come to appeal to me less and less. I now see 
them rather as part of the problem. 
In this book, I will present a different account of both the problems and 
their causes. At present, the central problem is the generally shared image 
of agriculture and the countryside. This prevailing image is represented 
by the title of this book. The virtual farmer stands for the agricultural 
entrepreneurs - and their partners, their histories, their work, their 
environment, and so on - as we think they are. However, the real farmers 
- their work, their environment, their points of view - are further and 
further removed from this image. 
This does not have to be problematic, if only the image of the virtual 
farmer was not used increasingly in policy-making, as a basis for 
agricultural policy, environmental policy, spatial policy, etc. Therefore, 
new frictions and new problems have emerged. At worst, it sometimes 
results in the real farmer being manoeuvred into operating in a seemingly 
clandestine manner. By introducing the virtual farmer, we have created an 
insurmountable problem. 
In this book, I will discuss at length the way in which agriculture and the 
countryside are represented. By implication, the expert system in and 
around agriculture, the producer of the virtual image, and the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, its foremost user, will be 
involved in the analysis. 
At the beginning of the third millennium, we find ourselves at a 
crossroads. We have left behind us the path followed in the past - a path 
still covered with numerous misconceptions. Ahead, two roads beckon us 
to the future. Along the first one, usually identified as rural development, 
it is possible to define new, yet fragile, development opportunities. The 
other is the road of accelerated scale enlargement and continuous 
industrialisation of farming. 
As a result, for the first time in history, the survival of Dutch agriculture is 
at stake. The interaction between theories and policy interpretations 
centring around the virtual farmer, as well as the far-reaching choices 
ahead, do not at all exclude the demise of Dutch agriculture. At the same 
time, it puts at risk the preservation of our beautiful rural areas and the 
production of high-quality and safe food. 
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This book also includes a search for what in social sciences is called the 
'ordering moment'. What are the guiding and driving forces making 
agriculture and the countryside into what they are? Although I do not 
want to anticipate the answer at this point, the principles ordering 
agriculture and the countryside are, at the present, to a large extent those 
of ignorance and irresponsibility. Standing at the aforementioned 
crossroads, this does not ease my mind. 
Over the past years, I have been closely involved with the developments 
in agriculture - sometimes with farmers and growers working directly on 
new solutions, sometimes in Brussels and The Hague with policymakers, 
at other times as a researcher. With hindsight, I think that multiple 
involvement is one of the most important methodological principles 
imaginable. If only because multiple involvement not only urges posing 
the 'why question', but it also leads constantly to the question 'why not?'. 
In certain respects, this is a long and complex book. In Section 1.5, the 
reader will find an overview of the various storylines; a bookmark, as it 
were. Detailed methodological explanations are indicated clearly in the 
text. The less-interested reader might want to skip these sections. 
I have been working on this book for a long time; the first fragments date 
from 1994. Work on the book was sometimes like keeping a journal. The 
waves of optimism and pessimism resulting from my multiple 
involvement will no doubt reverberate through the following chapters. 
Over the years, I have been able to tap many sources and use various 
corrective mechanisms. The first mechanism is the lectures I gave usually 
once a week, sometimes more often, to local organisations, to groups, and 
to associations of farmers. Giving lectures and participating in debates 
constitute powerful mechanisms for testing the development of one's 
ideas, for gaining insights, and also for being rudely brought back in line. 
The second corrective mechanism is being part of the Council for the 
Rural Areas, which has been an ideal seedbed for me. Particularly, since 
the Council's attention is inevitably broadened towards a general view on 
agriculture and the countryside. The expertise, serenity and humour I 
encounter within the Council are both inspiring and correcting. Just like 
giving lectures, participating in such a council is one of the best 
instruments a researcher could wish for. 
Third, I would like to refer to the work of our research group. Initially, its 
emphasis was largely on the exploration, description, analysis, and 
theoretical elaboration of farming styles. Later on, the emphasis shifted to 
rural development. The group laid brick after brick, enabling us to 
eventually build walls such as in Amelia in Umbria (Italy). 
At the risk of forgetting too many researchers, I would like to mention 
several who have made important contributions, directly or indirectly: 
Sicco Antuma, Bettina Bock, Froukje Boonstra, Wijnand Boonstra, Rudolf 
van Broekhuizen, Ellie Brouwer, René de Bruin, Monica Commandeur, 
Adrie van den Dries, Jasper Eshuis, Maarten Ettema, Peter Gerritsen, Ab 
Groen, Erik Hees, Ina Horlings, Greet Kerkhove, Gerard Kolkman, Geesje 
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Kuit, Cees Leeuwis, Hielke van der Meulen, Natasja Oerlemans, Henk 
Oostindie, Elke Pohlmann, Gaston Remmers, Henk Renting, Dirk Roep, 
Joek Roex, Sabine de Rooij, Peter Schuthof, Henk Spaan, Marian Stuiver, 
Han Wiskerke and Tjirk van der Ziel. 
Furthermore, I owe many thanks to people who read and commented on 
(earlier) fragments of this book, who, for the sake of the book, would talk 
at length to me and /or otherwise provide me with valuable information. 
These included, inter alias, Bernard Slicher van Bath (who will no doubt 
still have the same objections to the method upon which Chapter 2 of this 
book is based), Willie Baak (who conducted part of the statistical 
analyses), Bruno Benvenuti (who supported me in more ways than he will 
probably realise), Jan Bieleman, Rudolf van Broekhuizen, Henk Brouwer 
of Frisian Organic Dairy Products, Jaap van Bruchem, Henk Dokter, and 
Cees Hartmans of the Boerderij magazine (with whom we organised many 
of the surveys discussed in this book), the attentive Henk de Haan, Frisian 
dairy farmer Taeke Hoeksma, emeritus professor Jerry de Hoogh, Cathe 
Kwakkenbosch (who carried out much of the archival work for this book), 
René Liefaart of Statistics Netherlands (CBS), Frisian historian Spahr van 
der Hoek (who sent me the most poetic comments), cattle farmer Alfred 
Oostindie, Arie Rip of the University of Twente, Gerrie van der Ven, 
Harm Wielink (who, I suppose, still does not agree with Chapter 4), Ada 
Wossink, and Georg Beers, Jan Dijk, Tjomme de Haan, Wil Hennen, and 
Huib Silvis of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute, with whom 
co-operating was always a pleasure. 
Ans van der Lande, Paul van der Haar, Jaap Bijkerk, and Maarten Ettema 
have shown total dedication to the technical and editorial conclusion of 
the book, while Guy Ackermans, Bert Jansen, and Twan Wiermans 
attended to the pictures. I owe special thanks to the board and staff of the 
accountancy firm AVM/CCLB in Leeuwarden, Friesland. 
International discussions have been of major importance for me in the 
completion of this book. The agricultural debate in the Netherlands 
usually takes place within the space of a few suffocating square metres, 
tightly demarcated by the prevailing conventions. Broadening the debate 
beyond those boundaries comes as a breath of fresh air - literally and 
figuratively. Furthermore, the comparative approach is essential in order 
to recognise the relativeness of the prevailing axioms. Colleagues who 
have inspired me greatly are: Silvio Antonello (who died too early, alas), 
Michèle de Benedictus, David Booth, Arturo Cristovâo, Chris Currin, 
Marcel Jollivet, Bertrand Hervieux, Karlheinz Knickei, Philip Lowe, Joe 
Mannion, Terry Marsden, Pierluigi Milone, Sergei Nickolsky, Jose Portela, 
Cees de Roest, James Scott, Eduardo Sevilla Guzman, Frank Vanclay, and 
Flaminia Ventura. 
Similarly, there is a number of Dutch colleagues, both from scientific and 
political circles, whose field of vision reaches beyond the national borders. 
In this respect, I would like to mention: Ria Beckers, Johan Bouma, Arie 
van den Brand, Gert van Dijk, Jaap Frouws, Paul Hebinck, Servaes Huijs, 
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Norman Long, Jan Renkema, Niels Röling, Bert Speelman, Pieter ter Veer, 
Marijke Vos, Harm Evert Waalkens, and Wouter van der Weijden. 
I owe special thanks to Sicco Mansholt, who, despite his age, made an 
effort to discuss our farming style analyses and their possible agro-
political implications with Bruno Benvenuti, Vito Saccomandi, and 
myself. 
Finally, I would like to thank Jaques Delors, Franz Fischler, and Laurent 
van den Poele of the European Commission, Jozias van Aartsen, Derek 
Hanekom, and Vito Saccomandi (Ministers for Agriculture of the 
Netherlands, South Africa, and Italy, respectively), Kobus Walsma 
(agricultural member of the Executive for the province of Friesland), and 
Pé Miedema and Geert Hofstra (Frisian farm leaders) for the unique 
opportunities they offered to conduct unusual research. I hope that this 
book tells that story to some extent. 
Jan Douwe van der Ploeg 
Wageningen, October 1999 
Parti 
Introduction 

1 Past, Present, and Future 
We generally imagine society and the practices and processes localised in 
it, as ordered by historically rooted patterns and relationships. Yet this 
idea, found in and promoted particularly by the social sciences, is 
increasingly open to challenge. Indeed, this idea becomes an obstacle to 
an adequate understanding of social processes and developments. 
However improbable it seems at first, contemporary society is 
increasingly ordered in a roundabout way - that is, via the future. 
Human activity is always and everywhere future oriented. Somos lo que 
vamos a sex, we are what we are becoming, according to Ortega y Gasset 
(1995, p. 277)} This does not pre-empt the fact that the relations between 
past, present, and future are subject to radical changes. The way in which 
future-oriented actions are constituted and founded has changed 
drastically. 
Within societies that are generally regarded as traditional, the future was 
understood, and subsequently created, as a repetition of the past. 
Previously acquired experiences plotted the course of the future. By 
pursuing that course in the present, the future became a repetition of past 
relations. The past was reproduced via the present through collective 
memory, through the fear of deviating from it, as well as through the 
convenience of the tried and true. Thus emerged a straight and above all 
narrow road, running from the past, via the present, to the future. A 
crucial role was played by what sociologists call Gemeinschaft. Well-
defined norms applied to the levels of community, family, village, and 
vocational group. One had to act according to norms reflecting what was 
well-tried, what was historically just. Deviation resulted in sanctions. 
A radical change was introduced into this initially monotonous scheme, 
during the period defined as the age of modernisation. The past turned 
from guiding principle to starting point, to be built upon in various ways; 
no longer according to the strict rules inherent to the Gemeinschaft, but 
according to new degrees of freedom applying to the Gesellschaft: people 
belonged to a class, to a society, they were part of markets, and they 
shared in the blessings of technical development. 
On the one hand, this new constellation introduced an often considerable 
set of limitations; on the other hand, it accommodated further unfolding 
and unfurling. Starting out from the foundations created in the past - and 
embodied in particular practices, resources, knowledges, and 
opportunities - various roads were developed towards a future that could 
be understood as a multifaceted process of unfolding the potentialities 
situated in what had been established so far (Kosik 1976). 
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Thus, the present became an important link. It had been built on the past 
in specific and often contrasting ways. Hence, the future appeared as a 
vast array of possibilities - that is, those possibilities contained in the 
present to be utilised and realised subsequently. 
At the moment, we already have one foot in an ensuing constellation, 
which I will call, for the sake of convenience, the postmodern. In this 
constellation, the future is no longer the multifaceted utilisation and 
unfolding of development opportunities situated in the present. Instead, 
the future becomes a beacon, strongly conditioning contemporary actions. 
If future-oriented actions were initially based in the routines of the past 
and later became founded on, and hence defined by, the opportunities 
located in the present - today, the construction of the future is 
systematically disconnected from both. History becomes almost 
irrelevant, and the present is reduced to merely a (more or less 
favourable) run-up to the future. The burning questions are who, or what, 
will in which way, construct the guiding images of the future. 
All in all, the moment of ordering has shifted dramatically. Initially, this 
moment was hidden in history (for the future could not be anything but a 
repetition of the past). Collective memory, with its defined normative 
frame, constituted the moment of ordering par excellence. Later, in the age 
of modernisation, the moment of ordering shifted to the present: even 
though the past was still built on, the way in which this happened was 
highly variable. The present became an essential, albeit highly variable, 
link between past and future. Taking the former achievements into 
consideration, one chose and realised multiple roads to the future. Thus 
the future became freed from its ties with the past. 
If every moment represented a particular reality, it also contained various 
development opportunities, various routes to the future. Of course, of all 
those possibilities, only one could be realised in any given situation. 
Agency - that is, the capacity to achieve something - became decisive in 
this dance from reality to the future. 
At present, the ordering moment is, to a large extent, located with those 
who are able to specify where we are heading. However astonishing this 
may initially seem, images of the future almost irresistibly determine 
what we do today. 
Social developments and practices are increasingly ruled and directed by 
such images of the future. In a way, the present becomes shackled by the 
limited and compelling images of the future that we create; for these 
images of the future define what is, in the here and now, sensible and 
rational and also what is absurd and irrational. 
Remarkably, and in sharp contrast to the previous phase, these are no 
longer multiple and mutually contradistinctive images of the future 
(every one of which can potentially be realised) but instead they are 
compelling and exclusive. Only one option is regarded as feasible and 
legitimate. If a certain reality contained various alternatives in the past, 
now one single option acts as the selective frame in defining the preferred 
(or unavoidable) future reality. Institutionalised images of the future have 
become the pre-eminent moments of ordering. The expert systems that 
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have emerged in recent decades are the most important carriers of this 
process. 
Megaprojects (see Scott 1997)5 now constitute the largely contested, but 
still highly imperative frames that orient the actions of various actors 
towards one set of parameters: towards the future constellation that 
facilitates 'profits' and in which it is better to participate than to stand 
aside. Expert systems are crucial in constituting these megaprojects. 
A similar development can be encountered in the markets. The most 
important markets no longer deal with commodities that are produced 
and traded here and now - they are concerned with the future. On option 
markets (and on stock markets) 'trade' is in expectations: trade is about 
the opportunity to supply and sell a certain commodity at a future price. 
The same applies to stock markets: they are inspired and constituted by 
expectations about future profits. Crucial in all this is that the actual trade 
taking place at present is dominated by the trade in expectations. 
Figure 1.1 summarises this argument. In traditional society (la) past, 
present, and future were in alignment with each other. In modern society 
(lb) the present contains a series of alternatives. Starting from currently 
available resources various prospects can be realised. Finally, in 
postmodern society (lc) 'disciplining' originates from the future. Only 
one future is considered possible, to which present practices are 
subordinated. Future resources, rather than current ones, become critical. 
1.1 Types of social cohesion 
The crucial cement in traditional societies is constituted by what is tried 
and true. Everyday life is shaped by faith in what are well-tried routines, 
and by faith in those organisations and individuals that embody and/or 
express this faith most adequately. Social practices are ordered through 
such faith - similarly, the compass is oriented to the past via this faith in 
what is familiar and well-tried; thus the past is carried towards the future, 
via the present. 
In other words, the habit of drawing on the repertoire of what is tried and 
true emerges here as one of the most important ordering principles (or, 
following Law 1994, one of the most important 'modes of ordering'). The 
normative frame - 'do as we always have done because it is right in itself' 
- is the foremost medium for maintaining the continuity that connected 
past, present, and future. It provided social cohesion. 
In modernising societies, this normative moment, which focuses on what 
is tried and true, is replaced by agency: the ability to realise one's own 
future projects. Here too faith is a-vital ingredient, yet this is no longer the 
same faith that once was the cement of traditional societies. Now it is 
confidence in one's own knowledge and capacity. Integral to all this is 
confidence in the realisation of new alternatives that build on the 
resources developed thus far and in the ability to develop the required 
connections with others. 
6 The Virtual Farmer 
Figure 1.1 The relations between past, present and future 
figure 1.1a 
figure 1.1b 
figure 1.1c 
the past 
has been made 
irrelevant 
multiple realities different 
future projects 
different practices 
directed by 
megaproject 
megaproject 
Thanks to agency, the various projects of Figure 1.1b can be realised. The 
question of what is possible is always crucial. Knowledge (whatever the 
type) of new possibilities that reach beyond both what is well-tried and 
what is considered right becomes a decisive factor. Knorr-Cetina provides 
an accurate definition of the difference between these two phases: 
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'Not only has order become a cognitive (including linguistic) rather than a 
normative phenomenon, it has also become a man-made rather than a man-
coercing matter: it is produced, contested, repaired, organised and displayed in 
concrete situations whose definition became the subject of continual 
accomplishment and interruption' (1981, p. 6). 
Increasing differentiation is characteristic of 'order as a man-made 
matter'. Available resources (both material and social) are unfolded and 
developed in increasingly different ways. Hence, different and mutually 
contrasting realities (multiple realities) emerge, each providing their own 
starting points for further evolution. Apart from the social, the material 
too produces an ordering effect. 
In retrospect, the high degree of institutional clustering that seems to rule 
the contemporary, post-modern world was largely absent in modernising 
societies. At present a semi-coherent system of artefacts, rules, 
procedures, agendas and expectations - in short a technological regime 
(Rip 1995; Rip and Kemp 1998) - directs, informs, and sanctions social 
actions to an extent that can almost be described as coercive. In contrast, a 
much more diffuse process of variation and selection was in operation 
during the modernisation phase. New development opportunities (such 
as those represented in Figure 1.1b) were not judged a priori by the degree 
to which they were in alignment with dominant development projects. 
Variation originated from every nook and cranny. The evolving practices 
themselves formed the basis for the judgement of what was 'better' and 
what was 'worse'.7 Variation increased and selection followed later. The 
selection was ex post and essentially made by the parties that were directly 
involved. 
These ongoing processes of variation and selection merit further 
discussion. First, the unfolding of development opportunities - that is, the 
pursuit of particular development projects - should not be understood as 
a mere individualistic enterprise. Just as the actions (of any individual 
actor) can only be understood as the concomitance (interlocking) of 
and/or distantiation9 from different practices, individual projects can only 
be realised if they are founded in the required degree of coordination -
that is, if they become part of a larger system of interlocking projects. 
Actor-networks are crucial in this . 
This is illustrated in Figure 1.2. Actor A only has a chance of realising 
their specific development project if they succeed in realising the essential 
convergence with B's and C's development projects at the right time. Say, 
B and C stand for the dairy industry and a neighbouring farmer, 
respectively. So far, A has had little to do with C (there is currently no 
interaction). However, since A's 'project' anticipates a rapid expansion 
(more land, more quota, more room for ammonia emissions, etc.), partly 
because this is expected by B, the future disappearance of C (and hence 
the transfer of development opportunities from C to A) can be crucial for 
the realisation of A's development project. 
8 The Virtual Farmer 
Figure 1.2 The convergence of projects 
future 
present 
The degree to which convergence of development projects is created thus 
emerges as one of the most important ordering principles. 
'Instead of being seen as a monolithic system which regulates individual 
action, order comes to be seen as an upshot of concrete, communicative 
interaction [. . .] Social order is not that which holds society together by 
somehow controlling individual wills, but that which comes about in the 
mundane but relentless transactions of these wills' (Knorr-Cetina 1981, p.7). 
In the postmodern constellation, a new 'cement', a new mechanism for 
maintaining cohesion can be identified: Trust. Trust refers to the 
necessity to follow more or less implicitly, and to rely on, a system of 
objectified parameters defining rational versus irrational alternatives for 
action. In this context Galjart (1998, p. 13) speaks of 'trust in systems'. As 
social cement, trust contrasts sharply with the normative and cognitive 
mechanisms discussed above. What may, and should be, proved is 
defined by new frames. The (decentralised) production of multifarious 
knowledge becomes replaced by a new approach: how to organise 
knowledge in a centralised way. This requires a particular carrier. If 
collective memory and widely supported normative frames were initially 
important and later replaced by the capacity to make a difference, as 
supported by various and varying groups of actors - trust is accompanied 
by a new carrier, the expert system. That is: 
'a system of technical accomplishment [and] professional expertise that 
organises large areas of the material and social environments in which we live 
today' (Giddens 1990, p. 27). 
Figure 1.1c illustrates how a certain (as yet not existing) image of the 
future is specified within, and through, the expert system. Only later will 
the means and rules through which this image will be designed and 
implemented become evident. This realisation takes place via the 
simultaneous coordination of various, apparently unconnected, practices. 
The extent to which such a coordination occurs depends directly upon 
trust, upon the supposed certainty that adjusting one's own actions to the 
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specified image of the future achieves better results than diverting from 
the image. 
The outcome of modern courses of action (see Figure 1.1b) is a highly 
heterogeneous world, a set of contrasting practices, which, due to a 
particular organisation of interrelationships, collectively compose a 
system that is able to operate due to the realisation of sufficient degrees of 
freedom for each of the discernible practices. 
In the postmodern constellation (see Figure 1.1c), on the other hand, 
society tends towards uniformity. Since expert systems radically 
restructure the relations between 'the universe of the undisputed' and the 
'universe of discourse' (Bourdieu 1977, p. 168) and between what is and 
what is not allowed, a process of ordering emerges that puts great 
pressure on, or eliminates, the heterogeneous nature of social relations 
and practices. 
Expert systems create a new 'domain of the undisputed', a new 'habitus' 
(Bourdieu 1990) of their own: that is, a world as it should be; not because 
there would be some sort of subjectivity or intersubjectivity, but because 
this 'world', this future, would be determined objectively by laws that are 
understood in and by the expert system. I will discuss this at length in the 
following chapters, particularly 4,5, and 6. 
Incidentally, it should be mentioned that in the creation of a 
heterogeneous world the phrase 'everything goes' definitely does not 
apply: the world cannot be moulded and shaped at will. Co-production 
and co-evolution always play a key role in the development of the various 
practices, that collectively compose a 'heterogeneous world'. I use these 
concepts to refer to the interaction between, and the mutual 
transformation of, the material and the social. Farming can be understood 
as a special type of co-production, precisely because here the material 
, largely coincides with the living world. 
| The living world (animals, crops, soil, ecosystems in the wider sense, etc.) 
S is not only exploited by agriculture; it is also continuously unfolded, 
jl recombined, enriched and/or depleted by it. In short, the resources that 
| are derived from nature, and which remain part of nature at the same 
,i time, are particularised in, and through, farming to contain new, always 
,[ specific, possibilities but also new, again specific, limitations. In terms of 
! Figure 1.1b: you cannot jump from Bl to C5 just like that. For example a 
high-yielding Holstein cow cannot suddenly be put on a low-energy diet. 
In summary, people draw their own boundaries in and through their 
interaction with nature (that is, through co-production). And where one 
considers jumping over the boundaries, it emerges sooner or later that the 
material, and certainly the living world, cannot be understood and treated 
as if it is as 'malleable as clay'. 
Similarly, the social world has its own characteristics. Various examples 
will be discussed in the course of this book. They are partly related to the 
particular requirements resulting from co-production: not every form of 
social organisation matches the particular kind of co-production and co-
evolution in agriculture. Disregarding those particular requirements (a 
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remarkable characteristic of current expert systems) can result in extreme 
disruptions and irreversibility (Scott 1998; NRLO 1997b). 
Finally, when expert systems become dominant, in the sense that they 
reduce the expanding set of future possibilities to one exclusive 
alternative, selection changes its nature. Then there is no longer concern 
about an ex post facto selection, but rather about an ex ante selection: only 
those actions that correspond with the preferred future count as valid. All 
the others become delegitimised from the very start. It goes without 
saying that this has radical and highly negative effects on the production, 
and maintenance, of variety. 
1.2 Time, structure, and the social sciences 
Just as every revolution is decorated with the colours and symbols of the 
previous revolution (Groen and De Buch 1968), the social sciences try to 
unravel existing constellations by using concepts that were developed to 
understand the previous ones. The modernisation period - characterised 
by its highly differentiated nature, by a process of simultaneous unfolding 
of various, contrasting projects (see Figure 1.1b) - is usually approached 
with a concept of structure derived from, and corresponding more closely 
with, the previous, traditional situation. Central to this concept of 
structure are causal complexes, which precede certain outcomes (see 
Figure 1.1a). Because a certain cause cannot produce contrasting effects, 
the explanation of heterogeneity (see Figure 1.1b) becomes an almost 
insoluble problem from the outset. 
The same is repeated under postmodern relations. Attempts are made to 
understand practices that are increasingly standardised, if not 'caged', by 
the dominance of the expert systems (see Figure 1.1c) through the 
application of an adage better suited for the modern era: 'agency is going 
beyond structure/structure follows action'. Again, a major problem 
arises; that is, to understand how convergence, homogenisation, and 
coercion increase in an apparently free world. 
In all societies, regardless of time and space, regularities and recurring 
patterns emerge. These regularities constitute the blessing and the curse 
of the social sciences. They constitute the starting point, but often also the 
Waterloo, of the enterprises of economists, sociologists, and historians. 
Such regularities, irrespective of where they occur and of their nature, 
always lead to a set of interrelated questions, which I will briefly 
summarise here. 
1 To what extent are the observed regularities absolute? What is the 
importance and relevance of the exceptions, the 'black swans', which, 
on careful inspection, can generally be found as well? And 
subsequently, what influence (if not bias) do the methods have with 
which we construct these regularities? How do we get to determine 
regularities at all? 
2 What do these regularities mean? Do they mark out the undisputed 
from the discursive, the fixed from what might still be variable? Do 
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they refer to a frame in which human action and, more generally, 
social development necessarily has to take place? 
3 What do the occurring regularities refer to? Do they offer information 
about underlying structures (irrespective of their nature) imperatively 
directing human action (and hence social development)? Do they refer 
to cause - effect relations with which the observed (or constructed) 
regularities can be regarded as resulting from underlying causal 
complexes? Or are they rather the expression (and/or representation) 
of temporally and spatially bounded conventions, which should be 
considered as fluid and variable? 
4 More precisely, how do the different regularities, the different 
conventions, relate to each other? And maybe even more importantly, 
what role does our ability and/or inability to gain control over the 
occurrence of regularities play in the actual ordering of the world? 
Social^ractices contain certain regularities. They follow certain patterns, a 
certain logic, resulting in a certain course, a certain pattern, becoming self-
evident truisms: 'that's just the way it goes'. Observers of the agricultural 
sector will come across countless, and often impressive, examples of 
regularities. These are usually examples that reach far beyond specific 
locations in time and space. 
Whatever the place or time, agriculture is generally organised into small 
units, which we define nowadays as family farms - that is, units in which 
labour and capital are combined in one and the same person. Farm men 
and women are not only owners of most of the means of production, they 
also do most of the productive work. Management as an isolated factor is 
absent: mental and manual labour are combined in the same person. All 
this constitutes a remarkable contrast to the industrial organisation in the 
urban economy (Braverman 1974) where design and implementation, 
mental and manual labour are usually separated, as are the ownership of 
the means of production and the realisation of the actual labour and 
production processes. 
Other regularities are more confined in terms of time and space. There are 
periods in which farms are systematically and purposefully reduced in 
size (Staatscommissie 1912, pp. 477, 492), whereas in other periods there 
seems to be a universal tendency towards farm enlargement. These seem 
to be almost general processes within the boundaries of the period in 
question. Someone who looks further into this will recognise the 
particular and the temporary. 
Similarly, regularities are spatially confined. Hayami and Ruttan (1985) 
show, in a comparative analysis at the global level, how there is ongoing 
intensification in certain regions, while scale enlargement emerges as the 
dominant development pattern in others, and stagnation is most striking 
in others. A similar spatial differentiation can be found even within the 
European Union, where similar economic relations increasingly apply and 
where new technologies are basically accessible to every one (Van der 
Ploeg 1991, p. 65). 
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Why do regularities exist at all? What are their roots? What exactly do 
they consist of? And why does one pattern sometimes replace another? 
These essential questions are asked repeatedly within the social sciences 
and many answers have been offered. In this book I will try to relate these 
questions to the way in which past, present, and future are connected. 
Regularities are, to summarise a large part of social science theories, the 
outcome of a certain ordering: the result of an ordering that, it is often 
assumed, is produced in the last instance by a certain structure. There are, 
to summarise further, certain, clearly definable and identifiable structures 
that order human action, i.e. different social practices. 
Structures form the guiding principles for action, they lead action in a 
certain direction. Hence, regularities emerge, which in turn constitute an 
argument for further (conformation of the already introduced) ordering: 
indeed, 'that is just the way it goes'. One can try to set up an industrial 
farm (based on labour - capital relations), one can try to escape the 
necessity of farm enlargement, but sooner or later such attempts will fail. 
The course of history - structural development, as one says in agricultural 
circles - is irreversible. 
Alongside the question of where to locate such a structure (within the 
predominant mode of production, in the system of norms and values 
inspiring and informing human action, in the system requirements 
inherent in every society, within the combination of opportunities and 
limitations contained in every situation, within the relations situated in 
markets, in the development of technology, or within the combination of 
technological and economic development?) the question of how to 
imagine such a structure emerges. In essence, the latter question leads us 
to the relation between cause and effect, to the interrelations between 
past, present, and future. 
Within the space of this section it is almost impossible to do justice to all 
that has been said about this issue (for an excellent discussion about the 
structure concept in agriculture, see Benvenuti 1990). Therefore, I will 
confine myself to a simple contrast: the image in which structure is 
represented as a skeleton, as the carrying framework, versus the concept of 
structure as a process of ordering, as that which is being built. 
A favourite image represents structure as being like a skeleton. Just as a 
skeleton shapes the human body (at most one can be fatter or thinner), 
structure shapes human action. In other words, action is conditioned by 
structure: certain actions are possible, others are ruled out. I will never be 
a sprinter with my hip dysplasia. 
Apart from the analogy with the human body, reference is frequently 
made to large-scale constructions: a modern high-rise block of flats 
contains a framework, a skeleton made of reinforced concrete (Giddens 
1992, pp. 19, 731). The framework is fixed. Within the possibilities of the 
framework, only certain rooms and arrangements can be created. 
In short, structure is coercive. Certain possibilities are ruled out, while 
other possibilities present themselves as obvious. Furthermore, structure 
precedes subsequent actions. Action is determined by structure; and 
structure precedes action. Hence, structure is in essence external to action. 
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Structure as process of ordering 
As indicated in Figure 1.1b, certain realities contain certain development 
opportunities, while ruling out others at the same time. This goes back to 
elements that I will analyse and explain further in Chapter 3. In essence, it 
means that the mobilised resources are shaped, are differentiated, into 
particular resources. In plain English, a beef cow is not a dairy cow, and it 
is impossible to change her into a dairy cow overnight. The same goes, 
for example, for the craftsmanship of a beef farmer; it differs remarkably 
from a dairy farmer's. By implication, there is little use in abruptly 
replacing the herd (selling beef cattle, buying dairy cows); the necessary 
craftsmanship will still be missing. The same applies to the capacities (the 
'abilities') of the actors involved: they know how to realise, utilise and 
further develop certain matters, but not others. And finally, the networks: 
there are certain relations that can be built upon, while other relations are 
missing and cannot be developed just like that. It is questionable, for 
example, whether a dairy factory is willing to accept a new supplier, 
especially one with no experience of dairy farming. 
Further illustration will not be necessary. A particular constellation has 
been built up, including networks, resources, and actors (often 
summarised in this context in terms of socio-technical networks); a 
particular 'system' that contains its own development opportunities and 
rules out others. This particular process of ordering directs and shapes 
future-oriented action to a large extent, but not so much in the classic, 
determinist sense. What orders (or 'structures') here is the already 
constructed practice, not something external to that practice. 
Similarly, the situation of the beef farmer (I use the example one more 
time) contains various distinct possibilities. He or she can gradually 
develop their farm towards high-quality cattle (focus the use of his 
resources into one direction) and develop the networks necessary to 
pursue this goal. However, other options will present themselves too: to 
continue beef production whilst sharply increasing its scale, et cetera. 
Whatever alternative is chosen (can be chosen), the process of ordering 
will always be continued. Ordering is an ongoing process, and a process 
that largely directs itself. I have summarised this again in more detail in 
Figure 1.3. 
Of course, the unfolding of development opportunities, the realisation of 
a particular project that builds on what is already realised, does not 
happen in isolation. Whatever possibility is pursued and realised, 
interactions with the development projects of others will always be at 
issue. Frequently this will be translated through abstract, depersonalised 
categories. For example, what developments are taking place in the 
markets? Of course, these issues are taken into consideration in the 
unfolding of one's own project. External developments are followed, 
interpreted, and translated into one's own actions, into further-reaching 
processes of unfolding. 
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Again we have to conclude that this does not involve unidirectional 
determination. Not everyone has made himself equally dependent upon 
external developments, upon other projects. Some meat producers, for 
instance, will have made extensive use of external funding. They have let 
their own development project converge largely with the particular 
development projects of banks. Consequently, in case of further 
expansion they have to take account of the parameters applying to capital 
markets and of the requirements of the funding organisations. This will 
not apply to other meat producers who have based the construction of 
their farm on their own savings and /or family capital, or if it does apply 
it will be less significant. 
Analytically, integration and distantiation thus become important key 
concepts. In more general terms, the network of relationships connecting 
different projects becomes decisive in the further construction of practices. 
What is important to note here, however, is that the nature of these 
networks can vary considerably. 
In a way current practices constitute the result of former processes of 
unfolding. In turn, these practices (the particular and fine-tuned systems 
of resources, capabilities, and networks) direct and order the further 
processes of unfolding, which will undoubtedly leave their mark on 
subsequent possibilities and impossibilities. That which has been 
constructed in a certain practice structures the further development of 
that practice. Hence, regularities emerge: patterns of coherence and 
continuity. In turn, they refer indeed to something that orders, to 
something that structures. In other words, there is absolutely no need to 
deny that 'actors' choices can be constrained' (Harris 1997, p. 11). 
Figure 1.3 Ongoing process of unfolding 
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Essentially, that which structures is not external to, but inherent and 
implicit in, the practices themselves - that is, in the practices that the 
actors involved realise themselves, in mutual interaction with others and 
with other things. In essence outside of these social practices (in their 
broadest sense) there is no other structure that orders these practices as a 
given 'skeleton'. The structuring element is contained in the practices 
themselves: in the unfolding and, therefore, in that which is unfolded. To 
unfold is to structure, and structuring takes place through processes of 
unfolding. This is not to deny the influence of distant practices, of 
practices situated elsewhere, or the influence of 'interactive systems over 
which they [i.e. the actors involved] have little control' (Booth 1994, p. 
39). In so far as such 'interactive systems' (or 'networks' as I have 
defined them above) and external parameters, such as the interest rate, 
given in the previous example, exert any influence this will occur through 
the interaction between the 'internal' and the 'external' - never 
unilaterally and deterministically from the 'external'. 
Agency - the capability 'to make a difference' - and networks are two 
essential concepts in the development of a non-determinist concept of 
structure as construction, of structure as situated, and inherent, in social 
practices - hence, of structure as a heterogeneous and evolving 
phenomenon. 
The concept of agency occupies a prominent position in contemporary 
sociology. According to Giddens: 
'Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their 
capability of doing things in the first place . . . Agency concerns events of 
which an individual is the perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, 
at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently. Whatever 
happened would not have happened if that individual had not intervened' 
(1984, p. 9). 
In other words, agency is the capability to make a difference, the art of 
changing the course of events; the capability, in summary, to turn one's 
own situation into something different, into something that would not 
have existed, or that would have been different, if the actor in question 
had not intervened. 
What does this 'capability of doing things' depend upon? The problem 
with Giddens' definition is that too much emphasis is placed upon the 
individual. As I will show in this book, agency expresses itself nearly 
always as a manifestation of several actors and explicitly not as something 
of which the 'individual is the perpetrator'. Even if it involves only one 
individual, the action expressing his or her agency should absolutely not 
be considered as an individualistic action. An individual only displays 
agency in interaction with other people or with other things. 
Second, it is not clear from the quoted definition (which applies to 
Giddens' oeuvre, tout court) what it is an actor draws from to realise 
agency (hence there is little left but to represent it as a somewhat mythical 
individual attribute). What resources are mobilised to produce agency? 
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A more adequate description that addresses this problem, is presented by 
Long. 
'[A]gency attributes to the individual actor the capacity to process social 
experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme 
forms of coercion. Within the limits of information, uncertainty and the other 
constraints (e.g. physical, normative or politico-economic) that exist, social 
actors are 'knowledgeable' and 'capable' (Long 1992, pp. 22 - 23). 
Agency is made concrete in this definition, especially by pointing out 
what it relies on and builds upon: the capability to process and utilise the 
experiences gained thus far and also the capability to face existing and/or 
imminent difficulties (it should be noted explicitly that these difficulties 
are of a social nature - that is, concern the interrelations among actors and 
between actors and things). En passant, I want to mention that agency is 
discussed here as something that 'is attributed' to the individual actor, 
which implies that agency does not necessarily have to be rooted in or 
stem from the individual - even if it seems that way. 
Third, when we speak about agency we should also mention its opposite 
('non-agency')- Alongside the capability to make a difference, the 
opposite, incapability, also frequently occurs.20 Without the latter, we 
cannot define the former. Without non-agency as a conceptual and 
empirically manageable counterpart, agency becomes a non-concept. A 
number of the issues raised here can be solved by involving the future-
oriented nature of social action explicitly in the analysis. I will do this by 
way of Figure 1.4, which builds upon Figure 1.3. 
Effective unfolding (from the initial situation A) along the first track (from 
A to Cj and subsequently to C2) is only possible if C, and subsequently C2 
can be effectively woven into the required relations. If we consider C2 as a 
project in which strategic and future-oriented actions are united, C2 can 
only be realised if coordinated and actually interwoven with other 
relevant projects. 
Par definition, un projet . . . est une fiction, puisqu 'au début il n 'existe pas 
(Latour 1991b, p.155). 
The essence of a project is that it does not yet exist, but that it has still to 
be realised. Let track 1 be the above-mentioned quality option of the beef 
farmer (the example returns once more). It will only be possible to realise 
this project if it interlocks with various other projects (first with X, and Y,, 
subsequently with X2 and Y2). Groups of consumers will have to be 
interested in high-quality meat; they will also have to be able to recognise 
this. Butchers will have to be willing to distribute the meat as a distinctive 
product. Abattoirs are needed that are willing to slaughter an, initially, 
limited number of animals. And so on. 
It might be possible to think of alternatives (for an empirical sketch 
describing production, processing, distribution, and consumption of beef 
from nature reserves, see Kuit and Van der Meulen 1997; Ventura and 
Milone, 2000). However, it remains to be seen whether these alternatives 
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correspond with the way in which government implements and enforces 
hygiene regulations - which, in turn, could depend heavily on 
developments in the agro-industrial complex. More generally, it is highly 
conceivable that X (for example, the agro-industry) and Y (for example, 
government) establish their positions (X, and Y, and later X2 and Y2) to 
such an extent that actor A is left with only one trajectory (for a general 
view, see Burawoy 1985; and with regard to agriculture, see Benvenuti 
1982,1989). Thus it becomes, for example, impossible to realise C3 - unless 
actor A can actually develop mechanisms to distance himself from X2 and 
Y2. 
Figure 1.4 The interaction between projects and the construction of networks 
^ ^ axis along which projects are 
connected and interwoven 
'Realising things' (of any nature) always happens through others, 
although to a varying degree - through other actors, through institutions, 
through artefacts, etc. An 'actor-network' is needed: a set of precise (i.e. 
not accidental) relations with others, through and within which one's own 
'project' can be realised. Through an 'actor-network' one's own project 
can be carried out, because through this network the project is connected 
to the projects and procedures of others. Such a network explicitly 
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involves the 'social' (it includes other actors and institutions), the 
'material' (it contains particular resources, artefacts, and transactions), 
and the interaction between the two. 
What then is agency? Agency is the capability to anticipate the necessary 
interaction and synergy of various projects - the capability to develop 
one's own project in such a way that the chance of actual synergy, of an 
'interlocking of projects' (Long and Van der Ploeg 1994, pp. 80 - 81), is as 
strong as possible. Hence, agency is also (and perhaps especially) the 
capability to interest and involve others in one's own project, the 
capability to encourage others to further unfold their projects in 
coordination with one's own. In other words, agency is the capability to 
create an actor-network. Only by doing so, is it possible to make the 
proverbial 'difference'. 
Furthermore, agency is the capability to actually realise the initially 
imagined constellation (the set of 'interlocking projects' around C,). The 
more and better anticipated, the more carriers of other relevant projects 
will become interested and involved, and the more and better the road to 
C, becomes effectuated. The more agency there is, the more capability 
there is to 'make a difference'. The less this applies (to whatever subject), 
the less agency there will be; hence, incapability emerges. 
Initially, the network around C, is a virtual network (a 'prospective 
structure', according to Van Lente and Rip 1998). The network is, as yet, 
only imagined. However, this does not make it less real, for it is above all 
real in its consequences. 
Agency manifests itself through initially virtual networks; networks that 
are subsequently realised (or not). Therefore, agency should not be 
considered an individual quality. Whatever it is that I imagine and 
consider, does not in itself help me realise anything. 
Agency is first of all dependent on the extent to which a virtual network 
can be imagined and, subsequently, can be constructed and extended. The 
individual actor emerges only in the second instance, in so far as he or she 
has the capability to contribute to the constitution, specification, and 
realisation of the intended set (the network) of 'interlocking projects'. 
Again, the role of the individual actor can only be understood in relation 
to the thoughts and actions of other actors - and definitely not in a strictly 
isolated, sheer individualistic sense. 
What turns the commotion and goings-on of the human enterprise into 
agency? What is the ordering principle? What is the structuring moment? 
The answer is simple. The fluid and continuously changing concepts 
with which groups of actors imagine the future - the virtual networks of 
intended future projects, whether or not attuned to each other - are 
structuring action. 'Commotion and goings-on' become agency in so far 
as they result in virtual networks that actually mobilise, inspire, and cause 
realisation. All action is future-oriented action (even though it appears to 
be different sometimes). Future-oriented action is structured via and by 
way of virtual networks - networks imply agency and at the same time 
define it (in a more concrete sense). 
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I claimed above that no structure exists beyond social practices (I should 
say socio-technical practices). Structure is immanent in social practices. 
That which structures is implicit in social practices as the way in which 
ordering occurs. How this process of ordering occurs is described here in 
a general sense: via the indicated virtual networks. Hence, structure is 
localised, agency is specified, which explains why the concept of structure 
is partly actor dependent and partly not; moreover, structure - that is, that 
which appears to be structuring - is the outcome of agency. At first this 
seems incomprehensible (and within the accepted Giddensian theories it 
cannot be but nonsensical), but it becomes plausible as soon as we 
integrate the time dimension and the importance of virtual networks into 
the analysis. 
Networks, routinisation, and institutionalisation 
'[A] network refers to a set of direct and indirect social relations, centred 
around given persons, which are instrumental to the achievements of the goals 
of these persons, and to the communication of their expectations, demands, 
needs and aspirations' (Anderson and Carlos 1976, p . 28). 
In this description, Anderson and Carlos stress, surprisingly, the 
orientation to the future - that is, the virtual nature of networks. 
The concept of social networks was developed initially by anthropologists 
such as Radcliff-Brown and Mitchell (1969). Their direct intention was a 
better understanding of society in terms of 'fabric' and 'web of social life'. 
What keeps society together? What gives cohesion to, and connects, the 
commotion and goings-on? 
The social relations of which individuals are part can be analysed as a 
network (Boissevain 1974, p. 25). A social network is more than a 
communicative structure, for many messages consist de facto of 
transactions - transactions that explicitly concern the material. In short, it 
concerns socio-technical networks (Wiskerke 1997, p. 1). This applies a 
fortiori to the above-mentioned virtual networks. 
In premodern constellations one would hardly, or even not at all, be 
aware of the extent to which the construction of the future occurs via 
virtual networks. The goals that those involved aim for, and more 
importantly 'the set of direct and indirect social relations' (the network) 
supporting the realisation of the goals, are all largely routinised. Today's 
goals, and the social relations important for their realisation, are the same 
as yesterday's. It is as if thinking is not needed. One can steer by the 
compass of the well-tried and proven. The required network does not 
seem to be virtual. It is the network that has always been there. 'That is 
just the way things are'. Having unshakeable faith that things would 
happen just like they did before, one could face the challenge of the 
future. 
The most fascinating - and unusual, but no less adequate for that -
critique of traditionalism and its routinisation stems, surprisingly, not 
from science but from literature. This criticism is from Jean Auel (1980), 
who sketches the ins and outs of the 'clan of the cave bear'. The members 
of this clan act on the grounds of routine. The tried and true is the 
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measure of (future-oriented) actions. Because the members of the clan 
increasingly, and despite themselves, gain new experiences, however, they 
have to remember more and more. Consequently, their heads become 
larger, the essential brain size intended for the required memory 
increases. This results in more difficult child births. The heads of the new-
born babies, brimful of and hence swollen by collective memories, become 
too large. Therefore the clan becomes extinct. 'They didn't know it, but 
their days on earth were numbered, they were doomed to extinction' 
(Auel 1980, p. 503). 
In the modern period the creation of variation becomes an established, if 
not self-evident, phenomenon, resulting from the ubiquitous search for 
innovations and improvements. Of course, certain types of division of 
labour accompany this: not everybody can carry the risks inherent in 
innovation (see Hofstee 1985a). Similarly, (experiential) rules apply, 
structuring the process of innovation. Ironically, the smaller the 
proportion of what is potentially changeable, the higher the chance of 
success (Herrera 1984). Innovation is explicitly understood as a quest. 
This is typically expressed by the subjunctive, as explained by Van Kessel 
in a fascinating essay: 
'The subjunctive . . . is oriented towards the universe of possibilities, to 
everything that could exist in society' (Van Kessel 1990, p. 92; see also 
Darré 1985). 
Talking and thinking about changes does not involve security but rather 
insecurity. Hope and desire constitute the most important guidelines; 
hence, the subjunctive mood. This grammar is in sharp contrast with the 
grammar of the previous, traditional period, characterised by the 
imperative, and especially with the grammar of the postmodern phase, in 
which expert systems use the indicative, which refers to the way reality 
merely is. This involves a highly objectified ('it is the case tha t . . .') and 
nomological language ('if this, then that'; see Koningsveld 1987). Also 
closely related to the subjunctive, which is so typical of innovation in the 
modern period, is modesty: the success of an intended innovation 
depends on many elements that collectively compose the socio-technical 
network. Van den Berg (1989) gave his study about agriculture in the 
Peruvian highlands the meaningful title: La tierra no da asi no mas. The 
earth does not give without difficulty - you cannot impose just anything 
upon her, let alone demand and expect just anything of nature and the 
living world (see also Salas 1996). Looking back, this modesty 
(recognisable in many places) is in striking contrast with the pretensions 
with which the process of innovation is positioned and legitimised in the 
postmodern period - but I will leave this aside for the moment. 
Looking back, various other features can be recorded. It is remarkable that 
innovations almost always start at a small scale. This not only reduces the 
risks involved, but it also enables 'learning by doing' (Dosi 1988). The 
initial small scale is partly related to the situation of utilising mainly, if 
not exclusively, one's own resources (one's own land, own labour, own 
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knowledge, own savings, own networks, etc.). The latter feature, in turn, 
reinforces the multiformity of (potential) development routes, explored 
and realised through experimenting and innovating (Osti 1991). After all, 
the specificity of the already present resources (irrespective of their 
nature) cannot but lead to multiple modes of unfolding (Jollivet 1988). 
In summary, the process of innovation as it occurs in agriculture under 
'modern' conditions implies a clear balance. The development of new 
constellations ('new realities'), such as C, in Figure 1.4, assumes the 
creation of new (or more clearly specified) resources, and also of new 
combinations of resources and new (or at least partly new) networks. As a 
project, C, is (that is, from the position of the here and now, i.e. seen from 
A's position) a virtual reality. It is not there yet, but it is, presumably, 
possible to create it. 
At the same time, this very confidence makes the project into much more 
than a merely virtual whole. It inspires actions in the here and now (at A 
in Figure 1.4) but also in the future and probably elsewhere too (see X, in 
Figure 1.4). It can and will also inform and inspire the actions of others, 
certainly if the project in question radiates sufficient authority and 
persuasion to create faith, to establish the necessary network (Xj-Q-Y,) in 
the future (C,). Hence, there is an essential balance between, on the one 
hand, what is new, what is unknown, what is still to be realised and, on 
the other, the thus far constructed set of resources and what is knowable 
and controllable. 
In other words, innovation is not the abrupt reorganisation of what exists 
(for an applied analysis, see Van der Ploeg 1993a). Here, innovation 
represents the art of creating something new by making as much use as 
possible of the existing (see, for example, Brush et al. 1981); however, it 
needs mentioning that the 'existing' does change, precisely because it is 
fitted into a new, relevant whole. Voilà, the paradox of the innovation 
process: the less virtual the networks, the higher the chance of creating 
them and, hence, new 'realities' (such as C,). The tension between 
possibility and reality is essential for the innovation process, but a careful 
'monitoring' of the tension is equally essential. Just like an elastic band, it 
cannot be allowed to break. 
At this very point, one of the central differences between 'modern' and 
'postmodern' constellations emerges (between Figure 1.1b and Figure 
1.1c). The definition of macroprojects (or 'megaprojects', following Scott's 
terms) by, and from the position of, one or more expert systems is crucial 
(see Figure 1.5). Such macroprojects are pre-eminently virtual. They are in 
principle disconnected from the identities, resources, projects, and 
networks that apply here and now (at moment X). Here the balance 
between what is virtual and what is real, so typical of the modern 
constellation, is largely if not completely absent. Hence the intended 
innovation can only take place as a comprehensive reorganisation. 
In this book, I will discuss such a macroproject at length: the 
reorganisation of agriculture according to the models developed in the 
expert system in and around agriculture. I use the metaphor of the virtual 
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farmer for this. The 'virtual farmer' is an image developed in the expert 
system. It concerns the farmer (or grower) as s /he should be and should 
function according to the assumptions that are axiomatic within this 
expert system. The same metaphor also refers to agriculture as a whole -
at least, as it should be - and to farms as they should be. 
The virtual farmer refers to the 'one order world', to the only conceivable, 
rational model towards which the actions of a wide range of actors, of 
government, of banks, of agro-industries, of farm men, of farm women, of 
advisory services and research centres and so on, need to be directed. 
Hence, the virtual farmer also defines a network, a virtual network. 
However, the latter network does not contain a balance between reality 
and possibility, it is completely virtual. It does not consist of the unfolding 
of the potentials contained in the current reality. On the contrary, a 
rupture emerges: the development opportunities are replaced by the new, 
virtual macroproject. This macroproject directs and sanctions the actions 
of various actors in and around the expert system in an almost coercive 
manner (see Figure 1.5), in such a way that, on the whole, the intended 
reorganisation materialises. Hence, the macroproject implies trust, the 
essential cement assumed in a constellation such as that sketched in 
Figure 1.5. A virtual network can only function by the grace of trust - that 
is, by the grace of faith in the prospect suggested by the expert system. 
Also, it can only function in so far as various unintended consequences of 
the macroproject can be controlled and/or externalised. 
Figure 1.5 The directive role of macroprojects 
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The realisation of a macroproject can only happen via and as a 
comprehensive reorganisation. This implies that variation and selection 
cannot happen via the multiple unfolding of various realities. Here 
selection is no longer part of the development process: selection becomes 
a one-off and occurs ex ante. 
Alongside macroprojects, other alternatives are implicitly or explicitly 
interpreted as inferior; and as undesirable, because the realisation of 
other, competing alternatives cannot but be an intrusion on the intended 
comprehensive reorganisation, reducing the efficiency of the operation as 
a whole. Similarly, a partial realisation of other opportunities refers to an 
insufficient degree of trust; the virtual network would be incomplete. In 
summary, variation is thus significantly reduced from the beginning. 
En passant, this points to the essential differences in scale. The intricate 
types of development, characteristic of the modern constellation, will be 
relatively small in scale because of the reasons briefly touched upon 
above, especially in the initial phase of conceiving, experimenting, and 
innovating. 
In a postmodern constellation, on the other hand, the realisation of 
macroprojects implies almost by definition a large scale. Not for nothing, 
system innovation has become a catchword. Various other implications 
arise from this difference in scale. I refer to two effects here. First, 
transformation costs will be very much higher, not only because of 
differences in scale but also because of the generally high degree of 
disconnection from the existing situation. The macroproject does not build 
upon the resources, networks, identities, and opportunities inherent in the 
existing situation (X) as described in Figure 1.5, but represents a rupture. 
Second, a 'democratic issue' of a completely new order emerges. 
Realisation of the macroproject leaves little opportunity for discussion 
and learning, whereas multiple unfolding provides more room for the 
insights and choices of the different actors themselves. While existing and 
virtual networks coincide within traditional constellations (because the 
future can only be imagined as repetition of the given) and while modern 
constellations consist of an undeniable tension, of a carefully managed 
balance between both types of networks, in postmodern constellations 
one finds the other extreme. Just as, in general terms, the future dominates 
the present, in a more specific sense, virtual networks come to dominate 
the current networks and practices. In agriculture, this becomes strikingly 
clear in the fact that those who define and materialise the future (the 
macroproject) are completely different actors than those who constitute 
the current relevant networks in and around agriculture. Alongside these 
complications, there is another, central, paradox. Conceptualising 
innovation is no longer difficult. The expert systems are well up to this 
job. On the other hand, realisation of the imagined innovations (the 
intended macroprojects) becomes one of the main, if not the central, 
problems. Here capability and incapability emerge again as two, closely 
related, themes. 
Finally, an observation about the often extreme degree of 'institutional 
clustering' arising in postmodern constellations in and around these 
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virtual networks. Innovation revolves, in essence, around the recognition, 
realisation, and utilisation of new possibilities. New possibilities (that 
currently do not exist but that could exist in future) are the pre-eminent 
resources in the postmodern constellation (one could say, with some 
irony, that resources too have become highly virtual). However, by way 
of large macroprojects, such as those developed by different expert 
systems, this future has already become highly parcelled out by the state. 
The future is divided into fields that are considered to be conceivable, 
realisable, and legitimate and into other fields that are considered to be 
inconceivable, unrealisable and illegitimate. 
Hence, in the postmodern constellation, the virtual network is highly 
institutionalised. With respect to various future projects (irrespective of 
their nature) particular government organisations function as 
gatekeepers. A constantly expanding set of rules and procedures is 
developed to this end. The realisation of different future projects 
(surfacing in civil society) is only possible in so far as they correspond 
with these procedures, in so far as they provide support for the 
gatekeeper, or, more generally, in so far as they are in line with prevailing 
macroprojects. 
From this point of view, the state is, above all, a complex machine that 
seeks to prevent its parts from entering (for whatever reason) into hasty 
arrangements: the meetings, the endless consultations, the mechanism of 
initialling (all divisions and departments involved have to agree), the 
mechanism of co-funding, the procedures and calendars all function to 
eliminate every possible deviation from the prevailing macroproject (and, 
at the same time, to orient all possible resources and networks towards 
the macroproject in question). 
The effects are threefold. First, the so-called transaction costs (the costs 
that have to be made to make something happen, to get something done) 
increase often to extreme levels. Second, the rules, procedures and 
gatekeeper functions often gain an independence that reaches far beyond 
the initial macroproject. It is possible for a macroproject to have long lost 
its meaning and importance, while the rules and procedures retain their 
own power. This can lead to grotesque events: important innovations 
remain unnoticed or are hindered. During the past ten years, I have 
witnessed extreme examples of this. Innovations that emerge outside of 
this expert system are regarded as suspect - as undesired competition, 
even if only in a symbolic sense. Hence, numerous potentially valuable 
innovations remain marginalised, restricted to the proverbial proportions 
of 'hidden novelties' (see Van Lente and Rip 1998). 
I came across a different expression of the same tension through the so-
called 'commissions of wise men' of which I was part several times 
(probably by mistake). Such commissions are generally launched in the 
Netherlands when implementation of the prevailing regulations leads to 
almost insoluble problems and conflicts between those involved. To a 
researcher, these commissions constitute an exceptional research method 
as well as an extraordinary learning experience. One of the things that I 
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have learned from them is that the solution, the way out of thorny 
problems (irrespective of whether they are concerned with the ammonia 
question in south-east Friesland, the national ecological network and the 
Gaasterland uprising,* or unemployment in the north of the country), is 
often very simple in theory (because it assumes at the most a flexible 
interpretation of rules and above all a clear focus on objectives). The 
complication lies in sidestepping the prevailing procedures, 
arrangements, and (bureaucratic) identities in ways that do not set a 
precedent or mean that the civil servants involved lose face. 
This takes me to a third complication. This is the 'democratic deficit' 
brought about by, and effectuated in, this procedure. The trias politica -
the separation of powers, at one time the basis of our polity - becomes 
increasingly lost as a result of the institutional clustering. Increasingly one 
and the same group of highly specialised and highly gifted civil servants 
are responsible for (i) developing the rules that regulate the workings 
within a particular socio-material domain (for example ammonia emission 
and deposition), (ii) providing for the 'right interpretation' of these rules, 
and (iii) deciding when the rules are violated, or not. In short, even 
though the term 'postmodern' constellation seems to suggest a more or 
less definite, or at least superior, mode of social ordering, as yet things do 
not function at all smoothly. 
The coordination of projects 
With a view to the empirical analysis of the differences discussed here 
between multiple processes of unfolding, on the one hand, and 
macroprojects, on the other, we need an adjusted vocabulary, a set of 
interrelated words and concepts, which, on the one hand, does justice to 
the outcome of events while, on the other hand, being fundamentally non-
determinist (Knorr-Cetina 1996). 
One of the concepts of great importance here is agenda-setting (Rhodes 
and Marsh 1992; Baumgartner 1993; Kingdon 1995; Just 1998). That is, 
defining the situation, specifying problems, indicating directions for 
solutions, and hence identifying the resources that have to be mobilised in 
order to implement the intended solutions. 
Agenda-setting is not a neutral activity. Crucial issues are who is to join in 
the discussions, and who will be excluded. Joining in the discussions 
provides the opportunity to influence the agenda: It gives authority and, 
conversely, only authoritative persons are invited to join in the 
discussions. As such, an agenda represents authority. An institutionalised 
agenda influences the thinking and acting of others - even when there are 
no face-to-face relationships; in that case we can only speak of 'control 
from a distance'. 
* Translator's note: The realisation of the national ecological network was initially imagined 
as a massive expropriation of farm land in order for it to be converted into a nature reserve. 
In Gaasterland, the entire population (including the non-agricultural population) protested 
against and effectively blocked this approach. 
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What is authority? Authority, you could say, represents insight into, and 
overview of, the relevant whole - that is, knowledgeability and capability. 
For this reason, and also because of the related capability to subsequently 
arrange events according to this insight and overview, we can define 
authority as a type of agency. It is not, however, an arbitrary type of 
agency but rather one that is generally recognised. Again, this makes clear 
that agency is not an individual attribute. It emerges in and is brought 
about by networks. 
Control over and mobilisation of resources deserve - as do agenda-
setting, authority, and networks - a prominent place in the vocabulary 
with which structuring or ordering of social practices can be understood 
in a non-determinist sense. However, it is essential that resources are not 
taken at face value. 
Speaking straightforwardly, a certain area of land, a number of cows, a 
shed with adjacent buildings, a certain number of labourers (or whatever) 
do not represent resources, either intrinsically or collectively. Material 
and/or social elements become resources only in the case of a more or less 
explicit model, in which they are congruently forged together into a 
working and sufficiently promising whole, into a solution, a vision, an 
expectation. 
Such a vision or solution ('how to achieve goals', following Anderson and 
Carlos) also represents authority in the above-mentioned sense. It 
represents authority if it (i) concerns the relevant whole, (ii) puts 
something into perspective, and (iii) is recognised as such by a sufficient 
number of actors. 
Defining boundaries is an element that needs separate attention. It is 
partly implicit in the definition of problems that follows from agenda-
setting. Determining the boundaries is also closely linked to the question 
who does and who does not join in the discussion about the agenda. The 
same applies to the other elements. Take authority, for instance; authority 
is not limitless. Authority always applies vis-à-vis a more or less defined 
territory; outside of which apply the remarks: 'What's it to you?', 'What 
do you know?' Boundaries are crucial. They are also constantly subject to 
dispute, negotiation, and renegotiation. Boundaries mark inclusion and 
exclusion. But again, this repeatedly concerns exclusion and/or inclusion 
vis-à-vis something. This applies perhaps pre-eminently to the presented 
solution, which must be defined as superior in comparison to other 
trajectories, by way of a clearly defined boundary. 
Agenda-setting, authority, resources, solutions, boundaries - these are all 
concepts that mutually define each another. Without the other terms, each 
concept on its own becomes an isolated and therefore meaningless notion. 
Collectively, these concepts refer to an actor-network (or a socio-technical 
network). Within this network, agendas, authority, solutions, and so on 
follow naturally from one another. It is the essence of a network to 
produce a high degree of congruence. 
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A typical feature of the period of modernisation is the emergence of 
complex constellations characterised by a multitude of networks that 
operate alongside one another, but which also partly overlap and partly 
compete with one another. In other words, there are multiple structures, 
and therefore variation and selection; hence, the ordering of a highly 
heterogeneous world. 
Why? I will confine myself to one or two observations. Compared to the 
traditional world, agenda-setting became increasingly desacralised in the 
modern world. Priests, elders, and nobles lost their power and control. 
People themselves were increasingly looking for solutions and answers. 
New forms of authority were acquired in the process and, again, became 
institutionalised. 
Another example concerns the value of what is tried and true (the Jean 
Auel formula). Confronted with the decreasing importance of local 
authority and with the emergence of new, at first seemingly imperative 
parameters such as markets and technology, many farmers redefined 
their solutions in their own, often original, ways, hence giving rise to a 
whole gamut of farming styles. Of necessity, they crossed the boundaries 
of the tested and true and developed various, contrasting, sometimes 
complementary, sometimes competitive solutions, each of which 
represented a search. 
The preconditions for such a development are also clear, at least in 
retrospect. Again, I confine myself to a few considerations. The first 
concerns the degree of institutional clustering. Or rather, its absence. Far-
reaching institutional clustering can, as I argued above, nip many, if not 
all, innovations in the bud. In this context, it is telling that calls for 
"protected spaces" are heard (Kemp et al. 1997; Kemp et al. 1998; Van 
Lente and Rip 1998) in the very situations that are characterised by a high 
degree of institutional clustering. A second essential precondition 
concerns the necessary self-confidence. A third concerns the required 
design capacity, the art of creating new solutions and new development 
opportunities (see further Chapters 2,3, and 4). 
1.3 Actors, projects, co-production, convergence, and distantiation 
In the beautifully written introduction to Organising Modernity, John Law 
describes projects as 'self-reflexive strategies for patterning the network of 
the social' (1994, p. 20), a description which captures the meanings of 
agency, virtual networks and their interrelations. At the same time, Law 
describes these strategies as modes of ordering, as the mechanisms that 
shape social life. This underlines that these modes of ordering do indeed 
work via the future, precisely because they are the expression of the 
reflexive strategies that constitute networks. 
In Chapter 3 of this book, I will discuss in detail the farming styles in 
Dutch agriculture as modes of ordering, as forms of unfolding that also 
contain a highly strategic and, therefore, reflexive component. In 
anticipation of that discussion and partly building upon the previous 
section, I want to make one issue clear here. No direct one-to-one relation 
can be assumed between a mode of ordering and the practices that 
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emerge from it. The decisive element is the interaction between various 
modes of ordering. 
As indicated previously (in part as a result of Figure 1.4), the presence, 
interaction, synergy, and tensions between various, sometimes even 
conflicting, modes of ordering must always be anticipated in the 
construction of a network. The outcome of this process is, in principle, 
indefinable. Strategies and projects will be adjusted - that is, unfolded in a 
particular way - to enable interlocking of and/or distantiation from other 
projects, strategies, and modes of ordering. Considered thus, a network 
('for patterning the social') is, above all, a particular set of modes of 
ordering linked together or defined vis-à-vis one another. 
In the process of constituting and developing such networks as a set of 
interrelated projects, interfaces are crucial. This concept, largely 
developed by my colleague Long, refers in essence to discontinuities, to 
issues and social relations that do not necessarily follow on from one 
another (Long 1989; Long and Long 1992). 
The idea grew from another concept: linkages. A different research group 
(from Leiden University) developed this concept to explain how various 
issues and relations are constantly forged together by linkages, 
originating from their (supposedly) underlying structural patterns. The 
Wageningen reaction to this, most imaginatively expressed by Long, was 
that it was not so much the unproblematic linkages that should be the 
focus of attention, but rather the incapability to combine various issues 
and relations (i.e. the problematic linkages). 
Thus, interface analysis was born - that is, the study of both 
discontinuities and the, above all, unpredictable and often difficult to 
grasp ways in which translations sometimes emerge at the level of 
interface - translations that, in turn, produce a highly ordering effect, 
even though it is not chosen by anybody as such. 
'Interface studies are essentially concerned with the analysis of discontinuities 
in social life. Such discontinuities are characterised by discrepancies in values, 
interests, knowledge and power. Interfaces typically occur at points where 
different, and often conflicting, 'life-worlds ' or social fields intersect. More 
concretely, they characterise social situations . . . wherein the interactions 
between actors become oriented around the problem of devising ways of 
'bridging', accommodating to, or struggling against each others' different 
social and cognitive worlds ' (Long 1989, p. 232). 
The development of a project implies risks, which are largely related to 
the question whether the required connections with other projects can be 
established. Considerable risks exist on and around the interfaces. Heavy 
investments are often required in the creation of concrete agreements. The 
withdrawal of one actor can imply a major disappointment. Realisation of 
possibilities that have thus far not been taken advantage of is risky, for the 
individual actors involved in the construction of a new network, and for 
all of those involved as a whole. 
Risks are perceived in various ways. If the realisation of a certain project 
presupposes a considerable input of external capital - that is, the 
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association with an external financier - this introduces a perspective in 
which the relation between opportunities and risks are decisively 
different from when this does not apply. External funding implies a 
particular way of valuing invested capital - that is, as an increase in the 
value of invested capital. This entails particular criteria: it forces the actors 
involved to develop their project in a particular way - that is, to extend 
certain possibilities, to curtail or exclude other possibilities, to enter into 
certain coalitions, to rule out others. Such 'coercion' will apply less if one 
can use one's own resources and if other forms of valuation can be 
chosen. 
Financial capital wields a highly conservative influence: it 'forces' the 
development and utilisation of new possibilities into the mainstream of 
established projects and their related interests and visions. It corkscrews 
new plans towards dominant constellations and towards their associated 
certainties. These constellations seem to offer trust, the (supposed) 
certainty that there is no, or a lesser degree of, risk. Related interests are 
reproduced via the chain of risk avoidance, the search for certainty and 
dominant visions. Capital, in the Marxist sense, represents power and 
dominance, but not for intrinsic reasons. Capital retains its dominance 
because it is repeatedly used as a guiding compass in the process of 
project development. 
There are, of course, other ways to develop and realise a project: 
1 by using resources that do not need to be used as capital in the narrow 
sense of financial capital; 
2 by using other calculi, with a broader range of values; 
3 by structuring the development process differently (for example, step 
by step as opposed to all at once). 
Agency is crucial in the development and realisation of projects. In this 
context, I understand agency to be the capability to create the required 
interrelations with other projects. In other words, the capability to 
recognise, to utilise, to bridge, or to reconceptualise discontinuities as 
essential demarcations. Insight into the interaction between intended 
plans, the interaction between presupposed positions, actions, reactions, 
outcomes, benefits, costs, and their allocation is decisive in this. 
Therefore, agency is the capability to create virtual congruence: 
congruence that does not yet exist (or is not yet necessary), but which is 
decisive for the future of the projects under discussion. To create future 
congruence, coordination in the here and now becomes decisive: the 
required congruence is achieved by way of coordinating various 
development projects vis-à-vis each other. Failure to do so results in 
incongruence. Fragility is therefore a term that should be part of any 
analysis of social developments, because the effective construction of 
congruence and coherence is probably the exception in real life. In view of 
the many possible discontinuities, risks, and incapabilities, failure seems 
to be more likely than success. This applies more strongly when it 
concerns innovations and the more so when it concerns deviations from 
the institutionalised patterns and regularities. The search for and 
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extension of such 'deviations', however necessary when established 
patterns go wrong, is and remains particularly fragile. 
An example 
In the autumn of 1998 the Friese Ecologische Zuivelfabriek (FEZ, Frisian 
Organic Dairy Products) was opened in Drachten. However, the real, the 
essential, innovation is not the building and inauguration of this factory, 
but the preceding rearrangement of projects vis-à-vis one another. 
Numerous projects were at issue here: those of the many organic dairy 
farmers (about 80 in Friesland at the time) who at the time had to have 
their milk processed beyond the provincial borders; furthermore there 
was the, shall we say, potential project of an unknown number of dairy 
farmers considering a changeover to organic production, but confronted 
by a series of questions. These questions all related to the future actions of 
others. They raised many uncertainties: will consumer demand grow 
sufficiently to support the higher supply levels and maintain higher 
prices? Will the cost increases related to producing organically exceed the 
benefits? Will the profits of the organic circuit become increasingly 
extracted by those controlling large-scale processing (that is, the owners of 
the new organic dairy factory)? Is it possible, if the intended project (the 
changeover to organic dairy production) appears set to fail, to fall back on 
the existing patterns (specifically: will it be possible to rejoin Friesland 
Coberco Dairy Foods, the largest and, by now, sole processor of milk in 
the north of the country)? 
The initiators (who intended to build the FEZ) also had an almost infinite 
series of questions, which again were related to the future actions of 
others. Will sufficient dairy farmers want to change over and supply the 
new plant? If not, there will be underproduction and losses. 
If the new project to establish processing and marketing units is 
successful, will the big brothers (the established dairy companies) 
subsequently decide to invest in this new area and attempt to outcompete 
the FEZ? Will consumers accept the scale increase of production, 
processing, and marketing? And is it possible to realise a reduction in the 
consumer price through this scale increase (and the subsequent cut in, for 
example, logistical costs), without having to lower the farm gate price? 
Alongside consumers, who buy organic products for reasons of principle, 
will new groups decide to purchase because of the lower price (although 
still higher than the price of non-organic products)? To what extent will 
supermarket chains co-operate? Will financiers (banks) want to co-operate 
in the realisation of the intended project? And to what extent can new 
government projects, such as green funding, be used in order to win the 
financiers over and/or to present better conditions? 
It is clear that - even though we have only discussed some of the actors 
involved - their projects, and the many questions and uncertainties 
surrounding those projects, cover an almost infinite sea of possibilities. If 
each actor has at their disposal X alternatives of future action and there 
are N actors in question, X is raised to the nth power. In the case of 8 
actors (organic dairy farmers, farmers considering a changeover, the 
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initiators of the FEZ, the conventional dairy companies, consumers, 
banks, supermarket chains, government) who each have, say, 5 
alternatives for action at their disposal, there are almost 400,000 (390,625 
to be exact) possible final constellations, the majority of which will be 
characterised by a sometimes high degree of incongruity. 
Only in a limited number of cases will there be congruence, a 'working 
whole' (Roep, 2000) functioning properly and, indeed, generating the 
expected results and distributing them in such a way that there will be 
continuity. 
To be able to operate in this sea of uncertainty (that is, to be able to 
actually realise innovations), it is essential for all relevant actors to choose 
or develop their alternatives for action in such a way (to have their 
projects evolve in such a way) that real interweaving and mutual 
reinforcement emerges. Projects should be integrated into the working 
whole; a working whole that does not yet exist, but which (still) needs to 
be realised. In other words, it concerns an (increasingly concrete) 
expectation that will structure the doings of the actors involved (as 
expressed by the slightly abject, but still frequently used phrase that 'they 
have to be of one mind'). 
In the creation of this expectation (this interpretation of a new working 
whole), an essential role is played by agenda-setting, integration, 
boundary definition (who will be involved?, in which ways?, how to keep 
negative and disintegrating forces at a distance?), and scale (what level of 
co-operation and how many participants are needed to define the 
'working whole'?). The more convincing answers, solutions, and 
prospects are generated with respect to integration, definition, and scale, 
the more convincing the presented course through the sea of uncertainty 
will become (precisely because the uncertainties and their associated risks 
become eliminated step by step). 
In fact, the thus presented degree of complexity returns at least twice. For 
even though it is possible to conciliate a working whole, it will actually 
have to be constructed subsequently. The seemingly real possibility will 
have to be realised. This is only possible if the participants effectively 
devote themselves to its realisation. If they do not - if in the interim they 
withdraw or they adjust their projects in a non-congruent way - it can still 
go completely wrong. Thus, the trouble experienced by other participants 
will appear in vain: it will reveal itself as a cost with no return. Hence, 
fragility needs to be considered. 
Furthermore, a solution (whichever one) will have to contain a sufficient 
degree of acceptability: there will have to be an acceptable balance 
between advantages and disadvantages, between benefits and costs. If it 
appears that free riders can rake in an unequal share of the benefits 
without sharing the costs of the whole, this may provoke extensive 
desertion. The same will occur if some partners have to carry a more than 
equal share of the costs. 
The uncertainties in question are largely related to the expectations of the 
actors involved with regard to the future actions of other, similarly 
involved, actors. What will the others do? And to what extent will I be 
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able to influence their projects? Or rather, to what extent can the 
developments of my project and that of the others be integrated so as to 
create co-evolution? How can fragility be reduced? How can the required 
acceptability be achieved? 
These are weighty questions, especially if one realises that neither 
hierarchy nor the autonomous development of market relations provide 
an obvious answer and/or a smoothly functioning mechanism for the 
construction of such an answer. 
Why and how was co-evolution constructed in this particular case? I will 
only mention a few elements here (and discuss this issue more generally 
in Chapter 9). A first important element was the increasing pressure from 
supermarket chains on the large dairy companies to offer a range of 
organic products alongside their conventional ranges. Given the 
hesitation of these dairy companies to independently start a separate line 
for processing of organic milk, a coalition between the initiators of the 
FEZ and the large dairies became increasingly obvious. The latter 
eventually participated in 33 per cent of the financing of the FEZ; more 
importantly, they also declared that their suppliers were allowed to 
change over to the FEZ without having to pay withdrawal fines; 
furthermore, the suppliers would have the right to rejoin the companies in 
question within three years if FEZ's results were disappointing. 
This clearly indicates a package deal: participation in the FEZ and hence 
being able to satisfy the desires of the supermarket chains became 
possible by offering good conditions to the potential suppliers. Thus, 
various projects became interwoven; they were combined into the 
indispensable connections upon which the new working whole had to be 
based. As a result of this package deal, which was definitely not 
undisputed, a number of other positive effects occurred relating to 
distribution and its costs. If lorries of the large companies stop at the FEZ, 
supermarkets could be supplied with a wide range (including organic 
products) from one lorry-load. 
In early 1999 I had a long conversation with Henk Brouwer, initiator and 
current director of the FEZ. Looking back he says; 
'Yes, you do indeed set out with grave uncertainties, and you want to move 
towards more certainty. But of course you never achieve this ...Ifl look back, 
it was mainly faith that grew in the start-up phase. Faith on both sides and 
also faith in one's own abilities, to the extent that you dare to take risks. You 
need faith, commitment of all those who will become involved in such a chain, 
of farmers, financiers, retailers, the whole lot. This faith will in turn give you 
the feedback that you 're on the right track. ' 
Here I want to bring forward a number of elements that played an 
important role in the creation of this faith (and therefore in the 
construction of the FEZ as a new socio-technical network). I do this 
especially because these elements are in sharp contrast with the way in 
which expert systems usually operate and also because those same 
elements sometimes represent a somersault through past, present, and 
future. 
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A first element concerns the goals. While expert systems (at least the 
agricultural knowledge network that I will discuss in detail in Chapter 6) 
usually arrive at a clear indication of objectives, to subsequently 
implement these via standard planning techniques (which create en 
passant the required prescriptiveness and verifiability; cf. Christis 1985), a 
completely different approach applied to the creation of the FEZ: 
'You have to know which way you want to go, you '11 have to be very clear 
about it, but otherwise your more concrete goal is something that emerges 
slowly as something that you work towards. Most important is to define the 
margins, to drive pickets into the ground. Those margins or boundaries are V-
shaped as it were, they take you closer to where you want to be . . . Yes, of 
course it's true that you adjust your objectives along the way. I wanted much 
more at first, and other things too. ' 
In other words, the goal around which the necessary set of partners (the 
virtual network) groups itself, is not well-defined. In fact, it is precisely the 
other way round: an at first loosely organised network is gradually 
working towards a set of shared objectives. Partners will drop out, new 
partners will join. Meanwhile, the possible goals become more and more 
sharply defined, hence creating faith on both sides. 
Network and strategy consolidate each other to the same extent. Neither 
one is a function of the other. Henk Brouwer is very outspoken about this: 
'In the beginning you 're swimming against the tide. I have had some problems 
addressed -for example, where roughly the break-even point would be. It gives 
you some idea, and then you can again determine where the margins are, 
where the pickets have to go; and thus the end goal gradually takes more shape 
[agenda-setting and particularly agenda-building appear as key factors here]. 
No, the planning approach with one well-defined goal from the start, from 
which you have to reason backwards - it doesn't work like that. Yes, that's the 
way the large organisations deal with things, but not surprisingly that's how 
they kill everything off. The Investment and Development Company for the 
Northern Netherlands [Noordelijke Ontwikkelings Maatschappij] wanted 
me to do that, but it was impossible of course. That's how they set up a 
dictatorship, they dictate things, they issue a diktat, but things work the other 
way round. ' 
A second important element was, so I understand from Henk Brouwer's 
story, the introduction of clear rules of the game on the basis of which the 
required network (however virtual at first!) could be demarcated and 
consolidated: 
'Farmers, processors, and the trade, and the others too, they all had to benefit 
from it. ' 
Hence, the foundation was laid for the actual interlocking of various 
projects, which occurred much later. 
But more rules were developed: 
'Sooner or later you'll have to make it clear that it will continue, with or 
without the other. ' 
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Here emerges what I pointed at previously: authority. And related to this: 
the moment at which involvement (of the other partners) becomes a 
choice, whether or not to actively contribute and devote themselves to the 
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cause. 
Furthermore, there is a third element, the combination of autonomy and 
fallback position. The most important resources were to a large extent 
controlled by the initiators. Here I refer not so much to financial resources 
(which partly evolved from the sale of a considerable share of the quotas 
of their former dairy farms), but above all to immaterial resources, such as 
the capability to (in all likelihood) actually manage the required socio-
technical network (to actually supply retailers with a high-quality and 
organic product, to actually have retailers commit themselves, to actually 
have a number of producers supply organic milk, etc.). 
Agency, not in an abstract but rather in a concrete sense, reveals itself here 
as resource par excellence. In obtaining this agency, the aforementioned 
start-up phase (in which a network emerged, expectations were adjusted 
vis-à-vis one another, faith emerged) was a sine qua non. Without wanting 
to go into detail, the availability of a fallback position ('if it had gone 
wrong, it wouldn't have been the end of the world') was important in the 
creation of this indispensable precondition. 
An organic dairy factory has now been established in Drachten, despite 
being initially regarded by various expert systems (the 'Eindhoven' office 
of the Rabobank, the large dairy companies,38 and the Ministry of 
Agriculture) as unthinkable and/or unfeasible. The creation of this 
factory is exceptional in that it illustrates the realisation of agency in a 
context characterised by and also controlled by expert systems that 
increasingly rule out such agency. 
I will return to this in more general terms in Chapter 9 of this book: 
current and countercurrent are the keywords there. It goes without saying 
that all this is closely related to the question about the interrelations 
between various ordering principles, and to questions about who and 
what will create the future, which conditions will have to be met, and 
what its legitimacy will be. 
1.4 Agriculture as empirical object 
In this book, I want to investigate the implications of the reversals as 
represented in Figure 1.1. I will do this on the basis of recent 
developments in Dutch agriculture. Where possible, I will turn to Frisian 
agriculture - not to confine myself unnecessarily but to introduce some 
form of continuity and consistency between the various storylines and 
themes. 
Agriculture as a particular empirical phenomenon presents complications, 
but also a certain advantage. The advantage can be described easily. The 
search for and creation of congruence and consistency within projects 
(between the natural and the social) as well as between projects, the 
subsequent complexity of the coordination issue, and the sometimes 
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inclusive, at other times radical, nature of the variation and selection 
processes make their presence felt more in agriculture than in other areas. 
Why? In agriculture, there is always and everywhere an enormous 
number of actors. There are now about 110,000 farms in the Netherlands, 
involving more than 300,000 workers. (Incidentally, the number of farms 
is part of the problem, as I will explain at the end of Chapter 7). 
Furthermore, there is an immense agribusiness: a set of enterprises 
supplying commodities and services to the primary sector. A further 
250,000 workers are involved in this. 
In contrast to various other sectors, this complex and variegated whole, 
this multitude of projects, cannot and does not allow itself to be managed 
like a command economy. Coordination is essential, particularly in and 
around agriculture. In addition, present, past, and future fall continuously 
on top of each other, sometimes in the most bizarre ways. This makes 
contemporary agriculture such a fertile, yet difficult, empirical territory 
for the issues under scrutiny here. 
Two issues should be clarified from the outset. They concern the relation 
between the words and the things, and between things. 
There once was a time when it was felt that the Netherlands were 20 years 
behind the rest of the world - Germany acted as the most direct point of 
reference. Similarly, agriculture and the countryside were seen as being 20 
years behind the rest of society, i.e. the city. All in all, this does not do 
agriculture and the countryside much good. It is hard to imagine them 
without the stigmas of slowness and tradition, of reluctance and 
resistance to adopt that which has been widely accepted elsewhere for 
some time. Incidents, discussions, images, and events that seem to 
support such an interpretation are not difficult to find. 
What needs to be stated clearly and resolutely is that the agricultural 
sector is often more modern, progressive, dynamic, and innovative than 
the rest of society. Not forty years behind but in some ways ten, 
sometimes thirty years ahead. However, this applies (let me dampen the 
fun at once) not only in a positive sense but also in a negative one. 
In the conventional view of agriculture, the countryside is seen as 
intrinsically traditional and conservative. While the rest of society had 
thrown off the shackles of the past, the modernisation project only began 
to become defined in agriculture in the late 1950s. Backwardness rules, 
certainly if we realise that at the end of the 20th century things have still 
not been put right. 
In this conventional image, the relation between the words and the things 
is completely amiss, persistently amiss. For, even though these are 
established self-evident habits, or an institutionalised view, it has to be 
stated that the relationship between the notions employed and the 
practices grasped and interpreted with these notions suffers on all sides. 
Of course, there is tradition in the rich and complex agricultural history of 
the Netherlands. However, there is no absolute traditionalism, in the 
sense of conservatism and stagnation. This has been demonstrated in the 
diligent work of agricultural sociologists and historians. The seeds of 
progress slumbered in the bowels of tradition. 
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Certainly in the 19th and 20th centuries, a comprehensive process of 
modernisation took place, spurred on and driven by the peasants of the 
time. I will discuss this more in detail in Chapter 2 of this book. Tradition 
and progress, conservatism and progressiveness do not constitute 
opposites. As I will stress, each needs the other. The balance between the 
two is essential (Terron 1984). 
The great modernisation project became defined at the end of the 1950s. I 
will discuss this at length in this book. However, the principal issue is 
that, again, the word was wrong from the beginning. It is not true that 
agriculture only started to modernise from that moment onward. It had 
been modernising for a long time. Looking back, one cannot but say that 
this so-called modernisation project was definitely not what was expected 
and suggested at the time (nor later): to finish once and for all with 
tradition, to finish once and for all with the rural as consistently 
backward. 
The agricultural modernisation project of 1950 - 1990 was one of the first 
great megaprojects realised in the Netherlands. It was not an adjustment 
of a past that was moving too slowly, it was a universal operation in 
which the future was made to dominate the past and the present. All in 
all, the so-called modernisation project in agriculture was (and is) an 
'undercover megaproject'. It was not the beginning of modernisation in 
agriculture, it was about the forced implementation of another 
modernisation path than the path or trajectory followed up to then. 
However, the particularities of this modernisation path remained 
undiscussed, for it seemed to be about modernisation tout court. 
The gradually manifesting chaos of the undercover megaproject should be 
thought through and included in the planning and assessment of the 
megaprojects that are now (forty years later) being defined in society at 
large. There is a case for the thesis that expert systems and macroprojects 
are almost inevitable in contemporary society - at least with regard to 
certain issues. What is fascinating about agricultural modernisation as a 
macroproject, however, is that it was unnecessary, certainly from a 
comparative perspective. We would have had a different kind of 
agriculture - probably of a better kind, maybe of a worse kind. However, 
it is impossible to maintain that agriculture and the countryside would 
have vanished without the great modernisation project. This knowledge 
prompts a critical examination of the ways in which expert systems 
operate and intervene in the organisation of time, space, and social 
practices. 
So much for the relationship between the words and the things, the social 
constellations and terms with which we interpret and understand them. 
As I stated previously, the social sciences try to understand every 
constellation using the vocabulary and the regularities of the previous 
constellation. This applies a fortiori to agriculture. As if by natural law, the 
things and the essentials of the periods in question are invariably 
interpreted and understood wrongly. 
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The next issue is the relationships between things. What is fascinating, but 
also confusing, about the world of agriculture is that there are no 
separations between periods and phases. Even though there are 
noticeable shifts in emphasis, overlap and mutual influence predominate 
rather than clear boundaries. In the traditional phase or constellation (see 
Figure 1.1a) agriculture was already modernising rapidly. And during the 
decades in which the process of modernising had become dominant (as 
represented in Figure 1.1b) a megaproject, confusingly named 
'modernisation project' was developed and implemented. This was in fact 
an expression of the 'postmodern' operation of expert systems avant la 
lettre (see Figure 1.1c). More accurately, the moment when the past finally 
seemed to lose its straitjacket, two new, unequal but interconnected, 
developments emerged. 
On the one hand, modernity, which had already been hidden in the 
bowels of traditionalism, made its entry. Building upon experiences, 
practices, and resources, which had all been handed down through 
history, multiple developments were initiated resulting in a variegated 
morphology, in a wide range of farming styles, each one equipped with a 
particular future project, an attempt to develop its own practice (that is, its 
own farm and set of relations into which it is woven) corresponding most 
closely to its own wishes, insights, interests, capabilities, and limitations. 
Even though the term would be used only much later in the social 
sciences, one could say that agency increasingly flourished from this 
moment onwards. More or less at the same time, a countermovement was 
defined, for an expert system was created through which farm 
development was represented as a uniform process. 
It follows clearly from the previous explanation that the phases I 
described above cannot be regarded as consecutive, let alone as well-
defined periods. They are ordering principles, ways of relating past, 
present, and future in and through social practices. Analytically, one can 
attempt to define certain basic patterns vis-à-vis each other; empirically, 
however, one will always encounter different and mutually conflicting 
principles, sometimes dominated by the one, sometimes by the other. 
Recent agrarian history is usually narrated in terms of necessity and 
inevitability. The development of agriculture is, to coin a phrase, 
structurally determined. Agricultural development has taken place in a 
particular way; it could not have happened differently. The development 
that took place over the past decades informs us about underlying forces. 
These forces will also, and probably more than ever before, determine the 
panorama of the agriculture of the future. 
The structuring moment is located in various 'bodies': in the coercive 
forces recognisable in the market sphere; in the ongoing technological 
development; in the complete modernisation of our societies, which 
leaves neither the agricultural sector nor the countryside unaffected; 
and/or in the sphere of politics. The latter body is usually understood in 
terms of reflex, in terms of an intermediary between the underlying 
economic, technological, and cultural changes. 
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In this narrative style, the future of agriculture emerges as a story that 
'can be told in advance', as a story that is, as it were, the inevitable 
outcome of a script contained within the major structuring forces - forces 
that applied to the past and that will also determine the future. 
Later on in this book, I will discuss this (ever evolving) script at length. 
English colleagues sometimes characterise this by the fine expression 'the 
race to the bottom'. Agricultural development acts in this script as a 
process that occurs inevitably via a combination of scale enlargement and 
rural exodus: less and less farmers, while the surviving farms become 
larger and larger. Similarly, a continuous industrialisation of the 
interaction with the living world (of 'co-production') is therefore 
inevitable. One glimpse of the 'bottom' is provided by the frequently 
produced scenario studies, which speak of a Europe in which 75 - 80 per 
cent of rural areas have become superfluous to food production. Similar 
figures apply to the farming population (WRR 1992). In other scenario 
studies, with regard to the Dutch dairy industry, farms are mentioned 
that carry 1,000 cows (LEI/SC 1996). This would imply only one and a 
half farms surviving in every rural municipality in the Netherlands. 
The 'virtual farmer' acts as the pivot of this script, or rather of all these 
foresight studies. He (she is hardly mentioned) orients the organisation 
and development of his farm to the laws of market and technology. These 
'laws', which are constantly made explicit by the expert system, allow no 
other course of action than the race to the bottom. 
In this book, I attempt to develop a different narrative, a different view. I 
will demonstrate that there is no structural development, no inevitable 
race to the bottom. Nor is there a 'virtual farmer', as posited by the 
knowledge system - and where the sorcerer's apprentice does succeed 
there is the devil and all to pay. 
In other words, this book is an attempt to narrate the story of farmers, 
agriculture and the countryside in a different way than is by now 
customary. This conventional story is largely spanned by a number of 
axioms, by, in other words, a number of institutionalised cognitive 
models. They concern, inter alia, the farmer as agricultural entrepreneur 
and the behaviour that he (or she) should therefore display. They also 
concern the processes that are supposed to characterise the sector as a 
whole: structural development, rural exodus, and the dynamising role of 
the agricultural expert system. Furthermore, there are axioms concerning 
the real nature of farming. Above all there are a number of deeply rooted 
and widely shared ideas about the future of agriculture. Collectively, 
these axioms span a world-view (one could almost say a 'paradigm') that 
I will characterise here by the metaphor of the 'virtual farmer'. This 
world-view is deceptively consistent. The concepts within it keep 
presupposing and (re-)confirming each other. To support the logic, the 
inherent truth, of one axiom it suffices to refer simply to one, or a few, of 
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the other axioms. However, on the whole this is not even necessary. 
Axioms are self-evident because: 
1 they are shared by nearly everyone; that is, 
2 they are hardly ever disputed; and 
3 neither are they interrupted by a 'stubborn empirical reality', precisely 
because the same axioms constitute the frame for the perception and 
the ordering of this reality; hence 
4 they span a 'universe of the undisputed': a universe of things that are 
the way they are because they can only be the way they are. 
All this is emphasised by those who do dispute this universe: sooner or 
later they are exposed as charlatans? 
However high the theoretical and communicative consistencies, the 
problem is that this set of axioms no longer corresponds to reality. This 
need not be a problem if it were not that, first, policy-making, 
implementation, and evaluation are consistently informed from the point 
of view of the virtual farmer, and, second, the same image is a heavy 
burden on the urgent search for new alternatives for an agriculture that is 
partly deadlocked within these axioms. 
The axioms, which I will further define and unravel in this book, share 
above all the common feature that they specify the agriculture of the 
future. They tell a story about the direction in which agriculture should 
move. That story is not told, however, in terms of opportunities inherent 
in the current reality (see Figure 1.1b). It concerns one necessary and 
inevitable future (Figure 1.1c). This may seem unlikely - the point is, 
however, that this one future is supported by a series of iron laws 
contained in the past and the present. The axioms that I will analyse in 
this book refer to two aspects: they define history thus far as the inevitable 
unfolding of structural patterns, after which the future is represented as 
the perfecting of such a process of unfolding. 
The cognitive monopoly of the expert system is crucial here. There is only 
one actor, only one institution, capable of knowing the patterns and hence 
the future: the expert system in and around agriculture. An expert system 
that is increasingly forged into a unity, also in organisational terms. 
Somos lo que vamos a ser, we are on our way to the future. Future-oriented 
acting makes us what we are, especially because so many different 
options, roads, interests, and identities are at issue in working towards 
the future. In the agricultural sector (but probably also elsewhere), 
however, the future has increasingly been parcelled out, completed, and 
allocated beforehand by the expert systems, which specialise in this 
activity. And the more the expert systems appropriate the future, the 
firmer their hold on the 'existence' of those involved, in this case, inter 
alia, Dutch farmers. All their actions are increasingly conditioned and 
ordered by the future, which is monopolised by expert systems. Hence, 
the former are governed by the latter via the future. 
This book is a critique of the expert system, of the semi-coherent whole 
constituted by the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and 
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Fisheries (LNV, ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij), 
Wageningen University, Dienst Landbouwkundig Onderzoek (DLO, 
Agricultural Research Institute) and other research institutes, parts of the 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment (VROM, 
ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer), Dienst 
Landbouwvoorlichting (DLV, Agricultural Advisory Service, now privatised 
as DLV Adviesgroep NV), parts of the provincial authorities - in short, by 
the complex set that interacts with the agricultural sector on the basis of 
real or assumed knowledge. 
I am part of the expert system, in a somewhat contradictory way. 
Pleasure, curiosity, and passion connect me to this larger whole. Yet at the 
same time I often experience disbelief, rage, and disturbance at its 
shortcomings. In any event, I feel no false obligation to be loyally silent. It 
is rather my right and my duty (in that respect, I take my job in an old-
fashioned way) to criticise when necessary, especially when others are 
hardly, or not at all, able to do so. 
However, let there be no misunderstanding. For - even if I am aware of 
the conventional classification systems on the shop floor, which divide the 
components of the expert systems into categories such as 'twits', 
'eccentrics', 'dimwits', 'barons', and 'simpletons' (a complex world!) - I 
argue strongly that we generally deal with very capable and driven 
people. The failure of the expert system, which I discuss in this book, does 
not concern the qualities of the people involved. What is fundamentally 
wrong is the way in which we organise and apply knowledge. That is all 
this book is about. Nothing else. 
1.5 Storylines 
The theme has been clearly defined by now. Five distinctively different 
storylines can be identified within the described framework. The 
storylines interweave and interconnect in places. In other places I attempt 
to develop first this, then another, storyline independently. 
The first storyline concerns agriculture as a complex practice - as a 
carefully coordinated unit comprising (i) the mobilisation of resources, (ii) 
the conversion of resources into end products, and (iii) the sale of these 
end products. 
The mobilisation of resources is discussed in Chapter 2 in particular. 
There I point out how, via a lengthy and complex emancipation process, 
the mobilisation of resources (land, capital, labour, knowledge, water, 
tools, etc.) is actively withdrawn from the influence of markets. This 
distantiation from markets at the input side of the farm provided the basis 
for the success of Dutch agriculture. Creating a certain distance between 
farm and markets is one of the hidden ingredients explaining the success 
of Dutch agriculture. It is also one of the ingredients that is systematically 
ignored in the currently predominant description of the virtual farmer. 
Farmers act as Homo economicus within the image produced by the 
contemporary agricultural knowledge network, as entrepreneurs 
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integrating their farm fully into markets and therefore following and 
implementing the logic of the market: as puppets on a string. 
Dutch farmers are, I will argue in this book, not so much the 
entrepreneurs they should be according to the agricultural expert system, 
but peasants: producers who, for the sake of their own survival, actively 
withdraw the processes of farm management and farm development from 
the logic of markets that seem to ignore their survival. 
'We have never been modern', according to Latour in a well-known essay 
(1993). In its footsteps one could claim: 'Dutch farmers have never been 
entrepreneurs' (which in fact has already been raised by Constandse in 
1964). They are peasants, and precisely because they are peasants they 
have proved to be so successful through the ages. The fact that this is also 
extremely topical and relevant nowadays is discussed in Chapter 5. 
The transformation or conversion of resources into end products is 
discussed at length in Chapter 4. This transformation (for example from 
grass and cows into milk and meat) is conceptualised in the agricultural 
expert system as regulated by production functions: a fixed relationship 
between inputs (grass and cows) and outputs (milk and meat). It is 
assumed that new, more productive and/or more sustainable production 
functions can only be created after technological breakthroughs. 
In contrast to this thesis, I want to develop another image. Indeed, there 
are regularities and patterns of coherence. Unmistakably, the relation 
between inputs and outputs (the I /O relation) displays a certain range 
and contains a certain, as yet uncrossable, frontier function (the most 
efficient I /O relation) in certain, temporally and spatially restricted 
situations. But what is important here is that these patterns or regularities 
are a product, a result of the labour process in agriculture. Furthermore, I 
regard the labour process as locus of co-production, of the continuous 
encounter between, and mutual transformation of, the social and the 
natural. Precisely because the results of this co-production are rooted in, 
and arise from, the labour process, it will always involve extremely 
variable I /O relations. New production functions are constantly created 
in and through the process of farm labour: new patterns of coherence that 
correspond closely with farmers' own interests, perspectives, insights, 
and knowledge. 
In previous studies of farming styles, researchers concentrated initially on 
the above-mentioned dimensions: the conversion and mobilisation of 
resources. This initially limited approach was later broadened, thanks to 
the work of Kerkhove (1994), Ventura (1994), De Rooij et al. (1995), 
Wiskerke (1997), Van der Meulen (1999a 1999b), and Roep (2000). The 
studies identified the sale of end products and, hence, the specific circuits 
connecting production and consumption as ordering principles, as 
essential types of interlocking, and therefore as crucial parts of socio-
technical networks. I will return to these new insights in Chapter 9, where 
new development opportunities for Dutch agriculture will be discussed. 
What is important in this first storyline is that the interconnected domains 
of mobilisation, conversion, and sale contain considerable variability -
each separately, but above all collectively. They are malleable, flexible, 
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changeable. The resulting variability cannot be understood as a 'fixed' 
range: it is constantly enlarged in the practice of farming - that is, by 
farmers' innovative capacity. 
Similarly, the potential variability is constantly restricted, if not reduced. 
If two keywords describe agricultural history and its development of 
production capacity, they are variation and selection. On the one hand, 
there is a constant search for new patterns, and for new combinations, to 
further increase the already available variation. On the other hand, some 
patterns, and some combinations, demonstrate that they are more 
successful than others, while others prove unsuitable in the light of 
changing social and ecological conditions. Thus selection appears, while 
the provisional end result of the selection is the starting point for the 
search for and creation of new variation. 
Farming is like 'a dance through time': time and again variation and 
selection result in new socio-technical networks, new types and 
connections. While these new expressions emerge, others degrade and 
disappear - sometimes stealthily, almost unnoticed, at other times 
abruptly. 
This brings us to the second storyline. It concerns the heterogeneity of 
farming as the (temporally and spatially confined) expression of this 
'dance through time'. In Chapter 3 of this book, I will discuss in detail the 
farming styles that can be distinguished in contemporary Frisian dairy 
farming. I will try in particular to describe these styles as projects, as 'self-
reflective strategies for patterning the network of the social' and, hence, as 
part of a more comprehensive socio-technical network. 
The remainder of the book builds upon this, particularly Chapters 6 and 
7, which discuss selection, and Chapter 9 in which variation is discussed. 
More precisely, in Chapters 6 and 7,1 analyse the interaction between the 
development opportunities inherent in various farming styles and the 
dominant agro-political project - that is, the process of modernising 
agriculture - while the interaction with a new agro-political project, in 
which rural development has a central role, is analysed in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 8 forms a link: there the central theme is the extensive erosion of 
trust, the essential ingredient in the functioning of expert systems. 
The third storyline can be summarised as a systematic critique of various 
forms of determinism: of technological determinism (in Chapter 4, inter 
alia, where the doctrine of production functions is discussed); of economic 
determinism (in Chapter 5); but especially of what is called structural 
determinism, which has overrun the social sciences (including rural 
sociology). Chapters 6 and 7, which discuss modernisation as 'the 
unfolding of structural patterns and relations', can be understood as a 
critique of structural determinism. There the agricultural knowledge 
system, the expert system that represents, propagates, and realises this 
structuralist notion like no other, is discussed at length. 
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The fourth storyline is the obvious counterpart of the third: it entails a 
search for a more adequate concept of structure. I have already 
commented on it in this introductory chapter. In this book, I will test the 
concepts and notions raised in this chapter, to arrive at a conclusion in the 
final chapter (Chapter 10). I will also summarise the critique of the 
contemporary expert system in Chapter 10. Chapter 9 forms an important 
prelude to this, which brings us to the fifth and final storyline. Chapter 9 
concerns new development opportunities that reach beyond the current 
misery. In the discussion of these opportunities, I use 'rural development' 
as the connecting concept. Chapter 9, the 'battle for the future', is also 
concerned with the social and political struggle that was waged in the 
1990s over the realisation of new development opportunities. 
Notes 
1 Incidentally, the full text runs as follows: 'vivir es constantemente decidir lo que vamos a 
ser'. The author states further: 'nuestra vida es ante todo toparse con elfiituro . . . la vida es una 
actividad que se ejecuta hacia adelante, y el presente o el pasado se descubre después, en relación con 
esefuturo. La vida es futurición, es lo que aun no es' ('life is above all dealing with the future . . . 
life is a progressive activity, and the present or the past is discovered with hindsight, in 
relation to the future. Life consists of making futures; it is what it is becoming'; Ortega y 
Gasset 1995, p. 228). For a further comment, see Remmers 1998, chap. 7, esp. pp. 313-317. 
2 I am acutely aware that it is easier to speak about the great period of modernisation than it 
is to define the period. Two issues are clear. First, the era of modernisation was constructed 
only gradually in civil society as a whole. The rise of capitalism - initially in the Italian city 
states, later in the Netherlands - and the subsequent civil revolution in France, the 
Enlightenment, and the industrialisation that started in England all represent many stages in 
this protracted process. Second, it is clear that the same process of modernisation occurred in 
agriculture much later than in the urban sphere of influence, although it is not clear exactly 
where and when to situate the turning point. The work of Hofstee is a case in point. In his 
'early' work Hofstee (1949, 1985a) located modernisation (the turning point from a 
traditional to a modern-dynamic cultural pattern) in the first half of the 19th century. 
Furthermore, he sometimes refers to the early Middle Ages and to the periphery of the then 
feudal systems as the cradle of modernisation. In his 'later' work (see, for example, Hofstee 
1953) the post-war period of the 20th century acts as the turning point. The identification of 
the turning point is, as is well known, highly controversial. Historians such as Van Zanden 
(1985) and particularly Bieleman (1987) have indicated that in the olden days agriculture 
already showed remarkably 'modern' features. Be that as it may, it is striking in this 
controversy that no one disputes the difference between 'traditional' and 'modern'. The big 
question is where, and particularly when, to situate the beginning of certain phases. 
3 Again, it is not my intention to look for clear boundaries in time, hence the use of the 
vague description in the main text. Incidentally, it is remarkable that this 'next phase' started 
earlier in agriculture, so it seems, than in the rest of society. See in addition Chapter 6, where 
the functioning of the expert system in agriculture is described. 
4 As I will demonstrate below, we should perhaps say: in that which specifies our future. 
The contemporary expert systems are more than just a collection of scientists, specialists, and 
experts. They are also the paramount prisoners of the axioms that regulate knowledge 
production. 
5 James Scott relates the phenomenon of mega- or macroprojects largely to the functioning of 
the contemporary state. Thus, he interprets megaprojects as 'state simplifications'. These 
simplifications (as such inherent in the functioning of bureaucracies) 'do not successfully 
represent the actual activity of the society they depict, nor are they intended to; they 
represent only that slice of it that interests the official observer . . . [They are simplifications] 
that, when allied with state power, will enable much of the reality they depict to be remade' 
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(1998, p. 3). Scott points out that the development of megaprojects ('the tragic episodes of 
state-initiated social engineering') arises from a combination of four elements: the 
'administrative ordering of nature and society', a 'high-modernist ideology', an 
authoritative state ('willing and able to use the full weight of its coercive power to bring the 
high-modernist designs into being'), and finally 'a prostrate civil society that lacks the 
capacity to resist these plans' (1998, pp. 4-5). Indeed, those seem to be the required and 
necessary conditions with respect to the cases Scott analyses. However, if we introduce the 
modernisation of agriculture into the analysis, these conditions appear insufficient. 
Agricultural modernisation as a megaproject takes place (just like various other 
contemporary macroprojects) under democratic conditions, which refers indirectly to the 
considerable influence obtained by and assigned to the expert systems. 
6 This has been described at length in general terms by Callon 1986; Bijker and Law 1992; 
Latour 1994; Lowe et al. 1995. 
7 The communication between farmers from various regions is a shining example of this. 
The 'other' was not taken note of in order to imitate but rather to understand better and, if 
possible, to strengthen what was one's own. If parts were adopted from elsewhere, its 
structure would typically be 'one's own' - that is, that which was constructed and expanded 
thus far, the frame from which to assess what could possibly be adopted and how it could be 
fitted in. (For a further analysis, see Van der Ploeg 1987, esp. pp. 35-42.), It is remarkable that 
the 'grammar' of comparison and adoption has radically changed since then (Cristovào et al. 
1994). At present, there is a clear hierarchy of 'most developed' agricultural systems and of 
more or less 'underdeveloped' agricultural systems. The technologies of the former now 
hold as the normative frame around which the agricultural practices of the latter have to be 
reorganised. 'Areas lagging behind in development', the term frequently used within the 
EU, is a striking expression of this. 
8 See Long and Van der Ploeg 1994, pp. 80-81. 
9 This term is used to indicate the opposite of 'interlocking'. Distantiation represents 
creating a distance, creating room for manoeuvre or autonomy. 
10 Robinson Crusoe's project, to mention probably the worlds' most famous castaway, could 
only succeed with the presence of the stranded ship - resources! - and with the arrival of 
Friday. 
11 Trust emerges as one of the important mediums to cement postmodern societies together, 
and as a vehicle to implement developments. Trust is (in contrast to faith and confidence) 
highly depersonalised. It is institutionalised faith in a system and its artefacts and 
procedures. Trust implies that carrying out certain actions will lead to a future situation 
specified beforehand. If the latter situation is the objective and if the actions to be carried out 
are the means, trust integrates the two. If I want to cross a busy and dangerous road, 
pressing the button at the pedestrian crossing and waiting for the lights to change to green 
are the means by which to safely reach the other side (the objective; Giddens 1990). As a 
pedestrian, I do not have to know the different drivers (or look deep into their eyes). I trust 
not so much the drivers as subjects but the 'system'. I assume that the other participants (the 
drivers) do the same. The knowledge that everyone acts on the basis of the system generates 
trust, just as the functioning of the system presupposes trust. The same example makes clear 
that a simultaneous co-ordination of various actions is necessary to realise trust. Drivers will 
have to stop when the lights change to red. If they want to meet their objective (let us at least 
hope that this consists partly of avoiding accidents), acting on the system of traffic rules 
(stop at red, go at green) is a necessary means for them. Trust connects everything. Without 
trust the system (the set of traffic lights and rules) will not work at all. 
12 This trust in systems includes primarily 'the faith that a role is interpreted according to 
the norms, more or less independent of the person performing the role' (Galjart 1998, p. 13, my 
emphasis). Galjart contrasts this trust in systems with what he calls 'particularistic trust': 
'the expectation that someone else will cause us harm in a transaction or a relationship' (ibid., 
p. 12). In his discussion, Galjart considers the crucial importance of trust for development. 
13 If collective memory is the subject in traditional societies, just like agency in the era of 
modernisation, the expert system is the most important subject under postmodern relations. 
14 But it is possible in the long term, see Groen et al. 1993. 
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15 For a theoretical explanation, see Wiskerke 1997; for further specification in agriculture, 
see Chapter 3 of this book. 
16 It is no coincidence that I refer here to Harris. From his pen comes one of the most 
eloquent critiques of the approach that we have tried to develop in Wageningen. In the 
proceedings of the fiftieth anniversary congress of Wageningen sociology (where Harris 
unfolded his critique), Long and Van der Ploeg discuss the critique at length. 
17 What remains intact is that one can of course use a conceptual framework in which 
'external structure' acts as a causal complex. Thus emerge the so-called structuralist theories. 
The bankruptcy of such approaches has been amply exposed, by Long (1985) in particular. 
18 The same applies to Booth as to Harris. From his pen comes an inspiring critique, a 
heartfelt search for the possible weak points in the Wageningen approach. Just as in Harris' 
case, Booth's observations revolve particularly around the question whether an actor-
oriented approach excludes the concept of coercion (whatever its nature or form). See Booth 
1994. 
19 Of course, the relations at issue here (the relations among various projects) can differ 
considerably. Some will be extremely hierarchical and coercive. This does not imply, 
however, that one therefore needs to fall back on structuralist approaches; I attempt to show 
this in Chapter 6 by means of the so-called structural development of and in Dutch 
agriculture (as a result of which more than half of the farmers had to abandon their farms). 
20 Following the work of Giddens, it is tempting to locate such incapability in 'structure' (in 
its Giddensian sense). For structure is not only enabling but also constraining. It excludes 
certain types of action, certain manifestations of agency, while others become possible. 
Theoretically, this solution is hardly satisfactory - empirically, it is unmanageable, as will be 
shown in note 21. 
21 If one looks at contemporary Dutch agriculture, the complications can be seen a mile off; 
because there is no other possible interpretation than that agency is ubiquitous. In any case, 
the presence of farms, of whatever farm, is inconceivable without the notion of agency. If, in 
the previous period, there had not been a determined effort to continue the farm and if one 
had not succeeded at this, there would be no individual farms nor a collection of farms as a 
whole. Every farm is evidence of the 'capability of doing things'. In agriculture (and I 
assume the same applies elsewhere) there are no actors walking around in a permanent 
comatose state. This notion of structure could be introduced as the counterpart of agency. 
Apart from the extremely difficult question of what should be interpreted as structure 
(elsewhere in this book, 1 will discuss this at length by means of the concept of 'structural 
development'), a not very satisfactory dichotomy would emerge here. Structural relations 
(as 'both enabling and constraining') imply that a number of farms are doomed to vanish, 
while others can continue (for the time being). The notion of non-agency would apply to the 
first group, and agency would apply to the second group. Such a dichotomy is completely 
unsatisfactory. First, because it ignores, on the one hand, the fact that a number of farms are 
purposefully abandoned (not only intentionally, but also through the corresponding 
actions), and, on the other, the situation that a great many farms are continued purely as a 
matter of routine (see, inter alia, De Bruin 1991, who discusses the problematic aspects of 
farm succession). Second, it is unsatisfactory because it is hard to understand why and how 
'structurally impossible farms' (let me put it in that way for the time being, I refer especially 
to small or even very small farms) are sometimes continued or even guided along the cliffs 
of a very difficult farm transfer. If 'structure' is 'constraining' in some cases, it must be in 
every case; because if it does not do so in some cases (because dominated by agency), the 
notion of actor-structure as duality becomes very problematic. Third, I want to point to the 
fact that there is an impressive degree of differentiation among the 'remaining' farms; in 
other words, agency can result in innumerable 'things', or else various types and degrees of 
agency should be introduced. In short, I think that agency as an undifferentiated concept, as 
the opposite of structure, is very unsatisfactory. 
22 In other words, Law's principle of symmetry (1994) can and must be applied here as well. 
23 This does not imply that these notions, or images of the future, are always fluid, are 
always variable and changeable in empirical reality. The crux of the large macroprojects and of 
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contemporary expert systems emerges here: they make the images of the future rigid and 
unchangeable. 
24 Because on the whole, cohesion, fabric, and web are very remarkable. More obvious 
perhaps are disintegration, the inability to coordinate, ignorance, and so on. Rather than 
simply taking cohesion for granted, it should be explained. 
25 Van der Ploeg (1993) explains in more detail how difficult, if not improbable it is to 
innovate under contemporary conditions. 
26 For example Adellijk bloed by Popta (1962). There is also an incipient critique in there 
about the expert system that was beginning to emerge in the world of livestock breeding. 
27 This is the comprehensive 'modernisation project' that was conceived and also 
materialised in Dutch agriculture from the 1960s onwards. For more detailed descriptions, 
see Frouws and Van der Ploeg 1973; Van der Ploeg 1995a, 1996. I will discuss this 
modernisation project in more detail in Chapter 6 of this book. It may seem confusing at first 
that I present and analyse this 'modernisation project' as a shining example of a 
'postmodern' approach. Just as in the social sciences (see earlier in this chapter), however, it 
applies here that one's own projects are decorated with the colours and terms of the past. 
Agriculture had of course been modern for a long time before mid-20th century. See the 
convincing work of historians such as Bieleman 1987. Hofstee's work (1985a) is significant in 
this: he shows how a 'modern cultural pattern' emerged in the clay region of Groningen in 
early 19th century. However, as if this had never happened, the induced changes in the latter 
half of the 20th century are just as easily called 'modernisation'. If one takes a magnifying 
glass and watches various processes, it would show that the term repeatedly re-emerges 
during and after this period. Time and again, the 'need for modernisation' is mentioned: at 
every land consolidation, at every adjustment in arable agriculture, at every introduction of 
new technology, every time one has to face adverse market conditions. The power of the 
word is probably in the suggestion that undesired situations can be overcome once and for 
all in a single operation. 
28 See, inter alia, Van Egmond et al. 1996; Nijhof et al. 1996; Langman et al. 1998. 
29 The greatest upheaval emerges, I know this from my own administrative experience, if 
one allows participants other than the usual ones to join the conversation about the 
definition of the 'agenda'. Conversely, many examples in and around agriculture and the 
countryside indicate how certain voices are regrettably turned into a predominant, if not the 
only possible, routine. 
30 In other words, one should avoided equating the eventual ordering, or its effects, with the 
initial mode of ordering/strategy as such. In those cases where Law speaks of 'imputation', 
such a danger becomes far from imaginary. What occurs as 'practice', as state of affairs, as 
material effect, at moment T and in place P will never be the unilinear effects of one mode of 
ordering, of one strategy, but rather of the encounter, the interaction, the mutual influencing, 
conditioning, and often the mutual transformation of several modes of ordering, i.e. several 
strategies - of several interlocking projects. However, Law does indeed hint at this, for 
example when he discusses 'interordering effects' (1994, p. 22). The empirical setting within 
which Law conducted research (one large laboratory) was probably less encouraging to 
further explicate the issue touched on here. 
31 In the fourth chapter of his study, Law presents four modes of ordering: enterprise, 
administration, vision, and vocation. He stresses that they cannot be defined in terms of 
persons, or in terms of personal attributes. They are strategies. It is the same point with 
which we have often struggled in the farming styles group. For the sake of recognition, we 
have modes of ordering reduced to and attributed to nouns instead of verbs. In English texts, 
however, this is not the case. There, for example, 'the strategy of farming economically' is 
used consistently, rather than 'economical farmers'. In Law's analysis, those four modes of 
ordering are present in constantly changing combinations in the laboratory. The great 
difference is, of course, that agriculture is concerned with sole proprietor businesses. 
Therefore, there will rather be only one style, only one strategy, on family farms. (However, 
partnerships and corporations are interesting phenomena; in the case of several siblings, you 
will certainly find that one pursues one strategy, the other pursues another. Furthermore, 
there is of course the tension between men and women: various principles that are balanced 
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against one another. See De Rooij et al. 1995). Law stresses that enterprise and administration 
are antithetical modes of ordering. This emerges notably from various farming style analyses 
too. The 'economical' versus the 'ambitious' (to elaborate on one's own resources versus to 
mobilise as many external resources as possible; see Van der Ploeg et al. 1992). The same 
applies to the styles of cowmen v. machinemen; as well as to skill-oriented v. mechanical 
technologies (Bray 1986) and to intensity v. scale (Van der Ploeg 1987). Thus a mutual, 
although ever changing, influencing of modes of ordering occurs within the laboratory. 
Furthermore, Law shows that interlocking with projects (or modes of ordering) of clients, 
financiers, ministries, universities, etc. is also going on. All in all, 'interactive systems' 
(Booth 1994), i.e. 'interlocking projects' (Long and Van der Ploeg 1994), become decisive. 
32 In short, the 'network' cannot be understood simply as an aggregate of modes of 
ordering. All the more because the 'patterning of the social' (certainly in the current 
postmodern constellation) increasingly defines which modes of ordering, which strategies, 
do or do not fit. Here too the turning point, to which I referred previously, appears again. 
33 All in all, financial capital represents nothing more than a particular project: to increase 
the initial amount of capital through participation in other projects. 
34 A definition in terms of 'feasibility' is also important: What can I exercise influence over? 
What is beyond my power? 'Feedback' is already integral to all this: as part of the decision 
of what is relevant to me (and definitely in the further specification of what I could 
influence) I will have to take account of the world as it presents itself to me and/or of the 
world as it is presented to me. Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia, as Ortega y Gasset states in this 
context: 'I am myself and my situation'. 
35 These are the terms suggested by neo-institutional analysis as solutions to problems such 
as those described here (see, inter alia, Saccomandi 1991,1998). 
36 In fact, this continued to the extent that the building of the factory had almost been 
finished before the third partner, Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods, decided to participate. I 
think it goes without saying, therefore, that considerable risks have been taken along the 
entire trajectory. On the other hand, as Henk Brouwer argues, you 'need to be able to fall 
back on a number of side streets. If you can't turn left, you'll have to be prepared how to 
turn right if necessary.' 
37 Even though leading thinkers of the Rabobank in Utrecht (its headquarters), such as 
Wijffels and Krouwel, supported the initiative wholeheartedly; the Eindhoven office (where 
credit applications are eventually assessed on the basis of formal criteria) reached a negative 
decision. It was reasoned that dairies were being closed all over Europe, and it was therefore 
ludicrous to think that a small dairy such as the FEZ would stand a chance of survival. 
Eventually, the Rabobank did become involved in the FEZ indirectly through Rabobank 
International. 
38 Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods had attempted years before to set up a range of organic 
products. However, it had turned out to be a total flop. A new initiative by a 'small outsider' 
was initially regarded as rather painful: 'If we can't do it, nobody can'. 
39 The Industry and Commerce Board was notable by its absence in this innovation. It is also 
typical that serious practical research on organic dairy farming by the expert system only 
started during 1998-1999. For that is the moment when institutionalised practical research 
(in casu Aver Heino) makes a changeover. It means that the first results will only be available 
in five years time, i.e. in 2003 or 2004. 
40 The alleged backwardness became even the conceptual starting point of operationalising 
the countryside and, therefore, of differentiating it from the city (see Van der Ploeg 1997). 
41 Of course, other large megaprojects did exist. In the Netherlands, they included the 
organisation of water management, coastal defence, and energy supply. It is well known that 
each of these represents so much as a state within the state. 
42 After all, you cannot experiment simultaneously with Schiphol Airport in the North Sea, 
Schiphol in Flevoland (or in the Markerwaard), and the expansion of the existing Schiphol. 
43 If there is anything in this world that can hardly be virtual, it is a farmer. Farmers stand in 
the mud, between their cows. Or they watch the latest version of a milk robot at the 
Agricultural Show. However, they watch all this knowing that milk will soon have to flow 
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into the jars. In our 'virtualised world', farmers are probably the last junction of its stubborn 
opposite: it starts off on matter, on mud and cows, and it ends in matter, in milk or in seed 
potatoes. Hence, it is out of the question that there is or could be any detachment and 
evaporation of things into words and symbols and nothing else. 
44 The 'old boys network', which clearly exists in the agricultural knowledge network or 
'expert system', centres largely on aspects of one and the same set of axioms. 
45 Recent agrarian history has a painful flip side, related to the 'conversion' of critics and 
innovators into 'charlatans'. Older colleagues have told me many stories about this. I leave 
the retelling of those stories to the first agrarian historian who dares to research a really 
controversial issue. 
Part II 
Distantiation: Creating Resources 

2 Dancing through Time 
The previous chapter pointed to the highly variable nature of the 
relationships between the farm, on the one hand, and markets and the 
prevailing technological repertoire on the other. In this chapter, I want to 
discuss the historical backgrounds to these highly variable relationships. I 
want to stress that the current room for manoeuvre, which provides the 
countryside and agriculture with their attractive and colourful 
morphology, is partly the outcome of a lengthy and complex 
emancipation process, in and by which farmers transformed themselves 
into what they are today: independent producers able to operate within 
degrees of freedom created over the course of agrarian history. 
History - agrarian history too - is often thought of as a unilinear process, 
evolving inevitably from a 'natural economy' to a 'fully commoditised 
economy' (Gibbon and Neocosmos 1985; Bernstein 1986). The natural 
economy would be dominated by production directed at self-sufficiency. 
Production for a market would be a secondary phenomenon. In a fully 
commoditised economy, on the other hand, production is entirely 
oriented to markets. Furthermore, and crucially, organisation and 
development of production would be governed completely by the 
prevailing market relations. Farmers become ever so many expressions of 
the Homo economicus or, more profanely, agricultural entrepreneurs. The 
development of agriculture would be completed through a generalisation 
of agricultural entrepreneurship. Unfortunately this is not so easily 
achieved. Every ten years or so, farmers are presented with the message 
that they should be more and better entrepreneurs. 
In this chapter, I will first and foremost explain the thesis that recent 
agrarian history (from the mid-sixteenth century until today) should not 
be understood as a process of continuous commoditisation, as an 
inevitable progression from a natural to a fully commoditised economy. It 
seems rather that the initial situation of extreme dependency on 
commodity circuits is overcome by a sometimes gradual, sometimes 
rapidly advancing process of decommoditisation. 
Throughout the course of agrarian history - the most important point of 
reference in this chapter is Friesland - farmers actively distantiate farming 
from the influence of the prevailing market relations, which are often 
experienced as suffocating. If a tendence lourde, a long-term movement, can 
be identified in Frisian agrarian history over the past 500 years, it is 
definitely a movement towards decommoditisation rather than towards a 
completion of the market economy. Thus this story has a topical value. 
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For market-oriented production, deregulation, and liberalisation are the 
keywords used to reorganise the relation between agriculture and 
markets at the turn of the millennium. 
The pursuit of more room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis markets is not neutral. 
In this chapter, I will emphasise the extent to which this pursuit became 
interwoven with the struggle for 'farming freedom' and with the 
successful development of Frisian agriculture since the mid-19th century. 
Decommoditisation, prosperity, and 'farming freedom' went hand in 
hand. This development is crowned with the completion of the 
contemporary freehold family farm (NRLO 1997b). 
The outcome of the fascinating history of Frisian agriculture can be traced 
not only in the objective degrees of freedom created in the relationship 
between agriculture and markets. Collective memory, resulting from the 
complex and often contradictory history, is also of considerable 
importance. This collective memory, repeatedly kept alive (if not brought 
back to life again), is heard clearly in the cultural repertoire, in the ideas of 
sunige boeren* (economical farmers), fokkers (breeders), and koweminsken 
(cowmen), that we will encounter in the following chapters. 
Apart from the relationship between farm and markets, technology also is 
discussed in this chapter. Initially, Frisian farmers were condemned to 
make use of an extremely harsh, if not hostile, ecosystem: blue or dun 
cows, marshy land, and the ever present danger of cattle diseases and 
inundations. The first Roman chronicler was not entirely wrong when he 
characterised the Frisians as mangiatori di sabbia, as mud eaters. However, 
farming gradually overcame the limitations of the prevailing ecosystem. 
Frisian farmers developed new techniques, new methods of conversion, 
which resulted in the gradual genetic improvement of livestock and in the 
gradual but unmistakable improvement of pastures and meadows. 
Increasingly, a wide repertoire of techniques emerged - techniques with 
which agriculture gained independence from the initially oppressing 
ecosystem. The creation of the beautiful Dutch-Friesian breed is but one of 
the outcomes of this. 
There is yet another reason to discuss history here. It is related to the way 
that the success story of Dutch agriculture is usually told today. In this 
story, the high productivity, dynamics, and prosperity of Dutch 
agriculture are presented as the outcome of its structure: the size and 
production potential of farms and the institutional infrastructure 
(advisory, research, education, banking, agro-industry, etc.) are all 
regarded as crucial to this success story. Repetition of these factors - that 
is, a (more or less substantial) reorganisation of the relations in lesser 
developed and/or backward agricultural regions along the lines of the 
Dutch model - thus appears as logical lever (as 'trigger') for agricultural 
development. 
Translator's note: the author used Frisian folk concepts in the original text, derived from 
Frisian vernacular. In the remainder of the text these will be printed in italics. 
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There is no need to recall here how disastrous this still commonplace 
approach is. What I am concerned with here is that the 'structure' of 
Dutch agriculture no more explains its productivity, dynamics, and 
prosperity than restructuring along the lines of this model would result in 
development elsewhere. The fact that structure goes hand in hand with 
prosperity, productivity, etc. is critically dependent upon the way in 
which this 'structure' was ordered (and hence upon all the other 
interrelations arising from the process of ordering). 
For example, let us examine the advisory service. In the Netherlands, we 
have at our disposal a much-praised and currently highly centralised and 
partly privatised advisory apparatus in agriculture. One of the success 
factors that this advisory apparatus boasts is a relatively high level of faith 
from farmers. This faith has been built up over the years, partly due to the 
highly decentralised organisation at the time and to its non-private 
character. Anyone seeking to replicate the Dutch model- whether in 
backward agricultural regions in Portugal or developing countries such as 
Peru - might start a highly centralised and probably partly privatised 
advisory service to act as a 'trigger' for development. Whether such a 
service would build up the necessary trust between farmers and advisors, 
whether, in other words, it would foster development, is open to 
question. 
An understanding of contemporary Dutch agriculture requires 
knowledge of its history, of the way in which it became unfolded. 
However, the power and weakness, capability and incapability of 
agriculture are contained in other relations and resources than the ones 
currently presented as such. We use the notion of 'structure' nowadays to 
refer to a world that is ordered logically at face value, in which well-
defined, causal complexes go hand in hand with similarly well-defined 
effects. This image, however, is highly virtual. It inspires our actions, yet it 
also results in numerous unintended consequences emerging from those 
actions. Even though one can imagine the world as one pleases, this does 
not guarantee the most adequate guidance for action. 
The hidden (because ignored and hence effectively rendered irrelevant) 
strength of Dutch agriculture lies in the relatively high degree of control 
that direct producers have over the resources necessary for agricultural 
practice. Farming requires resources: land, water, labour, capital, 
knowledge, the capacity to apply adequate technology, cows, sowing 
seed, manure, machines, and so on. Essential here is the question of the 
extent to which these resources are available (a question that concerns not 
only the quantity but especially the quality of resources) and the question 
of who manages the resources. 
Typically in Dutch agrarian history, the farming community has 
increasingly acquired control over most of these resources. At the same 
time, it has also typically unfolded the capacity to develop these resources 
in a relatively autonomous way. This hidden feature applies not only to 
agriculture as a whole but also, and especially, to individual farms. 
Whoever ignores all this will not come to a real understanding of Dutch 
agriculture. 
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2.1 Hemmema's memorandum book: back to the 16th century 
An appropriate starting point for an overview of the changing relations 
between markets and agriculture is the account book or memorandum 
book of Rienck Hemmema (for the verbatim text of the memorandum 
book, see Gerbenzon 1958; for comments and analyses, see Slicher van 
Bath 1958; Fryske Akademy 1990; Hazelhoff 1991; Van der Ploeg 1995b). 
Rienck Hemmema's farm was located south of the Frisian city of 
Franeker. The farm was not rented but largely owned by Hemmema; it 
comprised 25.5 hectares, of which 8.5 hectares were arable land and 17 
hectares grassland. Hemmema carefully kept an account book for this 
farm in the period 1569-1573. Slicher van Bath described it as 'an almost 
unique source of the history of agriculture in the sixteenth century', to 
which he adds that 'the value of this document is increased even more by 
its elaborateness and meticulousness' (1958, p. 72). Hemmema's account 
book enables an in-depth examination and detailed analysis of the set of 
economic relationships in which the farm was interwoven. 
A high level of self-sufficiency (of self-support, according to Spahr van 
der Hoek 1952) is one of the striking elements: 'In the account book, one 
encounters little about the food that was purchased'. 'Understandably', 
according to Slicher van Bath, 'because the farm produced the necessary 
foods largely themselves' (1958, p. 118). Self-support extended into many 
aspects. Thus, an important part of the herd was slaughtered in the 
autumn months: two to three cows and some calves. 'The meat was 
largely for home consumption' (ibid., p. 102). Self-support took place not 
only within the boundaries of the farm but also occurred via various 
social relations. Thus, hides went to the shoemaker, and 'the fat, the 
tallow, went to the candle maker to produce candles'. Mostly, this 
concerned socially regulated exchange, transactions that did not involve 
money but happened through reciprocal service or through payment in 
goods. Thus windrowers were always paid in beer. 
These practices were not uncommon. Van den Akker mentions that until 
the end of the 19th century 'farmers did not have an account with a feed 
merchant, nor with a butcher - a baker received little more. Butter went to 
the shop, for which they received goods in return. If we imagine that 
farmers often supplied craftworkers, such as carpenters, blacksmiths, and 
cartwrights, with a whole or half a pig, to settle completely or partially 
their neijierrekken [New Year's account], we can hardly escape the 
conclusion that autarky was applied to the old farm in such a refined way 
that today's elder statesmen could definitely have drawn a lesson from 
this' (1967, p. 14). And Spahr van der Hoek states more generally: 'Money 
was far from common in ancient times; if one wanted to obtain something 
from a merchant, it was best to bring exchangeables along' (1952, vol. 1, p. 
370). 
The importance of the described self-sufficiency or autarky is often 
misunderstood, since it is interpreted as indicative of the total or near 
total absence of market integration. It is assumed that the more important 
or inclusive self-sufficiency, the less weight market and price relations 
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would carry. The idea of irrational economic behaviour easily appears 
compelling. Such opinions, implicitly rely on the idea that history 
generally, and agrarian history in particular, embodies a unilinear trend 
from a presumed natural economy towards a completely monetarised, 
universal market economy. This notion is apparently so strong that 
innumerable indications, which referred if not to the contrary then at least 
to a considerably more complicated situation, were ignored altogether. To 
the farmer-writer Van den Akker, the matter was considerably more 
complicated. If, on the one hand, he describes the pursuit of autarky, he 
also makes clear that farmers lost no time in making money out of 
something as, and when, the opportunity arose. 
For, at an even earlier time, Marc Bloch (1939) had already pointed to the 
importance of the culture d'or: the crop with which the necessary money 
was earnt on farms that were otherwise very much directed at self-
sufficiency. And Spahr van der Hoek concludes that at Hemmema's time 
'self-sufficiency in the absolute sense has proved to be an untenable 
presupposition' (1952, vol. 1, p. 370). Self-support and market orientation 
are not mutually exclusive. One might well be a precondition for the 
other. In this context Hemmema's account book provides a wealth of 
relevant data. 
First intermezzo 
Generally, a farm can be represented as a mechanism for converting 
resources (such as land, water, plants, manure, animals, labour, 
knowledge, etc.) into useful end products (such as milk, meat, butter, 
hides, grain, etc.). This conversion (the real production process) is based 
upon the mobilisation of resources (Georgescu-Roegen 1972). Figure 2.1 
shows how the necessary resources can be mobilised via markets; in this 
case the 'resource flow' represented by the arrow at the top left-hand 
corner dominates. It is also possible that farm management is based 
particularly on resources generated within the farm, in which case the 
level of self-sufficiency or self-support is high. It will be clear that these 
notions do not relate exclusively to the farm economy (let alone to food 
consumption). They refer to the unity of farm and family. Of course, the 
same applies to the contrasting notion of market dependency. 
Fertile soil, good livestock, seeds, labour and knowledge, feed, and the 
required amount of money - all of this can be generated within the farm 
itself; it can also be mobilised via the respective markets. High market 
dependency occurs when the mobilisation of resources via markets 
prevails strongly over self-sufficiency (Van der Ploeg 1990; Saccomandi 
1991). Choices also exist over how to use outputs. If 'well-ripened' 
manure is one of the end products, it can be utilised on one's own farm to 
increase soil fertility, but it is also possible to sell it. If this issue seems to 
be only of theoretical importance today, it played a crucial role in Frisian 
agrarian history. The same applies to cows, calves, hay, to farm labour, 
and so on. 
The degree of market dependency (or degree of commoditisation) can be 
approached and operationalised in two ways. First, resources mobilised 
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via the market can be related to resources reproduced within the farm: 
this is relation a in Figure 2.1 (for empirical applications, see Bolhuis and 
Van der Ploeg 1985). However, it is also possible to approach the degree 
of market dependency as the relation between purchased resources and 
sold produce: this is relation b in Figure 2.1. The more this relation tends 
towards 1:1, the more oppressive the relationship between markets and 
farm will become. Thus emerges, to use a beautiful, old, Frisian term, 
jildkrapte (shortage of money; Brolsma 1948, p. 6). And vice versa, farmers 
will again get a bit more de macht yn'e hannen (if I may use a clumsy 
translation, farmers will again gain a bit more agency - literally have 
strength in their arms; ibid., p. 10). 
Figure 2.1 Resource flows on the farm 
mobilisation 
of resources 
via markets 
marketable 
output 
commodity circuits 
relation b 
relation a 
agricultural production process: 
conversion of resources 
into output 
non-commodity circuits 
In a situation of high market dependency, many resources will enter the 
farm as commodities, as merchandise. Production and subsequent 
marketing have to be organised in such a way that the monetary output 
compensates at least for the actual monetary costs. Market relations 
penetrate, as it were, into farm management: they become part of its 
organising principle. 
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Along with various resource flows, different circuits become important. 
The 'lowest circuit' in Figure 2.1. (generating and reusing resources 
produced on the farm) is rarely controlled by those actors that control the 
commodity circuit (the set of markets in which the farm participates). In 
consequence, other norms will be applied to these circuits and other 
interests will dominate (Long et al. 1986). Thus, with increasing market 
dependency not only does the origin of the utilised resources change, so 
do the circuits themselves. Hence the 'rules of the game' can change 
decisively. All this can have far-reaching consequences for farming itself. 
Back to Hemmema: the nature and extent of market dependency 
The operation and survival of Hemmema's farm is, according to the 
account book, highly market dependent. Even though numerous elements 
and mechanisms fit in with self-support, as explained previously, market 
dependency is an important and structural fact too. Hence the question of 
interrelations becomes essential. 
On the supply side, Hemmema's farm is woven into an extensive range of 
market relations. Sometimes he buys manure (50 cartloads in 1571, later 4 
barge loads, and later again 113 cartloads), at other times cows, grain 
(including rye from the Baltic region), pulses and hay. He hires a lot of 
labour (via numerous mechanisms) and rents land, while land is also 
leased or sublet. Furthermore, Hemmema has a number of loans and 
takes out new ones. In short, for a wide range of production factors and 
inputs (including a great many factors and inputs that could in principle 
have very well been generated on his own farm) Hemmema's farm is 
dependent on markets. 
This can be illustrated more precisely through the example of cattle 
purchases. It is quite conceivable, in principle, to enlarge one's own herd 
by home-reared calves and heifers, freeing up animals for sale (or for 
slaughter and home consumption). Monetary costs can thus be 
minimalised as they can be restricted to the incidental purchase of a good 
bull. On the other hand, it is also possible that almost all starting material 
is bought in, for example as in-calf heifers, milkers, and /or fattening 
cows. In those cases, beef and dairy cows are not generated within the 
farm, but obtained through markets. Again, on most farms a combination 
of both schemes will be followed, in which sometimes the market 
dependent way of reproduction dominates, at other times the 
autonomous, historically guaranteed type. Available historical farm 
accounts show that an enormous empirical range existed in this respect, 
just as it does nowadays. 
In some years, Hemmema spent more than 1,000 stivers on cattle 
purchases. To give an impression of this amount, it was more than was 
paid in wages to permanent staff, and easily one eighth or more of total 
expenditure. In 1573, hay purchases are registered for 637 stivers, an 
amount that is not very different from the then average annual 
expenditure for human food and drink. New loans cover a total amount 
of nearly 400 stivers. 
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And so one can continue. It will be clear, however, that the phenomenon 
of self-sufficiency should not be made absolute in terms of lacking market 
integration. On the contrary, management and development of 
Hemmema's farm are pre-eminently market dependent. Both farm 
management and farm development occurred by entering into systematic 
relations with a whole range of markets. 
Combining these different elements (on the basis of Figure 2.1), the only 
conclusion possible is that market dependency prevailed over autonomy 
and independence on Hemmema's farm. The degree and nature of market 
dependency become clearer if we relate monetary expenditure to 
monetary revenue. Of course, this can be carried out in different ways, but 
the resulting balance appears extremely fragile whichever way you look 
at it. As Slicher van Bath observes: 
Only the exceptionally good year of 1571 has resulted in a considerable profit, in 
1570 there is a balance between receipts and expenditure, the other years 
generate a negative margin . . . During the five years that cover the account 
book, Hemmema suffered a total loss of 3,893 stivers' (1958, p. 129). 
The exact circumstances are debatable. It is clear, however, that 
the blame is not on the lack of knowledge of agriculture, nor at the hands of the 
revenue, but at the side of expenditure (ibid., p. 130). 
If Hemmema's farm management would have been based less on market 
dependent reproduction - in other words, more on a relatively 
autonomous, historically guaranteed reproduction - the outcomes of the 
account book would have been less precarious. 
The 'suyvere deeV 
Relating monetary expenditure directly to revenue (relationship b in 
Figure 2.1) is not a purely academic, ivory tower exercise. This is precisely 
what farmers did (and still do) themselves. In his shult-register (debt 
register), Jacob Koorn, a West-Frisian farmer, labelled this difference as 
the suyvere deel (literally the 'clean part'; see Meihuizen and Kuperus 
1968). It is the proportion of monetary revenue that remains after 
deduction of the monetary expenditure (cf. Chayanovian types of 
analysis). Now, this suyvere deel, which in Hemmema's case was on whole 
extremely low if not negative, appears to be very low in other cases too. In 
Koorn's case (which was more disadvantageous than Hemmema's, 
because the latter was owner while Koorn had to cope with high rents, the 
monetary expenditure amounted to over 87 per cent of revenue. Also data 
of a later date and from elsewhere refer to an extremely fragile suyvere 
deel. 
Figure 2.2 summarises the available data from the late sixteenth century to 
the present day. On the basis of an analysis of various account books and 
later bookkeeping data, monetary expenditure is represented as a 
percentage of monetary revenue. The higher this percentage, the lower 
the suyvere deel. The figure visibly raises several issues. Possibly, 
Hemmema's case is extreme, but, according to the other cases, the margin 
between monetary revenue and expenditure was on average very small. 
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This is connected with, inter alia, the high dependency of the farm vis-à-vis 
those controlling the markets. 
Figure 2.2 The historical development of the suyvere deel 
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In the case of the heirs of Jacob Herweijer (also included into Figure 2.2) 
this can be specified accurately. If we assume owner-occupier status, 
monetary expenditure amounts to only 52 per cent of monetary revenue. 
However, in the case of a tenancy, this percentage would rise to 87 per 
cent due to the additional rents. In other words, the more the cost 
structure reflects a high degree of market dependency, the lower the 
suyvere deel. 
The gradual increase of the suyvere deel as shown in Figure 2.2 (and 
therefore growing autonomy vis-à-vis supply-side markets) is probably 
related in part to the secular trends revealed by historians. Thus Faber 
(1972, p. 132) indicates that between 1650 and 1735 there was a continuous 
fall in prices received by farmers for their products, after which a turning 
point was reached; subsequently, a period of gradual, but steady price 
increases set in, which are probably also expressed in the trend 
identifiable in Figure 2.2: the most favourable relation between revenue 
and expenditure (about 67 per cent) is found in the period between 1789 
and 1823. 
Taking an overview of the whole period Figure 2.2 suggests a clear 
tendence lourde: through different epochs the suyvere deel is increased. I 
will develop the thesis that this increase has been achieved by the active 
and purposeful actions of farmers. Three observations should be made 
about this. First, bookkeeping activities of people such as Hemmema, 
Koorn, and so many others should be understood in context. Their 
account books, shult-registers, etc. were instruments to monitor as closely 
as possible the market relations that they entered into. That is why 
(monetary) expenditure and revenue were registered. As Spahr van der 
Hoek notes, 'the farm journals that survived consist by and large solely of 
a list of expenditure and receipts' (1952, vol. 1, p. 313). One could closely 
follow, examine and analyse (using the concept of the suyvere deel) the 
relations between farm and market, especially as those relations contain 
such an extremely high degree of dependency. 
This specific type of accounting stands out particularly when compared 
with contemporary bookkeeping techniques (with which people such as 
Koorn were acquainted). Nowadays both circuits are lumped together. 
Thus one's own production factors and inputs (see Figure 2.1) are 
calculated at current prices, just as the component that is going to be 
regenerated within the farm (available livestock, produced and stored 
feed, savings, etc.) is calculated at prevailing market prices (see, inter alia, 
LEI 1984, which also provides a theoretical explanation about this 
approach). By means of these techniques (which are taken from industry 
and trade) it is possible to examine the extent to which the total set of 
available resources (including, amongst others, labour) produces net 
profit. In the quoted farmers' account books, it is, on the contrary, the 
dependency relations vis-à-vis markets that are monitored. This is a crucial 
difference. 
Second, it must be made clear why farmers such as Hemmema, Koorn, 
and so many of their followers could remain farming. The circuit 
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constituted by one's own production factors and inputs (reproduced 
again and again) forms the reservoir to draw on when facing extremely 
difficult circumstances (it goes without saying that this works better the 
more advantageous the interrelations between both circuits in Figure 2.1 
are towards the autonomous circuit). The 'non-commodity circuit' is of 
strategic importance particularly with regard to markets. It is the engine 
with which one can sail against the wind if necessary and substitute being 
adrift for following one's own course. 
Thirdly, it is to be noted that self-support and market orientation, 
autonomy and dependency do not constitute exclusive categories. They 
always go together, they presuppose each other. The one is possible 
because of the other and vice versa. Self-support of family and self-
sufficiency of farm go hand in hand with producing for markets and 
purchasing from other markets. However, judging from the data 
presented here, the balance between dependency and autonomy was 
extremely unfavourable in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Costs 
were, and I refer to Slicher van Bath one more time, exceptionally high, 
precisely because the market-dependent circuit dominated over the 
autonomous circuit. If Hemmema had been able to rely more on rearing 
his own youngstock (and thus had to spend less on cattle purchases), had 
saved more (and thus had to raise fewer loans), and had been able to get 
more hay from his own land, he would have been better off. The suyvere 
deel was too low, precisely because of the high market dependency, as a 
result of which Hemmema had to be sparing of various matters and farm 
development became a delicate issue. But he was fortunate, for if he had 
also been dependent on land markets, one could indeed with Slicher van 
Bath wonder what course should have been followed. 
Frisian agrarian history 'after Hemmema' can largely be interpreted as 
the purposeful search for opportunities to make the initially unfavourable 
balance between autonomy and dependency more favourable. This has 
been partially successful: the suyvere deel actually increased, as shown in 
Figure 2.2. How this process of decommoditisation actually occurred will 
be discussed in the following sections. 
2.2 About farming freedom and agricultural development 
Farmers considered a high degree of dependency to be problematic for 
various reasons. First, market dependency on the supply side made the 
farm extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in prices, a phenomenon still 
known today and usually called 'market-induced risk'. It goes without 
saying that the smaller the margin between monetary costs and monetary 
benefits, the more threatening the risk. 
Poverty was a second aspect closely associated with a high degree of 
market dependency. Thus Dewez (1958, p . 57) writes in his commentaries 
on accounts from the period 1730-1740 that 'the net income on which a 
farm family had to live in those days was very small. If one encountered 
additional difficulties, poverty would be a very frequent visitor, and it is 
understandable that many farmers lost courage in those circumstances'. 
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The danger of poverty reached beyond the actual moment: gradually 
eating into one's own farm was one of the, sometimes grim, consequences 
of an unfavourable balance between dependency and autonomy. 
The forced changeover to rûch arbeidzje (farming roughly) was a third 
effect of extremely high degrees of market dependency, which was 
experienced as extremely unfavourable. If monetary expenditure and 
monetary revenue threatened to meet, farmers sometimes looked to 
curtailing their expenditure. Less manure would be spread on the land, 
the number of 'daily rents' (daily wages) spent on various tasks was 
reduced dramatically, maintenance was postponed, and so on. At the 
same time, attempts were made to speed up monetary revenue: for 
example by serving heifers at an earlier age, by letting less land lie fallow, 
etc. All this led of course to a certain extensification of production, and 
also to the exhaustion of land, animals, and people, which increasingly 
clashed with the norms of 'good farming'. 
What applied in the short term was felt even more strongly in the longer 
term. If a high degree of market dependency encouraged extensification, 
it usually implied that various improvements that seemed possible and 
essential would necessarily remain undone in the long term, precisely 
because one did not have the private means to realise them. For the small, 
sometimes even negative, margin between monetary output and costs 
rules out the generation of savings almost entirely. Similarly, seeking to 
accelerate monetary revenue rules out the gradual improvement of the 
quality of land and animals almost entirely. 
In Spahr van der Hoek (1952, vol. 1, p. 419), we find one of many 
indications that the latter was very much a real problem. It concerns using 
jarre (liquid manure) as fertiliser in the 19th century. Spahr van der Hoek 
quotes a report of the Sneek branch of the Friese Maatschappij van 
Landbouw (Frisian Agricultural Society), stating that 'owner-occupiers 
sometimes defend to extremes the spreading of liquid manure', whereas 
tenant farmers, on the other hand, opposed the spreading of liquid 
manure because they 'did not see any favourable outcomes in it'. Of 
course, this is not the place to discuss who was right. The issue here is that 
owner-occupiers considered a method to improve soil fertility differently 
than those who were, through lease, entirely or largely dependent on the 
land market. This particular type of market dependency (with its short-
term perspective) implies that 'the activities, obstacles, and required 
monetary sacrifices (related to the spreading of liquid manure)' were 
judged as being too high, too risky, and/or too expensive. 
The same applies to capital as a production factor. Necessary 
improvements could have been realised earlier if financed by one's own 
savings rather than having to support them by borrowed capital. Even if, 
according to the formal models of neoclassical agricultural economists, 
this is supposed to make no difference, it was noted until the mid-20st 
century that 'measures to improve the farm become introduced much 
earlier if one has the disposal over private means, than if one has to 
borrow money' (Dijkstra and Van Riemsdijk 1952, p. 37). The smaller the 
margin between monetary revenue and expenditure (including interest on 
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borrowed capital), the smaller the opportunity to create 'private means': 
thus, a high degree of market dependency becomes a hindrance to 
improvements. However, if one would still carry out improvements 
(partly by using borrowed money), the already narrow margin becomes 
even slimmer. Especially if these are improvements that only yield 
monetary benefits in the longer term. In short, an unstable balance 
between dependency and autonomy ruled out continuous improvements 
(however desired it would possibly be from other points of view) on pain 
of a further deterioration of the balance. 
A final aspect of a high degree of market dependency is how it coincided 
with various forms of political, cultural, social, and economic dependency 
in Friesland at the time. What appears as a series of apparently neutral 
debit entries in the account books, memorandum books, and shult-registers 
actually embodied a complex set of dependency patterns. Landowners, 
money lenders, merchants, transporters, regents, and landed aristocrats 
constituted collectively an arena of which farmers were also a part - by no 
means did they occupy the easiest position. 
In his magisterial essay about farming freedom, Slicher van Bath (1978) 
distinguished between two components that define collectively the idea of 
farming freedom. They are the 'freedom from something' and the 
'freedom to something'. 'Weighed down by the burden of certain 
expenses and obligations [...] the serfs were limited in their actions' (1978, 
p. 72). In this respect Slicher van Bath refers, inter alia, to farmers who 
were subjected to landlords through tenancy relations. Stewards and 
judges are mentioned too. In other words, the expenses and obligations 
imposed on farmers not only limited the suyvere deel (precisely because 
they implied a high and usually increasing level of monetary costs), but 
also contained a fatal restriction of the freedom from. The lesser the 
freedom from, the more restricted the freedom to. Because 'the right to 
have movables and immovables freely at one's disposal' was absent or at 
least highly restricted - for example, by the many expenses and 
obligations and the associated dependency relations (see Spahr van der 
Hoek 1952, vol. 1, p. 378) - the opportunity (or freedom) to organise 
production and the development of the farm in such a way as to agree 
with one's own interests, insights and perspectives, was missing. 
Farming freedom is not a static phenomenon. Slicher van Bath observes 
that 'the freedom that farmers have is determined by various factors, 
which are in turn the effect of historical circumstances. Therefore, 
medieval liberties are nowhere stationary, they are subjected everywhere 
to historical evolution and digression' (1978, p. 80). He stresses with 
regard to Friesland that 'farming freedom in the Frisian regions was not 
static, it underwent a development that reached its peak during the 
thirteenth century, after which it declined' (ibid., p. 75). The concrete 
expression of this decline can be read in Rienck Hemmema's 
memorandum book: the new dependency relations between farm and 
markets, and hence between farmers and new elites, was such that the 
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room for manoeuvre of farmers, their freedom to, was reduced to a 
minimum. 
In subsequent centuries, freedom from and freedom to were regained to a 
certain extent. Sometimes this happened purposefully and rather 
abruptly, as in the struggle for volheid van magt (self-determination, 
literally 'plentitude of power'; Spahr van der Hoek 1952, vol. 1, 38-72). At 
other times the same process occurred more imperceptibly and gradually. 
I will illustrate certain episodes below. In any event, the market 
dependency that was so very tight in Hemmema's age was replaced over 
the course of the subsequent centuries (see Figure 2.2) by a more stable 
balance, by a balance that contained more freedom from and that, 
therefore, contained also more freedom to pursue one's own development 
trajectory. 
Second intermezzo 
In theory, the high degree of market dependency can be reduced by a 
range of strategies. 
1 A steady price increase can augment monetary revenue and therefore 
the suyvere deel to such an extent that one's own capacity to accumulate 
and, hence, the capacity to reinforce one's own 'engine' is increased. 
However, one does not result automatically from the other. Farmers' 
purposeful actions remain an essential link, because a steady price 
increase can also create an attitude of 'getting rich without effort' (Van 
der Poel 1983). This still applies today, however: it remains crucial for 
farmers to consider alternatives. The period of approximately 1986 
until 1989 has been extremely favourable to dairy farmers: the milk 
price was relatively high. This caused some to invest heavily in further 
growth (including the purchase of quotas), while others seized the 
opportunity of the favourable economic climate to accelerate 
redemption in order to gain more 'engine capacity'. In other words, 
price levels are important but they do not tell the whole story. 
Farmers' responses remain the essential link. 
2 Costs of attracting production factors and inputs from markets can be 
reduced over longer periods. Whether this will occur depends upon, 
inter alia, the power relations between the actors involved: between 
farmers, on the one hand, and urban and rural elites on the other. 
Since the late 19th century, both strategies have been pursued 
purposefully through the creation of co-operatives (Wiersma 1959) and 
often fierce struggles against land owners. Thus, the secular trend 
described by Faber (1972) was actively translated into an improved 
suyvere deel. 
3 A third strategy revolves around increasing the technical efficiency of 
the labour and production processes. The higher the production level 
achieved from a given amount of production factors and inputs, the 
higher the technical efficiency (Timmer 1970; Yotopoulos 1974). 
Quantity and quality of farm labour are crucial links in this, because a 
Dancing through Time 65 
higher technical efficiency (also known in agrarian history as 'yield 
ratio', Slicher van Bath 1960) makes it possible, in principle, to increase 
both market production (and thus the suyvere deel) and the amount of 
reusable production factors and inputs, in order to reduce market 
dependency in both the short and the long term (by substituting 
purchased production factors and inputs for home-produced factors 
and inputs). 
Fourth, the structure of the farm can be changed considerably. In this 
context, a useful concept from classic agronomy is 'tiered agriculture'. 
It is the ordering of a farm as a series of interconnected subsystems or 
tiers. Output from the one subsystem provides input for the next, 
where the supplied input is transformed into input for the subsequent 
phase. Tier piles onto tier. Grass and hay are produced for the cows 
(forgive me the banal nature of the example), cows produce milk, the 
milk subsequently disappears into the cellar to produce cheese (and 
whey to feed to the pigs to produce meat, which is transformed into 
ham and sausages). 
Bieleman (1987) has sketched such developments for Drenthe. If 
farming there was initially oriented solely towards producing and 
selling rye, later farmers developed new tiers: the mixed farm emerges, 
which should be imagined not so much in terms of coordination but as 
the integrated ordering of farm tiers vis-à-vis one another. Analytically, 
this implies that an ever smaller part of the total annual produce is 
marketed. An increasing proportion of production is used as the basis 
(as input) for higher tiers. In other words, resources used in 
subsequent phases are hardly ever obtained from markets, they are the 
product of the autonomous circuit, they are supplied by the lower tiers 
of the farm itself. A Frisian example of tiered agriculture is constituted 
by the gardeniers (small farmers who make multiple use of their 
plots).11 
Finally, it is possible to tackle market dependency directly. In 
principle, two possibilities present themselves for this. The amounts of 
expenses and obligations at issue are negotiable and renegotiable. 
Leases, relationships with merchants, with money lenders, with 
farmer-colleagues with whom cattle is grazed, all these concrete types 
of dependency can be considered, reviewed, and (re)negotiated. 
Frisian agrarian history is full of such examples. Similarly, other 
mechanisms can be thought of. Farms that are highly dependent on the 
labour market could in principle reduce their size so the available 
family labour becomes adequate. Such a suggestion seems too unreal 
nowadays. However, very real and far-reaching processes can be 
identified in Frisian agrarian history that can only be understood from 
this perspective (Weideren 1912b; Van der Ploeg 1987). History should 
never be approached from the point of view of contemporary logic. 
However inconceivable it may seem now, Frisian farmers have used a 
rich repertoire of methods throughout history to reduce the very tight 
market dependency and to increase the suyvere deel. 
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The third and fifth possibility have been widely used, in and throughout 
Frisian agrarian history, as strategies for farmers to break away from the 
tight grip of market dependency. In the Frisian Woodlands, a modest role 
was played by the fourth possibility (Weideren 1912b); although it was 
also brought forward as a potential solution for the typical greidebedrijven 
(livestock farms, literally 'grassland farms'; Rauwerda and Van den 
Akker 1917), but not taken up. 
All in all, Figure 2.2 presents the results of the attempts to change the 
balance between commodity and non-commodity circuits to embody both 
more freedom from as well as more freedom to. Thus Figure 2.2 can also 
be interpreted differently - that is, as indicative of the partial completion 
of the family farm in agriculture. After all, the use of one's own 
resources - labour, capital, land, and non-factor inputs - is typical of 
family farms (or more analytically, of simple commodity production). The 
availability of one's own resources can by no means be understood 
merely as a remnant of former times, as the inheritance of a past natural 
economy. It has been actively created 'since Hemmema'. The family farm, 
as we know it today, is the outcome of a complex historical process, of an 
emancipation process in which farmers actively set course towards more 
freedom from and more freedom to - that is, towards the 'relative' 
completion of the family farm. Therefore, the family farm is not the 
remaining part of one of the initial conditions of this historical process. It 
is an actively created outcome. 
About hay trading and sniggering, or the purposeful and strategic actions of the 
actors involved 
I was born and raised in the Frisian Woodlands, and later I spent a long 
time in the Frisian clay area. I have heard hundreds of stories, and 
experienced dozens of incidents. I suppose I have forgotten most of them, 
but what I do remember is enough not to romanticise the past, let alone to 
glorify it. On the contrary. However, to brush it all aside as over and done 
with is also incorrect; the fragments that have survived are simply too 
fascinating. 
One of the stories I remember well concerned hay. Selling hay was highly 
taboo, as was purchasing it. A farmer who sold hay would be blamed: he 
had not properly balanced his farm. He had made some miscalculations 
during hjerstmis (autumn)* and disposed of too many cattle, or he had 
made another miscalculation. Similarly, the man who had to buy hay had 
bitten off more than he could chew - that is, he kept more cows than he 
could feed from his land, or he must have been lying down on the job in 
the ungetiid (hay harvesting period; literally 'bad time', i.e. the busiest 
time of the year), as a result of which he ended up with too little hay. 
Whichever way one looked at it, it was no good at all. 
* Translator's note: In autumn farmers had to decide on the number of cattle to be kept during 
the winter. 
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Of course, issues such as these were hardly mentioned explicitly or 
discussed as such. Particular incidents were needed to reactivate such 
notions in people's comments. I remember one such incident in detail. It 
concerned a father-in-law, an old farmer, who supported his son-in-law, 
who farmed elsewhere, with a few cartloads of hay. Of course, he could 
not do this in the daytime. What would people think? So it was arranged 
in the pitch-black night and, of course, noticed nevertheless, after which 
the gegniis (the sniggering) and the comments were not long in coming. 
Comments from which the above-mentioned norms could be extracted. 
Trading hay, or tabooing such a trade, seems an appropriate clue to 
raising a fundamental issue. First, we are dealing with a historically 
variable issue (Faber 1974). Initially, hay was a commodity par excellence. 
This was as clear as daylight in Hemmema's case (Fryske Akademy 1990). 
Then there is a period when buying and selling hay become taboo. What 
was mentioned before abstractly as the fifth strategy - reducing certain 
types of market dependency directly - thus emerges in a concrete way. 
The ban on hay sales was laid down even in leases. Older farm men and 
farm women often remember the norms of the day. Nowadays the trade 
in roughage and green fodder (and hay) is conducted in the open again, 
often involving immense volumes. There is no sign of any taboo. Hence, 
the cycle seems to have gone full circle. 
There have been periods when hundreds of barges full of hay departed 
from the harbour of the south Frisian town of Lemmer every year, to be 
sold in Holland. The same applied to manure, the better youngstock and 
the best cows and bulls. The idea of integrated farm management, in 
which tier was built onto tier, had not yet developed into a guiding 
principle: anything with which to make money was sold. The idea that the 
available manure, hay, and so on should be used above all to the lasting 
improvement of one's own farm (in intensification and the increase of 
technical efficiency) had to ripen still. Farmers' positions vis-à-vis 
markets are variable: they can take different positions. And as far as this is 
concerned, history shows that there have been dramatic and intriguing 
changes. 
This leads us to a second issue: taking a particular position vis-à-vis 
markets assumes actors that are purposeful and goal-oriented. To change 
from a lively trade in hay to a taboo on it presupposes an active 
(re)interpretation of the working conditions; it presupposes consultation, 
negotiation, and renegotiation; it implies setting out a new course of 
action and new evaluations: does the choice made appear to be the right 
one? Of course, this process takes place under ever-changing 
circumstances. That is why the outcome of the considerations, of deciding 
on the most desired position vis-à-vis markets, is always different. 
It is not surprising that this position is continually (re)defined. The 
relations created between farm and markets are closely interwoven with 
the particular way of farming and the way in which it is possible to farm. 
Dewez (1958, p . 57) quotes the steward Dingemans, who refers to very 
careful farmers (seer goede Baenders) but also to others who 
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are days away from home and never tend to their affairs, and who are repeatedly 
in town and in the inns to waste the money they have left. His wife likes to run 
the home generously. In summer, they sell their hay and straw cheap just to 
have money, and then in winter they will have to buy it dear. 
In other words, selling hay is not a neutral action with no implications for 
the management of the rest of the farm. The relationships with the 
markets are closely connected to farm management, farm development, 
and, more generally, the lives and the perspectives of those who work on 
the farm. 
2.3 The height of the dunging passage and other episodes 
During the 19th century, Frisian farmers succeeded in further reducing 
market dependency - by tabooing the hay trade, amongst other things. 
Hence they increased (directly or indirectly) the suyvere deel substantially. 
Without any pretence at being complete, a further set of episodes will be 
described, indicating how the high degree of market dependency was de 
facto reduced. These episodes are also an indication of that which has 
already been briefly mentioned: the purposeful actions of farmers, the 
process of actively choosing and changing positions vis-à-vis markets. 
Marx argued at the time that history never repeats itself. What occurs as a 
real tragedy the first time will reveal itself the second time only as parody, 
or worse, as farce. Presumably, this applies to numerous situations; 
however, the exact reverse happens in Friesland. There the farce happens 
first, and the meaningful event comes later. The behaviour of Frisian 
farmers during periods of high butter prices is an outstanding example of 
this. 
In late 18th century and early 19'h century, butter prices reached 'a peak 
unheard of in those days'. However, this resulted in a remarkable 
paradox: 'on the whole there was prosperity in agriculture', livestock, 
however, was subject to a reduction in 'numbers and virtue' (Broekema 
1913, pp. 346 and 347 respectively). The average height of cattle 
(measured at the withers) decreased significantly; 'nobility' (Popta 1962) 
seemed to be lost; good heifers became increasingly rare, and one had to 
have an accidental 'turncoat' for the milk to flow - they were very 
worrying signs, both separately and collectively. Thanks to the high 
butter prices, farmers made money without any effort, but the basis of this 
prosperity withered under their fingers as it were: cattle lost its virtue. 
There was a lot of speculation about the reasons for this at the time (and 
later on as well). Reference was often made to the cattle plague, the quade 
sieckte (evil disease), which had struck several times in the 18th century. 
The cattle herd was reduced to a fraction of its initial size every time, 
which, inter alia, prompted massive imports of cattle. Hence, the decline of 
Frisian cattle in the early 19th century was usually related to either the 
cattle plague or the import of inferior stock, or both. However, such a 
connection cannot be maintained. 
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Essentially, the systematic improvement of cattle - which is one of the 
concrete paths along which an increase in technical efficiency can take 
place - had not yet become an integral part of the farm labour process at 
the time of this first period of high butter prices. The floods, wars, 
pillaging, and the many cattle diseases had made it reasonable and logical 
to prefer quantity over quality. Farmers preferred to keep more cattle 
rather than better cattle. A smaller herd of higher quality cattle was too 
risky under the circumstances. Although in principle the basic material 
was present, there was, considering the results, 'not in the least reason to 
assume that farmers concentrated on the improvement of cattle breeds' 
(Spahr van der Hoek 1952, vol. 1, p. 257). These conditions applied until 
the 18th and early 19th centuries. 
In this respect, the response to the cattle plague is illustrative. During the 
18th century, this 'punishment of God' was finally conquered, especially 
through selection on the farms. Of every eleven infected cows, two 
appeared to survive and be largely immune to the disease. Thus it 
appeared possible to improve the cattle (and, as it seemed, permanently). 
Of course, the improved cattle commanded high prices after a wave of 
cattle plague. Demand from surrounding areas was enormous at times. 
Thus, a significant part of the improved cattle was sold rather than kept to 
form the basis of a fully improved herd. Again the result was many 
deaths at the subsequent outbreak of cattle plague. Spahr van der Hoek 
draws a bitter but correct conclusion: 'The desire to rapidly increase the 
existing prosperity was regretted' (1952, vol. 1, p. 54; my emphasis). 
We encounter this basic pattern again when butter and cheese prices 
increased significantly from 1783 onwards. Farmers reacted to this 
increase in a way that was very much determined by the then prevailing 
short-term perspective and by the strong orientation towards the market. 
Direct gain came first. This turned out to be catastrophic in the long term. 
High butter prices 'tempt farmers to make money at the expense of care 
for the exact breeding of high-quality heifers. In order to have a lot of 
milk, too many cattle were kept on farms, resulting in insufficient feeding' 
(Spahr van der Hoek 1952, vol. 1, p. 260). The underlying logic was also 
applied to other farm practices: 
1 The grazing season was extended as much as possible, the time cattle 
spent indoors was shortened, in order to save as much hay as possible 
and to avoid expensive supplementary feeding. Hay was still an 
important export commodity. 'The desire to speculate tempted 
farmers to be economical with this valuable commodity' (Spahr van de 
Hoek 1952, vol. 1, p. 206). 
2 If the above-mentioned practice had been about for quite some time, 
the stocking density was further increased in the late 18th century (as a 
result of the high butter price). However, there was little intensification 
of fodder production to match this. 
3 Paulus Scheltema (referred to by his contemporaries as Paulus the 
Liar) was a farmer in Dongjum. He described how, in about 1744, 
calves were fed a surplus of buttermilk (thus consuming the raw 
component of cheese-making), while the yearlings were pastured with 
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the dairy cows (and thus were eating the same grass with which other 
animals produced milk). Figure 2.3 clearly shows this. However, as the 
farming proverb says: hwat mear tsiis, hwat minder keallen (more cheese, 
less calves). After 1783, Scheltema began to make cheese. He increased 
the number of cows from 12-13 to 16-17. Calves were no longer fed 
buttermilk but were fed whey instead. The yearlings were moved to 'a 
far corner' (of poor quality; see Figure 2.4), and 'in spring I took my 
calves into the fields earlier than usual'. Calves were removed from 
the cows immediately after birth and placed in a dark corner of the 
shed - mother's milk had become expensive! 
4 The poor care provided for the calves was not caused by ignorance, it 
was a diversion from past norms. Typically, in the Frisian Woodlands, 
an area in which reactions to price changes were less marked, care for 
young calves was described as follows: 'When the calf is born, it is tied 
up in some straw in the middle passage behind the cows. It is fed some 
of the second colostrum and for about one week, thrice daily, mother's 
milk. In late summer, at about August, it receives potatoes boiled with 
butter milk, particularly linseed cake water, and some hay' (Allershof 
1891, p. 118). 
5 The miserable feeding and poor care of the calves was further 
exacerbated by the problem of rents: 'One is forced to graze the calves 
on low, cold, and poor land, whereas you pay too high a rent for the 
best land' (Spahr van der Hoek 1952, vol. 1, p. 437; again, see Figure 
2.4). 
Figure 2.3 Calves among the cows: less cheese, better calves 
ï. -"'-
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Figure 2.4 The calves were moved to marshy land: degradation of cattle 
6 If deteriorated care and feeding resulted in a downward development 
in the quality of cattle, no doubt early first calving also contributed 
significantly to this: 'One-year-old calves are already put to the bull, 
and a one-year-old bull at that' (Spahr van der Hoek 1952, vol. 1, p. 
437, and also p. 251, n. 1). Alta (quoted in Spahr van der Hoek 1952, 
vol. 1, p. 251) had calculated the costs 'of making a good cow at two 
years old'. This amount (41 Carolean guilders) would have been much 
more if the calving date had been moved back, resulting in better and 
more robust cattle in the long term, but it would have been at the 
expense of the directly realisable monetary revenue. 
7 A last element of the 'hunt for milk' - ensuing the 'desire for a rapid 
increase in prosperity', elsewhere called the desire to speculate - was 
the practice of continuing to milk the cows instead of drying them off 
(Spahr van der Hoek 1952, vol. 1, p. 438). The quality of calves and 
hence of subsequent generations was also affected by this course of 
action. 
To cut a long story short, the reproduction of cattle suffered badly - it was 
neglected for the sake of instant gain. The result was a sharp decline in the 
quality of livestock. When falling butter prices startled the Frisian farming 
community out of the dream of making money without effort, their future 
appeared to be looking worse than ever. 
A second wave of steady increases in butter prices set in around 1855. 
Apparently, farmers had learned from the previous farce. Partly as a 
result of the previous struggle for the volheid van magt, in which farmers 
freed themselves from landlords, the idea emerged that progress could be 
made with one's own means and one's own labour. Organised breeding, 
which began to take definite shape from 1860 onwards, is a clear 
expression of this (Strikwerda 1979); as is the reduction and subsequent 
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elimination of the once massive exports of hay, manure, and of the best 
stock. The best stock, hay, and manure lost their importance as 
merchandise: they became increasingly perceived as resources to be used 
to farm well and which would in the long term, through systematic 
improvement, constitute the basis for progress. Thus the norm that 'a 
good farmer does not sell hay' emerged. Later, the experiential 
knowledge that 'another farmer never sells their best calves' slowly 
became a reality. 
Without entering into a lengthy discussion about these issues here, I 
would like to refer to the emergence of cattle improvement, to the 
common project through which the herd is gradually altered towards the 
ideal cow (see Figure 2.5). Cattle improvement, which became the basis 
for the foundation of the Fries Rundvee Stamboek (Friesian Herd Book; 
Strikwerda 1979), revolves around two other projects: reducing over-
dependency on the market and the process of gradually gaining self-
confidence, the idea that one can produce progress oneself in the long 
term. 
Figure 2.5 'There you stand, full of promise' 
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Are truly blessed 
The rise of breeding (eventually making Friesian cattle world-famous and 
hence a widely respected commodity) has also been related to the then 
sharp increase in butter prices. However, it is incorrect to make such a 
direct connection. First, the farce that preceded all this was necessary. 
Critical lessons were learned on the basis of that experience. Only after 
the short-term perspective was exchanged for a long-term perspective, 
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and only after a certain distance was created vis-à-vis the markets, did a 
new increase in butter prices, in combination with the now accomplished 
cattle improvement, result in a long-term prospect for Frisian livestock 
farmers. In a way, cattle improvement can be understood as an extra tier 
added to the Frisian dairy industry.4 
The expression used here, distantiation from the market in order to better 
produce for the market, may sound paradoxical at first. However, the 
thesis that farms contain two economic circuits (see Figure 2.1) helps us to 
understand the particular rationale of these structural changes. The 
relation between the two circuits changed between the first and second 
periods of increases in butter prices. Manure, hay, dairy cows, and 
particularly calves were moved out of the circuit dominated by monetary 
values. They were no longer perceived as merchandise by the farmers, but 
were seen increasingly as part of, and relocated in, the second circuit - of 
one's own production factors and inputs, to which the logic of the market 
no longer applies directly. 
A different logic applies to this second circuit (dominated not by exchange 
value but by use value), revolving around the question of how to farm in 
order to be able to supply sufficient products with high value-added to 
the relevant market in the long term. In a way the focus becomes more 
inward. This is not a rejection of the market, but reflects a more 
sophisticated understanding of how to engage with it. The creation of a 
tiered agriculture is intrinsically connected to this. Manure is no longer 
merchandise but a resource to fertilise the land to increase grass 
production. Hay is no longer sold: it is fed to one's own cattle. The main 
function of home-reared cattle (the surplus of which is gladly sold) is to 
supply good milk for butter production. Furthermore, home-reared cattle 
has an even more important function: it shows prospect for the future (see 
Figure 2.5). A solid foundation is laid for further farm expansion by 
improving resources now, in this case by engaging in cattle improvement: 
better cattle and eventually the opportunity to sell good stock. Freedom 
from is used effectively as freedom to further improve the farm. Tier is 
added to tier: the farm becomes constituted by a well-structured set of 
cycles, well tuned vis-à-vis each other, only related to markets at the final 
stage of production (via the top tier). No direct market logic applies to the 
lower tiers: farming is practised to achieve optimal attunement. This also 
implies that the importance of the market changes dramatically. If it was 
initially the ordering principle par excellence, penetrating and determining 
every aspect of farm management, now it becomes more of an outlet: 
indispensable with a view to sales, and essential because an attractive 
market encourages farm management and development, but no longer 
the all-determining compass. 
Revisiting Figure 2.1, it can be said that self-sufficiency became 
increasingly more important: a relatively autonomous, historically 
guaranteed form of reproduction took gradually over from market 
dependent reproduction (Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 1985; Van der Ploeg 
1990). Frisian farmers dissociated themselves from the market as ordering 
principle between the first and second periods of high butter prices, 
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precisely to better anticipate the most interesting market (the one for 
butter). Even if better care for, and feeding of, dairy cows and followers 
are more expensive, even if the taboo on the selling of hay, manure, and 
the most promising youngstock implies giving up immediate gain, Frisian 
dairy farmers still reject these activities. Kreas buorkje (farming gently -
that is, in a responsible and aesthetic way) now becomes the norm for 
ordering the farm and also for defining and establishing the more distant 
relationship vis-à-vis the market. 
A fascinating illustration of this change can be found in the initial 
increase, and later reduction, of the height of floor of cattle stalls. During 
the 18th century the height of the floor was raised up to 70 cm from the 
bottom of the dunging passage when new sheds were built and old ones 
converted. An almost impossible situation was created in practical 
terms: 
The enormous height of the stalls was very inconvenient. Not only for 
caretakers when feeding and watering, but also for the animals themselves when 
one of them slid a hind leg into the passage. Apart from the pain and scrapes . . . 
it was a right disaster. Because the hoisting and pulling to get the cow out of the 
low passage and onto the high stall hurt her even more than the actual sliding. 
Not to mention the not infrequently fatal accidents' (Spahr van der Hoek 
1952, vol. 1, p. 446). 
Many theories have been formulated about the reasons behind this 
peculiar custom. Spahr van der Hoek's conclusion, however, is the most 
sound one: 'It must be accepted that the very high stalls served to display 
the cattle' (ibid., vol. 1, p. 449). Displaying characterises the extent to 
which cows were still regarded as merchandise: with a view to the keaplju 
(merchants) visiting the sheds in spring, the f e would stand to pronk (cattle 
would be displayed at its best). Everything was geared towards this. The 
welfare and health of the cattle and the efficiency and convenience of the 
labour process became subordinate to displaying cows as merchandise. 
Later on this changed again. There was more distantiation from markets 
and the height of the stalls was reduced to more practicable proportions. 
Kreas buorkje already sets the tone by then. Stalling the cows as high as 
possible, in order to present them as bigger and therefore as better, has 
then become a second farce - which has definitely passed by then. 
Farmers distantiate themselves from markets not only subjectively, they 
try to reduce the real dependency vis-à-vis supply-side markets too. This 
develops into two different aspects. On the one hand, there is the struggle 
to change, through collaborative effort, the conditions for entering into 
such a dependency; on the other hand, the material dependency is 
reduced where possible. The mechanisms used for this purpose would 
cause bafflement nowadays but were understood 'entirely according to 
logic' at the time. One of the many examples concerns reducing the size of 
one's own farm. 
A report by the Staatscommissie voor den Landbouw (Government 
Commission on Agriculture; 1912, pp. 477, 492) mentions 'a tendency to 
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reduce the hectarage of farms'. This observation concerns Frisian dairy 
farms and particularly those in the peat districts. It is noted that 'the 
explanation of this tendency' should be sought especially in 'that many 
aspire to obtain a farm in which one is as little as possible dependent on 
external labour'. Forage production per hectare of grassland could be 
increased considerably by 'carefully cleaning ditches and trenches' (ibid., 
p. 467), by 'producing forage more intensively' (ibid., p. 468), and by the 
'supply of artificial fertiliser and mud from mounds' (ibid., p. 477). 
Theoretically, this opened up two possibilities: expanding the cattle herd 
(which would have prompted to more labour market dependency, for 
both hay making and milking) or disposing of land that had become 
superfluous. The latter is chosen, to 'take away a part of the farm every 
now and again' (ibid., p. 477). Thus the estates were deliberately reduced 
in size, in order to reduce de facto dependency. This remarkable process 
occurred not only in Friesland, but in many parts of the Netherlands (Van 
Zanden 1985, pp. 333-337).16 
A final episode concerns the small farms in the Frisian Woodlands. The 
dependency issue was of course particularly difficult on small farms. 
Hence, solutions were often found here before anywhere else. The 
following episode is also interesting because it shows that farmers were 
supported by others in improving the delicate balance between autonomy 
and dependency. 
In the 1930s, the Office for Small Farms operated in the Netherlands. It 
was a special division within the Directorate for Advisory and Research of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries with the intention of helping 
small farms by designing and realising particular measures and 
innovations. One of the many research projects conducted at the time 
recognised that small farms in the Frisian Woodlands contended with 
constantly having to lease small pieces of land in order to have sufficient 
roughage at their disposal. Furthermore, 'if one compares rents paid by 
large and small farmers, the latter spend considerably more (often 20-30 
per cent) on similar land' (Witteveen, n.d., p. 1). At the same time, the 
problem arose that 'too many concentrates' had to be fed supplementarily 
in the shed. Thus, small farmers were steering between Scylla and 
Charybdis (two dependency relationships). In order to intensify 
production as much as possible (to generate sufficient income from the 
small farm) they had to consult either Scylla (the concentrates 
salesperson) or Charybdis (the landlord who demanded too high prices). 
Within the constraints in this particular situation, a new solution was 
found and tested. 
Central to this was the development of several innovations all of which 
aimed to create higher levels of self sufficiency within their farms. For 
'everyone who knows the severe difficulties of leasing separate plots of 
land will also feel the great importance of higher levels of self-sufficiency 
to small farms in particular' (Witteveen, n.d., p. 7). By substituting the 
then customary zero-grazing system for a renewed grazing system, by 
substituting common silage pits for 'Finnish silage pits' (offering less 
losses and better quality), and by introducing potatoes, mangold, etc. into 
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the crop rotation in order to replace concentrates, self-sufficiency was 
improved dramatically and additional leases and concentrate purchases 
became superfluous. 
Figure 2.6 Decommoditisation in the 1930s 
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Thus, 1.5 kg 'flour' (concentrates) and 25 kg Frisian silage could be 
substituted by '25 kg Finnish silage and 8 kg potatoes'. Witteveen 
remarked explicitly: 'both were produced on one's own farm'. Thus the 
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balance between autonomy and dependency was changed and 
consequently, the suyvere deel increased. This, in turn, made it possible to 
farm in a more kreas (gentle) way. 
The 1930s also mark a second important episode in the development of 
farm self-sufficiency. These were years of major crisis. Prices fell abruptly 
- as a result, the suyvere deel tended towards zero or even less. The 
reaction of Frisian farmers (which we can tell from the then widely 
available farm accounts, later analysed by Vondeling 1948) was typical. 
They adapted farm management strategies that reduced monetary costs 
and consequently, the suyvere deel increased again (see Figure 2.6). The 
cropping plan, for instance, was adapted in order to contract fewer or no 
wage labourers. Furthermore, wage labour was largely substituted for 
family labour. Vondeling also shows that less feedstuffs were bought, 
without a dramatic fall in milk yield. According to Vondeling, this 
reflected, above all, the more efficient use of the internal circuit, of 
pastures and meadows (1948, p. 103). 
2.4 Kreas or rûch: the Nijboer of the Lycklemastate 
Until the 1950s, intensive farming was an unambiguous concept - both 
among farmers and within agricultural science. According to the English 
agricultural scientist Graham Brade-Birks (1950, p. xvi): 'Good farming 
means farming so carried out as to produce the maximum economic output from 
the land'. He also describes 'good farming' as intensive farming, referring to 
'those practices designed to produce a very high output'. 
This is in contrast to extensive farming: 'The practice using the minimum 
amounts of labour, cultivation and manure'. Brade-Birks refers to extensive 
farming simply as 'a low standard of farming'. A similar pattern can be 
found in expositions by Dutch agricultural scientists at the time. Intensive 
farming is based on the intensive use of capital, labour, and inputs per 
unit of land and per livestock unit. In addition, a high technical efficiency 
was achieved by working carefully. The outcome is high productive 
results per labour object: per animal and/or per unit of land. 
This basic pattern was also recognised in the Frisian countryside. The 
'freedom to' secured by then was used for ongoing intensification, 
revolving around the quantity and quality of labour. Freedom from 
suffocating market relations and patterns of dependency was one of the 
essential conditions here. 
I want to stress this specific interpretation of the, then prevailing, concept 
of intensification, especially because a new meaning of this term 
gradually emerged from the 1960s onwards. Intensity is then increasingly 
understood as a function of technologies designed especially for this 
purpose. Intensity is based less on the input of high-quality labour, but 
becomes increasingly the result of the application of these new 
technologies on the farm. The cubicle shed, a sharply increased stocking 
rate, grassland improvement, highly increased use of concentrates and 
artificial fertiliser, automation of cattle feeding, reorganisation of manure 
storage and distribution, the reorganisation of breeding, substitution of 
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hay by silage, and so on constitute some of the remarkable and well-
known aspects of the emerging new technological model. This results 
partly in a dramatic increase in milk yield per cow and per hectare, while 
- and this emphasises the break with the past and with the techniques 
applied till then - the labour input was sharply reduced at the same time 
(Van der Ploeg 1987; De Bruin 1997a; Roep 2000). 
The then director of the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI, 
Landbouw Economisch Instituut), De Veer, observed that, 
generally, the yield increase per hectare of crops or per cow could be achieved 
without having to use more labour per hectare or per cow. It is in fact a feature 
of modern agricultural development that increases in yield levels are no longer 
connected to labour-intensive production methods but are based on the 
application of results of scientific research and the use of yield increasing 
methods and means, which demand hardly any labour or which are sometimes 
even labour saving (1986, p. 23). 
This change has serious implications for the concepts of intensity and 
intensification. In the historical period under discussion here, these terms 
did not yet refer to the use of technological models designed to this end, 
but intensification is seen above all as the result of simultaneously 
increasing the quantity and the quality of farm labour. 
This basic pattern is clearly present in the thinking of Frisian farmers. 
Thus Rauwerda and the farmer-writer Van den Akker noted that farms 
are supposedly becoming more intensive if the hectarage stays the same 
while the amount of labour and capital, which the owner appropriately 
puts into it, increases (1917, p. 6). They add that 'the intensive farm type is 
of vital importance to society as a whole' {ibid., p. 7). For them, intensive 
farming represents a clear, undisputed norm. Further, they refer 
indirectly to the necessity of a certain degree of autonomy, a certain 
degree of freedom from, for the 'intensive farm type involves higher risk' 
{ibid., p. 9). 
In the late 19th century, the then Friesche Maatschappij van Landbouw en 
Veeteelt (Frisian Agricultural Society) organised an enquiry into the causes 
of unemployment in Friesland. The final report describes numerous 
alternatives to intensifying farming by using more labour and hence 
reducing unemployment. It is a delight to go through the report. 
Eventually, revealing conclusions are drawn. On the one hand, 'there is 
an abundance of labour, productive labour, providing benefits under all 
circumstances, not in the least to the owner' (1892, p. 81). On the other 
hand, it is clearly recognised that at the time labour was 'not fully 
employed, which is regrettable and can be attributed to various causes' 
{ibid.). 
Referring to the period when farmers made 'money without effort', the 
report concluded that 'Friesland suffers (still) from the effects of the 
"golden" age . . . This age has not remained without influence on farmers'. 
The then Frisian Agricultural Society decided that, in terms that sound 
surprisingly like the ones Miedema would use almost a century later, 
'[farmers'] resistance to bad times has weakened, so that, when harvest 
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failures and lower prices followed, many had to refrain even from 
productive expenditure in tillage in order to economise'. 
The lack of sufficient net worth (that is, one's own capital) and family 
labour ruled out autonomously organised improvements. Entering 
(again) into dependency relations (borrowing money) was rejected. The 
necessity to continue and increase the freedom from had become part of a 
collective memory. The tenure mechanism, weakened by then, is also 
interpreted along those lines: 'Even though current rents are not 
excessively high, still many cannot afford them, because the productive 
capacity of the land has declined as a result of neglected tillage and 
fertilisation due to lack of farm capital' (ibid.). 
The struggle for more intensive farming can not only be traced in official 
documents, it also permeates the many expressions of Frisian culture. 
Traces of this struggle, cutting right across the farming community, can be 
found in numerous documents of the day: in the De Nijboer fen 
Lyklemastate by Brouwer, in Groun en minsken by Brolsma, and in the Frysk 
boerenkwartetspul (Frisian Farm Happy Families). 
The then very popular play De Nijboer fen Lyklemastate [The Newly 
Arrived Farmer on Lyklema's Estate] can be read as a bitter clash between 
two normative models of how to best farm. At the same time, it points to 
a conflict between and about people, for each model contains a particular 
code about the way in which people should treat each other. 
The opposites are embodied by Lyklema, farmer of the eponymous estate, 
and Hedzer, a newcomer (Nijboer), paired off by Lyklema to his daughter. 
The position of the old farmer Lyklema is described in clear terms, by 
having him say the following: 
De Lyklema's hawwe fen steach op steach Ijeafde hawn for fé en bedriuw, hja 
hawwe jimmer yn 't spier west om alles syn gerak te jaen en dêrtrocht hawwe 
hja in goede nomme krigen yn Fryslân ... ik bin . .. net fen plan om de boel... 
forrinnewearje to litten, dêr is alles to goed for! (For generations, the 
Lyklema's have expressed love for their cattle and their farm, they have 
always been busy paying attention to what it needed and that's why 
they have earned a good reputation in Friesland . . . I don't intend to 
screw everything up now, it means too much to me!; Brouwer 1943, p. 
39). 
Alles syn gerak te jaen ('Care for everything according to its needs'). It is an 
idiomatic expression, referring to farming as intensively as possible: give 
sufficient time and attention to fields and cattle in order that they flourish. 
It is a line of argument that fits in with the autonomous circuit of use 
values (of net worth and family labour) held within every farm - that is, the 
circuit to which the market logic does not apply directly, but in which 
farmers can set their own course. The extent to which this is connected to 
a caring way of treating other people, as well as cattle and land, emerges 
from further arguments in the book. 
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Old Lyklema's views clash bitterly with Hedzer's. If Lyklema represents 
the norm, Hedzer serves as its counterpoint (Wertheim 1972). The latter 
remarks about the former: 
Hy is fiersten to mal mei it spul! It seil my iiskâld litte, ho mynfé der ûtsjocht. 
Jimme heit kit it der ek wolris hwat al to tsjok op ([Lyklema] seems obsessed 
with his farm! I couldn't care less about the state of the cattle. Your 
father wants it all to be too beautiful, he lays it on too thick; ibid., p. 30). 
The way the labourers are treated is a thorn in Hedzer's flesh, who -
judging by the full story - is mainly interested in fast gains. If he tends 
towards the cold logic of the market (get rid of the old labourers), he 
states that Lyklema acts differently in every way on this: 
Dy omgong mei de arbeiders ek, dêr binne de arbeider en 't wiif by de boer op 
bisite, ho is 't gods mûglik.. . (The way the labourers are treated! Now the 
labourer and his wife are visiting the farmer, for Heaven's sake . . . ; ibid., 
p. 31). 
The tension between the two comes to an open conflict when the young 
Hedzer starts to treat cattle in a way that is immoral in the eyes of others. 
A practice that reduces him to a 'beast'. As the old Lyklema says: 
Kouweûren mei brânnettels wriuwe? Det stomme bist!! (Applying nettles 
onto the udders? The beast!!; ibid., p. 36). 
Hedzer represents in this, otherwise rather simplistic, play an extensive 
style of farming: rûch buorkje (farming roughly), which replaces the long-
term care for cattle, land, and people with the pursuit of short-term gain. 
Here Hedzer opposes the old farmer Lyklema, who represents intensive 
farming and the implied social relations of production. Why then do they 
relate to each other at all? The explanation is obvious. The old farmer 
expected to pair off his daughter with Hedzer. His self-reproach, is 
striking: 
As de earste de beste keapman haw ik hjarforkofl oan dy keardel. . . (Like any 
old merchant I sold her to this guy.. .f° 
Production and reproduction processes in agriculture cannot be 
understood solely in terms of a more or less wide range of technical 
activities: relations with others are established in and through labour. 
Similarly, relations with and amongst resources (land, cattle tools, 
fertilisers, feeding, etc.) are essentially social relations: they have been 
purposefully constructed in reaction to certain opportunities and 
constraints, with an eye to achieving certain objectives. This also implies 
that it is impossible to reduce these relations to solely monetary aspects. 
According to Polanyi (1957, p. 131): 'The commodity fiction disregard[s] 
the fact that leaving the fate of soil and people to the market would be 
tantamount to annihilating them'. Indeed, one should not operate like the 
earste de beste keapman (like any old merchant) - that is, in summary, the 
essence of Frisian agrarian history. Compassion for fellow people, land, 
animals and the future, rules out perceiving and treating everything as 
merchandise (as commodities). Similarly, it is ruled out by self-respect, 
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self-interest (as understood within a particular cultural repertoire), and 
the will to realise sustainable progress by using one's own resources. 
2.5 Daniël fan Kuken: rûch buorkje 
The tension between kreas and rûch arbeidzje - that is, between farming 
gently and farming roughly - is located at the centre of numerous 
historical expressions of local culture. This is not unique to Friesland, nor 
to the described period. I want to discuss one of these manifestations in 
more detail: the novel Groun en minsken [Land and People] by Brolsma 
(1940; 1979). This Frisian novel, widely read at the time, is important in 
various ways. The writer was a remarkable man, who knew the cultural 
repertoire of the Frisian countryside inside out.2 Groun en minsken 
revolves not only around the tension between kreas and rûch arbeidzje. The 
story has much wider implications. A crucial connection is made in the 
novel between rûch arbeidzje (of which the main character, Daniel fan 
Kuken, is an exponent) and the desire for (the compulsion to, one would 
almost say after reading the book) farm enlargement. 
Such an enlargement of the farm does not imply - this is made clear in 
various places - a simple multiplication of the farm in all its facets. The 
target of the intended farm enlargement is structural change within the 
farm: it implies enlargement of its scale. The amount of work per labour 
object (per unit of land, per cow) should be reduced by enlarging the 
farm. Thus, farm enlargement and rûch arbeidzje coincide systematically: 
the one presupposes the other and vice versa. 
Brolsma makes it clear in his novel that this is not solely a technological 
correlation: the creation of large-scale, relatively extensive farming, in 
which the labour process is highly standardised, is characterised by a 
string of consequences. A series of conflicts arise because it expresses an 
explicit break with dominant norms in the surrounding farming 
community (where it is obligatory to farm kreas). Above all the 
implications for gender relations are interesting. Groun en minsken seems 
to anticipate the social drama that is to unfold a few decades later: the 
modernisation project put into effect from the mid-1950s onwards. An 
increasing degree of commoditisation (see also Figure 2.2) with novel 
patterns of dependency and profound changes in work and in gender 
relations, are some of the implications of the accelerated process of scale 
enlargement in Dutch agriculture. If initially the pendulum swung 
towards kreas buorkje, towards intensive, relatively small-scale farming, 
largely based upon the quantity and quality of farm labour, the ensuing 
modernisation period represents an opposite movement: towards large-
scale farming, to some extent representing rûch buorkje. 
However, at least one essential difference is involved in all this. In the 
modernisation period - roughly the period from the mid-1950s until the 
mid-1990s - the intensity of farming becomes less and less dependent on 
the quantity and quality of farm labour. Intensity and labour are 
increasingly disconnected because of the then dominant technological 
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development (for an additional analysis, see Bray 1986; Van der Ploeg 
1987). The intensity of farming becomes chiefly a function of the applied 
technologies and of the productivity inherent in purchasable resources 
and inputs. All this does not alter the fact that the modernisation project is 
initially experienced as social drama, as a break from everything that had 
been built up and from everything that was considered right. 
The main character in Groun en minsken, Daniël fan Kuken, farms in such a 
way that the surrounding community holds him in low esteem. 
Syn striefruchten binne mei fan de lichtste, en syn ierdappellân, it stik dat oan 
de dyk leit, dêr giet sa simmerdeis wolris in wizende earm hinne, en dan wurd 
der frege: 'Hwa syn lân is dat, dêr sit gâns smoargens ynV. (His cereal crops 
aren't very full and his potato land, particularly the plot along the dike, 
is often pointed at on summer days; people ask: 'Who does that land 
belong to, it is such a mess?' [full of weeds and full of badly growing 
plants]; Brolsma 1979, p. 184). 
He has too much land, so much so that he cannot farm it as intensively as 
is customary in the area. Daniël farms in an extensive way: 
. . . hy had dochs tofolle om it skiklich syn gerak to jaen. (.. . he has too much 
land, he can't give the soil what it deserves; ibid., p. 214.) 
Hence the criticism, sometimes sneering, sometimes scathing, aimed at 
Daniël by the social environment. For: 
. . . as de groun sprekt oer minskene wurk, dan is Daniël foroardiele. (.. . if the 
soil tells you about people's labour, Daniël is condemned; ibid., p. 220.) 
Daniël practices a different style of land use than has been the norm in the 
area. He embodies new values, deviating from prevalent norms. The state 
of his crops (extensive soil use) and the large amount of land he 
appropriates (scale enlargement) are the concrete and criticised 
manifestations of this. A 'dirty potato plot' and an 'empty cereal crop' 
refer in Daniel's case not to setbacks caused by the vagaries of nature. 
They are an explicit expression of Daniel's extensive style of farming. 
Hence there is no compassion for Daniël, whereas an unfortunate 
neighbour is usually given as much support as possible (for a couple of 
moving examples, see Mak 2000). 
Der is mei sa 'n ien net to forkearren, sizze de Hegemeisters . . . Hy sizze hja, 
docht net mei fordrach. Hoe sille hja nou bigien wêze op de frucht, dy't sa'n 
man bout? ('You can't deal with somebody like that', is the opinion of 
the people of Hegewei. He doesn't work in the proper way, so they say. 
Why should they take pity on the harvest of a man who works like that?; 
Brolsma 1979, p. 307.) 
Daniel's aberrant value orientation - the deviation that is so apparent 
from his extensive style of farming - emerges at various times in the story. 
Typically, Daniel's father is an immigrant: he is a newcomer to the area, 
he does not share the prevailing norms. It was already said of Lammert, 
Daniel's father, that: 
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. . . dizzefan Kuken net fan doel is om op syn lytse buorkerijke te tidigjen. (. . . 
this Van Kuken has no intention to farm this small farm forever; ibid., p. 
10). 
The son takes after the father. Daniël is obsessed with: 
. . . de ûnforwoestbare twang om it eigen bisit ût to wreidzjen. (. . . the 
indestructible compulsion to enlarge his own possessions; (ibid., p. 68). 
To earn money, as much money as possible. Daniël throws himself into 
various sideline activities - lorry driver, makadamrider (transporting 
material for road maintenance, an activity performed in the autumn), 
horse-coper. Daniël even tried the potato trade. However, Daniël was not 
interested in money for the sake of money: 
Sinten, seit heit, sinten torane jin yn'e nonnen, mar lân der hoecht men net op 
to passen, dat bliuwt. (Money [says father Daniël to his son], money slips 
through your fingers; but land, you don't have to keep an eye on land, 
land stays; ibid., p. 235.) 
In Daniel's set of values, land performs a new function. It has not so much 
a use value, a means to farm well ( 'y o u don't have to keep an eye on 
land'!), but above all represents exchange value, or capital. Thus it becomes 
attractive to acquire as much land as possible. Several times, Daniël comes 
into conflict with the other farmers in the area over his hunt for more 
land. It starts at his father's death - that is, when Daniël becomes a 
farmer. 
Daniel's father (Lammert) was a kind of contract worker before the term 
existed (fourmanderij): he regularly prepared land for sowing by other 
farmers. Many bills had apparently not yet been paid. It is as if farmers in 
the area share their poverty. Now Daniël dramatically puts an end to this. 
He demands immediate payment of the overdue amounts, he even brings 
the bailiff into the community. This makes his mother believe Daniël is 
possessed by an evil spirit: 
Hja leaut oan in kweageast, oan Satanswurk dat de jonge oermastere had. (She 
thinks he has become possessed by an evil spirit; Satan has taken control 
over her boy; ibid., p. 84.) 
But Daniël persists: 'why should I continue to work other people's land?', 
he asks himself. 'I would rather acquire possession of it, even if I have to 
do Satanswurk' (the devil's work - in this case, serving a writ on his 
neighbours). Characteristically, the neighbourhood goes all out to have 
the vicar intervene: 
Yn dizze dingen wurdt der ûntsettend folle fan in doarpsdûmny forwachte . . . 
hwant it gie ommers lang net goed hjirre . . .hy sette it op haren en snaren mei 
lytse Iju om him hinne. (A lot is expected of the vicar, particularly in issues 
such as these . . . for everything went wrong here . . . he [Daniël] created 
tension between himself and ordinary folk; ibid., p. 99.) 
The vicar is the one person here who is able to sanction the 
interrelationships (hja easken it fan dûmny dat er it jaen soe, the local 
community demanded the vicar to reprimand Daniël); but Daniël ignored 
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his reproaches. This establishes the conflict between Daniël and his social 
environment: Daniel's 'unflagging urge to increase his possessions' had 
him clash bitterly with the other farmers. 
Daniël acquires a lot of land. Still he does not become a greatboer (a large 
farmer). For a greatboer (such as his neighbour Sinia) is not just a farmer 
with a lot of land, but also someone who is able to cultivate his land well 
(it lân syn gerakjean). In the case of farm enlargement this is only possible 
by employing more labourers. And that is exactly what Daniël cannot and 
does not want to do because he considers it an unnecessary expenditure: 
In ûnforstoanige wrotter, dy't alles op haren en snaren set om alle fremde help 
bûten to kearen, dy't wol rekkenje kin oer in deihier, mar net oer it gewin fan in 
pounsmiet lân, ien, dy't by need de dong forhannelje soe en de groun ûntkeare, 
hwat him takomt om it gewin op'e foarhân. (He slaves foolishly and stakes 
everything to keep external labour out; he can count a day's wages but 
not the proceeds of a pondemaat* of land;5 he is someone who, if the 
worst comes to the worst, will sell manure and will neglect his land for 
the sake of some easy gain; ibid., pp. 271-272.) 
The extensive (or ruche) way of cultivation is not the result of Daniël fan 
Kuken's laziness. On the contrary, the relatively large scale of his farm 
prompts him to work very long hours. Even though he puts in relatively 
little labour per hectare and in particular less painstaking labour, the total 
area is so large in relation to the available amount of labour that it 
becomes necessary not only to extend the working day but also to work 
Sundays: 
Hy makket de dagen jimmer langer as oare, ek warbere ierdewrotters; hy 
skammet him soms net om Sneins mei ark de lannen yn to reizgjen, hwat men 
de gleonste nijljochters net ienris neijaen kin. (He works longer days than 
other farmers, even though they slave in the soil too; he is not even 
ashamed to take machines into the fields on Sundays, and that is 
something you cannot even blame the most fervent innovators of doing; 
ibid., p. 307.) 
Since the 1980s, cutting grass, making silage, etc. on Sundays has become 
common practice. Here, I will discuss in detail the extension of the 
working day, because it is an outcome of the combination of scale 
enlargement and extensification. Other farmers, who work intensively on 
a relatively small scale, work shorter days than Daniël fan Kuken: 
It is wier, hy kin in part mear wurk dwaen as in oar, mar hy wol jit folle mear as 
dêr't ek hy ta yn staet is. (It's true, he's able to do more work than others 
[i.e. he works longer days than others], but he wants so much more than 
he's capable of [i.e. he wants to cultivate too much land]; ibid., p. 187.) 
Hence, het geduldich en ûneinich tafoarsjoch (proper looking after and, 
especially, proper care during work) become sidelined. This is different 
for the other, intensive farmers: they take more care (they work with 
fordrach [i.e. they are reflexive], they provide the land with syn gerak [i.e. 
" Translator's note: pondemaat is an old Frisian unit of measurement, equal to 36.75 ares or 0.91 
acres. 
Dancing through Time 85 
with what it needs]), but the scale of farming is so limited (relatively) that 
they do not have to work Daniel's long days. When they walk home, they 
call out to Daniel, who is still sweating: 
Navend fan Kuken, it moat swier helle wurde net? (Evening Van Kuken, it 
doesn't come easy, does it?; ibid., p. 308.) 
2.6 Daniel's downfall: gender relations in agriculture 
In Groun en minsken, Daniel still fails as the particular carrier of that which 
will dominate agriculture at a much later date historically: the tendency 
towards scale enlargement. Daniel's downfall as a farmer has particular 
causes, which form the main themes of the novel. An investigation into 
these particular causes - at the level of the novel in question, of course -
seems to be important, precisely because Daniel's downfall can provide 
an insight into the conditions that support the later generalisation of 
large-scale agriculture. 
At first, Daniel's downfall as a farmer is rather confusing. There seem to 
be two interchangeable causes. Daniel's family disintegrates (first the 
children run away from home, then his wife leaves too) and, furthermore, 
extensive farming does not produce the expected profits. 
What is missing from the dialogues and reflections is the very relationship 
between both phenomena. Because Daniel's family disintegrates, he is not 
capable of continuing the large-scale agricultural practices. On the other 
hand, the family disintegrates because mother and children do not want 
to and/or are not able to adjust to the demands of the model of large-scale 
farming. Daniel does not succeed in disciplining his wife and children to 
follow the course of farming that he had put into practice. The conflict 
between disciplining and subordination of female and child labour seems 
inherent to, on the one hand, large-scale agriculture and, on the other, the 
urge for freedom and independence of women and children. The same 
conflict makes Daniël the patriarch who comes to oppress his wife and 
children. 
As much as Daniël abhors wage labour, he strongly desires his wife's and 
children's labour. For family labour 
. . . giet bûten it rekkenjen om, hy buorke nou mei eigen . . . hy hoegde nea wer 
in deihier lit to kearen oan infrjemd. ( . . . is kept outside of the accounts, he 
farmed under his own steam, he never again had to pay a day's wages; 
ibid., p. 196.) 
But the labour of wife and children is not just unpaid labour, however 
important this aspect may be. There is more. It is also fully 'malleable' 
labour. We already saw that Daniel extends his own working day. 
However, he also tries to squeeze the maximum out of his wife and 
children. Daniël becomes, according to the neighbours, a boat (tyrant) to 
his wife and children. 
In conclusion, a final but certainly not unimportant aspect: defining who 
has to work, what needs to be done, how the work needs to be carried 
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out, how long and in which way - all this is under Daniel's control. He 
literally is boss. He becomes a patriarch, a padre padrone (Ledda 1978). He 
becomes one - for it can be deduced both from the indignant commentaries 
of neighbours and other farmers and from the denouement of the family 
drama that such a centralisation of the power to decide over family labour 
was definitely not (yet) widely accepted for men (see also De Rooij 1992). 
Frouk, later to become Daniel's spouse, arrives at the farm as a maid. The 
death of Daniel's father and the illness of his mother necessitated such 
help. However, Daniël is not happy with it. Furiously, he wonders 
whether this is yet another sensible expenditure. Anyway, he is forced of 
necessity. Daniël goes to Frouk's mother and asks first of all: 
Kin hja melke? Dat bitingst haw ik. (Can she milk? That is the condition I 
lay down; Brolsmal979, p. 87.) 
After Daniel's father's funeral, Frouk (they have secretly started courting 
in the meantime) stays to work on the farm - in the fields particularly: 
Har knibbles binne iepen fan it sunt lang ûtwende krûpen. Hja is rea, brun 
forband, de hannen ek en hwat hja oan stedskens opdien hawwe mocht yn har 
fammejierren yn'e herberch, datforfljocht yn ien simmer lânwurk wer. Men kin 
net fan beiden wêze. (Her knees have been scratched from crawling in the 
fields, which she had lost the habit of. She is reddened and burnt, 
whatever was left of the town lady from her years working in the inn 
[Frouk had been serving in an inn on the cattle mart in Leeuwarden for a 
number of years when she was a girl] evaporates in one summer's work 
on the land. You can't be town lady and farm woman at the same time; 
ibid., p. 107.) 
Sometimes Daniël assesses Frouk with the glance of a farmer who needs 
help: 
Soest wol opstekke kinne ju? Ja ik tink better as mennich keardel. Dou hast der 
lea f oar. (Would you be able to load hay? Yes, I'd say so, I think it comes 
easier to you than to many a fellow. You have the right, strong body for 
it; ibid., p. 109.) 
Frouk's assistance suits Daniël perfectly. He begins to see a farm woman 
in her. 
Dou bigrypst wol, hwat better as wy us mei eigen folk redde kinnen, 
nammerstomear lân kinne wy oanhelje. Der komt by't hjerst in geadlik stik los. 
(You do understand that the more we can do ourselves [not to have to 
pay day workers], the more land we can take on? A suitable plot comes 
available this autumn; ibid., p. 110.) 
Initially, Frouk is surprised but also delighted, to notice that she is already 
more or less regarded as eigen folk (part of the family). Daniel's mother 
protests initially. She has little faith in Daniel's dual project: extra land 
and a farm woman: 
Doe bygelyks, sei Lea tsjin Daniel, dou soest miskien noch mear oanhelje en oer 
dit jong frouminske de boal spylje. Mar hja sil wol wizer wêze. (You, says 
Daniel's mother to Daniël, you will perhaps take on even more land, 
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and be a tyrant over this young woman. But she will be more 
reasonable; ibid., p. 111.) 
However, Frouk is not wizer, for she is blinded by young love. She marries 
Daniël and works hard in the fields until the birth of their first child. This 
and the situation of breaking away from the traditional division of labour 
again causes considerable comment. A neighbour chuckles over Frouk: 
Hja kaem asfaem en die fammewurk, nou is hjafrou en docht mânljusivurk . . . 
haha, is dat net nûver. (She came as a maid and did a maid's work; now 
she is the woman of the house and does a man's job . . . haha, isn't that 
mad?; ibid., p. 125.) 
A second exponent of the social environment immediately offers an 
explanation: 
It is in hûs fan de Mammon wurde. (It has become a house of Mammon; 
ibid., p. 126.) 
However, things become very serious only when Frouk's mother comes 
for a visit. The highly pregnant Frouk is not at home but in the fields, 
binding sheaves. When she arrives home exhausted her mother turns to 
her son-in-law: 
Wie der oars gjin help to bisetten? Né, mar dat hoecht ek net, sei har skoansoan, 
wy kinne it nou mei eigen folk redde. En dat past ûs, en Dousen rjochtut tsjin 
Frouk: Past it dy ek,fanke, der wurdt net neifrege hè? Daniël sei neat. . . mar 
syn forhearde troanje pleite sa tsjin him. ('Can you not find any help 
elsewhere?' 'No, but there's no need for that, is there?', said her son-in-
law. 'We can manage by ourselves. It suits us [sic] much better.' After 
which Dousen [Daniel's mother-in-law] turns directly to Frouk: 'Does it 
suit you better too, girl? I don't think anybody's interested in you, are 
they, hey?' Daniël doesn't say a word . . . but his angry face is not to his 
credit; ibid., p. 130.) 
Relations change after the birth of their first child. Frouk becomes 
seriously ill after the birth. Whether this is because she demanded too 
much of her body, or whether she does not want to have her child 
baptised - we do not know. In any event, she recovers after having 
hovered between life and death. But she is no longer the same person. 
Increasingly, she begins to refuse to work as hard as before and she also 
refuses to economise in the house. 
Even though Frouk still participates in the work, she confines herself 
increasingly to the traditional tasks of the farm woman; she refuses the 
hard and heavy man's work, such as Daniël sets himself. She carries an 
effective weapon: 
Hja sei it him planût en sunder opmakkerij: as hja deis mei yn 't fjild moast, 
bigearde hja nachts de rest en net de ûnstjurens . . . Gjin bern mear, as hja syn 
ploechhynder wêze moast. (She told him straight out: if she had to go into 
the fields during the day, she wants to have a quiet night, not to have to 
tumble again at night . . . No more children if she has to be his 
workhorse during the day; ibid., p. 161.) 
88 The Virtual Farmer 
This makes Daniël feel quite upset. He begins to withdraw in silence. It 
has thwarted all his plans: 
En wankte der jit wol aventûr om mear te bisitten, hie Frouk al niet drige him 
de hulde op to sizzen mei it lânwurk. Ja, der barden wundere dingen, sa 'n wiif 
mei de kreftfan in keardel, en dy groude him ôf- trouwde men dêrfoar? Hwat 
in treli dels mei biskie en nachts mei ôfkearigens. (Was there a future still in 
pursuing more possessions? Hadn't Frouk threatened to refuse all work 
on the land? Yes, strange things were happening; this woman, who had 
a fellow's strength, snapping at you, that wasn't why you got married 
[sic]. How dreadful, to object by day and to struggle by night; ibid., p. 
161.) 
After a few years, the net to kearen delgong yn it bidriuw (unstoppable 
decline of the farm; ibid., p. 1985) begins to show. Daniël largely blames 
Frouk for this. And rightly so. Frouk's unpaid participation as labourer 
was essential within the relatively extensive and large-scale style of 
farming practised by Daniël. Frouk's desertion (first refusing heavy 
labour, later actually leaving, as do the children) hits him hard: 
It jildwinnen, nettsjinsteande syn gebealch, giet stadich. Dat is in forspiele 
ideal. En Frouk, dêr't er alles vanforwachte hie om him by to stean, dat is ek in 
forspile ideal. Frouk is gjinfrou wurden lyk as er tocht hie, gjin boerinne - neat 
fan torjochte kommen. (Despite his own labour, the realisation of profits 
happens only slowly. It is a lost ideal. And Frouk, of whom he had 
expected everything, is a lost ideal too. Frouk did not become the wife, 
the farm woman, who he had expected her to become; ibid., p. 189.) 
Daniël is the main loser in this conflict. The only thing left at the end of 
the novel is a sad, silent man, unable to explore and understand his own 
feelings. In retrospect, the writer remarks: 
Daniël. . . syn libben wurdt bihearskefan twa machten dy't him beide likefolle 
twinge en beide ek neelottich wurde kinne. De twang nei jtld en de twang nei in 
gnap hynder, itsij dat er it yn it wurk brek hat of om der yn to hanneljen. 
(Daniel's life is dominated by two powers, both forcing him equally and 
both able to become his undoing. The desire for money and the desire 
for a good horse, either because he needs it in his work or to trade; ibid., 
p. 296.) 
The desire for money. We already encountered this key aspect of Daniel's 
value system: money to buy more land - if need be by trampling on his 
neighbours, if need be by trampling on his wife and children. 
Furthermore, the 'desire for a good-looking horse'. It seems as if the 
good-looking horse figures here as the precursor of the, then not yet 
realised process of mechanisation, another essential condition for the 
generalisation of large-scale farming. But this aside. 
The compulsion for money becomes Daniel's undoing. A man who 
neglects (forsmoarge, literally 'pollutes') his land, who tried to sternly 
discipline and subsequently lost his wife and children; a man who became 
the outcast of the area, the laughing stock of traders at the cattle mart; a 
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man, finally, who was merciless to himself: working, always working 
hard. 
In the closing sentence of the novel, Daniël wonders, while reviewing his 
failed life: 
Hwat haw ik west: in wyld . . . of in minske? (What'have I been: a wild 
[beast] or a human being?; ibid., p. 338.) 
2.7 Collective memory as part of cultural repertoire 
The stories of the Nijboer van Lyklemastate and of Daniel fan Kuken of 
Groun en minsken both illustrate that agriculture operates within a clear 
normative framework - a framework activated as soon as it is violated. 
Such a moral framework, or cultural repertoire, is used to specify the way 
in which farming should be practised (Hofstee 1985a). The relationships 
between people, land, and livestock are clearly defined within a set of 
interconnected norms. The same applies to the way in which one should 
work. When digging for instance, it applies that der djip hakke wurde moat, 
de blaumodder moat boppe komme (it needs to be done so deep until the blue 
mud turns up). The view that it mar lichtjes hoecht, net sa djip (it can be 
done slightly easier, that it doesn't have to be that deep; Brolsma 1979, p. 
232 ff.) is rejected. Thus, there are exact codes for all the tasks. These are 
summarised by the general position that one should farm kreas (gently) 
and not rûch (roughly). 
Of course, all this also defines the relationships between people, and 
particularly the economic aspects of these relationships. In particular the 
relation between farm and market is specified. The economics of the farm 
cannot be organised arbitrarily. Even though it might sound pathetic -
that is, when disconnected from the context and atmosphere of Groun en 
minsken - 'Mammon' (i.e. short-term profits as defined by the prevailing 
market relations) could not be the absolute ruler. An organisation of 
agriculture based solely on profit maximisation was rejected, precisely 
because it leads to practices that would be destructive to land, livestock, 
people, and community (Polanyi 1957). It would result in all-disrupting 
conflicts among farmers, in deserting women and children, in cattle losing 
their 'nobility', and in land being destroyed. 
By applying a cultural repertoire that refers to kreas buorkje, such hazards 
and their related temptations could be prevented and resisted. Operating 
according to this cultural repertoire did not imply earning less, nor 
irrational economic behaviour. On the contrary, it provided the basis for 
long-term earnings and continuous development. Frisian agriculture 
could become prosperous precisely because 'Mammon', as an immediate 
guideline, was abandoned. Operating in the then already highly 
globalised markets was successful precisely because of this pre-eminently 
local repertoire. 
The degree to which these elements are woven into a cultural repertoire, 
into a set of views about the way in which farming should be practised, is 
illustrated surprisingly by a source that seems difficult to fit into a 
scientific analysis. I refer here to the Frysk boerenkwartetspul (Frisian Farm 
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Happy Families; see also Van der Ploeg 1996a). This game of happy 
families, published in the 1950s, contains a number of images collectively 
describing various aspects of Frisian agriculture. Each image is 
accompanied by a short verse, summarising and explaining briefly and to 
the point the essence of the presented activity. Happy families is finite, it 
does not contain an endless flow of images. The most important and 
striking images and verses have been chosen. On the whole, the selected 
images and verses provide a succinct and fascinating summary of the 
cultural repertoire of Frisian dairy farming of the mid-1950s. Nowadays 
these images appear completely dated as if the subsequent wave of 
modernisation has wiped out everything, both images and words. 
The first Figure (2.7) summarises straightforwardly the previous toing 
and froing with regard to the hay sales. The former confusion and the 
lessons learned are summarised in an essential element of what could be 
called 'collective memory': 'It is essential for the farmer to have the 
adequate amount of roughage'. Similarly, the images and stories in 
Figures 2.8 (youngstock) and 2.9 (dairy cows) stress the importance of 
cattle as a resource. What counts is not the monetary value (not cattle as 
commodity), but cattle (home-reared cattle in Figure 2.8) as part of (as tier 
of) a complex whole providing revenue (the jefte) and also insights into 
the future (in moedjaend amerijke). In that respect, the irony of Figure 2.10 
(the cowshed) is possibly most significant: 'as if there would be an auction 
tomorrow' ! 
It is as if a complete agrarian history is concentrated in these images. 
Agriculture has been distantiated from markets by way of a long and 
complex emancipation process. For this very reason there is a resource 
base (a set of resources), which can be unfolded and built upon according 
to the views of the farmer. This very resource base, which has become 
independent from markets, provides insights into and faith in the future. 
Of course, the various resources cannot be used at will: it should be done 
with fordrach (a term that we encountered several times already in this 
chapter), it should happen in a reasonable, responsible, and well-tested 
way (see Figure 2.11). Fordrach applies equally to labour, central in the 
farm economy. Labour was essential in the realisation of the present 
resource base, just like labour is essential in its further development (see 
Figure 2.12). The attitude towards labour is easy-going (it is anticipated 
that things might go wrong at times; see Figure 2.13) but also clear. Work 
should be organised in such a way that the possibilities embodied in 
cattle, land, manure, plants, and so on are utilised and unfolded 
optimally. Work should be done in a kreas way. The times of raised stalls 
and treating udder infections with nettles have now passed. Labour is 
providing that which the resources require: it Ian moat sines ha (Figure 
2.14). In other words, the labour process is informed by the interaction 
with labour objects or resources and not directly by the prevailing market 
relations. It is of course impossible, on the basis of the previous 
discussion, to construct a 'morality' that would stand in a Hegelian sense 
above history. 
Figure 2.7 Self-sufficiency as norm 
IV. MAITIID OP 'E PLEATS 
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Rûehfoer ^ei 
dat is hwat foar ùe boer, 
't mei earstv.-oyos wéze of eartiäns 
s»'n kâlbul t h e l l « oer. 
3. YnkÛlje 
1. Kij ûtlitie 
2. Bûthésskrobje 
4. Skieppeknippe 
Having plenty of roughage 
That's what pleases the farmer 
Whether it's spring or autumn 
A haystack that topples over from 
fullness 
Figure 2.8 Youngstock 
I. IT FOLK OP 'E PLEATS 
• V " 
. / • * " 
•\&. .„„,. 
skogiend syn jongfé oer; 
in iHoedîaend anicriïke 
in oaiureast fo.ir de boer. 
1. de Boer 
2. de Boerinne 
3. de Arbeider 
4. de Faem 
Leaning on the fence 
Watching his young heifers 
The farmer experiences a moment of 
hope 
A consolation 
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Figure 2.9 Dairy cows 
VII. IT MELKEN 
TT» *"•*? :u **j2räft v. 
J-, ; s-i.-JiH- rs>l en prys, 
.in-*.-: t.iMkir™s ci jouns de keppel 
h t r icitc stil nei has. 
1. Kïj ophelje 
2. Yn 'e jisler 
3. Molkleegje 
4. Keaileboarne 
Nearly unbalanced by udders 
Full and heavy 
The herd proudly carry their gift home 
Every morning and evening 
Figure 2.10 The cowshed 
II. DE BOERE-HUZINGE 
De bisten ste.in der ioar. 
gléd, skjin en tsjok yn 't strie, 
net likcr oft it moarn 
op dit sté boelguod wie. 
1. itBûthûs 
2. de Skuorre 
3. de Heasouder 
4 it Keallehok 
Look at the animals 
Brushed, clean, and well-bedded in 
their straw 
Such a beautiful sight 
The farm could be ready for sale 
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Figure 2.11 Working carefully 
V. DE UNGETIID 
Gôed en hard operjen 
is handichheit en slach, 
kin 't hea nzt daiiis droeeh 
dan moat it mei t'ordrach. 
3. Operje 
1. Meane 
2, Swylje 
4. Weidloeije 
Build the stack quickly and well 
And that needs craft and skill 
For if the hay doesn't dry quickly 
You'll have to start using your wits 
Figure 2.12 Enriching the land 
VI. LANWURK 
f 
'VI. -"* ±1 
Hoe fynder men it jaget, 
moai otspraet, g!cd en sijoclu, 
hoe gauwer as it wei wurde 
en hoe mear frucht iE docht. 
2. Eidzje 
1. Dongje 
3. Greppelje 
4. Heakkelje 
Spread it fine 
Gleaning, even and smoothly 
The soil will take it up quickly 
And your harvest will be a rich one 
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Figure 2.13 Everybody makes a mistake sometimes 
VII. IT MELKEN , 
3. 
1. 
2. 
4 
I^^B -if ... 
• • ^ ^ • L . Oppasse m a n ' îu'.ant ek 
de a k k r i ù k s i e boer, 
jit v.«! m i n k ' e kear 
sen eisen b u ^ e n oer-
Molkleegje 
Kij ophelje 
Yn 'e jisier 
Kealleboarne 
Watch out man 
Even the best farmer 
Spills his milk 
Figure 2.14 Giving the land what it needs 
VI. LANWURK 
H&v*-
As jo làn hâkie wolle 
dan moat it sines ha 
en mei oats net as kunstiloma 
kin it net earlik ta. 
1. Dongje 
2. Eidzje 
3. Greppelje 
4. Heakkelje 
If you want to stay on the land 
You have to give it what it needs 
And you are unlikely to succeed 
With artificial fertilisers alone 
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It is clear, however, that intentionality, subjectivity, and morality always 
constitute an intrinsic part of farming. Moreover, intentionality, 
subjectivity, morality, and previous experiences inspire new projects that 
are rooted in specific actions and in new practices. This is partly how 
various relations are created between agriculture, markets, and 
technology. Therefore, the functioning of markets and technology cannot 
be considered as separate from the cultural repertoire, particularly where 
this cultural repertoire is materialised, no longer through high or low 
stalls but as the particular ordering of many hundreds of farm aspects vis-
à-vis each other and as the capacity to actually utilise this particular 
ordering. 
2.8 Into the future 
The family farm in agriculture constitutes one of the junctures at which 
commodity circuits and non-commodity circuits are structurally tied 
together. The way in which this attunement becomes established is very 
much historically variable, just like the particular outcome of the, always 
actively created, combination. Throughout all the fluctuations, however, it 
is possible to identify an unmistakable tendence lourde in Frisian agrarian 
history, which I have tried to define in Figure 2.2. 
If, in accordance with dominant arguments, we interpret the agricultural 
entrepreneur or farmer in contrast to a peasant, we cannot but conclude 
that throughout history the Dutch farmer has increasingly become a 
peasant - and that this is precisely the hidden strength of Dutch 
agriculture. 
This basic pattern is, as I have tried to make clear, partly the result of the 
way in which farmers have actively distantiated agriculture from a 
market dependency that was too tight. Hence, a 'collective memory' was 
constituted too: a good farmer is more than de earste de beste keapman (any 
old merchant). Moreover, a good farmer is able to resist the temptation to 
operate as a merchant. A good farmer organises the market relations (or 
commodity relations) into which he enters in such a way that they fit into 
a broader framework of normative notions and non-commodity relations. 
Various counterpoints keep these notions alive - and it does not make any 
difference whether these counterpoints are imaginary (such as in the cases 
of the well-read rural novels, plays, and stories) or real (that is, presented 
as the adventures of others who come to no good). 
The described collective memory lives on in contemporary agriculture -
ironically now as counterpoint, as critique of the predominant discourse 
of agricultural science and agricultural policy. In certain farming styles (in 
which a farming style is a set of particular notions about kreas buorkje) the 
search for the highest possible technical efficiency (for tûk buorkje, to run a 
farm in a clever, skilful way) and the search for the lowest possible 
supply-side market dependency (for sunich buorkje, i.e. farming 
economically) continue to be highly present. 
Given the new challenges, which also face Frisian agriculture, these 
notions - and above all the practical experiences in which they are rooted 
96 The Virtual Farmer 
- constitute valuable springboards for the future (LUW et al. 1993). Given 
their history, it will not be the first time that established axioms have to 
make way for what initially seemed foolish, illogical, and unusual. 
The representation of Dutch agriculture is now centralised largely in 
Wageningen and The Hague. I already referred to the Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute (LEI-DLO, Landbouw Economisch Instituut), 
which employs a method of representation that removes every form of 
regional specificity right from the start. Furthermore, in the course of this 
chapter I have repeatedly used a Frisian metaphor. Friesland has for long 
time had the CCLB co-operative, which is now part of AVM, an 
accountancy and advisory firm. Although it does injustice to the current 
services offered to Frisian farmers by this organisation, for the sake of 
clarity it can be mentioned briefly that we are talking here about 'the 
accountant of the Frisian farmer'. These accountants are by the nature of 
their work involved in a direct dialogue with Frisian farmers. They are 
'organic intellectuals' as it were. 
In his comments in response to the farm results of Frisian dairy farms for 
the year 1990-1991, Miedema* (1991) uses a fine metaphor. This metaphor 
('one's own engine') will possibly cause some confusion among outsiders; 
it will be immediately recognised by farmers, however. 
In his discussion, dairy farmers emerge as sailors. At other points the 
ship, the sails, the wind, and the available engine capacity are mentioned. 
Referring to the price fall that happened at that time, Miedema observes 
that 'last year we had the wind in the sails nicely, but now we haven't 
made any headway'. He adds: 
We have just tacked, and it remains to be seen whether we will have enough 
space to round up in the wind. In any case, a minimal speed is required to keep 
the ship navigable. A ship that lies almost idle does not answer the helm at all 
(1991, p. 1). 
Obviously, market relations act here as the wind. If the wind is 
favourable, it is not difficult to hold a steady course. However, if the wind 
comes around, or drops completely, the ship becomes out of control and 
faces the danger of drifting onto the lee shore. In periods of a favourable 
economic climate, in short, it is attractive and easy to set course for the 
logic of the market (Friedman 1980). If the economic climate changes, 'the 
sailor will have to make himself certain of the engine capacity' (ibid.). For 
if necessary 'we will switch on the engine'. 
The importance of the above is obvious in Miedema's discussion. He 
specifies the engine as 'net worth and family labour' (1991, p. 5; my 
emphasis). This is contrasted with the situation in which farm 
management and farm development are supported primarily by external 
capital and external labour - in short, a situation in which there is a high 
market dependency and in which labour and capital represent direct 
costs. 
The real difference between those two situations can be illustrated by way 
of an imaginary farm, indicative of the average Frisian dairy farm. If this 
* Translator's note: Miedema was a high ranking AVM/CCLB staff member at the time. 
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farm was highly market dependent there would be a negative net margin 
of NLG -42,000 (about Euro 20,000). If the same farm was more 
autonomous, it would result in a positive farm income of NLG +72,000 
annually. On the basis of this, Miedema concludes: 'with only sails the 
ship would go adrift, but thanks to the inboard motor it is able to go 
against the current' (1991, p. 6). 
Notes 
1 Extensive parts of this chapter were previously published in the Frisian language (Van der 
Ploeg 1995b). I owe many thanks to the comments on previous versions of this chapter by 
Slicher van Bath, Spahr van der Hoek, Jan Bieleman, Henry Bernstein, and Lammert Jansma. 
2 The most accurate concept can be found in Marxist theory. Within this theoretical 
framework, small entrepreneurs are regarded as simple commodity producers. The essential 
difference between simple commodity production (SCP) and capitalist commodity 
production (CCP) is that the latter is, above all, oriented towards the production of surplus 
value. In SCP this is not the case. SCP is the application of commodities in order to produce 
other use values. The essential exception here is labour: it does not function as a commodity 
within SCP. A further mode of production can be distinguished. So-called petty commodity 
production (PCP) is characterised by the fact that not only labour but the other resources too 
hardly function as commodities. These are means reproduced, in and through, the 
production process itself (and so within the farm) and /or obtained via socially regulated 
exchange. PCP constitutes the peasantry. In the course of this chapter I will make clear that a 
shift from SCP to PCP is hidden within Dutch agrarian history (and from CCP to PCP, see 
Van Zanden 1985) and that the strength of Dutch agriculture is in fact rooted in PCP (i.e. a 
certain distantiation from markets). Dutch farmers, rather than many of their colleagues in 
the Third World, are peasants (for a comparative analysis, see Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 
1985; Van der Ploeg 1990, chap. 5), and they are successful precisely because they are 
peasants. 
3 Remarkably, farmers in many places the world over still count and calculate with such a 
concept. In large parts of Italy, for example, they use la parte pulita (the clean part; see 
Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 1985, chap. 4). Many farmers in the Netherlands refer to this by 
saying, 'what is important is what is left in my account at the end of the year' (Van de Ploeg 
et al. 1992). The techniques and circuits change (here, a current account at a bank), but the 
notion remains essentially the same. An example from Zeeland can be found in Wiskerke 
(1992). Again and again, central to all these concepts is the safeguarding of the relationship 
between the commodity and the non-commodity circuits. 
4 See, inter alia, DKB 1937; Vondeling 1948; De Winter 1952; Dewez 1958; Gerbenzon 1958; 
Kuperus 1964; Meihuizen and Kuperus 1968; Dijkstra and Baars 1975; Van der Ploeg et al. 
1992; Wiskerke 1992. 
5 Incidentally, Slicher van Bath observed a similar tendency for Overijssel at the time: 
'Between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries the Naturalwirtschaft has regained the lost 
terrain, a decline contrary to the development that could have been expected' (1950, p. 11). 
The terms used by Slicher van Bath are clearly those of the debate of the 1950s. However, its 
conclusion is not less interesting. Slicher van Bath remarks elsewhere: 'The shift from 
Naturalwirtschaft to Geldwirtschaft is not . . . a linear development' (ibid.). The downward 
trend in Figure 2.2 is a clear indication of this. 
6 A strong tendency can be identified in the agrarian historical literature (see, inter alia, 
Slicher van Bath 1958) to deduce from the fact of the calculating farmer (as embodied by 
Hemmema, Koorn, and so many others) that we are in fact already dealing with capitalist 
entrepreneurs here. This seems to be a fundamental mistake to me: for a capitalist 
entrepreneur (capitalist commodity producer, see note 2) would have ceased production 
immediately, precisely because it was impossible to realise surplus value. Here simple 
commodity producers emancipate themselves by developing into petty commodity 
producers: this is precisely why they guard the market relations so much. In accordance 
98 The Virtual Farmer 
with the highly neo-classical fixation, Slicher van Bath and others included calculated 
interest as a cost in their calculations. 
7 Here I use a metaphor that would be introduced much later (i.e. in the 20st century) by 
Miedema of AVM/CCLB. I will discuss this in detail at the end of this chapter. I suffice here 
in saying that the 'engine' refers to as much as the autonomous capacity (to the non-
commoditised resources) of a farm. 
8 This is raised again as a central issue in the later discussion of further developments in 
Frisian agriculture (see Friese Maatschappij van Landbouw en Veeteelt 1892). 
9 Hence the preference at the time for situating transactions and market relations within the 
domain of family and kinship relations (a phenomenon that can still be encountered in parts 
of Africa and that is usually analysed by the term 'veniality'). Also, the various account 
books are always annotated with the names and persons involved in those transactions: an 
anonymous market is out of the question - again, safeguarding is the motto. 
10 Incidentally, there is a debate among agrarian historians, started by Van der Woude, 
about the question of the extent to which this was a real phenomenon or ascribed to farmers 
of a certain period retrospectively. However, the danger of such a reaction can nevertheless 
have played a part in people's considerations at the time. 
11 The outstanding authority on Frisian agriculture, Mr. Van Wijngaarden from 
Wageningen, drew my attention to this. 
12 I am greatly indebted to Prof. Michèle de Benedictus and his colleagues, who drew my 
attention to this 'reading' at a seminar on mercificazione e rapporti sociziali ai produzzione (at La 
Sapienza, Rome, July 1991). The family farm (SCP) is not a remnant of the past; neither is it 
the result of the demise of CCP in agriculture (Koning 1982). It is the result of a complex but 
persistent emancipation process of the farming population itself. 
13 Furthermore, as stated by Faber (1974), farmers were driven of necessity towards these 
'inferior' types of farming, in which 'merchantship' dominated over 'farming well'. 
14 Because they could only exist and continue to exist in the case of a further perfected farm 
management- Only if dairying was perfected would it be able to support breeding. The 
impressive story about Fokstal Knol, which explicitly discusses the enterprise's farming 
style, deals with this issue (see Bottenburg 1965). 
15 This can be clearly observed in the shed of the Frisian livestock farm at the Open Air 
Museum, Arnhem. 
16 This is often discussed as repeasantisation (the absolute number of farms increased 
dramatically). Incidentally, I am of the opinion that this concept can be used to describe and 
summarise the whole range of adaptations resulting in PCP dominating SCP. 
17 Vondeling's Ph.D. thesis is based upon a longitudinal study (from 1923 until 1940) of 117 
dairy farms. 
18 I am greatly indebted to Lammert Jansma, Director of the Fryske Academy, who drew my 
attention to this publication. 
19 This metaphor occurs frequently in this type of literature and, more generally, in the 
everyday vernacular of the Frisian countryside. To act as a 'beast' degrades a person. Even 
an 'animal' does not lower itself to what a 'beast' does. I will revisit this theme several times 
in this chapter. 
20 Typical of this quotation, the notion of keapman (merchant) is confronted with the notion 
of farmer (see also Van der Ploeg 1995b). The notion of Mammon, discussed below, as 
guiding principle for the actual farming practice reinforces this opposition even more. It 
goes without saying that these notions relate directly to the normative tension connected 
with the various resource flows described in Figure 2.2. 
21 There are further elements confirming my opinion that Groun en minsken mirrors a real 
drama of the time. They are the opinions of the most important Frisian literary critics. Dr 
Douwe Kalma calls Brolsma a forheljend skriuwer, a narrator, who, partly from the way he 
was in touch with things, could tell stories about Frisian folk life. Again according to Kalma, 
Brolsma was not only a sharp observer (in tûke opmerker) but also someone who knew how to 
get to the heart of events; he is sa 'n fiener fielder (someone who can sense a situation very 
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well), he is no stranger to it djippere forstean. For 'hwat seit it feitlike kennen, as it djippere 
forstean en it meifielende hert net meiwurkje om fan it materiael dat it libben biedt, hwat kostbers to 
meitsjen, dat duorret fier oer de eigen generaesje hinneV (For 'what is the meaning of knowing 
the facts if a sharp insight and an emphatic heart do not co-operate to make something 
valuable out of the materials provided by life, something that reaches beyond one's own 
generation?') Piebenga calls Brolsma's work in spegelfan Fryskfolkslibben (a mirror of Frisian 
folk life). Just like Wadman, Piebenga points to the sharp dividing line between Brolsma's 
work and that of 19th century folksskriuwerij (folk writing). If the latter is full of moralism, of 
speculating about the supposed national character, and of a strong desire for the return of 
better (i.e. former) times, the opposite can be found in Brolsma's work: he is ien dy't objecktyf 
bisjocht en biskriuwt (someone who observes and describes objectively). Mild humour is 
another feature of Brolsma's work: he is a stranger to kâld synisme (bitter cynicism), even 
though he rather writes about the victims of oppression, about those of whom there are so 
many in the Friesland of that time. Hy koe it lân en hy koe de minsken (he knew the land and 
the people), he did not write about an imaginair Fryslân, mar oer Friezen lyk as wy dy allegearre 
koene of dèr't wy alteast fan oannimme koene dat hja der wiene (he did not write about an 
imaginary Friesland, but about Frisians as we all knew them or who we could at least 
imagine to exist), wrote another critic, S. v.d. Schaaf. Frisians, in turn, loved to read him. 
Brolsma must have been the most widely read Frisian writer between the 1920s and 1940s. 
Did they read him to recognise themselves even better? Who knows . . . Finally, what 
convinced me perhaps most is that one of the few times that Brolsma actually did talk about 
his work, he said that he was often asked, for once, to 'write about the real, the progressive, 
Frisian farmer, the man who had all this beautiful pedigree cattle and numerous committee 
jobs'. Brolsma is supposed to have said that he refused to do that, that his conscience made 
him write about the iensume, fan nimmen bigrepene, rüge wrotter (the hard worker who is 
lonely, rough, and understood by no one). That book became Groun en minsken. His best, 
according to the critics. A sad and tragic epic, according to Piebenga. About a farmer, Daniel 
fan Kuken, understood by no one. 
22 Various sources, especially from about 1969, refer to this. 
23 This is a frequently recurring theme in rural novels. For a discussion of a pact with the 
devil on the large, prosperous farms, see, inter alia, A. M. de Jong (1979). Incidentally, the 
subordination of women and sexuality emerges here succinctly. 
24 Later, at the barber's, Daniël nearly comes to blows with his neighbours. Again, because 
the land is mentioned that Daniël had obtained and had subsequently cultivated badly (for it 
is this that matters in particular). But I will leave those entertaining episodes to those readers 
who (want to) read the novel. 
25 Here, the description of a calculus is fascinating; it can be found later in mathematical 
form (Y/T * T/L = Y/L) in standard texts such as Hayami and Ruttan (1985). 
26 This is a direct reflection of one of the episodes of Frisian agrarian history described 
earlier in this chapter. 
27 The greatest limitation of Groun en minsken is, in this respect, that a 'project' that becomes 
essential later on is still missing. This is the technological development culminating in the 
combination of the cubicle shed, new milking techniques, Holsteinisation, increased 
concentrate intakes, and grassland intensification. Hence, simultaneous scale enlargement 
and intensification becomes possible, without a proportional increase in labour pressure. The 
potential tension between men and women described in Groun en minsken will later be 
mediated by new technologies. Above all, it implied for farm women a restructuring of the 
nature and content of their work; see De Rooij 1992. 
28 This did not happen, especially due to the 'desertion' by wife and children. Furthermore, 
the fact that there were no adequate technologies available to satisfactorily continue a project 
such as Daniel's played also a role. 
29 On the basis of a comparative research, De Rooij argues plausibly that the farm women's 
influence and share was reduced highly on large-scale, specialised farms as against the 
smaller-scale mixed farms. 
30 The portrait of Daniël as paterfamilias painted from quotations, as the man who tries to fit 
his family into to the particular needs of the practice of his extensive, large-scale style of 
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farming, might seem cynical, and highly exaggerated. If this is the case, it will largely be the 
result of the selection of quotes itself, since I have concentrated the selection on family 
conflicts. Again, I would like to call to mind that, according to the Frisian literary critics 
(Kalma, Piebenga, Wadman, Riemersma, etc.), cynicism is a feature lacking entirely from 
Brolsma's work. In summarising their opinions, an image emerges of a sharp observer (in 
tûke opmerker en sa'n fiene fielder, die it folkslibben ût'e pin koe), who rather covers his 
observations with mild humour. If I try to situate the novel in a historical perspective, as a 
frame belonging in a longer series, it seems impossible to avoid the idea that the conflict that 
arises with Daniël in the farm family and that even explodes in the shape of a disintegrating 
family becomes structural with the generalisation of an extensive, large-scale agriculture. 
Although the writer exposes in trysk en tragysk epos (a sad and tragic epic; Piebenga, p. 218) 
in Groun en minsken, he also states that the family tragedy as described by him, ignored by 
the changing style of farming, would possibly go unnoticed to outsiders: in frjemd sjocht dat 
sa net! 
31 It seems important to emphasise again that classifying farm women's work as 'men's 
work' - the expectation that farm women make excessive working hours just like farm men 
and the relation of farm men v. farm women as 'tyrant' v. ploechhynder (drudge) - is not 
inherent in agricultural production (and the family farm) as such but is the very result of the 
relatively extensive and large-scale production practised by Daniel in an almost pioneering 
manner. Judging from the novel, these phenomena, which we can summarise as the 
subordination of farm women, do not, or to a much lesser degree, belong to an intensive 
agriculture. 
32 At first it is remarkable that the reference to 'a wild beast' arises both in the play about 
the Nijboer and in the novel about 'Daniel'. On closer inspection this is less accidental. For 
both expressions of local farm culture deal with the boundary between what is normatively 
given and what falls outside. In the latter domain they 'carried on like a beast', according to 
the above-discussed perceptions. However, not as an 'animal'. For animals have a 'built-in 
code' (see below): they have learned how to behave. 'Beast' is one of the worst curses to hurl 
at someone in the Frisian language. Thus it is often indicated by ellipsis (...) in written texts. 
It resembles a curse: it was not allowed to be written. 
33 To work with fordrach in turn leads to nocht (taking pleasure in work), as is shown in 
various other cards not reproduced here. 
34 There are striking parallels. See, for example, the study about 'sons of bitches' in Thai 
agriculture by Michael Moerman (1968). 
Farming Styles as Socio-Technical 
Networks 
At the start of the 21st century, Frisian dairy farming exhibits a high 
degree of diversity. Considerable variability can be noticed in all forms of 
farm structure and activity. In general there is more variety now than 
there was four decades ago. The increase in variation has not occurred 
accidentally. It is the expression of (and informs in turn) underlying 
patterns of coherence, which we will analyse here in terms of farming styles. 
A farming style is, generally, a mode of ordering: a systematic and 
continuous attempt to create congruence within those domains in which 
farmers and their families have to operate. However, they are not the only 
ones operating within these domains. Others are directly or indirectly 
involved - other actors, other institutes, other entities - each of which 
might represent a mode of ordering. 
Thus emerges a socio-technical network: a particular constellation of various 
modes of ordering, interlocking in particular ways and collectively 
defining the apparent courses of action and development opportunities. A 
farming style can thus be regarded as a socio-technical network. 'Socio-
technical' because the style is comprised of social elements, material 
elements (including aspects of the 'living world'), and above all the 
interrelations between the two. 
-/Farm labour includes a wide range of tasks. By way of illustration, I 
would like to refer to a few labour tasks in the domain of production: 
feeding, care, milking, milk storage (and possibly milk processing), grass 
cutting, haymaking, silage-making, and so on. An almost infinite number 
of tasks can be identified. For example, over 200 tasks have been 
distinguished in the relatively simple cultivation of cereals. Moreover, in 
the domain of reproduction, old cows have to be replaced by new ones; 
soil fertility has to be maintained if not increased, which also involves 
engagement in water management, tillage, selection of grassland varieties, 
and so on. Other tasks may be identified as well, such as training new 
workers (usually a son or daughter), setting aside savings, maintaining 
buildings and machines, etc. - for the reproduction of the farm is 
unthinkable in the long term without such tasks. Similarly, the domain of 
economic and institutional relations is essential: the farmer has to enter 
into relationships with suppliers, banks, cattle traders, the dairy factory. 
Finally, the domain of social relations between and within the family and 
the wider community also generates an additional range of tasks 
(Marsden et al. 1992). 
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The broad set of tasks, which is highly variable both temporally and 
spatially, demands careful coordination. This process of coordination 
results in a particular structuring of time and space (Mendras 1970). If the 
process of coordination is ignored or executed less than optimally, the 
farm will function less well - costs will be excessively high, production 
too low, and the farm will lack cohesion. Therefore, it is crucial to create 
congruence and coherence. Tasks need performing in certain sequences in 
order to save time and money. 
The construction of congruence and the active creation of association 
unfold along various development trajectories, which in turn lead to 
different farming styles. The creation of development opportunities is 
intrinsic to the nature of the agricultural production process and to the 
way in which it is connected to the wider environment. 
Analytically, three central elements can be identified within the 
agricultural process of production. First, there are the objects of labour, i.e. 
those things that are converted into new values. For example, livestock is 
converted into meat, milk, new offspring and manure. It is characteristic 
of agriculture that labour objects are part and parcel of (are derived from) 
the 'living world' (for a more extensive explanation, see Sevilla Guzman 
et al. 1990; Toledo 1992). Secondly, there are tools or instruments: those 
elements that are fabricated and used to lighten and improve the labour 
process - think about tractors, artificial fertiliser, concentrates, and 
buildings. The third element is the labour force. Together, these three 
elements collectively compose the labour or production process. 
Its concrete structure (the interrelations between the constituent elements) 
will depend upon the social relations of production (Poulantzas 1974; 
Meillasoux 1975). Various aspects of the organisation and further 
development of this production process can be stressed in different ways 
(depending partly on the social relations of production). Thus, various 
development opportunities emerge. 
Organisation and development can be centred largely around achieving 
high and increasing productive results per labour object. Thus the 
quantity and quality of labour become of strategic importance. Tools and 
instruments, or techniques, are 'skill oriented' (Bray 1986). On the other 
hand, emphasis can be placed largely on the tools. These are developed in 
such a way as to enable the management of as many labour objects per 
labour unit as possible - that is, the pursuit of as large a scale as possible. 
This usually leads to 'mechanical technology' (ibid). The nature of the 
labour objects and the realisable value per labour object are thus a 
function of the chosen scale. 
Voilà, a first dimension, a first field of tension that is spanned by two 
contrasting development opportunities - which we encountered in the 
previous chapter through two concrete and mutually highly conflicting 
expressions: kreas versus rûch buorkje (farming gently v. farming roughly). 
The tension thus outlined is found and defined in some way in almost all 
agricultural systems (Robertson Scott 1912; Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 
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1985; Maso 1986; Manolescu 1987; H u g h e s 1988; Leeuwis 1989; Van der 
Ploeg 1991a; Cristovào et al. 1994; H o w d e n 1998; Zuiderwijk 1998). 
Figure 3.1 Farming styles in contemporary Frisian dairy farming 
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Note: koweminsken, yntinsive boeren, sljuchtwei boeren, grutte boeren, fokkers, sunige boeren, and 
trekkerboeren are translated as, respectively, cowmen, intensive farmers, ordinary farmers, 
large farmers, breeders, economical farmers, and machinemen. 
More generally, various modes of ordering, or two contrasting styles of 
agricultural practice, are always involved. One pole is characterised by 
the centrality of the labour object and corresponding courses of action and 
modes of ordering, which we can define here as fine-tuning. Intensive 
production is pursued by means of the process of fine-tuning: high yields 
per labour object are both the guiding principle and the norm. The 
opposite pole is characterised by the centrality of the means of production 
and the corresponding pursuit of the highest possible level of labour 
productivity. Here, a large number of labour objects per labour unit (the 
scale of production) is the norm and the guiding principle. This 
dimension is represented in the vertical axis in Figure 3.1. 
A second dimension can be identified by reviewing the reproduction of 
farming over time ('the dance through time'). Reproduction can be a 
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function of the production process as such; however, it can also take place 
largely beyond the on-farm production process. Relationships with other 
farms and with other institutions are established: labour objects and 
means of production are mobilised through markets (see Van der Ploeg 
1990, pp. 12-26; Saccomandi 1991, p. 491). 
Thus, a second axis emerges, which again is spanned by two contrasting 
development opportunities. It involves, on the one hand, an autonomous 
way of farming (in which reproduction is a function of the actual 
production process), while the second pole is characterised by market-
dependent reproduction: reproduction (or development) takes place 
through the mobilisation of resources from beyond the farm gate, 
involving not only higher costs but usually also sharply increased 
transaction costs. This tension is referred to in the contemporary rural 
repertoire of Friesland by the concepts of sunig (economical) versus 
ambisjeus (ambitious). 
3.1 Farming styles in contemporary Frisian dairy farming: an 
introduction 
Figure 3.1 contains a number of local Frisian terms describing various 
distinguishable farming styles, which will be discussed throughout this 
chapter (for a similar example from North America, see Bennett 1981). 
Initially, one regional style applied largely to Friesland as a whole (for a 
general discussion, see Hofstee 1946; Maris et al. 1951 and Swierstra 1971). 
Farming kreas (gently) was the norm. At the same time one needed to 
farm sunig (economically). Collective memory had shown that the latter 
was the precondition for the former - and vice versa. Thus arose the style 
of koweminsken (cowmen; which, of course, included various subregional 
nuances). The extent to which this ideal goal could be realised varied 
greatly - however, the goal as such (for example described by the images 
and words included in Figures 2.7-2.14) was almost uncontested. Today, a 
multitude of contrasting farming styles have evolved. New development 
opportunities have come within reach. Returning once again to Daniel fan 
Kuken (see Chapter 2 of this book), he tried to cultivate more land, to 
keep more cows than the then available means of production allowed. 
Agricultural mechanisation has since developed immensely. 'To achieve 
the highest possible output with as little labour as possible' was a project 
that imposed clear limits in Daniel fan Kuken's days. Nowadays, this is 
far from Utopian. The historically created development trajectories 
(resulting from the particular integration of certain projects) now 
explicitly include the prospect of a constant increase in labour 
productivity. If Daniël still failed, some seventy years ago, a distinct and 
solid pattern of machinemen has now been established in the 
Netherlands. In Friesland they are usually described as trekkerboeren 
(tractor farmers). Anyway, the 'machine' or 'tractor' is a clear metaphor 
for the strategy of 'achieving the highest possible output with as little 
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labour as possible'. The necessary connection here is indeed the 'machine' 
or 'tractor'. This emphasises the orientation towards tools. 
The use of folk concepts in Figure 3.1 should not be misunderstood. 
Although they appear to refer to particular individuals they evidently 
describe strategies and modes of ordering. Certain strategies are applied 
in more striking, and more recognisable ways, by some farmers. Hence, 
mention will be made of economical farmers, for instance. However, this 
should not conceal that what matters is the underlying approach: the mode 
of farming economically. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the other 
terms in Figure 3.1. 
Initially, Dutch dairy farming maintained a certain, albeit flexible, 
equilibrium between cattle and grassland. This applied to Frisian dairy 
farming a fortiori. Not for nothing, a long battle was fought that resulted in 
self-sufficiency becoming the norm. In other words, there was a more or 
less stable relation between the most relevant labour objects: dairy cows 
and grassland. The internationalisation of fodder production and trade, 
that has occurred since the 1960s (and which was represented at the time 
by the so-called 'hole of Rotterdam', through which animal feed products 
were imported tax-free into the country), has made it possible to move 
beyond this once fairly stable relationship. A new development 
opportunity arose: a disconnection from the initially organic and highly 
local unity of fodder production and animal production. Thus the 
opportunity for developing the farming style of the yntinsive boeren 
(intensive farmers) emerged. A strategy that is summarised by the adage: 
'if you put in as much as possible, you'll get out as much as possible.' 
One of the typical aspects of the way in which intensive farmers operate is 
a relatively high stocking rate (the number of cattle per hectare). This 
approach requires large purchases of roughage and concentrates (and 
high concentrate levels per cow) to achieve high production levels per 
hectare. Hence, the margin per hectare (an important indicator referring 
to the difference between monetary benefits and monetary costs per 
hectare) is also high. Intensive farmers also exploit other, relatively new 
development opportunities (that is, more so than other styles). Reference 
can thus be made to the reorganisation of time - notably in breeding and 
the replacement of dairy cows - to zero-grazing and to a sharp increase of 
grassland production (due to regular 'grassland renewal', high levels of 
artificial fertiliser, low-level drainage and irrigation, and an increase in the 
so-called 'mowing percentage'). I will discuss several of these aspects 
elsewhere in this book - here it is important that these changes (these 
changing tasks) are forged together into a new and congruous whole: the 
style of farming intensively. 
Next, the grutte boeren (large farmers). The crucial characteristic of this 
style is that the resources obtained through market dependant 
reproduction (loans in particular) are used for accelerated expansion 
rather than for direct production. Large farmers believe, much more than 
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others, that they are involved in a 'battle for the future', a battle organised 
by the idea that only few, very large farms will 'survive' in the future (I 
will discuss this at length in Chapters 6 and 8). By implication actual 
production is subordinated to the desired growth process, which is in 
sharp contrast to the other styles where growth (the reproduction of the 
farm as a whole over time) is much more a function of the production 
process. This prevalent relation is reversed completely in the strategy of 
large farmers: the current farm is above all seen as collateral for, and as a 
'leg-up' to the large farm of the future. 
Within this style other relatively new development opportunities are 
employed as well. Highly accelerated farm enlargement is supported by 
new technological opportunities, by the prevailing fiscal regime, by 
generous credit facilities, and by an unmistakable change in the cultural 
pattern: if 'milking above one's head' (that is, trying to be much bigger 
than others) was taboo in the past, it is now strongly encouraged by the 
expert system, by the advisory service, by agribusiness, and by the 
farmers organisations. Accelerated growth has become a goal in itself for 
part of the farming population - it has become part of their identity. 
A conceptual consideration is in order here. Up until now, I have 
presented the development opportunities used in the various farming 
styles as 'external' to the farm. As a matter of fact, this is a somewhat 
misleading representation. In an abstract sense, the aforementioned 
development opportunities (and also the ones discussed below) can easily 
be imagined as separate from concrete agricultural practices. In so far as 
concrete development opportunities are concerned, however, we are 
dealing with development opportunities that exist partly because they are 
realised within, and further extended through, the agricultural sector. 
Even though every development opportunity requires a particular 
historical concurrence of circumstances and developments, the 
interweaving of the projects of groups of farmers with those of others 
(international trading firms, banks, governments, producers of 
technology, farmers organisations, other farmers, etc.) - that is, the socio-
technical network - is decisive in constituting these development 
opportunities (see also Figure 1.1b and its discussion). Hence, we are not 
dealing with a question of 'internal' or 'external': the coming together of 
various possibilities, interests, and rationalities into one socio-technical 
network is pivotal (Iacoponi et al. 1995; Lowe et al. 1995). 
We will continue with the trekkerboeren (machinemen). The guiding 
principle within this style is that 'you have to realise the highest possible 
output per person'. This leads to a particular perspective on farm 
management and the use of a particular technical indicator. If cowmen 
control and guide farm management and farm development by using the 
margin per cow, intensive farmers by using the margin per hectare, large 
farmers by the expected cost price, machinemen pay particular attention 
to the relation between gross output and labour input. 
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Figure 3.2 A grutte farmer 
Ruch (rough), the notion that was so important in the past, is hardly 
applicable nowadays. Although cowmen will invariably conclude, when 
observing both rapid expanders and machinemen, that 'a lot has been left 
there' (that is, not enough care has been taken, the work has not been 
done properly), machinemen will not regard their often lower levels of 
intensity per cow and per hectare of grassland as problematic. On the 
contrary, they see themselves as working remarkably 'efficiently' 
(enabled by the technology they apply). They will, in turn, be of the 
opinion that a 'cowman' is wasting time by excessive attention to the 
cows. This refers back to the classification struggle sweeping the 
countryside, that essentially revolves around the question of what is an 
adequate, responsible, and promising way of farming. 
Next up are the 'economical farmers' (sunige boeren in Frisian). Their 
overwhelming motive is to keep monetary costs as low as possible. This 
refers to both the nature of the growth process and the actual production 
process. Attempts are made to guard as closely as possible the balance 
between private and external capital, in order to minimise the financing 
costs. Investments are made cautiously. It is preferable to fall back on 
socially regulated exchange in the construction of new buildings, and to 
use and adapt existing buildings as much as possible (see also Figure 3.3). 
Machines are preferably bought second-hand (which presumes, of course, 
that other farmers are willing to sell them). Furthermore, the depreciation 
period is stretched as much as possible - maintenance becomes an 
important issue. In the case of the annual cycle of the actual production 
process, economical farmers again pursue the realisation of the lowest 
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possible monetary costs. Internationally, this approach is defined as 'low 
external input agriculture' (Reijntjes et al. 1992): costs of energy, artificial 
fertiliser, concentrates, livestock, and various services are kept as low as 
possible. Hence, the choice is usually for lower milk yields per cow, 
corresponding to a lower input of concentrates. If there are opportunities 
for substituting inputs with labour, economical farmers will prefer their 
own labour input (see also Chapter 5 of this book). Their labour input is 
usually higher than on other comparable farms. The orientation towards 
tools (see Figure 3.1) is translated here in a remarkable way: everything is 
geared towards minimising the monetary costs connected with the use of 
tools. At the same time, these farmers achieve a high efficiency in the use 
of their own resources. They are tûke (clever/reasoning) farmers: good 
grassland farmers, for instance, which has been known throughout the 
country for years and which has recently been demonstrated by scientific 
research (Rougoor 1999). 
Just as the cowmen's approach contrasts strongly with that of the 
machinemen, the approach of the economical farmers contrasts strongly 
with that of the intensive farmers (in particular in the short term - that is, 
with respect to farm management) and with the approach of the rapid 
expanders (that is, grutte boeren). If the latter accelerate growth (partly by 
entering into large financial obligations), economical farmers develop 
their farms gradually, on the basis of their savings. 
We encounter an interesting and doubtless typically Frisian approach in 
the fokkers (breeders). Their style shows a strong resemblance to the 
approach of the economical farmers. The difference between the two is in 
the keeping of a large number of youngstock, in order to supply heifers 
for export. This is a rather risky market, with sometimes very good prices 
but also with the proverbial lean years (at times up to seven years indeed). 
These are not the so-called 'top breeders' (who constitute a separate and 
very small group), but those who produce robust breeding stock very 
much in demand in North Africa, the Far East, and in Eastern Europe. A 
characteristic indicator is the value of 'output and change in volume dairy 
cattle' per 100 litre of milk: the extra revenues from cattle sales at a given 
production volume. Breeders excel in the respect. The breeders embody 
another development principle. Beyond the market for milk and 'sausage 
cows' they exploit other markets as well. The underlying principle of 
producing for a wider range of markets is one that has subsequently been 
adopted by several other farming styles as well. 
Figure 3.1 is based on data collected in 1990. It is, in a sense, already 
dated. Since this time several new development opportunities have 
emerged that run parallel to the fokkers strategy of producing for a wider 
range of markets. The upgrading of milk quality (and hence the milk 
price), for instance, has become a solid and rapidly spreading practice: 
organic dairy farming, the generation of quality products and/or region-
specific products and direct marketing are new development 
opportunities that are being explored. (I will discuss these further in 
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Chapter 9 of this book). Other development opportunities have unfolded 
too, such as the management and development of nature and landscape, 
the rise of agri-tourism - and the combination of farming and off-farm 
employment. Again, I will discuss all these later. At this point, it is 
important to recognise that farming evolves along different tracks, which 
could subsequently burst, at specific turning points (see Van der Ploeg et 
al. 1993), into a suddenly expanded range of development opportunities. 
It remains to be seen whether or not, and to what extent, these new 
possibilities are fertile ones. The complex outcomes of variation and 
selection are hard to predict in advance. 
Finally, the last group in Figure 3.1: the sljuchtwei boeren (ordinary 
farmers). This is a concept that can easily be translated literally, but 
which has another underlying meaning. They are the farmers that do not 
stand out. They are the farmers who sail a routine course: sljuchtwei. 
Perhaps I have been biased too much by my profession, but I am inclined 
to say that agency has developed to a lesser extent in this group. These are 
farmers who hesitate in making choices. They try to steer the path of least 
resistance, operating a little like one farmer and then a little like another. 
It is as if they are unable to conceive and pursue a clear project. They do 
not stand out but are almost invisible. As stated in Chapter 1: if we search 
for agency, we have to admit that something like non-agency does also 
exist. Whatever the reasons may be, it is remarkable that those who farm 
largely according to one style (whichever one it is) - other conditions 
being equal - realise higher incomes than those who hide in the ostensible 
safety of the unspoken. At equal production volumes (and under other 
ceteris paribus conditions), the 'extreme ones' in Figure 3.1 are able to 
realise better incomes and long-term perspectives than the ordinary 
farmers. 
Of course there are 'overlaps' between these different farming styles. 
They are not discrete categories. Some farmers will combine two or even 
three modes of ordering. We know this from practical experience; it 
appeared also from the application of fuzzy logic in those analytical 
models that normally generate discrete solutions. Second, and this should 
be self-evident but apparently needs emphasising - considering frequent 
confusion and misinterpretation (Volker 1993, 1994) - the practices 
resulting from a farming style, defined as an ordering principle shared 
and practised by a number of farmers, do not have to be completely 
identical. On the contrary, the outcomes of the strategy of farming 
economically will vary widely, depending on the size of the farm, the 
availability of family labour, et cetera. 
In other words, styles do exist, but varying conditions will result in 
variations within the style. A comparison with music will illustrate this: a 
theme leads to variations on the theme, but the theme does not become 
lost in all those variations - it presents itself only more strongly (Remmers 
1998). Analytically, this implies that the variation within a group 
compared to the variation between groups (cf. cluster analysis) is decisive. 
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Figure 3.3 Sunige farmers 
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3.2 Towards a specification of farming style as construction of 
congruence 
What is a farming style? Following on from the previous, a farming style 
can be defined (and researched) at three interconnected levels. 
1 A farming style is a coherent set of strategic notions about the way in 
which farming should be practised. It is therefore a particular cultural 
repertoire. It is a mode of ordering: a coherent set of strategic notions 
that guide practical actions and informs farmers' judgements (Roep & 
Roex 1992). In this respect, a farming stylets a decision-making model; 
it enables calculation: it is a calculus (Van der Ploeg 1990; Roep et al. 
1991). These strategie notions are time and again shared by a larger 
number of farmers. Hence, it becomes possible to refer to the networks 
in which these notions circulate and are discussed (the French research 
tradition refers to this as groupement professionel local; ref. Beaudeau 
1994). 
2 A farming style also appears as a particular practice: as an internally 
consistent, congruous, way of farming. The structure and the internal 
coherence of this practice is informed ('structured') by the cultural 
repertoire mentioned above. The practice is partly an expression of the 
strategic actions (of the mode of ordering) of the actors directly 
involved. And, vice versa, necessary feedback emanates from this 
practice. It reconfirms and/or modifies the cultural repertoire. 
The particular ordering of the practice can also be regarded as a 
specific model for income generation. Every one of the development 
opportunities discussed above contains a particular strategy (and 
hence a set of empirical cost-benefit relationships that are applied 
accordingly) with which income is generated. In dynamic terms, a 
farming style emerges, at this level, as a particular development 
pattern. 
3 The described practice has to be realised through the integration of (or 
through the distantiation from) other projects, other modes of 
ordering. It is not only the 'internal relationships' (within a particular 
practice, as indicated under 2) that colour and have an effect on the 
final results, but also, and especially, 'external relationships'. In this 
respect, we can regard a farming style as a socio-technical network, as 
a particular interweaving of divergent projects. More precisely, a 
farming style can be defined as a set of particular relations between 
markets and technology supply, on the one hand, and farming, on the 
other. And when market ordering and technology policy are explicit 
parts of a governments' agricultural policies, we can also conceptualise 
farming styles as strategic positions vis-à-vis government policy. 
Again, a farming style is a systematic and constant attempt to create 
congruence; at the individual level, but above all between the various 
levels. To farm in an yntinsive (intensive) way without wanting (or being 
able) to enter into the required market relations is an illusion: every 
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attempt would founder on discongruity. Similarly, sunig buorkje (farming 
economically) with cows yielding over 10,000 litres is rather 
inconceivable. Congruence is indispensable. Here congruence can be seen 
as an extension of thinking to doing, and vice versa, and from the 
farmer's practice to the network in which the practice is embedded. Mode 
of ordering or strategic repertoire, practice and socio-technical network 
need to be congruent. Practice needs to be organised and reorganised in 
order to be in harmony with strategic repertoire and vice versa. The same 
goes for socio-technical networks, which need to be adjusted to the mode 
of ordering and practice. And sometimes, when new development 
opportunities occur, strategies, practices and networks all have to be 
readjusted. Agency defines whether this will succeed completely or 
partly. 
Why do different styles emerge? Farming styles arise because agricultural 
practice has, always and everywhere, to be balanced with its 
environment. In the past, for example, the local ecosystem, the rule of law, 
town-country relations, history (and its collective memory) were 
important points of reference; they were modes of ordering that could not 
be ignored and with which the actual farming practice had to be forged 
into a 'working whole' (Roep 2000) - that is, into one particular socio-
technical network. Variation in local ecosystems, town-country relations, 
etc. resulted in an impressive range of regional farming styles - this 
variation was repeated in various aspects of the farm and farm 
management: the architecture of sheds differed from one area to another, 
as did the 'ways of hitching horses' (Hofstee 1985a) and the shape of beet 
cutters. The highly local nature of markets, of available technological 
repertoires, and the 'detached nature' of agricultural policy emphasised 
and reinforced the heterogeneity. 
The post-war period was characterised by an increase in state intervention 
in agriculture, especially from the early 1950s onwards: agriculture 
needed to be modernised. At the same time, certainly from the late 1960s 
onwards, an intensification of the uniformisation of markets and 
technological development occurred (as a result of both the strengthened 
influence of the EEC and the concentration of agribusiness). Market 
ordering, technology development, as well as the way in which 
agriculture had to be related to both, became increasingly subject to 
government intervention, to a mode of ordering geared towards a 
complete transformation of agriculture. I will discuss this 'modernisation 
project' further in Chapter 6. 
The farming styles that can be identified in Dutch agriculture today are 
above all responses to this new, dominant point of reference - that is, the 
modernisation project of the Dutch government, and later of the European 
Union. Increasingly, the 'local' disappeared as a point of reference 
(whether local ecosystems, local markets, local rules of law, etc.) - and 
new, rather 'global' points of reference took its place (see Swierstra 1971; 
Van der Ploeg 1992). 
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Therefore, farming styles have become increasingly intra-regional: they 
criss-cross regions, involving divergent responses to the dominant modes 
of ordering. The modernisation project introduced new development 
opportunities; it also encouraged the generation of contrasting 
development opportunities, precisely because modernisation as a new, 
rather accurately defined and specified development opportunity could 
not be realised everywhere - it could not be aligned with other, often local 
modes of ordering. 
A simple story may suffice here to illustrate the tension. In many parts of 
the Netherlands, there were numerous 'canal farms' (vaarbedrijven) which 
relied on flatboats for their transport within the farm and beyond. The 
introduction of new technologies, associated with modernisation (e.g. 
cubicle sheds, enlarged home plot, tankers collecting milk from the farm, 
increased stocking density, drainage in order to increase the carrying 
capacity of the soil; see De Bruin 1997a), created situations where the 
future of these canal farms became increasingly problematic. The moment 
suprème was usually constituted by the obligatory introduction of the milk 
tank and the necessity to gain road access to the farm. Even if this was 
physically possible, the costs of building bridges and/or ferries were 
prohibitive. The new development opportunities (the modernisation 
project of both the Ministry of Agriculture and the dairy industry) 
appeared unrealisable for these farmers. In many cases, it resulted in farm 
closure; in other cases, however, new development opportunities were 
unfolded - for example, by (again) taking up on-farm cheese production 
(see Figure 3.4). Thus, the (impossible) drive of the milk-collection tankers 
up to the milking parlour became unnecessary. Simultaneously, a 
completely new project was developed (on farm cheese making). This 
resulted in a new mode of ordering that demanded the development of 
that which had been unnecessary and superfluous within the then 
dominant socio-technical regime. A new socio-technical network was 
created that included new craftsmanship and new machines to enable 
small-scale cheese production; new relationships with traders and 
consumers; new forms of quality control; a careful aim at making these 
new activities profitable; the reordering of various internal relation on the 
farm; and so on. Thus, new relationships were forged, new perspectives 
conceived and consolidated, eventually resulting in a new farming style,14 
a new pattern of congruence. 
The farming styles, as they can currently be mapped out, can be regarded 
as ever so many responses to the modernisation project that dominated 
Dutch agriculture from the 1960s to the 1990s. Some styles primarily 
represent the internalisation of the modernisation project (and are 
materially dependent on its continuation). Other styles, on the other 
hand, represent a distantiation from, and a deconstruction of the all-
embracing and overpowering modernisation project. Socio-technical 
networks have been developed from within the latter group of styles that 
contrast, to differing degrees, to the networks that the modernisation 
project has helped forge. 
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Figure 3.4 On-farm cheese production as new development opportunity 
How do different styles emerge? Three issues are of importance. The first 
issue can be defined, following international debate, as resistance paysanne 
(see Pernet 1982; Scott 1985; Antonello 1987; in the Netherlands, Kuypers 
(1996), following Berger (1990), speaks of the 'culture of survival'). The 
demise of the peasantry (Mendras 1970; Gudeman 1975) has been 
predicted for decades. The expert system in and around Dutch agriculture 
also views the peasantry as an intermediary stage of agricultural 
development. In contrast to this paralysing image, I support a different 
perspective: 'resistance capacity' is omnipresent in Dutch agriculture as 
well, maybe more than ever before. For resistance of the peasantry is more 
widespread than fragility (see Chapter 7 of this book). Failure to 
distinguish between the two, as is generally the case in the expert system, 
inevitably leads to a misunderstanding of agriculture and how it evolves 
through time. But this aside for now. 
The second issue concerns the search for and the extension of new, 
contrasting development opportunities. Taking 'resistance capacity' as a 
starting point, new solutions, new perspectives, and the practices 
connected with them, are unfolded in such a way that once again 
'working wholes', or congruous patterns, emerge (Bagnasco 1985; with 
respect to marginal agricultural regions, see Bowler et al. 1995 and Osti 
1991). Control over the labour and production processes and the 
fundamental, and historically created, malleability of farming (see 
Chapter 4) offer prospects for this. The creation of a new congruence (the 
development of a new socio-technical network) can either succeed or fail. 
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Variation and selection are inherent to this dance through time. Some 
attempts have succeeded - often convincingly. The proof of the current 
abundance of farming styles cannot be ignored. 
The third issue concerns the relationship between the farm and the 
dominant ordering principles: globalising markets and the also highly 
globalised technology supply. Farming can be highly integrated into 
various markets (at the input side of the farm), it can also be highly 
distantiated from them (see Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 1985; Van der 
Ploeg 1990; Saccomandi 1991; Saccomandi and Van der Ploeg 1995). This 
involves various transaction costs, as particularly Saccomandi has stated 
clearly.7 The core issue in neo-institutional economics - make or buy -
arises here in an all-encompassing form and with all its repercussions. 
The same applies to the prevailing technology supply. This can be 
adopted integrally and be made into an ordering principle for further 
farm management and development - which can involve considerable 
transaction costs. However, the same technology supply can also be 
deconstructed, broken down into separate components, after which a 
critical choice is made to adopt certain elements and to convert them in 
such a way as to fit into the prevailing style. In turn, considerable 
'government costs' can be involved in this process. 
Thus, markets and technology do not determine the nature and 
development of farming in a unilinear way. Markets and technology 
create the environment in which various positions, that is various farming 
styles, are possible. Figure 3.5 (based on a canonical discriminant analysis 
relating various farming styles to the degree of dependence on or relative 
autonomy from markets and technology) illustrates this clearly. Various 
farming styles create highly divergent relations with markets and 
technology, and with the modes of ordering applicable there. This means 
that farming styles represent unique socio-technical networks 
(understood as particular combinations of several modes of ordering). 
In summary, new farming styles emerge from the resistance capacity 
contained within agriculture. Farmers use the malleability of the process 
of production and the room for manoeuvre contained in markets and 
technology, to construct new congruent responses to the dominant 
modernisation project. 
Particularly fascinating are the interrelations between the expert system 
that conceived and materialised this modernisation project, on the one 
hand, and the multitude of differentiated responses emerging in practice 
as a result, on the other. To summarise a lengthy discussion (which will be 
continued partly in the following chapters), the expert system clearly did 
not pay enough attention to diversity. Dutch agriculture was understood 
above all according to the logic of modernisation. 
In response to research about the ways in which various farming styles 
were perceived at the level of agricultural institutes, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the expert system replied that 'there are only two types 
of farmers: real entrepreneurs and hobby farmers' (Soldaat 1991). 
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Figure 3.5 Marke ts and technology as room for m a n o e u v r e 
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The empirical reality of agriculture was of interest to the expert system 
only for as long as it provided information about the extent to which the 
modernisation project had already been realised. The practice of 
agriculture advised at most about the extent to which 'imposition' (that is, 
the imposition of perspectives and measures) had been successful. 
Development opportunities such as those present in the practice of 
farming (or such as activated by the imposition of the expert system) were 
ignored, because they were not known. This very point of view created an 
extensive set of problems later on. 
On relevance and range 
The practices as developed in various farming styles (see level 2 of the 
previous definition) can be projected on and investigated through various 
dimensions. Initially, the emphasis was especially upon intensity, scale, 
and degree of specialisation. More recently, attention has been drawn to 
other dimensions. These include: 
• various types of entrepreneurship (Van der Ploeg et al. 1992; LEI 1996); 
• the highly variable use of rural space (De Bruin et al. 1992; Renting et al. 
1994); 
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• the possibilities for local self-regulation (Hees et al. 1994; Horlings 1996; 
NRLO 1997c; Hees 2000); 
• the highly differentiated nature of environmental pressure on 
agriculture, and its solutions (Roep and Roex 1992; Schuthof et al. 1994); 
• employment effects (Van der Ploeg 1994b); 
• the way in which 'nature' or, in more concrete terms, the way in which 
cows, wheat varieties, irrigation systems, and manure are folded into 
particular, style-specific entities (respectively Groen et al. 1993; 
Wiskerke 1997; Van den Dries and Portela 1995; Eshuis et al. 2000); 
• the way in which animals are treated (Commandeur 1998; for 
international references, see Seabrook 1997); 
• the way in which various input-output relations are created (NRLO 
1994; Ventura 1995); 
• the way in which relationships between producers and consumers are 
folded along style-specific lines (Kerkhove 1994; Ventura and Van der 
Meulen 1994; Roep 2000); 
• the interrelations between advisory and, more generally, farm 
management support, on the one hand, and farmers on the other 
(Leeuwis 1993; LEI 1996); 
• the role, position, and influence of farm women (De Rooij et al. 1995; 
Bock 1998); 
• opportunities for agritourism (De Bruin 1993; Oostindie and Peters 
1994); 
• and, more generally, the opportunities and starting points for new 
types of rural development (Van Broekhuizen and Renting 1994; 
Ettema, et al. 1994; Van Broekhuizen et al. 1997; Van Broekhuizen and 
Van der Ploeg 1997; De Bruin et al. 1997). 
Figure 3.6 shows the heterogeneous ordering of the socio-material reality. 
It is always possible to arrange two- or multidimensional fields around 
this 'reality', onto which parts of the heterogeneous world can be 
projected; and the addition of new fields can uncover new aspects. This is 
precisely what was achieved in the aforementioned studies. 
The core of this wide range of studies, supplemented by similar research 
studies from elsewhere in Europe and the Third World, can be 
summarised in three points: 
1 Irrespective of the dimension addressed, a relevant range of gradations 
could always be uncovered - which was sometimes wider, at other 
times narrower, and which was not only related to, but could also be 
explained by, the underlying differences in style. 
2 This amount of variation relates to the issues articulated on, and along, 
the various dimensions as a potential reserve of solutions. Some styles 
are, for example, environmentally 'cleaner' than others. In principle, 
this offers considerable opportunities for policy. Furthermore, the most 
likely route to better environmental outcomes will also vary between 
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each style. This offers a second series of opportunities for policy, at 
least in principle. 
3 Finally, it can be said that the range of potential solutions reaches 
beyond the currently identifiable variation. This applies 
'arithmetically', but also more substantially: if favourable conditions 
are created for certain development opportunities, it becomes possible 
to create new, initially unanticipated, responses to various problems. I 
will discuss this at length in Chapter 9. 
Figure 3.6 Projecting a heterogeneous socio-material reality onto various 
dimensions 
Thus, studies into farming styles refer, above all, to endogenous 
development opportunities (Van der Ploeg 1994c): to responses, to new 
development opportunities, the seeds of which are already present, to 
responses that can be utilised and unfolded further. 
However, other issues are at stake in early 21st century agriculture. The 
sector is confronted with a 'technological regime' (a semi-coherent set of 
artefacts, rules, procedures, views, interests, knowledges and ignorances, 
capabilities and incapabilities; Van Lente and Rip 1998), a system of 
opinions and rules related to agriculture as it should be in the future and 
that is increasingly imposed upon agriculture in immediate and coercive 
ways. Development is no longer understood as a process of conditioned 
unfolding from an existing position, but development is increasingly the 
'imposition' of an image of the future which relates to the current, 
differential developmental tendencies as a rupture. 
The connecting link is evident: it is the expert system in and around 
agriculture. This expert system excels in two apparently opposing, but at 
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closer view almost seamlessly dovetailing, aspects: on the one hand, 
ignorance and lack of knowledge about the current state of affairs, and the 
development opportunities intrinsic to this; and, on the other hand, 
expertise about the possible ways of organising agriculture, disconnected 
from the current state of affairs. 
Research into farming styles implies a constant search for and 
identification of the production, circulation, and strengths of 'novelties': 
new and potentially promising practices with which, at least in principle, 
some of the many problems around agriculture can be tackled. These 
novelties include any of the above-mentioned dimensions and often 
others too. The point is, however, that these innovative practices are 
doomed to remain hidden novelties under the dominant technological 
regime: they remain unnoticed and are often actively obstructed by the 
existing regime. Perhaps the most essential contribution of the farming 
styles studies emerges here: this approach has contributed in a number of 
situations to revealing what was 'hidden', and it has at times even created 
some room for manoeuvre (a protected space) for what appears to be at 
odds with dominant regime. 
For the time being, however, the farming styles approach can be no more 
than a counterpoint to the current generic approach, in which the 
imposition of future images domines over the development opportunities 
contained in the here and now. But this can in itself be important enough. 
3.3 Exploring farming styles 
Many studies of farming styles have been carried out over the past 10-12 
years. Collectively, they comprise a programme. Each study separately, as 
well as the set as a whole, is a return to empirical reality. This may seem 
surprising to outsiders - it is in fact extraordinary in a world composed of 
agriculture and expert system. The central questions are who or what 
represents the ordering principle in agriculture and where this moment is 
situated? Is it located in the future or in the present? In farmers, growers, 
and the other people working in the industry? Or in the experts, who 
from behind their screens, determine where we are heading? 
The return to empirical reality can be organised and arranged in 
numerous ways. More generally, I think that methodological pluralism 
constitutes the strength of this research tradition. I will not discuss the 
multiplicity of the applied methods and techniques that have been 
employed, nor the many conceptual and methodological nuances and 
debates. Here, I will summarise only one research into farming styles in 
Friesland (of the ten research projects conducted in Friesland), 
discussing possible alternative approaches in notes. 
Table 3.1 summarises a principal component analysis (PCA) that was con-
ducted on 300 Frisian dairy farms (year 1990). These farms were taken 
from the database of the AVM/CCLB, the 'co-operative accountancy 
organisation of the Frisian farmer'. PCA is used to search for underlying 
patterns of coherence. As shown in Table 3.1, six patterns of covariation 
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can be identified (for the year in question and using this method), which 
correspond well with the overall description provided by Figure 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Patterns of coherence 
SFU 
Dairy cows 
LU 
Total forage hectarage 
Milk quota (1,000 kg) 
Gross margin/ha 
Forage costs/ha 
Dairy cows/forage ha 
Output from cattle & cash crops/ha 
Machine costs/ha 
Rent + building costs/ha 
SFU/LU 
Dairy cows/LU 
Ha/LU 
Enterprise output/LU 
Milk price (excl. levy) 
Protein 
Butterfat 
Margin/100 kg milk 
Milk yield/cow 
Margin over feeds 
AI & recording fees 
Output & change in volume dairy 
cattle/lOOkgmilk 
Calves < 1-year-old 
Calves > 1-year-old 
large 
farmers 
.95 
.93 
.92 
.92 
.90 
intensive 
farmers 
.90 
.89 
.83 
.81 
.68 
.66 
-.36 
-.43 
machine 
-men 
-.33 
.97 
.94 
.91 
.88 
economical 
farmers 
.90 
.80 
.75 
.67 
cowmen 
.38 
.92 
.89 
.63 
breeders 
.82 
.81 
.72 
Note: SFU: standard farm units; LU: labour units; AI: artificial insemination 
One of the research techniques we have applied in certain cases (for a 
detailed description, see Van der Ploeg et al. 1992) is the reformulation of 
these patterns of association (as contained in Table 3.1) into everyday 
language, after which these 'verbalised' patterns are presented to a group 
of respondents (whose farms are part of the database used in the 
analysis). They are then asked: 
a whether they recognise the various patterns; 
b whether there are farms in their neighbourhood that could be regarded 
as typical examples for one or the other approach; 
c whether they can explain why farmers farm in this or that way; 
d whether they can characterise further the people on the respective 
farms; 
e what seems to be the most promising approach with an eye to various 
points of view (future prospects, income, sustainability, etc.); and 
finally 
f which pattern best resembles their own farm. 
This approach enables researchers to understand the different patterns -
that is, the patterns of covariation as revealed by PCA are loaded with the 
concepts, notions, and meanings of those who constructed them in 
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practice. Therefore, this approach results in clear portraits of strategies, 
farms and farmers. The above-presented description of the various styles 
is, in a way, a summary of these portraits. Incidentally, there are plenty of 
complications too. 
I have summarised a number of farm characteristics and indicators in 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3; the data have been specified per style. To outsiders, the 
data in Table 3.2 will probably represent above all insignificance and/or 
confusion, since it often seems to involve minute differences. For what can 
possibly be the relevance of an average age of dairy cows" of 4.07, or of 
4.77? Indeed, the difference is meaningless out of context. In combination 
with a range of other, equally small differences, however, the essential 
difference can by and large emerge. Whether it occurs, and if so how, 
depends on one decisive factor: the question of how various aspects and 
tasks are coordinated vis-à-vis each other. I will clarify this by way of a 
brief discussion. An average age of 4.07 means that on average cows are 
culled after two lactations. Thus, they have just had three calves: one and 
a half bull calves and one and a half heifer calves. Of course, one and a 
half heifer calf cannot exist in real terms; however, if we follow the 
argument through to its statistical conclusion and we subsequently take 
into account that part of this one and a half heifer calf will be disposed of 
as a result of illness and other ailments, we will approximate one heifer , 
ready to replace the culled cow. Other data confirm this. 
Intensive farmers have 40 heifers per 100 dairy cows available to replace 
old cows. At the same time, 32 per 100 of the dairy cows present are sold 
per year (mostly as 'sausage meat'). Thus the margin to select the best of 
the available heifers (a classic mechanism to achieve progress) is minimal 
here (8 per 100). 
An interesting difference appears if we compare this with the situation of 
the cowmen. Although the 'average age of cows' is only a fraction higher 
(4.48 versus 4.39, i.e. 4.3 per cent), in combination with keeping more 
youngstock (43 versus 40 heifers per 100 dairy cows, i.e. a difference of 7.5 
per cent) a somewhat better ratio of heifers to culled cows emerges: 43/31 
or 1.39 versus 40/32 or 1.25. This is a difference of 11.2 per cent. Thus, 
taking together, two almost microscopic differences create a slightly larger 
difference. And we could carry on in this fashion, piling one difference on 
top of another. 
I would rather refer to a completely different way of 'piling' these 
differences, however. One which is part of the strategy and practice of the 
breeders. At first glance (that is, if the various variables in Table 3.2 are 
considered in isolation) they do just about everything that God and 
science forbid. Heifers calve 'too early' (as early as 1.93 years old, against 
2.15 years old in the case of the economical farmers). The calving interval 
is 'too short' (the calving index is only 255 days!)- Cows are disposed of 
quickly (the average age is 4.18 years) and the number of heifers per 100 
dairy cows seems alarmingly high: 53 per 100. 
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Of course, there is an evident rationale underlying all this: breeders aim 
for a high production of good and robust breeding cattle, for dairy cows, 
but especially for heifers, that can be sold on the export market. From this 
perspective, individually surprising elements fall into place. Collectively, 
they result in a figure for 'output and change in volume dairy cattle' per 
cow that is considerably higher than in other styles (NLG 971 per dairy 
cow as against, for example, NLG 625 for intensive farmers, i.e. a 
difference of about 50 per cent). If the output and change in volume dairy 
cattle is calculated per 100 kg of milk, the difference would be even 
greater. Thus, various seemingly negative elements are forged together 
into one coherent pattern that constitutes the strength of at least this 
farming style. 
I could go on. The same variables could tell the story of those economical 
farmers who create 'robust' cows (as they call them) - cows that, in turn, 
enable them to keep various other costs low (see, for example, concentrate 
purchases per dairy cow). And we could flick through the other variables 
in Table 3.2, moving left to right and bottom to top. I will not do this here 
- it has been done meticulously elsewhere (see e.g. Groen et al. 1993; Roep 
etal.1991) 
The point I want to make here is that the various practical data (as I have 
illustrated above) can only be 'read' in a meaningful way if one holds the 
'key', which is hidden in the purposeful actions of the actors involved -
that is, the set of strategic notions with which various practices and 
processes are actively geared to each other and mutually coordinated. 
Without an explicit knowledge of 'level 1' (of the above-mentioned 
definition of farming styles), an adequate understanding of 'level 2' - that 
is, of farm practice - is impossible. 
This does not alter the fact that other perspectives can be constructed - it 
is very much common practice in agricultural research to do so. It is 
possible to construct agricultural economic and/or agronomic optima 
from which to look at the various practices. This subsequently informs 
about the (varying) degrees in which these practices are or are not optimal 
(the latter usually being the case). Such an approach remains blind, 
however, to an understanding of the aforementioned practices: no 
information is given about the question why a certain 'inefficiency', 
'irrationality', and/or 'suboptimal levels' occur. This 'blindness' 
increases exponentially, especially where the supposed 'optimality' is 
defined according to a reductionist method in which higher aggregate 
levels (for example, the farm or, even worse, a complete agricultural 
region) are understood and represented through the simple addition of 
Taws' that would apply to lower levels. I will revisit this issue in the 
following chapters. 
I have added a brief overview of various optimisation criteria in Table 3.3. 
Optimisation criteria are the standards with which farmers perceive, 
evaluate, guard, and adjust their farm organisation and development. 
These are concepts such as the one we encountered in the previously 
outlined history, namely in the case of the suyvere deel (the clean part). 
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Optimisation criteria are accompanied by 'indicators': variables and/or 
ratios that enable accurate quantification. Indicators are more or less the 
operationalisations of optimisation criteria. 
Indicators and the underlying optimisation criteria are largely style 
specific. A number of preferred indicators are used in every farming style 
to guard the development of one's own farm and also to enable 
comparison with other farms, 'to see whether we can still keep up ' . 
Cowmen, for instance, will especially keep an eye on the margin per dairy 
cow. They do this not only to critically guard their aim of the highest 
possible milk yield per cow ('you have to avoid excess'), but also and 
especially because they are convinced that a good margin per dairy cow is 
the most important cornerstone of generating a good income - which is 
indeed the case in their situation. Their farms are, above all, ordered 
(constructed) around this relation. 
Things are different in other styles - without implying any form of 
inferiority. Take the breeders, for instance. They will pursue slightly lower 
milk yields, because this provides more room for breeding. They order 
various farm internal relations and the 'materials' connected with these 
relations (in this case the cows) differently; they do this in such a way to 
optimise another indicator, the output and change in volume of dairy 
cattle per cow (or per 100 litre). This is how they safeguard their incomes. 
Thus we can move along the various styles distinguished above. Large 
farmers observe farm size and the annual expansion (such as reflected in 
the financial expenses connected to quota purchase). Economical farmers 
will try to keep costs as low as possible (as well as trying to realise the 
highest possible technical efficiency with their own resources). 
Machinemen will pursue the highest possible gross farm output per 
labour unit. For intensive farmers everything revolves around the margin 
per hectare. 
Different indicators and optimisation criteria can be identified for 
different farming styles. The intriguing and significant element is that the 
socio-material reality or the farmer's practice is moulded in such a way 
that every style does actually show the best results for the indicator 
regarded as the preferred and indicative one. 
3.4 Farming styles as socio-technical networks 
Figure 3.7 gives a description of, at least part of, the socio-technical 
network resulting from the style of farming economically. It seeks to show 
how the interlocking of various projects is essential. This applies to every 
socio-technical network. Subsequently, what makes a network special is 
the number and nature of the relationships between various projects. 
Collectively, these relationships compose the solidity but also the fragility 
of the project at the 'heart' of the network, in this case the project of 
farming economically. Solidity and fragility go together. It is usually 
assumed in the social sciences that this involves a contradiction. It is 
argued here that nothing could be further from the truth. Today's 
strength can be tomorrow's weakness. 
•^  
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Let me show this by means of one particular relationship in Figure 3.7: the 
one between economical farmers and others who sell newly bought 
machines as soon as the depreciation period is over (large farmers and 
intensive farmers are especially involved in this). The latter can buy new 
machines while still acquiring an attractive residual value for their 
discarded machines. Thus an attractive supply of not too old second-hand 
machines emerges for economical farmers, with which they can build a 
cheap and reasonably complete set of machines. 
Thus a concrete axis is formed between the projects of large farmers and 
intensive farmers, on the one hand, and economical farmers on the other 
(however, one particular government project - that is, the fiscal regime -
is partly responsible for the emergence of this axis). Without the particular 
nature of this association (of this connection), the project of the 
economical farmers would be much harder to realise. It is still a solid 
base, however, although changes along this axis can suddenly make the 
project of the economical farmers a lot more fragile (for further examples 
and a more detailed discussion, see Van Broekhuizen and Schakel 1991). 
In short, the style of farming economically does not exist in isolation, but 
is rooted in a particular socio-technical network, in a set of specific 
relationships with other farmers, with the dairy industry, with banks and 
supply-side industries (the key phrase here is low dependency), with a 
flow of government subsidies (in the sense that subsidies have hardly 
been taken up; although a certain change is now occurring), a critical 
relationship with the 'advisory complex', etc. 
The thus composed socio-technical network not only includes human-
human relationships but takes place largely via artefacts: via second-hand 
tractors and machines, via forms, cows, accounts, and transfers. These are 
mainly relations covering a considerable time-span. Fields, savings, the 
ability to maintain machines, buildings that are (can be) converted - time 
and again this involves resources that have been handed down through 
history and that are now being tapped and extended. 
In short, the socio-technical network connects past, present, and future in 
a particular way - one that contrasts sharply with those included in other 
networks. 
This applies equally to space in the socio-geographical sense: even though 
there are few face-to-face relationships, many economical farmers know 
about realities and points of reference tens, if not hundreds, of kilometres 
away (Chapter 4 will deal with many examples of this). Furthermore, new 
points of reference emerge partly due to the socio-political and 
institutional struggle within the network: new cows, new sheds, new 
documents, new contacts. And, vice versa, 'control at a distance' can be 
implemented through the same socio-technical network (from 'the 
outside in'). This happens, for example, due to the fiscal regime, to 
minerals regulations, to the future prospects as articulated by the expert 
system in agriculture, to technologies designed for a particular purpose 
(and other potential technologies that are not designed or marketable; see 
Staudenmaier 1985), etc. 
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Figure 3.7 Farming economically as socio-technical network 
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Figure 3.8 Farming intensively as socio-technical network 
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Note: * Registered by the Mineral Accounting System (MINAS), which has been 
introduced into Dutch agriculture in 1998 in order to monitor and restrict the 
amount of nitrogen and phosphorus surpluses. 
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Alongside the socio-technical network in which the style of farming 
economically is situated, there is the socio-technical network that is 
defined in and around the style of farming intensively. This is illustrated 
in Figure 3.8. The contrasts are striking. Apart from the immediate 
empirical content, there are quite string differences. In the first case, there 
are a number of relationships that could each individually be 
characterised as 'weak links', which does not alter the fact that the whole 
of these 'weak' relationships can form a strong and solid unit. 
In the second case (farming intensively as a socio-technical network) far 
more of the links are 'strong'. If characterised in terms of dependency 
relations, this evidently involves a higher degree of system dependency 
(see also Bolhuis & Van der Ploeg 1985, pp. 170-171). The 'nature' of the 
constituent relationships goes back to two fundamental issues. The first 
concerns the relation between past, present, and future. The purchase of 
new machines and their subsequent use, ordered ('regulated') by 
depreciation periods and residual values as defined by the prevailing 
fiscal regime, implies that a certain claim is imposed upon subsequent 
farm development. This has to occur in such a way as to correspond to the 
choices that have already been made: purchase and use define, at least in 
part, the agenda and calendar for the coming years. Farm development 
becomes rigidified - this is true to a much lesser degree for economical 
farmers. Of course, it applies to an even larger extent to the credit 
trajectory (or more generally, the balance between net worth and 
liabilities). Where hectares, cows, machines are burdened with high 
financial charges, there are unchangeable agendas and calendars. If high 
financial obligations have been taken on, it is difficult to reduce the 
intensity of production, for instance, however desirable this might be 
from other considerations (Van der Ploeg 1998b). 
A second important issue is that some networks (such as that of the 
economical farmers) have an almost built-in, fundamental 'balancing 
capacity', whereas this is very much absent from other networks (such as 
that of the intensive farmers), as a result of a very high level of functional 
integration and specialisation. To a certain extent, the former can 'play' 
with their relations in the output markets, because, amongst other 
reasons, different products and sales opportunities exist - apart from 
milk, there are good beef cows and, at times, heifers for the export market 
- and, furthermore, (but this is a more recent theme) possible 
contributions to nature management and nature development. 
Once entered into relations (particularly 'strong' ones), they often 
manifest themselves on the farm as constellations, which, in turn, appear 
as unchangeable, as no longer malleable (I somewhat anticipate Chapter 4 
here). Take the intensive farmers from Figure 3.8. High fertiliser levels are 
typical but, above all, indisputable. Why? First, because grassland is 
regularly improved - that is, ploughed up and reseeded with high-
producing, highly nitrogen-sensitive grass varieties. But also, and this is 
the second issue, because it is hardly possible to reseed other grass types, 
especially since (this is the third reason) soil biology has changed to the 
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extent that the autonomous nitrogen delivery capacity of the soil has been 
sharply reduced. More importantly (fourth), the available cattle have been 
raised on, and selected for, extremely high-energy fodder, which 
presupposes high inputs of artificial fertiliser. Fifth, the manure (slurry) of 
these highly productive cattle is of such quality that it cannot be used 
easily (if at all) as a substitute for artificial fertiliser. Finally, sixth, some of 
the machines used in the zero-grazing system cannot, in the short term, be 
set aside as useless; and, seventh, there will be high financial charges per 
hectare and per cow as a result of which a reduction of outputs becomes 
unfeasible, something that cannot even be contemplated. 
In other words, the reproduction of a set of relations such as that 
described in Figure 3.8 (that is, further development of the technological 
regime supported by it) is a material necessity within the style and the 
network of intensive farmers. Style and network cannot be disconnected 
and/or represented separately. The one orders and reproduces the other, 
and vice versa. 
3.5 The driving forces behind various socio-technical networks 
Why do different styles exist? Why are different development 
opportunities pursued, constructed, and used? Why does one style 
prevail in some situations and another in other situations? Why does one 
socio-technical network unfold and reproduce itself in one time and place 
and another elsewhere? 
Theoretically, the answer is simple; at least at first. The development, 
consolidation, and reproduction of farming styles are closely related to 
the social relations of production. 
Social relations of production are, following Poulantzas, the relations that 
constitute the labour and production processes. They shape labour and 
production processes (see level 2 of the aforementioned definition) into 
concrete and distinguishable practices. Social relations of production 
regulate the relationships between people and between people and 
'things', according to Poulantzas. Finally, relations of production are also 
the sets of relationships that regulate the distribution of produced value. 
To this I would like to add an important distinction, which to my 
knowledge was first introduced by Burawoy (1985) and which has 
subsequently been applied on a large scale in rural sociology. It is the 
distinction between social relations of production and social relations in 
production. If the former group of relations is situated around agriculture 
or, if preferred, on the interface between farming and the political-
economic environment, the latter group concerns in particular the 
relations that apply within the farm and within the actual labour and 
production processes. This distinction is used widely, for example, to 
develop a clearer understanding of gender relations in agriculture. 
What are the relevant social relations of production? It is impossible to 
identify from the outset what they are, how they function or how they 
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interlink. As Meillasoux (1975) argued, talking about social relations of 
production defines a research agenda. The set of concrete relations that 
has a 'constituting' (i.e. moulding) effect on agriculture, has to be defined, 
time and again, through patient empirical research. 
In this section, I will investigate three examples. These are usually omitted 
from the traditional literature on relations of production and are probably 
even regarded with suspicion. However, I think that they are essential to 
an idea of what makes agriculture function. Thus, I will discuss gender 
relations, landscapes, and culture as social relations of production. 
Gender relations 
It happened at a lecture in Oranjewoud, in the beautiful castle where the 
Instituut voor Coöperatieve Vorming (Institute for Cooperative Education) 
used to run its courses. According to tradition, it is also the castle where 
my grandfather was caught poaching. But that is a different story. 
I gave a lecture to a large group of farm women. It was in the early stages 
of the farming styles research, and there were still more questions to be 
asked than there were answers available. At that moment, I do not 
remember precisely why, I thought, 'well, I will grit my teeth and do it'. 
And so I asked them: 'Could you please explain to me why the style of the 
economical farmers is so widespread?'. 
I will not easily forget the uproar and amusement. Finally, one of the 
women spoke: 
Sjoch, wy witte dat wol, mar oer sokke dingen praat men eins net. (Look, we 
know what it is, but this is one of those things that it's better not to 
talk too much about.) 
An ambiguous statement. Still, the message was clear: it is because of us, 
because of farm women. 
Much more than most men, women represent a concrete axis within the 
agricultural firm, connecting the social and the economic spheres. 
Precisely this makes them 'guard' farm development: it is not allowed to 
be at the expense of the health of husband and children, too much stress 
must be avoided. Putting the farm itself at stake, for example by taking 
out large loans and thus running too many risks, is taboo to many 
women. 
In recent research (De Rooij et al. 1995) the following question was 
presented to farm women: 'If a man wants to grow 100, how much does a 
woman want to grow?' The researchers add: 'The number in the question 
is of course an arbitrary symbol. What is important is to determine 
whether men and women view continuous growth in the same way or 
differently' (1995, p. 30). The result was surprising: '73 per cent of farm 
women say that generally women choose less growth than men; 56 per 
cent of women indicate even that women choose 50 if a man wants 100' 
(ibid., p. 30). Another series of questions (see De Rooij et al. 1995, Table 
2.9) supports this conclusion further. Moreover, it is important to note 
that the more women participate in farm work, the more they take part in 
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decision-making. This happens more on the relatively smaller, more 
mixed farms, and less on the large-scale, highly specialised farms (see also 
De Rooij 1992): in the latter category, women are to a certain extent 
dispossessed - they are far less present as a driving force. 
Landscapes 
In the first half of the 19th century, a landscape was created in the Frisian 
area of the Friese Wouden (Frisian Woodlands) that became recognised 
only much later as a site of cultural heritage and as a carrier of distinctive 
ecological values (Van der Ploeg 1999). Characteristic of this landscape are 
the numerous wooded banks (or dykswâlen) and alder belts bordering the 
often minute fields. The 'scenic landscape' is alternated with lower lying 
and open mieden or old meadows. The juxtaposition of high and low, of 
open and closed, and of wet and dry constitutes one of the jewels among 
Dutch landscapes. 
Initially (especially in the first half of the 19th century), the wooded banks 
were built as plot separators - to prevent cattle from breaking through 
from one field to another. Barbed wire was not yet available, and there 
was no point in digging ditches because they would run dry in summer. 
Furthermore, wooded banks are also useful as windbreaks (the cultivation 
of rye, fodder beets, potatoes, and oats was then still an important part of 
farm management). Finally, they provided wood for fences, construction, 
cooking and heating. A farmer who had more wooded banks than needed 
would lease them out. More recently, dykswâlen and alder belts are 
recognised as valuable locations for useful predators. 
A fragment of a detailed map from the mid-19th century is presented in 
Figure 3.9: it indicates the extent to which an extremely intricate structure 
of wooded banks and alder belts existed by then. The successive images, 
which always refer to the same area, indicate how the basic structure of 
this pattern remained constant over the subsequent 150 years (see Figures 
3.10 and 3.11). Although some wooded banks and alder belts 
disappeared, the most striking aspect (above all in comparative terms) is 
that the incredible richness in landscape and ecological values has been 
retained - especially considering that, in effect, only from the mid-1980s 
onwards, government started to formulate policies for the preservation 
and protection of these landscape and ecological elements (ironically, 
these policies were highly counterproductive at first). 
The landscape that was formed in the mid-19th century (see Figure 3.9) 
can be regarded as 'objectified labour': it is the result of the co-production 
that previously took place. In other words, labour objectifies not only as 
capital, it objectifies or materialises here as a concrete set of production 
circumstances (that is, a concrete landscape), which, in turn, constitutes 
'living labour' (that is, the subsequent labour and production processes; 
Meeus et al. 1988). Farming took, and takes place, in the Friese Wouden 
in such a way that it fits into the landscape. Initially because wooded 
banks were needed, later because the removal of wooded banks 
encountered high, and continuously rising, costs and finally, because it is 
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recognised by the late 20th century that wooded banks represent cultural 
and ecological capital. 
In Figure 3.1,1 described a number of farming styles that can be found in 
Frisian agriculture. Machinemen are an important element of the palette. 
Typically, this style is highly underrepresented in the Frisian Woodlands: 
it has not been able to unfold properly, because it would run counter to 
the landscape as objectified labour. Past, present, and future were (and 
are) connected here by the landscape - by the landscape understood as 
the result of past labour, which, in turn, orders future activities. 
Of course, the continuity of the landscape does not just go back to cost-
benefit analyses restricted to a particular time and place. The cultural 
component is at least as important. 'If I were to die here', small farmers 
from the Friese Wouden said to each other when they were working in 
the empty and open Frisian grassland areas, 'for God sake bury me at 
home in the smûkens [the sheltered and cosy space between the trees], 
because my feet would be freezing here for as long as I'm dead [in the 
open and cold plains]' (see De Bruin et al. 1992). 
For the people who grew up in this historically created scenic landscape, 
it represents more than a 'home'; it provides an identity, a feeling of 
belonging. This feeling did not exist, as the quote indicates, merely by the 
grace of isolation and ignorance, but rather by the knowledge of the other 
and, consequently, the revaluation of what was one's own. In other 
words, the transaction costs related to the possible grubbing of the 
wooded banks can only be defined and understood within a cultural 
matrix. 
Within every farming style, farmers use a sometimes explicable image 
about what is considered the ideal 'rural' or production space. Such an 
image will include various levels: grassland composition, plots and their 
presentation, the architecture of buildings and presentation of the yard, 
and the overall lay-out of the farm. Thus, numerous landscape elements 
and structures (and hence carriers of biodiversity, see Gerritsen, 
forthcoming; Renting, forthcoming) are defined implicitly. These ideas 
have been elaborated methodologically by De Bruin et al (1992), for 
various levels of scale, by presenting contrasting images and asking which 
image was preferred (the methodology was developed previously by Ruiz 
and Ruiz 1984; Ruiz and Gonzalez-Bernaldez 1982). The results were 
integrated into maps: every style does indeed contain a 'subproject' with 
regard to the space in which it unfolds. 
By implication, most styles operate in practice in the Frisian Woodlands 
as active carriers of the present landscape and ecological values. They 
interweave past (the then performed and materialised labour), present 
(the present landscapes and their ecological values), and future (the 
reproduction and further unfolding and enrichment of landscape and 
ecological values) almost seamlessly and at the same time dynamically, 
just like dykswâlen, alder belts, plots, a relatively low stocking rate, ideas 
about future organisation - in short, farmers and trees - weave together 
into a solid socio-technical network. 
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Figure 3.9 The scenic landscape at about 1850 
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Figure 3.10 The scenic landscape at about 1910 
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Figure 3.11 The scenic landscape at about 1990 
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Later, these findings (which are activated especially when government 
tries to take over40 the management of nature and landscape) will lead to 
the establishment of the first environmental co-operatives. I will discuss 
this in Chapter 9. 
Culture 
Dutch farmers, their partners and children do not live outside of society. 
Even the most extreme expressions of what is seemingly the opposite, the 
contestations of the 1980s and 1990s, confirm this; the fierce and often 
coarse rejection of social desires highlights the extent to which these 
desires penetrated into the heart of the farming world. However, I will 
not discuss this contestation until Chapter 8. 
What is important here is how the great cultural movements in society at 
large are translated into the microcosm of the farm. From the late 1970s 
onwards, increased unrest about the ecological effects of industrial 
farming emerged among farmers. Typically, for example, more and more 
arable farmers no longer take potatoes for home consumption from the 
'big heap' but increasingly from a separate plot that gets no, or much less, 
pesticides. Often farm women were the crucial link in this. Such trends 
are of course nowhere documented (it was impossible to do this), but I 
have roamed in that world long enough to know that this is happening. 
Other trends that can be documented speak volumes in this respect. 
Figure 3.12 portrays the development of nitrogen surpluses per hectare 
for a number of farming styles in the Achterhoek area in the Netherlands. 
The period under research is 1986-1991, when strict regulations were not 
yet in force. It can be noted that surpluses were already reduced 
considerably in some farming styles, modestly in others. In terms of 
driving forces, these reductions go back to nothing but the factor of 
culture, to the insight among farmers that emission levels had to, and 
could, be reduced. 
This does not imply that government policy would be superfluous - on 
the contrary. What is crucial, however, is the question of how government 
policy and the cultural repertoires of farmers and their partners relate to 
each other: whether interweaving and mutual reinforcement occur, or 
whether there is a case of increasing antagonism. 
3.6 Differential developments through time 
Every farming style contains a calculus: a more or less explicit framework 
of interconnected concepts with which to 'read' the relevant empirical 
reality (in this case the farm and the relations in which it is embedded) 
and 'translate' it into new actions. A calculus is, as it were, the backbone 
of a particular strategy. It is the 'grammar' of the decision-making process. 
It entails the way in which farmers evaluate pros and cons (see Van der 
Ploeg 1990, pp. 59, 69; Roep et al. 1991, pp. 43-94). 
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Figure 3.12 The development of environmental pressure (1986-1991) 
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Note: D: double-goalers; P: practical farmers; Z: economical farmers; F: fanatical farmers; K: 
cowmen; M: machinemen. Local concepts in the Achterhoek and the associated expressions 
are somewhat different from those in Friesland. 
The presence of various calculi makes a reasonable case for the existence 
of different ways in which farmers react to overall changes. In most cases, 
the responses and reactions will be of a differential nature (for a general 
discussion about this, see Long 1985; Long and Van der Ploeg 1990; Long 
and Van der Ploeg 1994). Indeed, the encountered situation (and its 
diversity) will almost always be the result of differential developments as 
they have occurred until then. 
The data in Tables 3.1 to 3.3 can be read as the outcome of such 
differential developments. Figures 3.13 and 3.14 contain details of changes 
in the behaviour of different farming styles between 1987 and 1990. They 
show that differential developments occurred in this period. Large 
farmers expanded their farms most (from 397 standard farm units (SFU) 
to 446, an increase of 49 SFU /farm). This quantitative growth is much less 
in other styles. It fluctuates from +23 SFU/farm for intensive farmers and 
cowmen, to +15 SFU/farm for breeders, to a minimum of +2 SFU/farm 
for economical farmers. At the same time, it indicates the insignificance of 
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averages: in average terms farms grow by 22 SFU/farm, but the range 
around the average is enormous. Large farmers realised more than double 
this amount in this period, whereas economical farmers grew by only a 
fraction of the average. 
Does this imply that they are marking time? No. As Figure 3.14 shows, 
these economical farmers succeeded in dramatically increasing the margin 
per dairy cow in the period in question (with about NLG 250 per dairy 
cow per year). They managed to do this by further reducing the costs per 
cow (which were the lowest already compared to other styles), while 
increasing output per dairy cow at the same time. A different 
development can be observed in other styles: they all reduced the costs 
per dairy cow (without approaching the cost levels of economical farmers, 
however) but outputs per dairy cow also decreased (albeit to a varying 
degree). 
It is important to remember that the farmers mentioned here do not 
operate on different planets, nor in regions that are far apart: they all 
operate in the same region (the Frisian clay area), where the same 
economic, ecological, technological, and political preconditions apply. 
Nonetheless, differentiation is the rule, a point to which I shall return in 
Chapter 5. 
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Figure 3.13 The deve lopmen t of farm size (Frisian clay area; N = 100) 
standard 
farm units 
440 
430 
420 
410 
400 
390 
290-
280 
270 
260 
250 
< * 
G 446,(152) 
K 408,(175) 
G 397,(126) 
K 385,(148) I 293,(76) 
" 292,(116) 
average 
S 280,(72) 
I 270,(66) 
S 282,(61) 
F 267,(103) 
F 252,(77) 
87/88 
G = large farmers; 
K = cowmen ; 
S = economical farmers; 
Y = intensive farmers; 
F = breeders 
90/91 
Farming Styles as Socio-Technical Networks 141 
Figure 3.14 The deve lopmen t of ou tpu t s a n d costs per dairy cow 
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Notes 
1 This term refers to abstract development opportunities and principles: they have been 
stripped of the specificities of time and space. A farming style, on the other hand, is a 
particular time- and space-dependent expression of a more general style of agricultural 
practice. 
2 Kreas means beautiful, aesthetically sound, and also 'orderly', well organised. The term 
refers to something that is well arranged and therefore beautiful. In Frisian you can refer to a 
girl as a 'kreas thing'. If you refer to a farm (it kit er kreas hinne) the double meaning applies: 
it is beautiful, aesthetically sound, and attractive, because it has been made that way, it has 
been unfolded that way. 
3 Of course, a certain range already existed then, see Louwes and Van der Giessen 1926; for 
a more general discussion, see Van der Ploeg 1987, chap. 3. The problem described in Groun 
en Minsken is that Daniël tried to jump over the given boundaries. 
4 This is the adage of the trekkerboeren of Figure 3.1.1 will discuss this further below. 
5 See, for example, A. M. de Jong (1979), who described how large farmers made a pact 
with the Devil to be able to have the farm as large as possible and to remain that way. Again 
(just as in Daniel fan Kuken's case) the women become the victims. Theun de Vries describes 
several episodes in Stiefmoeder Aarde (Stepmother Earth) in which a sense of doom (that is, 
pride goes before a fall) hangs over farmers who want to be larger than is proper (and just as 
in Brolsma's case, thoroughbreds play the role of seducers and tempters!). 
6 Output and change in volume dairy cattle is the value of sold animals plus the calculated 
value of the genetic improvement of animals on the farm, plus the value of the increase in 
cattle numbers. 
7 This term refers to the slaughter destination and slaughter value of culled dairy cows (of 
the Holstein Frisian race in particular). It is in sharp contrast to the meat quality of real beef 
cows and double-purpose cows. 
8 Again, this involves a 'folk concept' that emerged during a series of qualitative 
interviews, when it was also constantly checked. The methodology used is explained in De 
Bruin 1993; Spaan et al.1992. 
9 An application of this can be found in Dijk et al.1998; Henne 1995. By the way, the 
emerging forms of overlap are significant. They are located along the borders described in 
Figure 3.1. However, no overlap was found between the real opposites (cowmen and 
machine farmers, economical farmers and intensive farmers). 
10 The work of Hofstee is above all concerned with such regional, or locally rooted farming 
styles. 
11 In late 19th century, an English freighter ran aground near (the Frisian fishing town of) 
Lemmer. From the wreck a machine is recovered that after years of inattention is 
'rediscovered' by an attentive young man as being very useful for cutting fodder beets. Soon 
afterwards, neighbours ask the village blacksmith to make such a beet cutter for them. 
Subsequently, a major movement sweeps first through Friesland, later through the rest of the 
Netherlands, in which time and again the beet cutter is adapted to local circumstances (the 
thickness and heaviness of beets as a result of soil type), the amount of beets to be processed 
(which is related to farm size), the extent to which beets have to be cut into smaller or larger 
pieces (which is related to the type of cattle), etc. Within 20 years, there are tens of distinct 
variants of beet cutter in the Netherlands. 
12 Up until the 1950s, considerable differences existed in labour charges, but also, for 
example, in the price of milk, within the Netherlands. These continued even longer 
elsewhere. Thus, the zone bianche around the big cities in Italy (which resulted from 
negotiations between farmers organisations and workers' unions, and which involved 
considerable differences in milk and other prices) were only eliminated in the 1960s as a 
result of European legislation. Initially, the technological repertoire varied from one area to 
the next. 
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13 There was not yet any question of direct prescription (see Benvenuti 1982 1990) such as 
we see today. 
14 See research into farming styles in the Veenweidegebied (peat district) in the province of 
Zuid-Holland, in which this style is referred to as pioniers (pioneers; Van der Ploeg and Roep 
1990). 
15 This was later extended into a co-operative project: the production of Veenweidekaas 
(region-specific cheese from the Veenweidegebied); see Roep 2000. 
16 This is shown not only by the highly differentiated use of grant opportunities (see De 
Bruin 1997a) - a phenomenon that is still reflected in the term of 'grant chasers', still used in 
the country - but also in the political-economic preconditions necessary for the reproduction 
of these styles (see Tracy 1997; Van der Ploeg et al.1998). 
17 Transaction costs are all the direct and indirect, already spent or still to spend, costs and 
risks involved in conducting a transaction; see further Saccomandi 1998. 
18 More generally, it can be said that every farming style contains a particular interpretation 
of government or management costs, of transaction costs, and of transition costs. Above all, 
every style contains a particular balance between these costs. 
19 Based on LEI 1996. A few modifications have been made for the sake of the explanation 
adopted here. 
20 Collections can be found in Van der Ploeg and Long 1994; Van der Ploeg and Van Dijk 
1995. See further Olsson 1990; Kerkhove 1994; Ventura and Van der Meulen 1994; Jurjus 
1996; Remmers 1998; Van der Meulen 2000. 
21 For Africa, see, inter alia, Hebink 1990; Van der Ploeg 1991. For Latin America, see, inter 
alia, Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 1985, chaps. 6-7; Gerritsen, forthcoming. 
22 It is possible to further explore the range of certain endogenous solutions not only by 
comparing the average per style per variable to the average of other styles, but also by 
calculating the standard deviation of the style in question. 
23 In the sense that there are clear environmental, planning, and qualitative preconditions. 
24 De Bruin et al.1992 (in the Frisian Woodlands); Van der Ploeg et al.1992 (Frisian clay area); 
Antuma et a/,1993 (linear programming Frisian dairy industry); De Bruin 1993 (mid-
Friesland); Hidding et «7.1993 (spatial perspectives); Van der Ploeg et «Z.1993 (projection of 
Frisian agriculture into the future); Wossink et al. 1993 (linear programming Frisian arable 
agriculture); Van Broekhuizen et al.1994 (farming styles in South-East Friesland); Renting et 
«M994 (development of environmental co-operatives in Friesland). 
25 For convenience of comparison, varimax rotation is applied to the results of the principal 
component analysis. The 'rotated' results are presented in Table 3.1. Furthermore, methods 
such as cluster analysis, canonical correlation analysis, and canonical discriminant analysis 
can be employed (see Figure 3.5). 
26 Needless to say, the description summarised in plain words included only farm 
characteristics and their interrelations. Every reference to a possible style (as in the caption of 
Table 3.1) was absent. The naming of these styles in terms of grutte boeren, etc. was 
developed on the basis of the interviews. Apart from the presentation of such verbalised 
results of a principle component analysis, the presentation of 'portraits' and/or simplified 
farm models has been used frequently in other research projects. Furthermore, it is possible 
to start with the most important dimensions along which farms are distinguished in an area 
(according to regional experts) and to enquire subsequently about the location (and reasons 
for this) within those dimensions. 
27 In other words, this is a more extensive exploration (and above all an exploration based 
on rather more 'real' and recognisable starting points) than the first attempts such as made 
by Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg (1985) in Italy, and Leeuwis (1989) in Ireland. 
28 This is, of course, not easy. First, it requires interviewers who are regarded as serious 
discussion partners in the eyes of those involved; in short, interviewers who know about 
fields, cows, farm economics, and hay tedding. Second, there is eternal doubt. Invariably, 
70-80 per cent of farmers define their own approach in terms congruous with previous 
analyses; in the cases of 20-30 per cent of farmers it remains a matter of pinching and 
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rankling. Third, a colourful bouquet of interpretations emerges as a result of the question 
under d. (for a description, see Spaan et al. 1992; De Bruin 1993). There is a skill in distilling 
the most significant and least ambiguous ones from this array of terms (although ambiguity 
is never removed). We have tried to overcome these problems partly by discussing the draft 
text of the research report with respondents individually and later in collective meetings. 
29 This is the average number of years they spend in the shed before they are sold - note 
that cows often only start producing milk in the third year of their lives. 
30 This is a young cow of less than two years old, served for the first time, and which will 
start its first lactation at the beginning of its third year. 
31 Every one of these are 'error messages' in the management systems designed and 
implemented today. 
32 The latter indicator is, since the introduction of the quota system, the most relevant. 
33 The cost price per 100 kg of milk is also an important indicator. However, this concerns 
not so much the current cost price as the future cost price. To be able to realise a low cost 
price in the future implies considerable costs that are to be made now, according to the large 
farmers; see Van der Ploeg et al. 1992. 
34 Furthermore, women were asked how their own situation related to this: 'Generally, men 
want to grow faster, invest more, and borrow more than women - is this the case in your 
situation?'. Fifty-two per cent of farm women said this is not the case, 48 per cent say it is the 
case. 'In almost half of the cases, farm women think differently about the necessity of 
continuous growth than men do' (De Rooij et flZ.1995, p. 31). 
35 Especially the gradients mentioned, of high and low, wet and dry, water and land, 
thicket and open land, are extraordinarily valuable as carriers of particular ecological values. 
36 Probably, the use of words appears unnecessarily long winded here. However, those 
familiar with Marxist analysis will be able to grasp the import of the terms used and of the 
argument as a whole. 
37 Most of the machinemen present in the area come from elsewhere. Notwithstanding local 
resentment, they often reorganised the entire range of spatial production conditions abruptly 
and en masse. 
38 The sense of belonging is perhaps one of the strongest human drives and usually one of 
the important ordering principles. What I tried to emphasise here is that the essential 
symbols connected to this, such as a landscape, will be strongly defended for that reason 
alone. 
39 Very indirectly, as in the statement: 'we and our fathers have made this area as beautiful 
as this and we want to continue doing this: we refuse to be pushed out'. 
40 The initially intended implementation of the Temporary Act on Ammonia and Livestock 
Husbandry (IAV) and also the intended realisation of the national ecological network were 
the triggers in creating this. Further episodes will be added later on, see Chapter 9. 
Part III 
Unfolding: The Utilisation and 
Development of Resources 

4 Capturing the Intangible 
From a strictly agronomic point of view, farming can be regarded as a 
conversion process: resources are converted into intermediary and/or end 
products: inputs into output. This process can involve various, 
interconnected conversions. Dairying, for instance, is based on the 
conversion of nutrients into feedstuffs and the subsequent conversion of 
feed into animal production (milk, meat, calves, etc.). 
Every conversion process in agriculture is embedded in and, at the same 
time, the object of the labour process. There is no universal or fixed 
relation between, for example, fertilisation (as input) and grassland 
production (as output). The interrelationships can take many different 
forms which are, above all, dependent on the way in which farming as 
socio-technical practice is ordered. The particular connection between 
inputs and outputs is created in, by and through the labour process. 
It is not only end products such as milk and potatoes that are created 
through the labour process, but also particular socio-technical practices -
that is, styles of farming - are created and reproduced. These practices are 
multidimensional. They contain numerous aspects, relations, and 
expressions. They consist of, inter alia, particular ways (sets of actively 
created technical interrelations) for creating end products. Although these 
technical subsystems - the conversion of resources into end products -
can be distinguished from farming practice as a whole, they can definitely 
not be separated from it. The production process sensu stricto is part of 
agriculture as a well integrated practice. The technical subsystems are 
constituted by the whole of which they are part. 
Farming is characterised by an impressive diversity. This applies across 
the board, even if we focus solely upon the technical or agronomic 
processes or systems (Almekinders et al. 1995; Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 
1985; Jollivet 1988; Hebinck 1990; Steenhuijsen Piters 1995; Jongerden and 
Ruivenkamp 1996). Analytically, the multiformity encountered in 
technical systems is the expression of a multiple malleability. Different 
development opportunities emerge as a result of this. Thus, folding and 
unfolding constitute the core of farming as co-production. 
4.1 The multiple malleability of farming 
The malleability of agricultural conversion processes can be attributed to 
a number of factors outlined below: 
1 First, there is a wide variation in local ecological conditions. As 
farming takes place in the natural environment, so it is shaped by it 
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(Toledo 1992; Altieri 1990). Most importantly however, the natural 
surroundings are, in turn, influenced, depleted, enriched and/or 
further differentiated by agriculture, because the elements comprising 
the natural surroundings are unfolded or particularised in terms of 
time and space in order to be recombined into a new, more 
productive, whole. By unfolding - that is, (re-)moulding - the natural 
surroundings, agriculture as a practice particularises itself. Where 
relatively undifferentiated ecosystems existed initially, farming 
produces a particularisation and enrichment of diversity - both in the 
natural surroundings and in farming itself (Gerritsen, forthcoming). 
2 As indicated in the previous chapter, agriculture can be characterised 
in a more technical sense as the interaction between labour, labour 
objects, and tools. It is typical of farming that labour objects, tools, and 
labour are reproduced in, and by, the labour and production 
processes. These elements can be particularised and improved via this, 
perpetually repeating, process of reproduction. They are folded and 
shaped according to the insights, needs, and interests of those who 
control farming. The fields , cows , instruments and machines , skills, 
expertise, knowledge of those working are all constantly developed 
and moulded; and, hence, farming as such is unfolded into different 
directions. 
3 The process of setting the components in motion - i.e. farm 
organisation and management - can also be ordered in numerous 
ways. A certain amount of labour objects can be combined with more 
or less labour. The labour process can be 'skill-oriented' or directed 
towards a 'mechanical solution' (Bray 1986). One can, following the 
terms introduced in Chapter 2, work in a kreas or rûch (gentle or rough) 
way. Therefore, scale and intensity can vary considerably. A 
fascinating description of these differences can be found in Fatal Shore 
by Hughes (1988). The choice of tools can vary considerably too, which 
again has implications for both the scale and intensity of farming and 
for the nature of the labour process. 
4 A fourth type of malleability emerges if we examine the labour process 
more closely. The labour process in agriculture is characterised by a 
vast number of tasks by which numerous aspects of the conversion 
process are influenced, if not driven, both directly and indirectly. The 
tasks do not constitute an amorphous whole; they are purposefully 
tuned vis-à-vis each other. Hence, the conversion process is further 
folded according to the insights, needs, and interests of the actors 
involved. 
5 A fifth type of malleability results from the caprichos, the 
capriciousness of the mechanisms described thus far. Nature, with 
which agriculture interacts, is like the Pink Panther, 'it always strikes 
back'. For example, the molecular structure of pathogens evolves to 
overcome disease resistant cropvarieties. Conversely, the interaction 
between agriculture and nature constantly gives rise to new varieties 
(and new résistants). Finally, the attentive observation of multiformity, 
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inherent in agriculture, results constantly in the identification of 
previously unknown growth factors and/or in fascinating and often 
far-reaching forms of product and process innovation (Remmers 1998). 
Needless to say, a thorough knowledge of the multiformity, of the 
existing and the new, is an essential condition for the use of this fifth 
mechanism. Consequently, 'diversity is a way of coping with the 
possible. It acts as a kind of insurance for the future . . . Selection from 
pre-existing diversity appears as the means most frequently used in the 
living world to face an unknown future' (Jacob 1982, p. 66). 
In summary, agriculture is characterised by multiple malleability. The 
natural environment with which agriculture interacts, the components of 
the production process, and the labour and production processes can be 
influenced, modelled, and remodelled - in both a general and a specific 
sense. The capriciousness inherent in the interaction between nature and 
agriculture further contributes to extending this malleability, which has 
been used, over the centuries, to make steady progress in agriculture10. By 
the same process, different practices are particularised into as many 
unique agricultural systems (Grigg 1974; Dumont 1970). 
Of course, malleability was not applied in a directionless or random way. 
People lived and worked through social relations that left an indelible 
mark on the extent to which malleability was recognised, used and, 
extended. Certain social relations, such as high levels of market 
dependency, could, just like the lack of freedom in feudal systems," 
exclude the search for, and the realisation of, practical improvements. 
Other social relations, on the other hand, could encourage and accelerate 
such a search. In any event, the use of malleability, the actual process of 
folding and further unfolding, never occurred arbitrarily. The risks 
inherent in change were acknowledged only too well. Change was 
therefore measured out with extreme care. It was especially expected of 
those who had enough resources to be able to take risks. 
More importantly, however, once a search direction (the one that 
corresponded closest to the local cultural repertoire) was set out, it would 
determine the subsequent search process. If fields are developed in a 
particular way, if cows are bred along a certain line, if certain instruments 
are designed, a code (Van der Ploeg 1991, chap. 6) - that is, a particular 
combination of opportunities and limitations - is built in to the respective 
labour objects and tools. 
A cow developed (folded) into a dairy cow differs from a cow constructed 
as a beef cow. A field gradually developed into a clover field differs from 
one developed into a meadow. Similarly, evident differences exist 
between a threshing roll and a flail, between the architecture of a Frisian 
kop-hals-romp farm and a los hoes in Twente. 
The trajectory already travelled (the thus far realised development of 
farming) unmistakably influenced the search for new types of 
development. The past left its mark on the present and, hence, on the 
future. Where dairy cows were bred 'with nobility' (Popta 1962), rich 
meadows had been created and the accordant architecture had been 
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materialised in sheds, houses, and outhouses, the thus established socio-
technical network developed further in an almost taken-for-granted way. 
The introduction of another breed of cattle would make the already 
created fields and the size and lay-out of the sheds futile and superfluous. 
Established practices became the matrix within which innovations were 
pursued. Similarly, these practices became the standard or norm to 
separate sense from nonsense, to sift the wheat from the chaff. 
The simple fact that the use of multiple malleability did not occur along 
arbitrary lines, but rather followed the particularisation of what was (had 
already been created as) one's own, implied that diversity in agriculture 
increased all the time. Farmers were well aware of this. As Robertson 
Scott, an English farmer, observed: 
Every year that I live in the country, and every year that I know more of 
what the people who work the land of the United Kingdom are doing, I realise 
more fully the profound agricultural truth underlying the remark of a skilled 
Dutch farmer to an English landowner: if you should come to Holland to 
farm, you would imitate me, but if I were to go to farm in England I would 
imitate you (1912, p. ix). 
Initially, classical agronomy, the precursor of the today's technological 
agricultural sciences, contributed significantly to the further increase in 
diversity. Classical agronomy was above all accumulated knowledge 
about the diversity in ways of farming. Hence, classical agronomy became 
an important channel of communication between various regions and 
cultures. Consciousness of one's own style was increased by this channel 
of communication. At the same time understanding of the repertoires of 
knowledge from elsewhere increased, which enabled the selective 
adaptation and introduction of new elements into existing styles, thereby 
strengthening them. 
4.2 The uncaptured peasantry 
Through the ages, the malleability of farming has been used by farmers to 
mould and shape the labour and production processes according to their 
own insights, experiences, needs, and prospects. This process took place 
under various conditions; it generated - and, subsequently, occurred 
according to - different styles. An enormous diversity was thus created -
a diversity expressed by (and hence repeated at the level of) the actual 
production process. Even if the agricultural production process is 
regarded in a strictly technical sense (for example as the conversion of 
inputs into outputs), an impressive variation can nevertheless be 
encountered - for example in input-output relations. This variation is the 
outcome of the fundamental and complex malleability of farming and of 
the fact that this malleability is repeatedly applied through the prism of 
different social practices of farming. I will discuss this further in this 
chapter, in the light of analyses of contemporary agriculture. 
The multiformity, complexity, dynamics, and sometimes stagnation 
resulting from the complex use of malleability have made farming into an 
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almost intangible phenomenon. This applies in a theoretical sense and 
certainly in a practical sense. Even though separate agricultural systems 
can be understood through rigorous study - particularly if the 
knowledge, insights, and concepts of the actors involved are taken into 
account - inclusive theories that pretend to explain farming as disconnected 
from the particularity characterising every social practice seem doomed to 
fail. This is solved in contemporary agricultural science by waving goodbye 
to empirical reality: the actual way of farming is considered to be less, or 
no longer, relevant (WRR 1992). A point of view that I consider to be 
untenable. 
An intangibility also exists in a practical sense. Farmers always do things 
differently from expected or required. Goran Hyden interpreted this 
phenomenon aptly in the title of his book about agriculture in Tanzania. 
The title refers to the 'uncaptured peasantry' (the peasantry that cannot be 
tamed). There are plenty of empirical illustrations to support the notion of 
an uncaptured peasantry, not only in history but also in present. 
Numerous examples of the 'uncaptured farmer' are documented from the 
Third World, but at least an equal amount of episodes can be reported 
about farmers in the heart of the industrialised world. However, these are 
stories that often remain untold - for they always disturb the illusion of 
ordering, the idea of a certain grip on events, which is cherished so much 
in science and policymaking. 
Nevertheless, recent Dutch agricultural history is replete with such 
stories: The small farmer' who did not want to disappear. The 
uncontrollable question of overproduction . The sustainability theme. 
Time and again, agriculture seems unable to be captured. 
The pig sector represents perhaps the most extreme example. When it was 
concluded in the mid-1980s that the sector was overpopulated by pigs and 
laws blocked further expansion, the pig stock grew like never before. 
Intangibility is everywhere: it concerns not only the relation between state 
and agriculture, farmers organisations also find that they lose their grip 
on events, often misjudging new developments (e.g. the quota system 
introduced in the mid-1980s was completely misjudged). It also includes 
their grip on the rank and file of the organisations (Frouws 1995). 
Ironically, the issue of control became recognised as the sector's cardinal 
problem in the mid-1990s. In summary, the uncaptured farmer is back at 
the centre of the agenda. 
4.3 The Cartesian theatre 
In order to get a grip on what is uncaptured, the agricultural sciences 
have struggled for a long time with what is called the object definition: 
what is the actual object of the agricultural sciences? Is it the confusing, 
complex and above all heterogeneous use that farmers make of the 
essential malleability inherent in farming? Or is it something else? 
The answer conceived in the 1930s is summarised most strikingly by 
Bordewijk, who stated that agricultural science 
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is involved in systematically and critically ordering the practical experiences 
of agriculture at all times and in every country, while attempting to explain 
those experiences on the basis of what is disclosed by the natural sciences, on 
the one hand, and the social sciences, on the other, about the laws of nature 
and society. It sets out to deduce and track down guidelines from all this, 
according to which the farm as an enterprise should be organised and 
exploited, and according to which farming as a sector of industry should be 
undertaken (Bordewijk 1936, p. 2). 
A double abstraction is presented in this definition. First, explaining 'the 
practical experiences of agriculture' abstracts from the experiences, 
insights, and knowledge of actors who fold this practice into what it is. 
Farming is essentially reduced to the application of the laws of nature and 
society. Hence, it goes without saying that those people who are best able 
to understand and represent such an application are scientists. 
The second abstraction concerns the further development of farming: the 
way in which farming should be undertaken is not understood as 
emerging from agriculture as a social practice; its development is to be 
derived from scientific laws and their application. A logical link exists 
between explanation and guidelines. This is the capacity to 'transform' 
(the term is from Mertens and Koningsveld 1986) the identified laws into 
technology. If X is carried out, under specified conditions, then Y will be 
the end result. Or, according to Koningsveld: 
Agricultural science conducts systematic research into natural processes that 
are considered relevant to agriculture and that are dependent on conditions 
that can be realised by technical interventions (1986, p. 46). 
A striking feature of the definition above is its prescriptive element. Once 
laws are identified, rules (or 'guidelines') can be deduced on the basis of 
which agriculture has to be organised. The phrasing seems based upon 
the assumption that a tension exists between farming as practice and the 
way in which it should be conducted. Theoretically, the rules mentioned 
by Bordewijk could be interpreted as a series of possibilities for action. 
However, the more inclusive and systematic the nature of the scientific 
design (the set of rules), the more coercive its character: the rules become 
explicit prescriptions for action. 
Initially, Bordewijk's definition is controversial. De Vries and Timmer, 
inter alias, take an unmistakable stance on the issue. 'Agriculture is not the 
same as applied science and economics' (De Vries 1931, thesis 1). More 
poetically, Timmer refers to 'a play that is very important to the world; 
the play is called agriculture, and the farmer plays the leading role' (1949, 
p. 22). Or as Koningsveld would later state more accurately: 'Agriculture 
as a domain of action is the result of a particular social coordination of all 
these (technical) actions' (1986, p. 45). A position such as Bordewijk's is 
criticised: 
[They are] not yet ready for the total concept of agriculture; they do not dare 
to go outside the boundaries of the concept of soil production; if the human 
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factor is mentioned, it happens at most in its function as economic subject 
(Timmer 1949, p. 11). 
In spite of all past and contemporary critique, a definition similar to 
Bordewijk's is dominant in today's agricultural sciences. Agriculture is, 
according to Zadoks (1985), 'a type of applied ecology, subject to the laws 
of physics, chemistry, and biology'. And Sansavini, the Director of the 
International Society for Horticultural Science, states that 
today, horticulture is the 'sum' of inputs from various disciplines that range 
from the basic sciences of biology, physiology, biochemistry and above all 
genetics to the 'applied' fields of engineering, information science, and 
economics and management which are skills needed to run a viable enterprise. 
Sansavini goes on to conclude (with striking resemblance to Bordewijk's 
reasoning) that 
horticulture can only continue developing with the aid of high-technology 
resources in areas such as computerised irrigation, fertilisation, harvesting, 
storage and marketing schedules, integrated pest management and 
production, farm management and market organisation (1995). 
Agriculture is increasingly understood as an area for the application of 
scientific blueprints - that is, as a Cartesian theatre?5 Progress in this 
theatre is increasingly and necessarily seen as dependant on further 
scientification (Van der Ploeg 1987). 
By representing agriculture as a Cartesian theatre - that is, as the 
unfolding of scientific and economic laws - farming was made (at least 
potentially) into a controllable phenomenon (for a more general 
discussion, see Christis 1985). The double abstraction and the attempt at 
controlling are combined in the notion of production function. Within the 
agricultural sciences, the production function constitutes an essential 
(though repeatedly modified) cornerstone. A production function 
specifies, generally, a precise relation between inputs and outputs derived 
from scientific knowledge. A production function is usually based upon 
field trial data or, as is increasingly the case today, upon simulations. 
Subsequently, it is possible to deduce an optimum from the combination 
of a production function and the prevailing or expected economic 
relations - that is, from a combination of natural laws and those of society. 
(In neoclassical agricultural economics, the farm is indeed understood and 
represented essentially as a production function, Saccomandi 1990). 
Hence, a technological determinism is created, with which, in turn, different 
practices can be defined as backward, as inefficient, or - at the other 
extreme - as 'too intensive' (Galetti et al. 1956). 
Thus, prescription becomes self-evident: farmers have to work towards an 
optimum specified by agricultural science (as illustrated by WRR 1992). 
Consequently, new disciplines emerge. For the question became, as 
RöTing (1985) states sharply: 'How do I get them where I want them'. 
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Abstraction from multiple malleability and from the multidimensional 
and comprehensive nature of the labour process in agriculture plays a 
crucial role in the construction of production functions. The only way a 
close connection between inputs and output can be constructed is by 
ignoring this fundamental malleability and the way in which it is utilised 
in the labour process. Furthermore, once the production function is 
constructed, it can only be used prescriptively (and hence normatively) by 
again ignoring the multiformity of agriculture and the active and 
innovative role of farmers. 
Production functions are artefacts. They are definitely not what they are 
intended to be - that is, a reflection of a given and unchangable 
biophysical world. I would like to explain this in detail by discussing one 
of the most basic subjects of the agricultural sciences: grassland 
production. Numerous production functions have been constructed for 
grassland production. Usually, they define the relation between 
fertilisation and total production for an hectare of grassland for one year. 
A classic example is shown in Figure 4.1. This simple concept, this 
abstraction is so at variance with practice as to constitute a fiction. Grass 
does not grow as presented in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 A production function (the relation between nitrogen fertilisation and 
grassland production) 
output : 
grassland 
production 
input : nitrogen fertilisation 
Over the course of a year, grass is grazed or cut several times. Therefore, 
Figure 4.2 presents a more realistic depiction. It shows that various cuts 
can be distinguished. Growth varies per cut. Grass grows faster and more 
abundantly in spring than in autumn. Furthermore, growth is, inter alia, 
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dependent upon fertilisation - this too is presented in Figure 4.2. The 
moment at which a cut is utilised depends on the decision of the farmer. 
Numerous considerations play a role in these decisions. First, it involves 
the question whether a heavy or light cut is desired. A heavy cut is grass 
that has overgrown, its colour is often darker and it contains a particular 
proportion of energy to protein. Such grass is obtained by moving the 
mowing date backwards. 
Moving the mowing date forwards results in lighter grass, characterised, 
inter alia, by a high proportion of protein and hence relatively less energy. 
Such considerations are also important with regard to grazing. Different 
grazing systems are employed (some more suitable to heavy grass, others 
above all suited to light grass). The proportion of grazing to mowing can 
vary considerably too. In some farming styles the emphasis is on grazing, 
in others on mowing. 
Utilisation of the cuts is interdependent to a certain extent. If grass has 
grown towards a heavy crop, the aftermath will be slightly paler. It will 
take longer before the next cut will start to grow. If mowing is carried out 
earlier (if the growth curve is interrupted at an earlier stage), the next cut 
will start to grow earlier. Furthermore, the first part of the curve - that is, 
the part of accelerated growth - is always utilised in the case of early 
mowing. 
By implication, total grassland production per hectare per year is partly, if 
not pre-eminently, dependent upon the organisation of time, upon the 
proportion of mowing to grazing, upon the chosen grazing system, and 
upon numerous other aspects of the labour process.1 If we limit ourselves 
to the organisation of time, its effect can be illustrated by a few simple 
graphs. Figure 4.3 indicates schematically which pattern will occur on a 
farm where a farmer shows preference for a heavy crop. Figure 4.4 shows 
the reverse situation: mowing early and often. The wide variation found 
in the so-called mowing percentage indicates that the examples are not at 
all illusory. 
The relation between certain inputs and the output realised with these 
inputs depends upon a wide range of conditions of which the concrete 
organisation of time is only one. Farm labour, as an all-encompassing 
practice, is in principle related to as many of these conditions as possible 
(while the possibility of knowing and influencing conditions is highly 
variable historically). By influencing certain conditions, the relations 
between certain inputs (fertilisation, for instance) and certain outputs 
(grassland production) can be influenced to a large extent. Figure 4.5 
clearly illustrates this. 
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Figure 4.2 The interrelations between grass growth, fertilisation, and grassland 
utilisation (growth research PR 205) 
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Figure 4.3 The creation and utilisation of heavy cuts 
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Figure 4.4 The creation and utilisation of light cuts 
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Figure 4.5 The construction of various 'production functions'. 
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A production function such as that expressed in Figure 4.1 is an artefact. It 
is a construction in so far as it suggests an unambiguous connection 
between one input and its realised output. This connection only applies 
under a comprehensive range of conditions (which usually remain 
undescribed). Production functions can only be constructed by assuming 
that this set of conditions and associated interventions, i.e. malleability, 
does not exist. In summary, a production function is the negation of farm 
labour as a comprehensive, purposefully organised, and highly differentiated 
practice. 
In contemporary agronomy, the substantial range of conditions and 
variables that determine the eventual output are usually summarised by 
the term growth factors. The amount of nutrients in the soil, their 
composition, the availability of these nutrients to root systems, 
absorption, the available amount of water, etc., are all growth factors. 
Within these growth factors, it is the most limiting one that is assumed to 
constrain the level of output. If this limiting growth factor is adjusted, 
production levels increase to a point at which a subsequent factor 
becomes the limiting one. This approach has been graphically presented 
as a barrel made of staves: the shortest stave determines the water level -
that is, the output level (for an accessible summary, see De Wit 1992a 
1992b). Several interesting conclusions can be drawn from this approach. 
First, the law of diminishing returns becomes highly relative. It involves 
an exceptional situation, since it only applies if the next limiting growth 
factor has not yet been identified. Second, it thus becomes easier to 
imagine the sheer infinite field of solutions. Take 10 growth factors, each 
with 5 partial solutions, the number of possible final solutions will be, 
theoretically, 5 to the power of 10, each with their own input-output 
relations. Now, this almost untameable complexity is averted within 
agronomy by focusing the attention onto the highest possible solution on 
the production function - that is, the final solution (the combination of 
partial solutions) containing the most optimal input-output relation (for a 
good example of such an approach, see De Wit and Van Heemst 1976; De 
Wit 1983). Below, I will try to show that such an approach only 
inadequately describes the practice of farming. Third, I would like to 
point to the fact that most growth factors cannot be regarded as 
determined by nature. The available amount of nutrients in the soil is not 
definitively anchored into nature with Genesis. It has been an object of 
farm labour through the centuries. More generally, what counts as a 
growth factor in theoretical agronomy is regarded within the perspective 
of the social sciences as an element of the labour process. So far, growth 
factors and the barrel of staves form the perfect meeting ground for the 
technical and social agricultural sciences. In and through the labour 
process, farmers regulate actively the set of growth factors that they know 
and consider relevant. 
This holds true all the more if we understand that an a priori definition of 
limiting growth factors is impossible. Again and again, it will have to be 
investigated in practice (that is, in the labour process) which factor is the 
limiting one. Hence, the interaction between mental and manual labour, 
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as included in farm labour, again emerges as strategic. Farmers not only 
regulate growth factors in the labour process, they also develop an 
overview and understanding of the relevant set of growth factors, in order 
to adjust de facto the limiting factors in a continuous process of 
experimenting, observing, interpreting, adjusting, and evaluating. 
Relevant growth factors are regulated, understood, and developed further 
in and through farm labour. Thus, interaction with the scientific expert 
system can be understood as part of the labour process in the broader 
sense of the word. Hence, the extent to which the process of farming 
moulds agriculture - and especially agriculture as a conversion process -
into an differentiated whole is emphasised once again. 
Does this imply that 'anything goes'? Of course it does not. It means 
simply that agriculture cannot be equated with the supposed 'unfolding 
of scientific laws inherent in nature'. Farming is involved in an active and 
goal-oriented interaction with nature. Farming is co-production, in which 
both the natural and the social are indispensable elements. Thinking in 
terms of hierarchy is therefore meaningless. Certain agricultural systems, 
and certain conversion processes, result from the interaction, 
interweaving, and mutual transformation of the natural and the social. 
These systems and processes are characterised by certain regularities and 
patterns. The regularities (symbolised and represented by, and thus often 
misunderstood as, a production function) inform about the way in which 
the conversion process is folded. This also demonstrates that different 
regularities (different production functions) can be identified more often 
than not alongside each other - precisely because agriculture is folded in 
always varying ways. 
Perhaps nature and its inherent laws (photosynthesis, for instance) can be 
understood as ultimate limits within which farming has to manoeuvre. If 
nature represents clay and farming represents kneading, agriculture (and 
its inherent conversion processes) is indeed workable as clay. However, 
this also implies that kneading and the kneaded result are marked by the 
starting material. Clay is neither gas nor water. One cannot model a hot 
air balloon (one which actually takes off) out of clay. The material is 
unsuitable. The 'anything goes' approach of postmodern constructivism, 
must be kept in proportion, if not rejected outright. 
This does not alter the fact that our knowledge about what is possible and 
what is not possible is a product of its time. New and previously 
unknown possibilities repeatedly arise. The history of agricultural 
sciences constitutes probably the most convincing encyclopaedia about 
this. In spite of everything else, knowledge development is a progressive 
process. 
The relation between nitrogen fertilisation of grassland and total 
grassland production (usually expressed as metabolised energy per 
hectare) is a fascinating example of this. New insights (Van Bruchem 
1997a 1997b, 1998; Van Bruchem et ai, forthcoming) are unravelling and 
challenging this once seemingly fixed relationship. Why? Because a 
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previously unknown or ignored link (or intermediary variable) is coming 
into view. This is the indigestible crude protein percentage of grass. 
In some farming practices, increased nitrogen fertilisation results in an 
increase in the percentage of indigestible crude protein (a highly 
counterproductive process), whereas in others it is translated mainly into 
an increase of metabolised energy production. Developing our 
understanding of this important intermediary variable has the potential to 
lead to a reorganisation of grassland production on a new and potentially 
more sustainable basis. One which is very different from the practice that 
evolved from our previous understanding of production functions. The 
former production functions have been blown up as it were. Established 
routines make way for new regularities. 
For the time being, we are, ostensibly, occupied with trying to understand 
the possibilities of using 'clay'. Or rather, we get to know 'clay' better 
through the development of new alternatives for its usage. Even though 
we know that there are limits somewhere, we also know that more is 
possible than what has been mapped out thus far. The development 
opportunities extend much further than the ones that have been unfolded 
thus far. 
A production function is an attempt to reduce the (actual, but especially 
the potential) results of farm labour to a more or less complex set of 
cause-effect relations. The variables that constitute this model do not refer 
to any aspect of the labour process. They are constructed as object-object 
relations. Furthermore, they have to be standardisable, quantifiable, and 
controllable. Typically, fertilisation models are never built upon (not even 
partially), for example, well-ripened manure, but only upon artificial 
fertiliser. But this is better left aside for the moment. 
The purpose of these models (think about Bordewijk's second step - the 
'guidelines') is to result in prescriptions for action. In other words, they 
are used to direct (or, as is often thought: to develop, to assist) and to 
control - in short, to dominate - the uncaptured peasantry. And this has 
happened a lot. One only has to remember the fertilisation advice of the 
previous decades and/or to take note of the enormous increase in the use 
of artificial fertiliser and the environmental problems resulting from this. 
Nevertheless, the intriguing question remains why farmers have widely 
accepted the recommendations and prescriptions derived from 
production functions constructed in agricultural science. In the end -
that is, without taking note of various relevant details - only one answer 
is adequate: science creates knowledge and, therefore, ignorance at the 
same time (Hobart 1993). Thus, science - in this case agricultural science -
acquires its highly directive and prescriptive role. Because of the 
widespread dissemination of knowledge about production functions, 
grassland management is focused almost exclusively on the quantity, 
composition, timing, and dosage of artificial fertiliser. Undeniably, a lot of 
relevant and useful knowledge has been developed within this range. Yet, 
at the same time, this also defined a boundary - since hardly any research 
at all was conducted beyond this well-defined range, as it did not seem to 
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be relevant. Consequently, grassland production expressed in 
metabolised energy per hectare (the effect) seemed mainly, if not 
predominately, dependent on the use of artificial fertiliser (the cause). It 
seemed hardly worthwhile to search for other intervention alternatives 
apart from the (presumed) cause. Alongside the realm of well-defined 
cause-effect relations, ignorance was increasingly created. Nitrogen 
fertilisation emerged as the most important lever of grassland 
management for farmers. 
Human conduct (I will draw this conclusion a couple of times in this 
book) is influenced principally by the given distribution of knowledge 
and ignorance at any time or place. Knowledge 'leads the way', 
knowledge inspires faith (or trust; see Chapter 6). On the other hand, the 
domain of ignorance is threatening and should be avoided at all cost. The 
other becomes increasingly tabooed with the development of a particular 
type of knowledge and the practices connected with this knowledge. The 
long and difficult build-up that organic and biodynamic farmers had to go 
through is a prime example of this. 
Ironically, the far-reaching influence of a particular distribution of 
knowledge and, by implication, of ignorance also emerges when we look 
at the extent to which agricultural scientists are prisoners of their own 
production functions. A heated environmental debate raged in and 
around Dutch agriculture in the latter half of the 1990s, when the 
necessity of reducing the use of minerals became evident. Translated into 
the available stock of knowledge about production functions, this led to 
the conclusion that a reduction in fertilisation levels would necessarily 
result in lower grassland production. Farmers would have to move 'along 
the function'. Thus, agricultural science (more specifically, certain 
institutes) introduced an extremely counterproductive element into the 
discussion. Obviously, farmers wanted to maintain their levels of 
grassland production. Nurtured by the idea that less artificial fertiliser 
input would imply lower levels of grassland production, farmers 
organised to obstruct the then emerging agri-environmental policy. The 
very fact that, by then, many farmers (at least 10-20 per cent) achieved 
completely acceptable grassland yields at very low fertilisation levels, and 
with very low mineral losses, was, and remained, a non-fact (a 
'refrigerator anomaly', following Koningsveld 1976). Apparently, the then 
most relevant part of empirical reality did already belong to the domain 
of ignorance. Through reliance on production functions, theory prevailed 
over practice. Farming becomes irrelevant, especially if practice deviates 
from theory. 
Agricultural science could have played a formidable role in the agri-
environmental debate if the relevant deviations had been analysed. 
However, the only possible 'progress' institutional science could imagine 
consisted of counterproductive moves 'along' previously constructed 
functions. As much as they prescribe the future, scientists are prisoners of 
the past. 
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4.4 The 'farming systems' approach 
Attempts have been made in the 1970s and 1980s at pairing off the many 
shortcomings of the production function approach with what became 
known later as 'farming systems analysis' (Gibbon 1994). Here a farm is 
represented as a system that is interacting with a certain environment and 
articulated internally according to various subsystems. Water, soil, crop, 
animals, labour, family, and so on constitute a whole, as it were, in which 
various relations can be aggregated. This approach is refreshing and 
useful from a number of viewpoints although some fundamental 
problems have not been resolved (Brouwer and Jansen 1989). Agency -
that is, an actively ordering subject - has not been built into the system. 
No prominence is given at a conceptual level to the capacity to regulate 
actively and from the inside out - that is, to react, to unfold, to extend, 
and hence to (re)order. That is precisely why dynamics and differentiation 
cannot be integrated into farming system models. 
Let me clarify this by means of a brief excursion into animal science. A 
cow can be modelled (that is, represented and understood) as a 
combination of two subsystems: the digestive subsystem, in which feed 
(grass, silage, hay, maize, etc.) are converted into nutrients (amino acids, 
saturated fatty acids, etc.), which can be utilised in the second, metabolic 
subsystem to be converted into reserves, milk production, etc. Sauvant 
(1996) remarks that 
research in animal nutrition has been basically sustained by laboratory 
experiments and has progressed in parallel with the improvements of the 
methodologies of investigation of biological events occurring within the 
organism. Therefore this . . . area was principally the support of Cartesian or 
reductionist approaches. 
This implies, for example, that the actual feeding of cattle (see also Figure 
4.6) is, in the end, governed by the laws of nature (since it is derived from 
the 'potential of production' in the cow). However, such an approach 
becomes 'more and more obsolete', according to Sauvant. In contrast to 
this reductionist approach, Sauvant presents an alternative model (see 
Figure 4.7) in which 'operating subsystems' (OSs) are driven by a 
'regulating subsystem' situated in the cow: 
The regulating subsystem (RS) mainly corresponds to a part of the endocrine 
system of the organism. The RS receives information relating to the status of 
the OS (size of the compartment, flux passing . . .). This information is 
interpreted and treated by the RS which in turn responds 'orders' resulting in 
alteration of the value of one of the several flows. In fact, the regulating system 
is also subdivided into at least two subsystems to allow the organisms [the 
cows, JDvdP] to achieve their 'two major life purposes ': the survival of the 
live organism and the perennity of its species. The homeostatic regulations 
(HS) deal with the first target, they are directed at maintaining life despite 
external perturbations among which is the meal (and the nutrient input) 
pattern. The homeorhetic regulations (HR) . . . are involved in the second 
purpose: they control metabolic events which support growth, pregnancy, 
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lactation . . . A better comprehension of the homeorhetic regulations is of 
utmost importance since they sustain the biosynthesis of animal products. 
Figure 4.6 The institutionalised view on cattle feeding 
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If all this appears slightly cryptic to outsiders, its implications are 
important, as the following example shows. If the available amount (or 
quality) of feed changes greatly in an ecosystem, an animal will react to 
this, for example, by reducing the times it is in season. In turn, such an 
adaptation will affect the regularities that apply to the level of 
metabolism. In Sauvant's model, the RS affects the relations within the 
OS. The regulatory system affects the conversion relations (input-output 
relations) that apply within the operating subsystem. Thus, the most 
appropriate input-output relations are always created from within the RS. 
A productive system - whether a cow or the farm as a whole - cannot be 
represented simply as a number of interlinked subsystems. The presence 
and smooth functioning of one or more regulatory systems is essential. 
The nature and functioning of the operative subsystems is driven from 
within the regulatory subsystem. From here, linkages between various 
operative systems are introduced, adjusted, and/or radically changed. 
The interaction (within more complex wholes) between various 
regulatory entities is probably one of the most interesting, but also one of 
the most complex, issues here. 
Again, take cows. A cow contains an RSc (where c stands for cow). 
Echoing the German proverb Was will das Weib?, the following question 
has been raised in Dutch literature: 'What does the cow want?' (Van 
Zomeren 1995). The question can be paraphrased: what does RSc do? At 
the same time, a cow is integrated into a farm, where the farmer is alive 
and well as a regulatory subsystem. Here we can speak of an RSf (where f 
stands for farmer). There is a continuous interaction between RSc and RSf, 
so to speak, in farmers' everyday practice (see the fascinating, but 
completely neglected, research by Seabrook 1977,1994). It is relevant here 
not only that farmers try to understand RSc and to see through it in their 
own way (to optimally use their animals in the short and longer term), the 
farmer also largely conditions, if not remodels, RSc. Farmers (RSf) make 
their cows into typical dairy cows or typical 'dual-purpose animals', as 
discussed below. Farmers make them, in the vernacular of the 
countryside, into 'easy cows' or 'racing cars'. Anticipating subsequent 
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sections in this chapter, farmers can actively influence the appetite and the 
nature of their cows by making the appropriate breeding decisions. In 
other words, RSc is actively changed. This takes place by purposeful 
selection and the creation of particular circumstances. The same applies to 
the fields: farmers create fields (those operating subsystems) that are most 
suited to their cows and their overall objectives. 
Figure 4.7 The live organism as a regulated system 
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This implies, first, that none of the subsystems (whether water, soil, crop, 
or animal) can be understood as the direct expression of immanent 
scientific laws - they are always modelled on the strategic notions and 
experiences of the entrepreneur involved. Thus, the possibilities and 
impossibilities inherent in modifying the various regulatory systems (such 
as RSc) constitute the self-evident boundaries within which such 
modelling takes place. 
Second, it implies that various subsystems cannot be imagined in terms of 
simple addition - indeed, the actively and purposefully created 
integration turns the whole into more than a simple sum of its parts. 
Therefore, agricultural production cannot be understood as a more or less 
complex accumulation of 'basic ingredients', each one regulated by a 
production function - the very interaction at higher levels of aggregation 
affects behaviour (and the regularities) at lower levels. 
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Figure 4.8 Scientific knowledge systems versus local knowledge systems 
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Third, the integrative moment has to be reconsidered: if knowledge of the 
individual subsystems is principally segmented in agricultural science, 
interaction is the knowledge-organising moment par excellence in local 
knowledge systems (see Figure 4.8). Manure is known in local knowledge 
systems by its effects on soil life and grassland production. Grass and 
other feed components are understood partly, or even predominantly, by 
their effect on the animals. The animals are understood partly by the way 
in which they react to a certain diet and by the peculiarities of excreted 
manure (some cows, for example, produce thin manure, which says a lot 
about the kind of feed they have had). I will elaborate on this below. 
However, let us first return to the essentials. Productive subsystems 
cannot be understood by means of a simple stimulus-response (that is, 
cause-effect) model. Integrative and interactive regulatory subsystems 
exist at various levels. Various responses to changes in the environment 
can be developed from within these ordering or regulatory subsystems. 
By implication, no unilinear relations exist between stimulus (that is, 
changes in the environment) and response. This results in a conclusion 
that appears simple but is far-reaching in its consequences: 'A more 
comprehensive system whose constituting components are represented by 
a number of deterministic equations has no mathematical solution' 
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(Sauvant 1996). This holds particularly true when time is introduced into 
the equation. Sauvant illustrates this convincingly with respect to feeding. 
Of course, his conclusion applies a fortiori to more complex systems such 
as a livestock farm as a whole. 
According to Sauvant, mechanistic modelling leads nowhere: 
During the last years such . . . models have been fairly criticised due to their 
inability to be applied out their specific context of elaboration and calculation. 
The alternative presented by Sauvant is 'the elaboration of empirical 
models of multiple response'. I think that this points to the heart of co-
production as a theory. 
4.5 The empirical variation in input-output relations 
Figure 4.9 comprises a structure of three quadrants in which the essential 
conversion processes in dairy farming can be situated. The bottom-left 
quadrant concerns grassland production, the conversion of nitrogen into 
grass, silage, and/or hay. Here, output is operationalised in terms of 
energy value of grassland production (expressed in metabolised energy). 
The actual conversion - that is, the relation between applied fertilisers and 
realised grassland production - is highly variable. First, because this 
conversion is integrated into a labour process that is always structured in 
specific ways (various stipulating growth factors such as soil structure, 
water availability, etc. vary considerably with this). Second, because a 
farmer's grassland production always represents a particular interest. One 
farming style may pursue the highest possible level of grassland 
production. Other styles may pursue the most efficient grassland 
production. And yet other styles may pursue cost minimisation or labour 
reduction as important objectives. Hence, the importance and 
organisation of grassland production differ time and again. 
On a contemporary dairy farm, home-produced fodder is complemented 
by purchased feed (see the second, i.e. bottom-right quadrant in Figure 
4.9). Usually, this involves concentrates, but it can also involve purchased 
fodder. Again, the interrelation between home-produced and purchased 
feed is highly variable. Home-produced fodder will form the basis in 
some types of farming (or farming styles), whereas purchased feed will be 
the pith and core in others (see Chapters 2-3). Similarly, the proportions 
of home-produced to purchased feedstuffs can vary considerably: 
sometimes there will be complementarity (mutual complementing), 
sometimes there will be substitution. 
Taken together, grassland production and feed purchases result in a 
certain availability of feedstuffs (expressed in metabolised energy per 
hectare). This total amount of available feed is the basis (the input) for the 
second conversion process: the conversion of feedstuffs into milk, beef, 
and cattle (situated in the third, i.e. upper-right quadrant in Figure 4.9). 
Again, this conversion process is above all dependent on (because it is 
embedded in) the labour process and, at the same time, it is the explicit 
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object of this labour process. Here, the obvious tasks are breeding and 
raising of youngstock, and thus the genetic improvement of the herd, the 
nature of the herd, the organisation of feeding, milking, the relation 
between youngstock and productive cattle, the daily care of cattle, shed 
conditions, etc. 
Figure 4.9 Conversion processes and I/O relations in Frisian dairy farming 
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Figure 4.9 draws on data from 300 Frisian dairy farms, equally distributed 
over the clay, peat, and sandy regions of the province. The figure is based 
upon accountancy data collected by the AVM/CCLB, and relates to the 
year 1990-1991. Figure 4.9 shows a considerable range in (summarised) 
input-output relations in the first and third quadrants. The range should 
not be understood as a random phenomenon but relates largely to the 
always varying way in which the labour and production processes as a 
whole are ordered. Regularities are created in every farming style. This 
point can be illustrated by analysing more closely two antipodes: cowmen 
and machinemen. Figure 4.10 is the guiding principle in this discussion, 
the input-output relations are presented per quadrant for both styles. The 
first quadrant (the bottom-left quadrant) shows that machinemen (T) 
produce on average more feed per hectare than cowmen (K) (the measure 
used here is metabolised energy production/ha). Incidentally, they need 
more fertiliser to achieve this than their counterparts. The regression lines 
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indicate that, viewed from a distance, machinemen are less efficient than 
cowmen. 
Figure 4.10 Triquadrant diagram with 'regularities' for cowmen (K) and 
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After diligent research, it seems that the explanation is clear and self-
evident: machinemen like mowing. Cowmen prefer to let the cows do 
the work. In their practice, the emphasis is on grazing. Machinemen 
manage their grass production (see Figure 4.2) differently from cowmen. 
If the latter usually opt for slightly heavier grass, the former choose to 
mow and ensilage a lot. They prefer the light crop. 
Preference is perhaps an unfortunate term here. Machinemen produce a 
light crop, just as cowmen produce a heavy crop. The purposefully 
created relation between grazing and mowing, the chosen grazing system, 
fertilisation, the specification of the best time for mowing, the losses that 
are taken for granted and so on, are all relevant conditions which 
contribute to actually creating the different relations presented in this 
quadrant. Regularities are generated by the goal-oriented directing of 
different tasks - that is, by the strategic organisation of farming as 
practice. Thus different input-output relations emerge. Input-output 
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relations are modelled in particular ways - according to the practice of 
which they form part. 
The second quadrant concerns the degree to which home-produced feed 
is supplemented by purchased feed. The proportion of home-produced to 
purchased feed can vary considerably. Determining this relation is an 
important field of attention for many farmers, it is an issue of strategic 
consideration. Throughout history the nature of these considerations and 
the resultant balance between the two have changed radically. Figure 4.10 
demonstrates that different regularities apply here. Machinemen on 
average buy more additional feed (roughage, but particularly 
concentrates), but, at equal metabolised energy production per hectare, 
cowmen buy in more. 
The third (upper-right) quadrant depicts the transformation (conversion) 
of feedstuffs into animal production. Different, mutually contrasting 
regularities can also be found in this quadrant. Here they are, to a large 
extent, the outcome of different breeding strategies. Cowmen and 
machinemen create cows that not only differ in various ways, but also fit 
into the created context as best as possible. 
The cows that populate Dutch pastures are above all social constructions. 
This applies generally: every cow is the outcome of previous chains of 
interrelated decisions. These decisions involve choice of bull, replacement 
of dairy cows, selection of mother animals, rearing of calves, age of first 
calving heifers, care and feeding of youngstock, proportion of youngstock 
to dairy cattle, and so on. Today's cow is the outcome of decisions taken 
in the past, just as today's decisions contain the cow of the future. Thus, 
past, present, and future weave together along different paths, along 
different chains. 
More specifically, these decisions have to be forged into a coherent whole 
time and again (see, among others, Beaudeau 1994), and this whole is 
always highly style specific (see Barkema 1998), resulting in the creation of 
different cows. 
In extensive research (related to 10,000 cows on about 260 farms in three 
regions) Groen et al. (1993) have analysed the extent to which breeding 
indexes (informing about the quality and nature of cows) and bull 
selection vary between styles. Not surprisingly, cowmen create excellent 
dairy cows. Their breeding indexes for INET (a measure for genetic 
progress vis-à-vis mother animals), produced amounts of protein, etc., are 
substantially higher than, for example, those of machinemen. There are 
also significant differences with regard to exterior. Dairy cows created by 
cowmen are - it could be said - more beautiful, 'more of a dairy cow', 
than the cows bred by other farmers. There are striking differences in 
terms of development, and above all in type of udder. 
On the other hand, cows of machinemen stand out because of their legs. 
This corresponds with the way in which machinemen handle their cattle. 
They define cattle often as 'use' cattle, as cattle 'that should be able to get 
its own feed in the shed'. Clearly, legs are necessary for this. A cowman, 
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on the other hand, pays individual attention and care to cattle; he will 
bring feedstuffs to the cows. 
Thus, every style is reflected in the cows that it creates, in the cows that fit 
in with the respective style. All things considered, the cows constitute the 
pars pro toto for the farming style. 
In conclusion, cows are social constructions. Nature (in this case cows) 
becomes folded in and by the labour process, in such a way as to 
optimally fit in with the rationale followed within the particular practice. 
This is demonstrated strikingly by Groen et al. when they make a 
distinction between typical milk-type cattle (Dutch-Friesian and Holstein 
Frisian, FH and HF respectively) and dual-purpose cattle (predominantly 
Meuse-Rhine-Yssel, MRIJ), where the latter represents cattle that produces 
both milk and meat. These two, very different types of cattle were related 
to the styles of the different farms in the research by Groen et al. 
I confine myself here to cowmen and the so-called double-goalers (a folk 
concept from the Achterhoek, the River regions, and South Holland, 
which refers to farmers who specialize in both milk and meat production; 
see Maso 1986; Van der Ploeg et al. 1990; Roep et al. 1991; Van der Ploeg 
1996b). Some results have been summarised in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 The malleability of cattle types (breeding indexes for exterior 
characteristics: development and muscle; muscle values are in brackets) 
Cattle type 
Milk-type cattle 
Dual-purpose cattle 
Style 
Cowmen 
98.9 [102.1] 
99.7 [101.2] 
Double-goalers 
96.1 [104.4] 
98.6 [103.2] 
Note: all breeding indexes are significantly different 
Muscle values are an indication of beef-producing capacity. Table 4.1 
shows that irrespective of the type of cattle, so-called double-goalers 
develop their cattle into animals that produce a lot of beef, alongside milk. 
This is obvious if they use the red-and-white MRIJ cattle (double-purpose 
cattle). However, if for some reason (rouge ou noir is, following Maso 
(1986), a fundamental issue in the countryside) they work with black-and-
whites or, more to the point, with typical milkers, these double-goalers 
'transform' their cattle in such a way that they stall excellent beef 
producers in the end. 
The same applies to the reverse situation. If cowmen work with MRIJ 
cattle (essentially a double-purpose animal that excels less in milk 
production), they develop their cattle, over time, into cattle that 
distinguishes itself in terms of milk production and that is hardly striking 
in terms of muscles value. Nature is folded in and by farming. Cows are 
(just like fields) made into something special. 
Let us return to the cowmen and machinemen in Friesland. Cowmen 
realise a considerably higher input-output efficiency in the third quadrant 
(the upper right quadrant relating to work in the shed in Figure 4.10, i.e. 
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relating to the conversion of feed into total animal production) than 
machinemen. There is no need to discuss in detail the question why, after 
the detailed descriptions of both styles in Chapter 3. In summary, 
cowmen have bred better cows (at least in this respect); they feed and take 
care of their animals in distinctively different ways. All of this (and much 
more) results in the emergence of the distinguishable regularities 
presented in the third quadrant of Figure 4.10. 
One could say that cowmen realise a different production function from 
machine farmers. This would indicate implicitly that a certain relation 
between inputs and outputs is not so much determined by nature or by 
available technology, but rather that it is the outcome of particular social 
practices in which nature and technology are shaped and folded in a 
particular way. However, I prefer to use the term regularities instead of the 
established concept of production functions. The notion of production 
function contains a trace of determinism, implying, e.g., observations that 
cowmen (or whichever other group) 'should move along their function'. 
Or, it is observed that 'there is a lot of variance around the production 
function of, for example, cowmen' (which, it is assumed, indicates a 
problem). 
In contrast, I think that only one position is possible: production functions 
do not exist. They are artificial relations that were and are created by 
scientists. On the basis of these, they think they can understand and 
prescribe farming. Production functions are essential for external 
prescription - yet it is very possible to produce grass and milk cows 
without those functions. Farmers create certain patterns and certain 
regularities in and through their work, in and through the process of 
folding nature (more particularly, in and through the making of their 
cows, for instance). These patterns and regularities vary between styles. 
They vary also within styles. Farmers seize this variation in order to 
produce progress (in continuous cycles of observing, comparing, 
interpreting, adapting, and again observing). This occurs by building on 
the variation within their farms; it happens especially through the 
constant and above all systematic comparison between farms. 
Furthermore, it needs to be stated that farmers definitely do not move 
their farms along (imaginary) production functions - on the contrary, they 
create new 'functions' in and through their work. This implies that the 
relations between farming as practice and institutionalised forms of 
technology development have to be conceptualised differently. Progress, 
even if it is defined in strictly technical and/or agronomic terms, emerges 
as essentially an endogenous process, in which exogenous elements can 
acquire complementary importance. But I will leave this aside for the 
moment. 
4.6 A methodological intermezzo 
The above presented results became the object of interesting discussions, 
since the correlation between styles and input-output relations is slightly 
surprising from a Cartesian perspective. With hindsight, there were two 
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phases in this debate. In this intermezzo, I would like to discuss in more 
detail the arguments and counterarguments that evolved. Of special 
interest are the different methods of analysis (for a summary, see Dijk et 
al. 1998). Readers who are not interested in multivariate methods of 
analysis may choose to skip this section. 
First, it was argued that regularities such as those illustrated in Figure 4.10 
represent at most statistical noise around a generally applicable series of 
input-output relations. The most our discussion partners could accept 
was that various styles would take different positions on this otherwise 
generally applicable relation. An economical farmer will choose a 'lower' 
position on the function, an intensive farmer will choose a 'higher' one. 
Taking a playful approach to the terms used here, one could say that 
alpine climbers do not create Mont Blanc. It 'is there' whether or not 
climbing takes place. Mont Blanc is an objective fact (just like a production 
function). The only issue that is assumed to be of importance is that some 
alpine climbers reach the top, while others do not seem to pass the 
halfway point. As an empirical researcher, one cannot but state that a 
production function can be approached like the Mont Blanc. Some 
farmers manage to climb higher, whereas others are not as successful at it. 
It is possible that it happens like this, but perhaps it does not happen like 
that.35 
Figure 4.11 presents a path diagram36 describing (indirectly) a series of 
input-output relations in dairy farming. The style-specific ß (a measure of 
the effect of one variable on another and thus an indication of the nature 
of the input-output relation) is presented for each partial relation. 
Figure 4.11 shows that important differences exist between different 
styles. Variation in stocking rate (dairy cows per hectare) does not 
translate into milk yield (XK = -0.01) in the style of cowmen (K), whereas 
the same change would have a strong negative effect (in X Y = -0.66), for 
intensive farmers. If this was represented graphically, (partial) production 
functions would have varying angles. 
The same issue can be approached in a different way. Figure 4.12 
summarises an alternative approach. It concerns the same model, but (in 
contrast to the approach such as summarised in Figure 4.11) here general 
relations have been calculated. Additional effects per farming style have 
been calculated subsequently. 
Figure 4.12 shows that style 'distorts' the assumed generic relations in a 
number of decisive places. Let us look, for example, at the correlation 
between purchased feed and total output per cow. If we approach this 
correlation as a generic relation, we find that ß equals +0.71. However, 
this generic relation varies between different farming styles. The input of 
purchased feed is systematically lower for economical farmers (additional 
ß = -0.15), while the partial result - that is, the total output per cow - is 
systematically higher (ß S = +0.17). The generic relation is bent ('folded') 
as it were. The exact opposite is the case for machinemen (T) and intensive 
farmers (Y): they are also involved in folding, but in a different direction. 
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Again, we reach a similar conclusion: style-specific input-output relations 
are created in and through the labour process. 
Figure 4.11 Style-specific input-output relations (Friesland, n = 300) 
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Figure 4.12 The additional effect of style 
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A second round in the discussion revolved, essentially, around the 
reintroduction of the conventional concept of structure. Our colleagues 
from the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) accepted the 
existence of variations around the generally applicable input-output 
relations. However, they argued that these variations stem from structural 
differences. Some farms, for example, have a high quota per hectare, 
whereas others have a low milk production per hectare. Such structural 
differences are translated, it was claimed, logically into various aspects of 
farm management. A high, structurally determined milk production per 
hectare obviously goes together with high concentrate levels, high 
purchases of roughage and high milk yields per cow. 
This argument accepts the strategic and internally consistent ordering of 
the farm as a whole. At the same time, however, the process of purposeful 
ordering is interpreted as a reflex of structural characteristics. Thus the 
uncaptured peasant has been tamed and located, as it were. Summarised 
polemically, farming styles are nothing but expressions of structural 
variations in contemporary agriculture. 
Methodologically, this involved an elegant 'attack'. A norm was 
calculated for various input-output relations by way of multiple variate 
techniques. This norm was supposed to reflect the level of, for example, 
roughage purchases that can be expected with a given set of structural 
propositions (such as milk production per hectare, milk yield per cow, 
etc.) And if the level of roughage purchases is known, a norm for expected 
levels of concentrate purchases is calculated. 
Essentially, this goes back to the question of 'factor endowments' - which 
are the available production factors and their interrelations? This 
combination of factors is understood as being structurally determined. In 
turn, the structurally determined combination of factors determines farm 
management. What initially seemed impossible to capture, now emerges 
as the logical expression of structural laws. 
The answer was twofold. Of course, 'structural differences' cannot be 
understood independently from the strategic actions of the farmers 
involved - that is, independently from farming styles. Intensive farmers 
will buy primarily quota and no land, and hence they will influence 
considerably the 'intensity of land use' (quota per hectare). Similar stories 
can be told about other styles. 
In short, a certain farming style cannot be understood as an a priori fact, as 
a particular position on a 'Mont Blanc'. The 'given' structure is partly, if 
not completely, the outcome of a series of decisions taken by the 
entrepreneur. This does not alter the fact that this 'structure' (the already 
created socio-technical network) will create its own immanent ordering or 
exert its own coercion (as already discussed in Chapter 3). 
Is this the end of the story? 
The calculation of a norm (such as performed by colleagues from the 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute) refers to a ceteris paribus 
situation. If all structural characteristics have been taken into account, 
what should be norm for the farm? Thus operationalised, the farm-
176 The Virtual Farmer 
specific norm, can then be compared with the actual results. Furthermore, 
it is typical of the Cartesian approach to refer to deviations from the norm. 
If empirical reality contains more variation than can be expected on the 
basis of structuralist approaches, we are dealing, it is said, with deviations 
from the norm. In response to this position, a statistical analysis was 
conducted on these so-called deviations from the norm. The underlying 
argument is simple, in principle. A farming style influences farm 
organisation (factor endowment) and farm management - that is, the 
particular use of production factors. By calculating a norm, the first effect 
of strategic conduct is taken away. Furthermore, a style should be 
noticeable by a particular use of production factors. Style, if it exists at all, 
should be relevant and thus demonstrable even beyond the ceteris paribus 
assumptions. 
Table 4.2 presents a number of deviations from the norm. The empirical 
data is drawn from the Agricultural Economics Research Institute 
database and covers 259 dairy farms on sandy soils in the Netherlands 
(particularly in the Frisian Woodlands, and in the provinces of Overijssel, 
Gelderland, Noord-Brabant, and Limburg). At a conceptual level, 'the 
deviation from the norm' seems to refer to purely accidental and/or sheer 
individual aberrations. Table 4.2 does imply, however, that these 
deviations from the norm are highly style specific. Even if economical 
farmers and intensive farmers operated on completely identical farms (cf. 
the ceteris paribus condition), the former would still realise considerably 
lower feed costs than the latter. Similarly, even if the farm organisation of 
cowmen were exactly the same as other farmers', they would succeed, 
through their particular way of organising farm management, in realising 
a higher gross margin per dairy cow and so on and so forth. 
In other words, even if production intensity, available farm size, labour 
input, and all other so-called structural variables remain equal, farming 
styles will still produce considerable differences in the final results. 
Farming styles have an effect on not only farm structure and farm 
organisation (via various long-term decisions), they also affect farm 
management. More specifically, even if differences in stocking density 
and milk yield are taken into account, economical farmers will still realise, 
with lower concentrate levels and lower total feed costs, a relatively 
higher gross margin per cow than intensive farmers using much higher 
concentrate levels and having higher total feed costs per cow. Again, this 
indicates the way in which various partial input-output relations are 
reordered and reshaped in the concrete labour process. 
If we return to the triquadrant diagram (see Figure 4.10), we can observe 
that contrasting regularities are indeed created in the different styles - or 
that, following Sauvant, multiple response models have been constructed. 
The question of course is why? Even though I previously referred to a 
number of aspects (breeding of different cows, mowing being conducted 
differently, etc.), it is still important to ask the questions why and how. 
Why and how are these different patterns or regularities created and 
reproduced? 
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Table 4.2 Deviations from the 'norm', for various farming styles (dairy farms on 
Dutch sandy soils, n=259, year=1994) 
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4.7 The fourth quadrant: strategic and ordering of the labour and 
production processes 
Systems can almost always be unravelled into subsystems. Previously, we 
unravelled the dairy farming system into three operative subsystems 
(symbolised by three quadrants). However, subsystems can rarely be 
combined into a well-working whole (into a system). The presence of a 
regulatory subsystem is crucial here. 
Theregulatory subsystem canoe equated with the strategy, with the style, 
of the farmer. Thus, particular objectives and particular indicators apply 
to every style. This has already been shown in Chapter 3. The activities in 
different quadrants (fields, the market for feedstuffs, and the shed) are 
organised in particular ways according to these particular objectives. 
The gross margin per dairy cow (output less costs per dairy cow) is a 
central indicator in the practice of cowmen, which is used to track and 
evaluate farm developments. The same indicator is also used for scanning 
the horizon of new farm developments, for sifting the wheat from the 
chaff, for determining where things worthy of further investigation are 
happening. · 
In Figure 4.13, the particular organisation of the operational subsystem 
(the first, second, and third quadrants) is linked to the regulatory 
subsystem (included here as the fourth, upper-left quadrant). The central 
issue for cowmen is to achieve the highest possible gross margin per cow. 
This is their starting point for organising the various operational systems 
and their input-output relations. 
Figure 4.13 demonstrates - at one single glance, as it were - the rationale 
of this particular organisation. Cowmen are able to achieve a high gross 
margin per dairy cow through their particular organisation of work in the r 
fields, in the shed, and their activities in the market for feedstuffs. If they 
organised their work in the fields, the shed, and in the market for 
feedstuffs like machinemen, they would have to settle for a lower score on 
this key indicator. 
Does this mean that machinemen are 'inferior' entrepreneurs? No, of 
course it does not do so. They do not organise their practice in order to 
achieve the highest possible gross margin per cow. The deciding factor for 
them is 'to achieve as high a volume as possible by using as little labour 
as possible'. The corresponding indicator is unambiguous: gross output 
per labour unit. 
If we introduce this indicator (gross output per labour unit) into the 
fourth quadrant, a s~gnificant relation between gross output per hectare 
and gross output per labour unit emerges in the fourth quadrant (see 
Figure 4.14). This relation is absent for cowmen - they do not,map their 
course with this indicator. Given the orientation of machinemen, their 
modus operandi is highly effective. Taken in isolation, their efficiency of 
grassland utilisation is less high. Similarly, in an abstract sense the 
efficiency in the shed is equally less high than the one of the cowmen. 
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However, the lower efficiency in fields and shed (their aversion to 
'wasting time on a postage stamp' and to 'fiddling around with those 
cows') results precisely in what machinemen want to achieve: a high 
gross output per lapour unit. 
Figure 4.13 Directing the practice of cowmen from the fourth quadrant 
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From the perspective of their own strategy (their own, particular 
regulatory system), the approach of machinemen is a rational one. The 
relative~y low efficiency in fields and shed (expressed in input-output 
terms) - in other words, the relatively low labour input in these quadrants 
- is essential in realising high gross output per labour unit. The rationale 
of the regulatory subsystem explains the apparently low level of 
'efficiency' in the operating subsystem, for the former implies the latter. 
The more ruch (rough) the machinemen's approaches to field and shed, 
the better machinemen they are; and their incomes will be higher 
accordingly. A similar story can be told for all other farming styles. Again 
and again, the organisation of input-output relations (of operating 
subsystems) is run strategically. In every style, farmers create practices 
that correspond with their strategies. The operational subsystems (here 
represented by fields, shed, and the relationship with the feed merchant) 
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are ordered in every style by the strategic considerations prevailing in the 
regulatory subsystem. Styles of farming entail and express multiple 
response models. 
Figure 4.14 Directing the practice of machinemen from the fourth quadrant 
net metabolised 
energy production 
per ha (* 1000) | ^ 
No normative importance should be attributed to the location of a partial 
input-output relation in isolation from the considerations applying in the 
fourth quadrant (in other words, applying in the strategy of the actors 
involved). From a distance, the input-output relations realised by e.g. 
machinemen in the first and third quadrants appear as 'less efficient' -
seen from the perspective of their own strategy, however, it does involve 
a highly rational way of working. This implies that the solution employed 
in contemporary agronomy - that is, attribution of extra value to the 
'highest' input-output relation (see, for example, WRR 1992) - cannot be 
maintained, because it ignores the different farming strategies. 
4.8 Operating strategically in the first quadrant 
Taeke Hoeksma's farm in the northern Frisian Woodlands is characterised 
by a remarkably high input-output efficiency. By standard parameters (or 
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'norms'), Hoeksma should have to buy considerable amounts of 
additional roughage or more concentrates. Through the years this has not 
happened at all. The farm was, and is, more efficient than the models 
allow. Hoeksma is a livestock farmer who records extremely accurately 
the goings-on of the farm over the years.42 Data on grassland utilisation, 
concentrate levels, and so on are available per plot and per animal, often 
for periods of more than fifteen years. Figure 4.15 emphasises the special 
position of Hoeksma's farm. It shows the amount of nitrogen from 
artificial fertilisers and the amount of nitrogen from concentrates and 
purchased roughage that are needed to produce 100,000 kilos of milk. The 
different curves refer to the 'frontier functions' inherent in various 
farming styles (K for cowmen, Z for economical farmers, G for large 
farmers and Y for intensive farmers). The position of Hoeksma's farm (H) 
is also indicated. At a single glance, it is notable that his farm is amongst 
the most efficient farms, in terms of nitrogen use. 
Figure 4.15 The interrelations between milk production and total nitrogen use, 
specified for artificial fertiliser use and the purchase of roughage and concentrates 
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What are the reasons for this? How is it realised? How are the 'deviations' 
created that reach beyond the practices included in the available scientific 
models? My colleague Rudolf van Broekhuizen and I have had lengthy 
discussions with Hoeksma about this. He emphasised constantly that 
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there has to a be a favourable balance between hectares, cows, quota, and feed. 
If the necessary balance is missing, costs will suddenly increase somewhere on 
the farm, and it is clear that you overstep the mark. The real skill is in 
rediscovering the balance. 
Incidentally, Hoeksma substantiates this argument with a number of 
preconditions. First, such a balance is not static: ' y o u can't stand still'. At 
the same time, abrupt changes should not be attempted: 'in those cases, 
something will definitely get stuck and go wrong, gradual change is 
necessary'. Second, 'you need some size, you have to have the space'. 
More specifically, you need to have sufficient home-produced feed. 
We have always wanted to be as self-sufficient as possible in terms of feed. But 
it is related to many things, including the way you use your land, how much 
of it you use for grazing, whether or not they go indoors for the night, what 
happens to the youngstock, and so on. Things will also go wrong if you have 
not enough cows per man. 
Hoeksma emphasises that an intensive farmer too will pursue a particular 
balance, but it will be a very different balance 'from mine', he says. 
Generally, the implications of the quota system have been very important. 
The superlevy has been very important. Before, we were following the 
intensification idea slightly. But after '85 it became a matter of looking for and 
recovering what you had handed in first. 
The latter refers to the strategy of farming economically: 
After all, 1 am most of all an economical farmer. 
On the way home from one of the discussions with Hoeksma, we 
suddenly realised that the implicit undercurrent in his explanation is the 
uniqueness of his own resources. Even though Hoeksma does not mention 
it as such, the particular takes central stage and is also strategic. One's 
own grassland cannot be exchanged for any other land but is made into 
something special (a few relevant data in this respect are low levels of 
artificial fertiliser, the use of 'Euromestmix' - a particular slurry additive 
- the fodder value of home-produced grass, and the low level of protein 
in fodder). The same applies to manure. It is handled so as to achieve the 
best fit with the farm structure and Hoeksma's style of farming. Hence, 
particular land, particular manure, and particular cattle. Thus, when 
Hoeksma emphasises 'balance' as an important regulatory principle, this 
relates not to abstract but to particularised resources. For this reason the 
balance is always a particular balance. This also indicates the particularity 
of the labour factor in this context: it is through labour (and its related 
knowledge, insights, experiences, capacities, etc.) that one's own cattle, 
land, fodder, manure, etc. become transformed into something special. 
We discuss at length with Hoeksma the material included in Figure 4.15. 
The uniqueness of his resources and the particular balance constructed 
with these resources are constantly mentioned in the search for a possible 
explanation of his position (see H in Figure 4.15). During this search, 
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Hoeksma appears to be saying, en passant, that he does not know why 
things are related as they are. Ignorance of some issues is not absent from 
farmers; it is intriguing to see how they deal with it. 
The first link that Hoeksma raises in the discussion of Figure 4.15 is the 
relationship between the production of 100,000 kg milk and the number of 
cows needed to achieve this. Hoeksma is very definite about this: 'To milk 
these 100,000 kg with as many cows as possible and at the lowest possible 
costs. That is the balance you have to find'. 
Hoeksma has a Dutch-Friesian (FH) herd. He considers FH cattle to be an 
essential element within the relationships he has created. Additionally, "in 
this way you'll get more output and change in volume dairy cattle and 
you get a nice export price for in-calf heifers, especially at the moment". 
Hoeksma also explains the logic behind this statement. He systematically 
uses the variations that exist within the farm. For example, Hoeksma 
relates concentrate levels to milk yield (see Table 4.3). This relationship is 
checked per cow (and per group of cows). Thus he learnt that less 
productive cows (between 4,500 and 5,000 kg p.a.) produce most milk per 
kg of concentrates and that this results in the highest margin per cow 
(milk output less concentrates costs). The same applies to the seasons. One 
kg of concentrates results in more milk in the first and second quarters 
(7.1 and 6.1 litres respectively) than in the third and fourth quarters (2.5 
and 2.4 litres respectively). However, since the milk price is higher in 
winter, the margin per 1,000 kg milk is roughly the same for all four 
seasons. 
What is important is the low milk yield per cow and the relatively large 
number of dairy cows used to fill those 100,000 litres. The milk yield is 
now in the lower 6,000s. Thus, the choice to continue breeding with the 
'old' Dutch-Friesian (FH) cows becomes an obvious one: 
Personally, I think that those FHs are very efficient. They want to grow. They 
do well at both milk and meat. I think that you have to feed those Americans 
much more and they produce more shit. 
Here I would like to interrupt Hoeksma's explanation once again, to point 
to the importance of knowledge, the organisation of knowledge, and the 
relevance horizon. Hoeksma organises knowledge on the basis of his own 
farm. Experiences gained elsewhere are certainly not irrelevant. But as far 
as directing his own farm is concerned (the organisation of relations such 
as stocking density, milk yield per cow, concentrates levels), it spans, as it 
were, the horizon within which his experiences are relevant. 
It appears from Hoeksma's records (see Table 4.3) that he starts from the 
variation within his own farm in order to determine the relations that he 
wants to develop. On the basis of this he sets out the course to follow. All 
this might seem obvious - its importance arises as soon as we address 
another alternative for comparison. That is, the one in which attention is 
mainly focused on the variation between farms, when every farm presents 
one unit of observation (that is, when is abstracted from the variation 
within the farm). 
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Farm comparison is one of the most important methods used in advisory 
services and in management support. Following this view, the first graph 
included in Table 4.3 contains a line representing the margin per dairy 
cow at various levels of average milk yield per farm. Thus a completely 
different image appears: high-yielding cows generate (on average) the 
highest margin per cow. If Hoeksma based his calculations on such a 
representation of data, he would organise the internal relations on his 
farm completely differently. However, based on his own perspective 
(variation within the farm as the most relevant aspect) and his own norm 
(kg milk per kg concentrates), Hoeksma concludes that a low milk yield 
and a large number of cows to milk the quota is the optimal solution. 
Table 4.3 Hoeksma's notes (including two additional graphs) 
Production 
level 
> 7,500 
7,500-7,000 
7,000-6,500 
6,500-6,000 
6,000-5,500 
5,500-5,000 
5,000-4,500 
4,500-4,000 
Number 
10 
15 
8 
18 
18 
9 
6 
3 
Litres milk 
per kg 
concentrate 
3.27 
3.40 
3.60 
3.94 
4.45 
5.11 
5.47 
4.35 
kg concentrates 
per 1,000 kg 
milk 
306 
294 
277 
254 
224 
196 
183 
230 
Concentrate 
costs 
132 
126 
119 
109 
97 
84 
78 
99 
milk 
price 
80.40 
80.40 
80.40 
80.40 
80.40 
80.40 
80.40 
80.40 
Margin per 
1,000 kg 
milk 
672 
678 
685 
695 
707 
720 
726 
705 
kg milk/ 
kg concentrates 
margin/dairy cow for 
259 dairy farms 
on sandy soils 
margin as calculated 
by Hoeksma 
• kg milk/kg concentrates 
\ on Hoeksma's farm 
I i I i I i I i I 
<4500 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 
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milk yield 
(in litres/cow) 
A 
>8000 
7500-8000 
7000-7500 
6500-7000 
6000-6500 
5500-6000 
5000-5500 
4500-5000 
4000-4500 -
—|—i—i—i—i—|—i—i—i—1—|—i i i—u-|—i—i—i—i [ i i—i—i—| >-
3,00 3,50 4,00 4,50 5,00 5,50 
litres milk per kg concentrates 
The relevance horizon used in combination with one's own particular 
norm (in short, the particular structure of knowledge and the ignorance 
defined by it) are decisive factors in the organisation of a particular 
practice. These are the structuring elements par excellence. 
A study by Leeuwis (1993) emphasises that this is not an exceptional case. 
He related various methods for the organisation of knowledge (i.e. 
internal farm comparisons; comparisons between farms; and comparisons 
between one's own farm and the norms) to various farming styles in the 
Achterhoek region. 
Table 4.4 summarises the results. It can be concluded that every style 
contains its own relevance horizon. 'Fanatical farmers' (a traditional term in 
the Achterhoek referring to rapidly expanding, intensive, large-scale 
farms), for instance, regard comparison with previous years as relatively 
irrelevant - for farm development is a constant break with the past. They 
also regard comparison with other farms as completely irrelevant. They 
do not learn anything from it at all - for the farm of a 'fanatical farmer' is 
by definition better than other farms. Only the norms constitute a relevant 
point of reference. 
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Table 4.4 The relative importance attached to various possibilities for comparison 
in DELAR* 
Compared 
with 
Previous years 
Other farms 
The norm 
double-
coalers 
+ 
0 
- / + 
economical 
farmers 
+ 
0 
practical 
farmers 
+ 
+ 
cowmen 
++ 
0 
machine 
men 
+ 
0 
fanatical 
farmers 
0 
++ 
Notes: — relatively much less important; - relatively less important; + relatively important; 
++ relatively very important; + / - large range compared to others; 0 average compared to 
others. 
* DELAR is a farm accountancy system for the dairy sector 
Important for fanatical farmers are the aforementioned norms indicating 
the production potential in case the farm would be farmed optimally. 
These are points of reference derived from scientific models. On the other 
hand, cowmen have a completely different point of reference: above all 
they compare their performance with the one of previous years. 
Let us return to Hoeksma's story. He has kept accounts of dry matter 
production per plot over many years. He combines this with the results of 
soil samples and with the data on fertilisation. Every time at mowing or 
ensilaging the amount of dry matter (dm) is estimated. 'We can do that by 
now.' The same applies to grazing. 'I assume that a cow eats about 15.5 kg 
dry matter per day (sometimes a bit more, a bit less at other times, but 
that should be it approximately).' Multiplication by the number of days 
will result in the dm output. For a whole year, this will result in the total 
dry matter production of the plot. 
The dry matter output per hectare is unusually high: more than 11,000 kg 
dm/ha . Calculations conducted by the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI) confirmed this although they didn't understand why. 
It is interesting that the LEI couldn't get it 'right' initially. The LEI always 
calculated a feed shortage on this farm. Two of their people have been here, we 
went through the whole lot, but they couldn 't work it out . . . They solved it 
by adding 10 per cent in our case. 
Why does his own grassland produce so much? Hoeksma (without being 
completely certain) makes a connection with, inter alia, the use of 
Euromestmix (a slurry additive). He started using the additive 'because 
we saw that the quality of the soil and the turf declined rapidly, the 
pastures became more hollow'. After applying Euromestmix, the amount 
of humus in the soil increased and the turf became denser. 
There's quite a lot of poison 4 in slurry, which doesn't help the rooting, and 
maybe this Euromestmix does neutralise the poison . . . Anyway, there's more 
dry matter in the manure now and more magnesium too. And we have started 
to graze a bit more, which probably helps too. 
Hoeksma is strongly opposed to grassland improvement: 
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It has happened here on some corners, but I don't see the results really. You 
bring the lesser soil to the surface, but it's the topsoil that you need because 
that's where you find life. 
Of course there are differences in dry matter output one year to the next, but 
that is mostly related to the weather . . . Do I still benefit from the N supply in 
the soil? No, I don't think that it is that important, the humus content is more 
important in my opinion, but I admit I cannot rightly explain this. 
Our grass is far from optimal in the eyes of many. It is not just rye grass, 
there's all sorts, some meadow grass too . . . The field in front of the house is a 
hundred years old . . . 
We move on to the next relation: concentrates. 
If the quality of home-produced roughage is not as good, for example because 
it's been wet weather and you have to mow later, you '11 have to use a few 
more concentrates. That's what happened last year. You have to do that 
because you want to fill your quota. If we didn't have the quota, I would 
readily milk a bit less. Up until 1985 we always used about 230,000 kg 
concentrates per year. It then went down to 123,000 kg in 1991 and 1992. 
Then we added a bit more milk (+ 25,000 lit.) and then concentrates rose to 
160,000 kg. In fact, I don't like it. In the milking parlour we feed them 
concentrates individually depending on their milk yield, and then they get 
more again at the trough, but this is the same amount for all of them. Yes, I do 
pay attention to the displacement effect, but it depends on so much else. In 
winter the butterfat is higher with concentrates, but if it is too high you '11 
have to give up kgs, you always have to look for the balance. At the moment, I 
think that we feed a few too many concentrates in winter. 
Yes, it is possible in principle to replace artificial fertiliser with concentrates . . 
But I don't think you should gamble too much on it. No, I don't think in 
terms of 'a bit less fertiliser and a bit more concentrates'. It doesn't work like 
that. What I want is to lower the amount of fertiliser while keeping 
concentrates at the same level. Economics plays a part in all this, and your 
own line is very important too of course. You can't just give less concentrates, 
everything would become confused then, the balance would be lost. You can't 
do that at once, but you can do it gradually ... 
The latter statement illustrates an important point. As discussed 
previously, it is often assumed by agricultural scientists that farmers 
move along the presupposed production function in their search for an 
optimum (especially if they are encouraged by changing market 
relations). The theme of many discussions about environmental policy 
was 'what will farmers do if artificial fertiliser becomes much more 
expensive? Or if taxes on concentrates are raised?' 
'Moving along the function' is an idea that does not sound very plausible 
to farmers ears. First, because such a partial modification clashes with the 
particular balance that they introduce into the farm as a whole. Second, it is 
questionable whether partial relations are ordered and - if necessary -
reordered on the basis of economic considerations and calculations. 
Levels of fertiliser and concentrate use originate more from considerations 
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about other factors, such as the minimisation of risk. Or they are derived 
from the dietary needs of one's own cattle. 
Perhaps even more important is a third issue. Farmers are not so much 
interested in moving along a function. They are, instead, constantly 
involved in creating new functions. We have indicated the position of 
Hoeksma's farm (on the basis of analyses based on available accounts) for 
various years in Figure 4.16, based on the same space as defined in Figure 
4.15. It can be observed clearly that moving along an imaginary function 
hardly occurs at all. 
What does happen on a farm such as Hoeksma's is a constant process of 
innovation - both on an annual basis and plot-wise. New connections are 
established, new regularities created and hence always new, initially 
invisible horizons are brought within reach as a result of these 
innovations. That is, Figure 4.16 shows how new regularities (or new 
'functions') are actively created. 
Figure 4.16 Nitrogen flows required for the production of 100,000 kg milk, 
specified for various years on Hoeksma's farm 
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artificial fertiliser 
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This leaves us with the last link in Hoeksma's farm, concerning the 
quality of roughage: 
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I think that there's less indigestible crude protein in our feed, less protein and 
such matters. That is because we spread less N and so you get different feed, 
which results in less ammonia emissions (because of the lower levels of 
indigestible crude protein). Our protein level has also been calculated. It is 
lower too. Yes, I do like to think about these things. Usually, an ammonia 
emission of 8.8 kg per cow in the shed is used in calculations in the 
Netherlands. This would be 4.4 kg in a Green Label shed. The Animal Health 
Service has measured the ammonia levels here and they are 4.4 and 4.7 for the 
front and the back of the shed respectively! Even the relation between 
ammoniacal N and organic N in manure is different here from the Dutch 
average (2.3 as against 2.8). This implies that ammonia emissions will be 
lower. 
The discussion that brought all this up was held on 2 February 1995. More 
than one year later, Van Bruchem broke the spell in the world of 
agricultural scientists by pointing at the, up to then, insufficiently 
recognised importance of the percentage of crude protein in roughage. 
The metabolised energy production of a hectare of grassland is increased 
by high nitrogen levels. Above all, however, the crude protein percentage 
is increased - to the extent that protein appears of hardly any nutritional 
value. The proportion of protein to energy inherent in grass no longer 
corresponds with the nutritional needs of dairy cattle. The protein surplus 
in grass (partly produced by high nitrogen input) is lost as ammonia or 
whatever. It can no longer be digested by cows. According to Van 
Bruchem, a crude protein percentage of between 12 and 14 per cent is 
optimal. 
Subsequently, I rang Hoeksma. I had to wait a moment, but as soon as his 
papers of the silage analysis are within reach he reads them out to me -
measured at the bottom, at the top, in the back and in the front of the 
silage pit, for more than 5 years. The data always fluctuate between 12 
and 14 per cent. I am amazed. I pointed out previously (inter alia, in Van 
der Ploeg 1987, 1993) that institutionalised research is disconnected from 
the practical laboratory called agriculture. However, I am again 
disconcerted that this disconnection could lead to such important findings 
into crucial issues being ignored or excluded. It would disconcert me even 
more at a later stage when conducting research (together with Van 
Bruchem, Brussaard, Bouma, and others of the Agricultural University, 
and with colleagues from the Research Institute for Animal Husbandry in 
Lelystad) into the novelties hidden in farms such as Hoeksma's is highly 
frustrated by the expert system. 
4.9 Operating strategically in the third quadrant 
Just before the summer of 1995, I had a long discussion with Alfred 
Oostindie. He farms in the north of the Dutch province of Drenthe. Henk 
Oostindie, a colleague in our research team, accompanies me. Alfred is his 
brother. 
If Taeke Hoeksma operates principally, if not exclusively, in the first 
quadrant, Alfred Oostindie is a farmer who concerns himself primarily 
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with the third quadrant, with the conversion of feed into milk. He says 
about his farm: 
I am in a partnership with my cousin on 60 ha of land, 48 ha grassland and 12 
ha maize. We milk about 100 cows and have about 200 cattle in total. Our 
milk quota is about 800,000 kg. We have bought some milk quota over the past 
years, but I don't know exactly how much. I think we started off with about 
750,000 litres. We strive for a milk quota of about a million. It will fill the 
shed nicely. We have to have the times on our side. The question is of course: 
what is going to happen to the quota? Opinions differ about this. Two of us 
work here full time. There are two other guys who help out on a regular basis. 
Others do some work for us too. Contractors do quite a lot on the farm. I think 
we can manage a million litres. When you 're a cattle farmer you have to 
concentrate on the cows. You should really farm out all the other work ...Ifit 
is done by the contractor, you might have less control over the way you obtain 
your roughage. That's the price tag that comes with it. But we can't do the 60 
ha on our own . . . Silage, the winter ration, revolves around the first cut, that 
is what high-yielding cows have to live off. The rest of the silage is really of 
secondary importance. You try to produce the first cut well, so you can milk 
well. After that you mow for the benefit of grazing, that way you 're more 
independent of the weather. If you mow in phases, you have a phased pasture. 
Otherwise you only have a few days of very nice pasture for the cows and soon 
it '11 be too long or still too short. If you mow in phases, you have the same 
quality all the time. The fact that the roughage is of a lesser quality sometimes 
is not as important, you can feed it to the yearlings and the old cows. 
Other farmers might do it differently. Every farm has its own policy, it's hard 
to compare between farmers. One will do more with their cows, another looks 
more towards grassland, a third to machines, or they are more engaged with 
arable agriculture. If you add it all up, you might end up with something 
similar. 
'Every farm has its own policy' - I would like to emphasise this 
statement. Oostindie's 'policy' is concerned with the third quadrant. As 
a cattle breeder par excellence, Alfred is able to explain, if not unravel, a 
number of the mysteries situated in the third quadrant. That evening we 
were going to present him with a number of research results that played 
an important role in current analyses. These involved the essential 
question of why there are empirical differences in input-output relations. 
I remember vividly the aha Erlebnissen I experienced several times during 
such discussions. 
I will quote Oostindie at length here. This is necessary in a book in which 
the voices of the past, of Hemmema and Koorn, and imaginary voices, 
such as of the Nijboer fan Lycklemastate and Daniel fan Kuken have 
already received so much attention. This is a story about the here and 
now. Before I present this story, however, I think it is appropriate - as an 
introduction - to point to a number of essential similarities between the 
stories of Hoeksma and Oostindie. 
Gradualness is a theme emerging from both explanations. If Hoeksma was 
very clear about this, also Oostindie emphasises that 'things should be 
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given time'. The same goes for the particular balance that has to be 
created in every farm. Again, 'every farm has its own policy'. This will be 
illustrated at length for Oostindie's farm in the following quotations. The 
particularity of one's own resources emerges as a third, uniting element. If 
in Hoeksma's case this concerns mainly grassland, feed, and manure (and 
cows too of course), in Oostindie's case it is first and foremost the cows 
and the related breeding policy. The particularity of one's own cows is 
emphasised. Also demonstrated is the pillar on which this particularity is 
based. This is the knowledge of bloodlines of the dames and the related 
capacity to select appropriate blood lines on the sire's side. 
These are precisely the types of factors that escape the reach of the 
sciences. Just as Hoeksma's grassland defies scientific models, the 
meeting of dame and sire lines defies breeding science; for breeding as a 
science is based exclusively on the influence of the bull and avails itself to 
this purpose of the law of large numbers. Thus appears an opportunity for 
farmers such as Alfred Oostindie, who operate in their own ways. 
A fourth issue of similarity is that the particularity of one's own resources 
is recognised and further developed on the basis of a meticulous 
estimation and assessment of the relevant variation. If the variation among 
cows (especially in the relation between concentrate levels and milk yield) 
and the variation among plots was important in Hoeksma's case, in 
Oostindie's case the importance lies in the variation in bull choice 
(surpassing the boundaries of his own farm, it is de facto a global 
assessment) and its relevance for those bloodlines present on the farm. A 
bull is not assessed on general terms. Instead, the discussion deals with 
'which bull will do well on our farm'. The horizon may be global but the 
reference point for evaluation remains strictly local (see also Long 1996). 
A fifth issue of similarity is the search for relevant variation in order to 
utilise this as optimally as possible. 
A sixth issue concerns the clear identification of objectives. Both Hoeksma 
and Oostindie know extremely well what they are aiming for (although 
they have very different objectives). 
The same applies to the seventh issue that I want to raise here briefly. The 
course is set out within a sea of uncertainties. Even though Hoeksma and 
Oostindie can well be called masters in grassland production or cattle 
breeding, both operate in a field determined by numerous uncertainties, 
question marks and mysteries. Maybe their mastery lies precisely in that 
they are able to define beacons in a sea of uncertainties and ignorance and 
from this they are able to set out their real course. 
The eighth and final issue is concerned with the language in which this 
'mastery' results. All kinds of apparently vague and partly overlapping 
terms are central to Oostindie's story. Collectively they compose an 
intriguing art de la localité (Mendras 1970; Van der Ploeg 1993; for a critical 
discussion, see Wynne 1996). 
'What is important in breeding is bull selection. You don't just look at INET, 
but also at bloodlines. There are very many bloodlines . . . The bull that I use 
for breeding has to project the image of Ivanhoe. There are bulls that only 
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have about 20 per cent oflvanhoe blood but still pass on the image oflvanhoe. 
On the other hand, there are bulls that have 80 per cent of Ivanhoe blood 
while Ivanhoe's image does not surface at all. Ivanhoe's bloodline always 
works well on our farm, at least on average better than other bloodlines. I 
have used quite a few bulls, as you do when you're young and on the look 
out. You try bulls that do very well on other farms, but you end up with 
nothing. 
Then I arrived at Starbuck, the best sire at the moment, most of the bulls sold 
are his. His daughters were said not to be too good, but I didn't believe this, 
and I used him anyway. Starbuck gave us some very good cows. After that 
we used him a lot and, without exception, it works out well here, although 
others complain about it. We breed lifespan, which means: a cow that lasts a 
long time, wants to produce a lot and gives us a high production at the end of 
the day. You can arrange that in different ways. 
AI is based on INET - that is, production during the first lactation. The 
higher a heifer's milk yield, the higher the INET of the sire. The same heifer 
might get into problems in her second lactation, she might have given her all. 
Many farmers use bulls with a high INET, but we think it is very very 
wrong. A heifer should be able to develop herself, she should not convert all 
her feed into milk. A heifer should have the chance to develop into a cow. A 
heifer weighs up to 200 kg less than a mature cow. If a heifer is an incredible 
milker, it will remain a small animal. The following year you '11 get problems. 
It should be the case that a heifer milks 8,000 litres, as a second calver 9,000, 
she should only start milking properly as a third calver, 10,000, 11,000, 
12,000 litres. Many heifers that start off on 9,000 litre might produce another 
9,000 after that, but you '11 never hear of her after that. They no longer exist. ' 
'Ever since INET was adapted in the Netherlands, the average age of cows 
has gone downhill fast, I'm convinced of that. Cows should develop 
gradually, they should grow to the top gradually. They have to start out well 
of course, for if they start at 6,000 you know they'll never get there. Or they 
had certain problems. Heifers very often have problems. They change teeth at 
the age of two, at which time most farmers let the heifer calve. A heifer is on 
average a more difficult calver than an older cow. They can have a lot of 
trouble with lubrication, with torn vaginas, and so on. And if you have a 
harsh environment on your farm and cows have to get to the feed at the 
trough by themselves, a heifer will always end up in the back. If you then 
select heifers, you might actually sell the wrong one. You have to be patient 
with a cow, especially if you breed lifespan as we do here. We also take the 
time to wait for that third calver. There are farmers who say they breed 
lifespan but don't allow the heifer to actually live up to this. The way in 
which you breed and your farm policy should follow parallel lines. 
A beautiful cow to me is a cow that wants to get old and that gives a lot of 
milk. Wanting to be old is related to exterior. This combined with production, 
that's what matters; even if the two are mismatched sometimes. I breed a cow 
that wants to get old with a high production. ' 
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'Yes, we have used different kinds of bloodlines on the farm, and it surprises 
me every time that the bulls that do best on our farm are the ones that project 
the image of Ivanhoe. So you pay more and more attention to those 
bloodlines, and then you're doing well in breeding. We have stood still for a 
while, because we were looking around. Ever since we have found it, we are 
prospering; both in terms of exterior and in terms of production. 
We're talking about great-grandchildren of Ivanhoe here; Starbuck is 
Elevation * Ivanhoe, and the mother's father of Astronaut was Hellton Apollo 
Ivanhoe, who's father was Ivanhoe; Starbuck's father was Elevation, and his 
mother's father was Ivanhoe too. Therefore, Starbuck is an inbred product of 
Ivanhoe; while you're already generations down the line, it is possible 
through inbreeding to get a bull that is close to Ivanhoe and that has 
preferably improved on certain characteristics, i.e. Starbuck's weak points. So 
Ivanhoe was the best bull for our farm. Viewed from every possible angle, you 
have more cow and you have more milk. The cows became heavier, they have 
better udders, better overall exterior, and milking improved, cows gave easier. 
That was the bloodline that we wanted to continue. 
At a certain point, when we have used up Ivanhoe, that time does of course 
arrive at some point, you'll have to look for another bloodline. It becomes 
possible to make another leap then. Of course, you '11 have to find your 
bloodline, although I have already an eye on a bloodline to continue after 
Starbuck. My parents used to have a cow, Aleida 54, this whole shed 
originates from her; directly, via the mother line, or indirectly via a son. They 
all have that blood in them. After that we looked out for new bulls; it seemed 
that bulls with Astronaut blood were doing well here, especially Tops. We 
used mainly Tops here at the time. A large part of the shed, maybe even 75 
per cent, has Tops blood in them. Tops blood * Aleida 54, that is pure blood in 
the shed. That is why we have a uniform shed of cows. The cows have all been 
crossed by one of our own bulls. 
Now we enter Starbuck as a bull that fits our farm. In 2 years time, all 
animals will have Starbuck blood in them. The old cows don't have that yet. 
We will use Starbuck or sons of Starbuck, nothing else. I don't do double-
crossing. I don't do Starbuck son * Starbuck himself. It becomes too much 
then. That's why I am now looking for a new line with Starbuck blood, and 
then I arrive at Chairman. Chairman is Middle Betty son, with mother's 
father Ivanhoe, which brings us back to Ivanhoe. We already have 
descendants from Chairman, the first ones of those are again the best ones. It 
gives you the courage to continue. 
Chairman is interesting for our shed because we have to move away from 
Starbuck. Everything is Starbuck. You have to find a new line. Chairman 
projects mainly an image of Ivanhoe, that's why we go for Chairman. We 
have tried a few other bulls, but they didn't do as well as Chairman did. He 
has the image that is closest to Ivanhoe. ' 
'About one per cent of Dutch farmers focuses their attention to bloodlines 
just as we do on our farm here. Maybe not even 1 per cent. Maybe one tenth 
of a per cent work like us. Endedijk in the Veluwe is someone who breeds 
purely on bloodlines. But the bulls of that farm don't do very well elsewhere. 
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Because those bloodlines fit in well with his bloodlines, but not with others. 
Here on our farm Ivanhoe's bloodline fits in with Aleida 54's bloodline, 
that's what happens here. There are bulls that work well on every other farm 
but ours. Then again, we are the only farm with that much Aleida 54 blood. 
Aleida 54 was my father's creation; it was all Knol blood, an inbreed product 
of breeding farm Knol, the best breeding farm in Friesland. My father used 
only Knol blood in breeding - Adema 469 and all that lot. ' 
'I am thoroughly convinced that you can achieve more with what we breeders 
know than with what scientists say. That is because we also look at the 
mother line. They only look at the father line and use only averages in their 
calculations. If there's one thing you cannot do with cows it's use averages. 
It can't be done. ' 
We presented research results to Alfred Oostindie. These concern the 
highly variable nature of input-output relations embodied in cows and 
were drawn from a study by the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute, the Farm Management Group, and the Rural Sociology Group 
(the latter two are both part of Wageningen University). The research 
results are summarised in Figure 4.17. We asked Alfred Oostindie for his 
responses to them. 
'Which line a cow is on depends on what a cow is able to take up from feed. 
Then you 're talking about genetic capacity. Compare this with pigs. One pig 
grows faster than the next with the same feed. This has nothing to do with the 
volume of a cow or whatever, what matters is the amount of milk that cows 
can produce from the same amount of feed. It has nothing to do with exterior, 
only with the workings of the gut. I cannot explain it any other way. If that 
functions optimally, and you can put a lot of feed in her, and the cow can take 
it all, of course you '11 get closer and closer to the optimum. Only if you talk 
about increasing the amount of feed, then you'll move along one of those lines 
of yours [ref. Figure 4.17], you'll end up with the cow's exterior, and so with 
the cow's volume. ' 
'Why is it that one cow can get more out of feed than another and so is on a 
higher line? I don't know much about that. That's all to do with feed 
conversion. We have cows that are on all of those lines. A cow of heavy 
build with a lot of room that gives little milk is on one of the lower lines. She 
has the capacity and she feeds well, but she doesn't produce anything. The 
Gamblers are on one of the higher lines. They're not much of a cow but 
there's no stopping them; it's Chairman blood, you see. They are slightly 
weaker cows, they don't age well. We cross them with Starbuck, to get the 
volume. You'd want the cow to get her volume from Starbuck and the 
Gambler's efficiency. ' 
'But there's something else. The Gambler's have the capacity to produce a lot 
of milk from little feed, but they are quibblers. They don't have the courage. 
They could give even more if they were more hardy. There are cows that can 
do it, but they don't have any appetite. Just one person eats much more than 
the next. One grows well, while the other does not add one inch. Tops ' cows 
eat all the time. Appetite and character are two important issues. A cow has 
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to have character and appetite. We had a Tops once, she was the head of the 
shed, she also produced an incredible amount of milk. Her descendants also 
give a lot of milk, they have the same character. Those are the cows that, if 
another cow enters the concentrates box, run in to chase that cow away as 
soon as the concentrates come down. Those are cows that produce more than 
a quibble that walks out of the concentrates box, like the Gamblers. ' 
Figure 4.17 The differential nature of input-output relations in the third quadrant: 
the relations between concentrate intake and milk production 
2200 2600 3000 
feedstuffs per cow 
Appetite and character - these are two key concepts with which Oostindie 
assesses and judges the regulatory system of his cows. They are also 
concepts with which he actually directs. Through a particular bull 
selection (more precisely, through the combination of bloodlines) he 
influences and shapes the RSc in such a way that the desired input-output 
relation appears. This becomes increasingly clear in the course of the 
discussion. 
'ƒ can name a bull for every line [in Figure 4.17]. Tops, with its enormous 
volume capacity, appetite, and production, is situated on a high line. For the 
bottom lines, i.e. a lot of volume and appetite and still little milk, I think, for 
example, of Berend 4. Cows built like houses that produce little milk. These 
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cows have everything, they just don't convert it into milk. They shit it all 
out, so it comes out at the wrong end. ' 
'Gambler had a low INET, while his efficiency was brilliant. Together with 
Royalty, they would tower far above all other bulls. Gambler had bad legs, 
very bad legs, so its capacity never surfaced. Those cows were chased away 
from the trough, or couldn't even get to the trough, because they didn't get 
out of the cubicle due to hurtful feet. That's why we have paired that bull 
with cows with incredibly good legs and a terrible character. We discovered 
this later, for Gambler was around years ago. Some of the calves are still with 
us. They have very good legs and character. You can see that straightaway, 
they are good calves '. 
'Everybody always talks about the use of new bulls, because it resembles 
speed and progress. The adequate complementary pairing for us is progress, 
and that's why we have used Gambler again. Those Gamblers that we have 
now are very good cows. His INET might not have been that high, but if you 
pair him off well he probably has a very high INET. If you pair him with a 
cow with very good legs, such a bull might have an INET of 1,000. If you 
pair him with a cow with bad legs, such a descendant might have an INET of 
100, or maybe a negative INET, because those cows won't get to the trough. ' 
'So everybody has cows on higher and lower lines. You can easily identify 
which lines they 're on. This capacity is part of the total package of why you 
keep a cow on or not. By the way, it is one of the most important issues of 
cows. If a cow on a high line has bad legs, is unable to milk in the parlour, has 
a bad character, or it is a quibble of a cow, whether or not she is on a high line 
doesn 't matter, she will go anyway. Cows on a lower line will probably go 
too, because they 're at the bottom. Cows on the middle line, if they 're OK 
otherwise, you should try and get them onto a higher level and take the rest 
with them. Cows on a higher line have an advantage of course. They'll have 
to perform a lot less on other aspects before they go out. ' 
'The capacity to convert feed into milk is strongly related to bloodlines of both 
father's and mother's side. Every breeder knows this. Someone who really 
thinks about pairing, who has proved himself in breeding, someone who 
knows what they're talking about, can name bulls to go with it straightaway. 
Then you're onto those lines in your figure. And if it's about moving either 
left or right along such a line, i.e. feeding more, it'll bring you back to the 
exterior story. You need a cow with volume, a cow that can eat an incredible 
amount. But it's not as you can say: a cow with a lot of volume, a long 
lifespan, high production, is on a high line. You '11 never find an efficient 
conversion of feed into milk in the exterior. But the top INET bulls are all on 
a high line. It has to be like that. They have both the capacity to easily convert 
feed into milk and volume, thus the capacity to eat, and good legs. They can't 
have too many daughters that fail on farms, because then their average will 
tumble. ' 
'The capacity to convert feed into milk depends on the gut - that is, if feed 
conversion is indeed determined there, I don't know this for certain. We all 
breed to improve that capacity, but of course not via the exterior. Those are 
bulls that produce daughters that give a lot of milk easily. And to give a lot of 
milk easily means that you don't have to feed them concentrates by the 
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cartload, but they can milk nicely on roughage. There are cows that don't 
want to, even if you feed them by hand. And there are cows that you leave 
alone to get on with it and there's a splash of milk in them. You notice that 
from the daughters of a certain bull of certain families. We have a mother line 
and whichever bull you use on them, they'll give milk. They have that 
capacity strongly. On the other hand, there are mother lines whose 
descendants do not give any milk, whatever production bull you use on them. 
If you want to bring such a mother line - which obviously has to have other 
qualities otherwise it would have long gone out -to a higher line, you '11 need 
at least two pairings with a production bull. The first time, for example, 
Gambler and the second, as far as I'm concerned, Valliant Royalty. Then 
you'll be able to remove that. You'll probably be higher in your feed 
conversion, but you'll take a step back in exterior. As long as that cow has 
something extra in terms of exterior, it doesn't matter so much. Primarily, of 
course, it all revolves around the milk. ' 
'The story relates partly to the level of concentrates. You can always move 
towards 0 kg concentrates. It makes no difference to the cow. On the other 
hand, you can't move beyond a certain amount of concentrates. That's when 
the cow decides, because she'll get ill. The fact that one cow uses more 
concentrates than the next to produce, for example, a yield of 9,500 is purely 
breeding. It is genetic disposition, which you can only breed into it. So if you 
want to achieve a high feed conversion, you have to choose bulls with 
daughters that milk easier than others, that have volume and enough 
appetite. The cow needs to want to be at the trough to eat the best bits out of 
it.' 
'There are cows that just don't want to eat, they only want concentrates and 
as little roughage as possible. Those are fusspots. We have a cow that throws 
herself at maize until she has to draw breath, or else she dies. Then she starts 
to chew, and chew, and chew, and then she throws herself back into it again. 
Her daughters have the same feature. There are also cows that will always go 
and visit their neighbour to see whether it's nicer there, and keep looking and 
looking. It is purely a difference in appetite. One cow likes eating better than 
others. Some cows are really always eating, those are the roughage 
consumers. ' 
4.10 Conclusions 
I wrote this chapter out of a need to move beyond the technological 
determinism that largely colours and pervades agricultural science. The 
core of technological determinism can be defined in terms of the 
previously discussed definition of Bordewijk. By representing agriculture 
as an application of scientific laws (laws, inter alia, symbolised by 
production functions) and by 'transforming' these laws into new artefacts 
and new patterns of action - in short, into new technologies (which are 
superior, since they contain higher level production functions) - farming 
appears as a range within which only one option is available: the 
application of new findings, insights and technologies specified by 
science. A farmer who refrains from this will be hit mercilessly by cut-
throat competition. He (or she) is left with costs and revenues that are 
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respectively higher and lower than for those who do apply the new 
technologies adequately. This has been aptly called the 'technological 
treadmill' (Owen 1966; Marsden 1998a). 
I have pointed out in this chapter that the construction of production 
functions can only take place by ignoring the fact that farm labour is a 
goal-oriented, multidimensional, and reflexive activity and also by 
ignoring farming as a highly differentiated activity. 
Farming is a strategically controlled practice, which constantly is creating 
different and new regularities. The conversion process is always folded 
through the insights and interests of those who are involved in it. It 
appears impracticable to use only one criteria for ordering the variegated 
set of practices that emerges. What appears, for example, less efficient 
from an abstract point of view can be highly desirable within the 
particular rationale according to which such a practice is developed. The 
empirical regularities (particularly the empirical input-output relations) 
provide information not so much about underlying natural laws, they 
refer above all to different ways in which farming as socio-technical 
practice is conducted and ordered. Thus they refer in part to the extent to 
which nature is folded and transformed, to the ways in which socio-
technical practices are unfolded. 
The influence of agricultural science is enormous in a country as the 
Netherlands. The ecology of the Netherlands has been changed and 
dramatically standardised as a result of applying the insights of agrarian 
sciences. Similarly, labour objects and tools are increasingly produced 
according to scientific designs. Labour too is 'moulded' from the scientific 
point of view, via an extensive system of training and advisory. The actual 
labour process is largely driven by prescriptions for action that have 
arisen from science. The unfortunate notion of 'best farming practice' is 
an important vehicle in this. Finally, the possibility for 'deviations' to 
occur - so often the starting point for endogenous development - has 
been highly reduced, particularly due to the established standardisation. 
Agricultural science has manifested itself above all as a globalising factor 
in Dutch agriculture. 
Having said that, it should be stated that farming as such cannot be 
understood but as a meeting place of global and local factors. In this 
meeting, farmers make a particular selection of global elements to 
incorporate within a set of relevant local parameters and practices. Such 
selection and incorporation imply usually a transformation: a 
deconstruction and recomposition that sometimes involves a 
dismantlement but often also an enrichment. Van Broekhuizen (1989) has 
demonstrated this convincingly with respect to the already highly 
globalised supply of 'bulls'. 
Frequently, added value (also in input-output terms) is realised in the 
practical application of global notions, artefacts, and procedures 
surpassing the limits initially anticipated by agricultural scientists. The 
previous explanations of Oostindie and Hoeksma are, in this respect, 
illustrations par excellence. They particularise (relocalise) their stock of 
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resources and knowledges to such a degree that new combinations and 
patterns emerge that should be the starting point and the object of new, 
multidisciplinary agricultural research. 
Incidentally, the same applies to some exceptional agricultural scientists. 
They too particularise, on the whole, certain resources (such as the 
'natural enemies' of Marcel Dicke 1988) and/or develop perspectives 
through which the particularisation of resources and/or of resource 
combinations become perceivable, understandable, and developable. 
Their findings too should provide a starting point for new, 
multidisciplinary research. However, the newly required links between 
agricultural research and promising farming practices are rarely 
established. The same applies within agricultural science: the required 
links between new insights and the mainstream research agenda hardly 
emerge. 
I will conclude this chapter with a few methodological comments. The 
material expression of technical subsystems is conventionally expressed 
as: 
G + E + G * E = F 
where G (the genotype) stands for nature (the immanent laws to which 
Bordewijk e tutti quanti referred and refer), E (the environment) stands for 
the objectified set of growth factors, and F (the phenotype) stands for the 
end result: cows and fields and their inherent production functions. 
This chapter suggests that several changes to this formula need to be 
made in order to understand the nature and functioning of technical 
subsystems (see Figure 4.18). 
Figure 4.18 The core of co-production 
(the living world) 
t 
H 
(the social) 
First, E should be replaced by H (for 'human agency') in order to (a) 
emphasise that agriculture is essentially co-production - that is, the 
interaction between and interweaving and mutual transformation of the 
natural and the social (Van der Ploeg 1997; NRLO 1997b) - and (b) to 
make clear that E is not a static (or unilinearly optimisable) category but 
one that is dynamic and open to differentiation. 
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Furthermore, it is essential to understand that G (the living world) as a 
whole can be constantly unfolded (but can also be degraded) by human 
intervention: hence the arrow (in Figure 4.18) that runs directly from H to 
G. The stories of Hoeksma and Oostindie speak volumes in this respect. 
The direct effect of H on G implies, just like the indirect effect of the 
interactive term G * H, that the end result F (farming, cows, fields, and 
hence landscapes, ecological values, food, etc.) cannot be imagined outside 
of the normative order of H (including, explicitly, the interaction with G, 
see the notion of kreas buorkje (farming gently) in Chapter 2). 
Both co-production and its outcomes fall explicitly within this normative 
order - simply because they are part of the social praxis, of civilisation. 
Current thinking within agricultural science (G + E + G * H = F) fails to 
acknowledge the social praxis. It is reintroduced in the approach 
summarised in Figure 4.18.1 will return to this in Chapter 9. 
The result of co-production (farming in all its diversity confined in time 
and space) is also explicitly included within any given normative order. 
This implies that feedback will occur from F towards G, H, and G * H. 
Hence the double-headed arrows, which refer to both the occurrence and 
the nature of multiple responses. 
Several conclusions logically emerge from the model presented in Figure 
4.18. Since H includes those directly involved in the farming process 
(farmers, agricultural labourers, contractors, shepherds, and whoever 
else), the centrality and importance of endogenous dynamics, of 
innovatività contadina (Osti 1991), is emphasised from the outset. 
Agricultural research appears as a particular (although therefore not less 
important) type of the production of innovations. 
If one accepts the centrality of the innovative capacity of farmers, then 
several essential axes can be constructed between farming practices and 
institutionalised research. First, great importance should always be 
attributed in institutionalised research to the discovery of relevant 
heterogeneity. Second, heterogeneity (or part of it) can be used as a design 
principle. Third, and of pivotal importance, is that the unknown (that 
which is not yet known) is not discarded as non-existent but is rather 
entered into and explored. Fourth, the development of 'protected spaces' 
(Van Lente and Rip 1998) is of the utmost importance in such an 
exploration, and above all in the further unfolding of possible 'novelties' 
that are concealed in the unknown. Currently, the predominant 
technological regime all too often excludes such research. 
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Notes 
1 Farming as practice contains also the interrelations between and the identities of the 
people involved in farming. Farming as practice also expresses itself in a particular 
interaction with its ecological surroundings. Particular cultural landscapes (and the 
ecological values inherent in them) are an expression of this. Entering into relations with 
others - in short, the interaction with other social practices (for example, of industry, trade 
and banks, but also of planners, administrators, and so on) - is another important part of 
farming as social practice. 
2 This occurs, inter alia, by means of crop rotation, by shifting cultivation, become forms of 
transhumance, and, above all, by gradually developing fields in a particular way. 
3 Types of spatial differentiation arose, for example, from the intention to use certain areas 
as meadows, which, inter alia, resulted in the creation of typical elements such as bluegrass 
meadows, marsh-marigold meadows, and so on. The spatial transport of nutrients, and 
hence the combination of deterioration and enrichment, was usually closely related to such 
types of spatial development. These types of spatial development (think of the relations 
between heather fields and ash trees) were abundant in Europe. The relation between this 
type of spatial differentiation and the enlargement of biodiversity is analysed by Gerritsen 
(2000). 
4 Incidentally, this reproduction has become increasingly, though unevenly, externalised. 
See Van der Ploeg 1990, chaps. 1-2. 
5 See Bouma 1993; Droogers and Bouma 1996; Droogers et al. 1996; Droogers and Bouma 
1997. 
6 Groen et al. 1993; Groen and Van Bruchem 1995; Ventura 1995; Felius 1996; Van Bruchem 
and Tamminga 1997 
7 Bray 1986; Van Bentum 1995; Van den Dries and Portela 1995; Frouws et al. 1998 
8 Van Kessel 1990; Van der Ploeg 1993; Murdoch et al. 1994; Wynne 1996 
9 One of the most fascinating and perhaps also best documented examples is still the 
genetic dynamics of potato cultivation in the Vasilov centre in the Andes region. See Brush et 
al. 1981; Van Kessel 1990; Salas 1996. For a more economic analysis that makes 
understandable the reasons behind these practices, see Mayer 1995. Similar dynamics were 
used widely in Dutch potato cultivation at the time, although they now have been 
abandoned; see Van der Ploeg 1987. 
10 The development of the harvest factor (the relation between used sowing seed and 
harvested production), documented by Slicher van Bath (1960), is a prime example of the 
way in which farmers utilise the malleability of the production process to achieve progress. 
11 Hayami and Ruttan (1985) provide a striking description derived from Japanese history: 
communication between farmers over longer distances (and hence the communication of 
innovations) was almost completely impossible due to tight feudal relations. A relaxation of 
these relations resulted instantly in a fast boom in agricultural growth: the development 
potential, blocked until then, was suddenly be freed up and tapped into. Similar examples 
(but of a much more recent date) can be found in the pre- and post-war mezzadri in northern 
and mid-Italy. Even the mode of ploughing changed almost overnight after the liberazione of 
these share-cropping farmers. Incidentally, Hofstee also relates the early flourishing of 
agriculture in the northern Netherlands to its peripheral position within the then feudal 
state. 
12 Perhaps one of the most intriguing episodes occurred in the late 1960s. It was widely 
considered, then, that large farms were still the most extensive. Elimination of small ('too 
intensive') farms and a simultaneous expansion of large, extensive farms would imply a 
hindrance to overproduction. The Mansholt Plan was largely based on this assumption, 
which later turned out to be wrong. The vanguard farm (see Van der Ploeg 1987) - that is, 
the large-scale and highly intensive farm - was already an incipient reality by the late 1960s-
early 1970s, consolidated in the subsequent 'structural policy'. Consequently, a policy 
202 The Virtual Farmer 
directed at control of overproduction resulted in an incredible acceleration of 
overproduction. 
13 Sustainable agriculture, to summarize a long debate, can only be realised by an adequate 
adaptation of farm management - that is, within the extremely decentralised practice of over 
100,000 farms, whereby the opinions and decisions of 10,000s of actors are somehow 
decisive. The one size fits all, generic prescription approach is hardly compatible with the 
aims of sustainable agriculture. Intervention in farm management, however, raises the huge 
problem of the 'uncaptured peasantry'. 
14 Especially in the Netherlands, it was thought that the 'agrarian question', which is 
largely a question of control (see Van der Ploeg 1991, chap. 4), had been overcome. 
15 This term refers to a highly mechanistic world, a world functioning like a machine. Every 
movement, every change in this world goes back unilinearly to definable causes. The 
Cartesian theatre stands for a world ruled by natural laws. The human factor, i.e. agency, is 
absent, is irrelevant, or goes back, at the most, to an understanding and the utilisation of 
these laws. 
16 I am greatly indebted to Harm Wieling of the National Reference Centre for Agriculture 
and to Ton van Scheppingen and Fritz Mandersloot of the Research Institute for Animal 
Husbandry for the patient ways in which they have tried to make me familiar with a number 
of details of grassland utilisation. However, mistakes in the text are my own. 
17 In addition, I could refer to water management, the selection of grass varieties, weed 
control, the timing of fertilisation, whether or not to control losses, the ways of mowing and 
shaking, whether or not to avoid seasonal losses, the frequency of rolling and towing, etc. 
18 By varying the organisation of time, various relations would appear. If the influence of 
other variables would be imputed (soil humidity, fertilisation, relation between mowing and 
grazing, grassland varieties, weed avoidance, etc.), a sheer unforeseeable playing field 
emerges in which an impressive number of interrelations and interactions enables numerous 
solutions. 
19 Theoretically, because a number of solutions will be internally contradictory. 
20 'Well-ripened manure' is an actor-dependent definition. Is cannot be defined exactly. The 
concept is highly context dependent. In northern Portugal (see Portela 1994; Cristovâo et al. 
1994) it means something different from on the sandy soils in the Dutch province of Drenthe 
where Harm Tiesing farmed (see Edelman 1918). In consequence, the use of 'well-ripened 
manure' cannot be prescribed precisely, nor controlled. Incidentally, the same issue applies 
to artificial fertilizer. 'Good use of artificial fertiliser' too is, for example, pre-eminently 
context dependent (it is even highly dependent upon variations within a plot; later on, this 
will become the starting point for precision agriculture). 
21 It should be noted that much of this research, both nationally and internationally, is 
conducted by the artificial fertiliser industry (in the Netherlands in the past decades by the 
Nederlandse Meststoffen Insituut - Dutch Institute for Fertilizers). However, this does not 
make the reference to the agricultural sciences less relevant here. The artificial fertiliser 
industry used agricultural science models and representations and hired or commissioned 
agricultural scientists for this purpose. Agricultural science as an independent institution did 
not operate as 'countervailing power' in this regard. 
22 However ironic this may sound, by giving them a particular instrument/tool for 
grassland management, farmers could in turn be managed by the expert system. 
23 Viewed from this perspective, it becomes understandable that the issue of knowledge 
development - that is, the agenda of agricultural research - becomes increasingly the object 
of a socio-political struggle in and around the sector. Think about the debate in Dutch 
horticulture about whether or not to conduct research that benefits cultivation in the soil 
instead of production on substrate. Reference can also be made to the debate about 
biotechnology, the debate about Herman the genetically modified bull, etc. 
24 Especially since knowledge transference (agricultural colleges, courses, advisory-services, 
etc.) have become a tightly anchored, well-functioning and ubiquitous set of institutions. 
25 Sauvant adds: 'Conceptually live organisms are largely similar to other tightly controlled 
systems in which OS and RS can be distinguished and where structures, functions and 
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possibilities of control are more or less segregated between the short term adaptation to 
environmental perturbations (tactics=homeostasis) and the achievement of longer term 
targets (strategy = homeorhesis)'. 
26 This is a phenomenon that is very well known within tropical livestock systems, for 
example South Africa's 'bush fields'. 
27 A more extensive analysis can be found in Van der Ploeg et al. (1994, particularly chap. 3). 
28 Such calculations are far from simple. Apart from technical complications, the largest 
problem confronting researchers is the 'many unknown quantities and several equations' 
(see NRLO 1994). Metabolised energy production of one's own grassland can usually be 
estimated, since it can be deduced from the estimated feed requirements of cattle. This 
results usually in the automatic attribution to the 'field' of differences in efficiency in the shed 
or between shed and field. I have demonstrated in Van der Ploeg et al. (1996) how this 
apparently Gordian knot can be disentangled. 
29 As demonstrated in other empirical studies (réf. Roep et al. 1991), the practice of zero 
grazing was, until recently, mostly confined to the farms of machinemen. However, a change 
took place because of the quota system. Environmental policy too has resulted in important 
changes in the 1990s. Machinemen in particular are the ones who have bought most land 
without quota (see Roep and Roex 1992). 
30 This includes machinemen even feeding concentrates 'above the norm' in summertime. 
They mow and ensilage so much grazing seems to suffer in summer. 
31 The cows in this study were on farms that had been previously the object of research into 
farming styles. 
32 Organic farmers are also interesting in this respect. A more recent study has shown that 
organic farmers create cows, and a farming system around these cows, that realise a very 
high input-output efficiency in the shed (even higher that that of cowmen). See Van der 
Ploeg et al. 1993. 
33 That is, they do not 'exist' as an objective reality in nature, independent of human 
intervention. 
34 Of course, more can be said about this on the basis of theoretical considerations. Mont 
Blanc is a given; it is, simply said, given with 'Genesis'. Human industry has had 
remarkably little effect on it.. It is hard to imagine that Mont Blanc becoming higher or 
developing radically different slopes as a result of purposeful human intervention. Over the 
course of a few decades we may slightly raise sea levels, as a result of which Mont Blanc 
becomes somewhat lower. Input-output relations are of course completely different. They 
are object of goal-oriented human actions and their level, position, and slope appears to be 
actually dependent on this. By climbing the Mont Blanc, we do not create (and/or reorder) 
it. But farming reorders agriculture all the time. 
35 More precisely, the average input varies often with each farming style (irrespective of the 
input-output relation concerned). The question is whether additional input-output relations 
are involved. 
36 A path model is based upon a number of causal partial relations (for an excellent 
description of its theoretical assumptions, see Nooy 1982). Various relations, expressed as ßs, 
are calculated through a series of stepwise regression procedures. 
37 Again, the calculations are based upon 300 Frisian dairy farms, from the database of 
AVM/CCLB. A more detailed description can be found in Van der Ploeg et al. 1994; NRLO 
1994. An English summary of some of the results can be found in Van der Ploeg 1994a, 
1996b. 
38 In the practice of extension and farm management support schemes similar 'norms' are 
calculated and used in order to inform farmers about the 'optimal resource use' - see e.g. 
Leeuwis 1993. 
39 The danger is of course that such a 'norm' becomes a prescription and hence the future 
norm. Already, this can be identified in the notion of 'best agricultural practice', which can 
be enforced on farmers through cross-compliance. This is the reason why I discuss this at 
length here. 
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40 An important methodological innovation was realised by Wil Hennen. We had identified 
farming styles - in quantitative terms at least - mainly by means of principal components 
analysis, after which certain 'groups' were defined by means of factor scores. This is 
unsatisfactory in as much as that sharp and arbitrary boundaries have to be imposed. Wil 
Hennen developed a 'fuzzy model', which centralised the probability that a certain farm 
could be included in a farming style. The following Table 4.2 is partly based on this 
approach (see Hennen 1995). An interesting sideline of this method is that the combination 
of various strategical elements (or rather the possibility of 'hybrids') emerge more clearly. 
These hybrids (such as economical cowmen, etc.) are included in the table. 
41 'Breaking into models' is a rather common procedure in research. I remember, for 
example, that we had to 'increase' considerably the percentage of weeds in the grassland of 
machinemen in order to 'approach' their less efficient grassland utilisation. This happens 
frequently on experimental farms too. In order to realize a more adequate concentrate level, 
the concentrate computer is, for example, misled on purpose. The big question is of course 
whether such use is possible without specialists. Thus, the (as yet clumsy) models will 
probably produce a much more directive and normative effect - especially since the 
knowledge about the real parameters, and thus the possibility to 'break into' and adjust, are 
less present in practice. 
42 'Farmers don't write enough, and there are too few farmers who write', according to 
Hoeksma. He has kept an amazing collection of data since 1958. He refers to it regularly. He 
also claims that 'whenever I think up something new, I will first go back and see how I did it 
in the past'. His own farm management over the years, including its well-documented 
variation, is a treasure trove, which he draws from, and returns to, in order to assess the 
potential value. 
43 Comparison with others suits cowmen less well, they are convinced of the uniqueness of 
their own resources. They distrust comparison with the norm. However, comparison with 
data from their own farm over previous years is regarded as very significant: they point to 
the degree of progress they made themselves. 
44 This is related to the rotting processes in manure, as well as to biogene amino acids and 
the shortage of antioxidants. The challenge is to let manure compost instead of rot. 
45 Oostindie adds: 'The difference between a good farmer and a bad farmer is that a good 
farmer has a fuller wallet. A good farmer takes good care of his cattle. Taking care of your 
cattle is number 1. Whether the bigger the better matters I don't know. It is hard to say what 
a good farmer is. If a farmer is satisfied, it is a good farmer. I think that I could have as much 
fun in my work if I had 3 tonnes milk on my own. I have most fun in breeding. I like the rest 
too, but breeding is the best. I also think that I could earn about the same amount on a 3 
tonnes farm. Of course you'd have to have the same proportions in the bank. That is 
important of course, but if that's the case I think I could make it. I am not a person who 
wants to buy milk quota at all cost. Farmers who do that are caught in a vicious circle. The 
purchase of milk quota is a purely fiscal technical issue. If you buy quota and you have 
everything else in place, you'll earn more again. The more you earn, the more tax you have 
to pay, so you'll have to buy more quota. If you're caught in that, you won't be able to get 
out. It is a kind of addiction for farmers. Anyway, those farmers are not well informed. There 
is more than one way of investing your money.' 
46 Here I was struck by the resemblance to a similar saying from the Po plain: ogni contadino 
a la sua linea (each peasant follows his own course). See Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 1981. 
47 Incidentally, I would like to state here that this is precisely what is so enjoyable about my 
profession: one is endlessly looking for an understanding of essential differences, and then 
suddenly, usually at completely unexpected moments, the key is thrown into your lap. 
48 A beautiful expression relating to the construction of congruence (see Chapters 1, 3 of this 
book). 
49 For a description of the rich history of the Knol breeding farm, see Bottenburg 1965. 
50 Later in the discussion, our partner returns to feed conversion: 'A different description of 
feed conversion is "what does a cow take up from feed". How much of its feed does it use. 
One cow just shits out a lot of useful materials, while another cow would be able to produce 
another couple of litres milk from it. If more milk can be made from it, it must still contain 
Capturing the Intangible 205 
nitrogen, for nitrogen is protein. A cow's shit tells you everything, about its health and its 
production. If a cow shits thin with much corn, it receives too little protein. If a cow shits 
thin without corn, either it receives too little protein or its feeding speed is too low, there is 
too much cellulose in the feed. In that case you also have to supplement protein. Protein is 
partly used for bacteria that have to convert feed. Thus it contributes indirectly to milk. 
Feeding is a story in itself. If the feed specialist comes round here and they want to calculate 
it, they need about 4 sheets of A4 for my explanation - about speed, digestible and 
indigestible protein, digestible and indigestible fats. Nowadays, they even talk about of a 
feed's speed. They work towards that. That's why you have your roughage tested and you 
see what your feed is made up of. You'll look for a cake to go with that. If your roughage is 
slow, you'll supplement it with a fast cake. If your roughage is fast, you'll have to feed a 
slow cake. If your roughage is rich in protein, you don't have to feed as expensive a cake. 
For protein is expensive. If roughage is poor in protein, you do need a protein-rich cake. 
Various combinations of these exist. And I didn't even start about carbohydrates and starch. 
They too have a certain influence on the protein percentage and on the milk. So it comes 
down to trying to produce as much milk from roughage supplemented by concentrates. This 
implies automatically that you try and keep losses as low as possible, whether ammonia or 
whatever. Of course you want to use your feed as optimally as possible. It's all profit.' 
51 At the start of this chapter, I discussed five mechanisms with which farming has been 
unfolded over time into what it is now. Of course, there is no getting away from referring to 
a 'sixth mechanism'. It is the malleability tout court as increasingly claimed by the 
agricultural sciences. From the perspective that a large number of growth factors can already 
be controlled (and that farming could be eliminated where this is not the case), various types 
of 'optimal agriculture' can be defined at different levels. This could be called 'mega-
malleability', based upon global parameters and resulting in the radical criss-crossing of that 
which farming has been up until now: a combination of global and local relations and points 
of reference. Under which local conditions such a 'globalised' (or 'optimised') agriculture 
should be conducted is as yet an unanswered question. All things considered, the question is 
not asked at all. Perhaps this is not even surprising. 
52 I put 'bulls' in quotation marks here, because for a long time it did not involve bulls, of 
course, but rather artefacts and symbols - that is, 'straws' and notions that define why a 
certain 'bull' is better than others. 
5 The Economy as a Set of Differentiable 
Relations 
In this chapter I will discuss at some length the economic aspects of 
contemporary agriculture. The objective is twofold. First, I will try to 
demonstrate that the determinism that permeates the discipline of 
conventional agricultural economics is not only untenable but also 
hinders the prospects of new issues and new solutions. Second, I would 
like to develop further the theoretical framework needed to adequately 
support farming styles as development opportunities and as socio-
technical networks. The malleability of grassland production and animal 
husbandry was discussed in the previous chapter. Here, I would like to 
extend that discussion into the sphere of economic relations, since they 
are also highly malleable. 
The economist Yotopoulos has aptly summarised the core of economic 
determinism: 
'It is well known that all firms would have the same quantities of inputs and 
outputs (and as a result only one point would be observable on the 
production surface) if a. all firms had the same production function [. . .], b. 
all firms faced the same prices [. . .] and c. all firms would maximise profits 
perfectly and instantaneously' (1974, pp. 265-266). 
The existence of only one (technologically determined) production 
function within agricultural systems has been rejected in Chapter 4. Just 
as the producers in Yotopoulos' explanations are constantly creating new 
functions (including new frontier functions characterised by the highest 
technical efficiency), farmers create different and always new production 
functions. More to the point, there are no production functions that 
determine the practice of farm labour. On the contrary, farmers create, in 
and through their labour, certain regularities and connections - in short, 
certain input-output relations. (In their practice H they develop G, and 
they particularise G via co-production (G * H) into a heterogeneous and 
dynamic F) For this very reason, there is indeed not just 'one point on the 
production surface'; we encounter enormous variation. 
Similarly, no economic laws exist independently of particular practices. 
These practices are not determined by exogenous laws. Of course, it is 
possible to identify numerous regularities in the sphere of (agricultural) 
economics. However, these regularities are no more than a reflection of 
the (heterogeneous and constantly changing) practices and socio-technical 
networks, and of the level of abstraction chosen to represent these 
practices. If stripped of its determinist perspective, agricultural economics 
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can provide numerous useful instruments and concepts to dissect and 
better understand the heterogeneous and dynamic practices. I will 
gratefully use a number of those instruments in this chapter. 
Farming can be analysed from various angles. Different sociological 
theories can be used; or farming can be understood through 'technical' 
disciplines such as agronomy and animal science. It can also be viewed 
from an economic perspective. From each angle, a particular aspect of the 
actual object, farming, is observed and represented. However, every 
'image', every representation is, almost by definition, partial. It shows 
certain aspects and leaves others undiscussed. It produces both 
knowledge and ignorance. Every point of view creates its own preferred 
facts and therefore also its 'black swans'. 
Furthermore, various domains of farming can be identified. For example, 
agronomic and zootechnical regularities apply to the domain of 
production (the conversion of inputs into outputs). Economic regularities 
apply principally to the domain of economic relations (entering into 
economic relationships, conducting transactions, checking the relations 
between monetary revenues and monetary costs). Social and cultural 
relations, usually institutionalised into regularities, apply to the domain 
of family and community. The point is here that in farming these domains 
can be distinguished analytically, but they cannot be separated. The 
essence of farming is the overlap between these domains. 
The animal husbandry practices of farmers (such as Oostindie's breeding 
practices) can be analysed very well (although not exhaustively) from an 
economic angle. Similarly, parts of the economic actions can only be 
understood through a grasp of the principles of animal husbandry: a 
promising cow will not be sold, despite her estimated monetary value; 
except in the case of a poor farmer in early twentieth century (Van 
Weideren 1912b). An understanding of this requires political economics 
and an insight into different calculi. 
The transfer of meanings always occurs in the practice of overlapping 
domains: the social is translated in terms of the technical, the technical in 
terms of the economic, the economic subsequently in terms of the social, 
and so on. The aforementioned pig farmer who has no intention of 
'working himself into stress' translates this statement into the technical 
domain. It leads to apparently suboptimal technical results (less piglets 
per sow per year). However, these are definitely not 'suboptimal results' 
to the pig farmer concerned. They are results that are in accordance with 
his objectives and that can be justified very well from the perspective of 
those objectives (see Commandeur 1998; and the discussion in Chapter 4 
regarding the fourth quadrant). In addition, perhaps, the costs of this 
course of action will also be lower (with which we arrive at the domain of 
the economic). 
The various domains interweave and intertwine with one another in the 
practice of farming. Even though the main points will vary between 
styles, the transfer of meaning and the search for and creation of 
coherence will always constitute the central axis. 
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Whereas this process of integration is central to the practice of farming, 
contemporary agricultural sciences tend towards the opposite: the object 
of study becomes systematically segmented, and becomes considered 
from the point of view of the laws that would apply to the individual 
segments. This alone makes both multidisciplinary research and the 
introduction of the concept of 'applicability' extremely difficult, although 
not impossible. 
The real difficulty appears only at, and as a result of, the next step, which 
is taken in an almost Bordewijkian manner by more or less every 
discipline. Its own preferential segment or domain is understood as a 
regulatory system (see Chapter 4), as a mode of ordering enabling the 
signification of the state of affairs in agriculture, its problems, and 
possible solutions. 
For a long time now, agronomy is no longer representing the knowledge 
of farming in all its diversity. Through the discipline of theoretical 
production ecology, it has been transformed into a regulatory system, 
from which it would be possible to specify the ideal ordering of a future 
agriculture. The well-known study Grond voor keuzen (Ground for 
Choices) by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy is a 
remarkable expression of this (WRR 1992). 
The same applies to agricultural economics. For a long time now, this 
discipline has not been concerned with the analysis and understanding of 
what is actually happening in agriculture. With a few exceptions, 
agricultural economics involves above all the claim that the set of 
economic relations in which agriculture is embedded should be regarded 
as the dominant regulatory system. In so far as this is not the case, the 
existing 'distortions and imbalances' should be adjusted as soon as 
possible. The superior solution in this approach is represented by the 
reorganisation of farming according to relations and rationalities inherent 
in the set of (undisturbed) markets. 
I would like to stress from the outset that the set of economic relations in 
and around agriculture is very important. However, this does not imply 
that economics (the set of markets, and the relations, institutions, and 
expectations contained therein) can be understood as a regulatory system, 
as a set of relations that coercively determine the development of 
agriculture. I would like to demonstrate this through drawing upon one 
of the central themes of agricultural economics. 
5.1 Substitution curves, expansion paths, and farming styles 
Different resources (land, labour, machines, buildings, animal feedstuffs, 
fertilisers, knowledge, water, etc.) have to be combined in the agricultural 
production process in order to let the labour and production processes 
run a desirable course. The interrelations between mobilisable resources 
will often be subject to changes; for example, if labour becomes more 
expensive and land becomes cheaper (Hayami and Ruttan 1985), if energy 
(one of the so-called non-factor inputs) becomes more expensive relative 
to labour (De Wit 1975,1977), and/or in the case of mechanisation (when 
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capital replaces labour). Such changes are presented in agricultural 
economics by way of so-called substitution curves (see Figure 5.1). It is 
usually assumed that the resources in question (labour and machines in 
the example in Figure 5.1) can be substituted according to static relations, 
determined by technology. 
Figure 5.1 Substitution curve, price line, and expansion path, an example 
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If one wants to realise, for example, a level of production A, then an 
amount of labour a' and a degree of mechanisation m' will be sufficient. It 
is also possible to substitute labour by increased mechanical input 'along' 
curve A: we will thus move to a" and m " (see Figure 5.1). Farms that are 
situated 'above' this curve (mobilising, for example, a' labour and m " 
machines) are technically inefficient. They mobilise too many resources 
(labour and/or machines) to realise a level of production that could be 
based upon a much more efficient use (such as represented by curve A). 
Realising a higher level of production (such as indicated by curve B) 
requires using more resources, of course. 
Finally, we can introduce the economic side of the equation. If curves A 
and B represent the technical interrelations (and possibilities) in the 
production process, the question remains as to what the 'optimal' point 
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on these curves will be. The answer is simple (at least in neoclassical 
analysis). This 'optimum' is defined by price relations (in this case the 
relation between labour costs and mechanisation costs) - for, according to 
the canonical variety of economics, agricultural production is 
'determined' by markets and technology. 
The price relation can be introduced into Figure 5.1 by way of line P. 
Economic efficiency exists at the point where line P touches the 
substitution curve. Therefore, a ' / m " ' would be an economically efficient 
combination (at production level B) in Figure 5.1, while the combination 
of m " and a '" would be economically inefficient. 
The so-called 'expansion path' (line E) is also shown in Figure 5.1. If, on a 
certain farm, production increases from level A to level B, a new optimum 
has to be found. The expansion path (see Dosi et al. 1993) is the route 
connecting the various optima. 
In principle, the neoclassical model (summarised in Figure 5.1) provides 
the possibility of a number of adjustments, particularisations, and 
refinements, collectively enabling a certain range around the exclusive 
optimum inherent in the previous argument. First, subjective valuations 
can be introduced: it is possible to valorise - for whatever reason - labour 
and mechanisation in a way that deviates from the so-called objective 
price relation. If this is the case, those prices are called shadow prices. 
Mechanisation can be considered, for whatever reason, as 'more 
expensive' and labour as 'cheaper': in that case, the priceline P 'flips', as it 
were, and another position is taken up. Second, the position of 
substitution curves (of A and B) can vary; they can change as a result of 
learning processes ('disembodied technical change', according to Salter 
1967; and 'learning by doing', following Dosi 1988; see also Röling and 
Somers 1993): the substitution curve can change in the direction of higher 
efficiency as a result of better control of the production process. It is also 
possible to imagine the substitution curve moving towards the upper 
right-hand corner - that is, in the direction of (partial) inefficiency. Hence, 
counterproductivity occurs. Similarly, expansion paths can be imagined 
that are subject to a particular dynamic (particular limitations). 
These considerations guide me to the following hypotheses: 
1 Where there are systematic differences in social regulation (where 
there are different farming styles) one will encounter different 
substitution curves. 
2 The subjective valuation of price relations is not distributed 
capriciously (not at random). Every social regulatory practice - that is, 
every farming style - contains a systematic pattern of style-specific 
valuations of scarcity and price relations. All the more since every 
particular practice (or style) contains a particular ordering of relations 
vis-à-vis the market. That is why there will be systematically different 
positions on different substitution curves. 
3 Finally, every socially regulated practice contains a particular learning 
process - that is, a particular accumulation of knowledge. This implies 
that different empirical expansion paths will manifest themselves over 
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time. This should be recognisable in a cross-sectional analysis as 
different interrelations between various production factors and non-
factor inputs at different production volumes. 
Figure 5.2 Style-specific substitution curves for a quota of 500,000 kg of milk 
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The interrelations between, and mutual substitution possibilities of, 
labour, inputs, mechanisation and land collectively compose a 
multidimensional space that can be unfolded in various ways. The style-
specific substitution relations between labour and machines have been 
represented in Figure 5.2 for a production volume of 500,000 kg of milk. 
These are relations that differ significantly, with a striking difference in 
slope: at decreasing labour input, the degree of mechanisation increases 
much faster for grutte boeren (large farmers) and trekkerboeren 
(machinemen) than for the other styles. 
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Figure 5.3 Substitution curves and price-relations lines for economical farmers (S) 
and machinemen (T) 
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Price-relation lines are described in Figure 5.3, which, for the sake of 
clarity, is confined to two styles. It can be noticed that labour and 
machines are valued very differently from each other within these two 
different styles. In the style of the sunige boeren (economical farmers) one 
labour unit represents a 'mechanisation value' of NLG 58,500 per year, 
while for machinemen this amounts to NLG 155,000. This corresponds 
exactly with the rationalities of both styles. It also provides a reasonable 
explanation for why (other conditions being equal) machinemen reduce 
their labour input much further than economical farmers - or why, at a 
more or less equal level of mechanisation, the latter employ more labour 
than the former. 
Figure 5.4 shows a few expansion paths (for koweminsken - cowmen - and 
large farmers). Incidentally, it is remarkable that at high production 
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volumes (a quota of 1 million kg milk/farm) the substitution curve for 
large farmers lies below the one for cowmen (at least within the more 
conventional range - that is, more than 2 labour units). This clearly 
demonstrates the particular efficiency of the large-scale approach. With 
respect to the expansion paths, cowmen explicitly try to stay within the 
limits of the family farm (that is, they try to avoid the input of external 
labour by mechanising relatively faster and more). Large farmers find it 
much easier to use external labour. All this can be found in the expansion 
paths. Moving from a production of 500,000 to 1 million kg, large farmers 
increase the degree of mechanisation by 106 per cent, cowmen by 171 per 
cent. 
In conclusion, Figure 5.5 offers a summary of the mobilisation of labour, 
inputs, machines, and land in order to realise a production of 500,000 kg 
milk. For convenience of comparison, the graph is again restricted to two 
styles. Assuming a farm area of 50 ha, cowmen will use inputs (purchased 
feed and fertilisers) costing NLG 70,000 per year but large farmers will 
buy NLG 130,000 worth of inputs. Cowmen will use more labour (2.0 
labour units as opposed to 1.5 for large farmers). Large farmers will spend 
NLG 120,000 on mechanisation against NLG 70,000 for cowmen. 
Considerable and significant differences can be identified in each 
quadrant. 
Particular substitution curves are created in every style - that is, in every 
particular organisational form in dairying. Furthermore, the various 
curves are related to each other in a coherent way. These are not a priori 
(technologically determined) connections but socially constructed and 
reproduced relations. 
Already in the 1970s (in the days after the first oil crisis), De Wit (1975) 
pointed to the substitution relations between, let's say, 'external energy' 
(related to use of inputs, mechanisation, etc.) and 'internal energy' (labour 
in particular). It goes without saying that this relationship is decisive in 
the sustainability question. With some imagination, Figure 5.5 can be read 
in those terms. The upper-left and lower-left quadrants represent the way 
in which 'internal energy' (labour) is related to the two most common 
types that embody 'external energy': input use and mechanisation. This 
shows that the relationship between the two types of energy is not fixed, 
but is malleable because it is, at least partly, created in the concrete 
organisation of the labour process. 
By way of an interim conclusion 
In the previous analysis, I have used a number of methods from the neo-
classical approach to show that a number of assumptions upon which 
neo-classical theory is based are inadequate, since they cannot be 
reconciled with the diversity encountered in empirical reality. The 
assumption of an "optimal" type of farming - in which both the highest 
possible technical efficiency and highest possible economic efficiency are 
realised at the same time, in order to obtain sui generis the highest incomes 
and therefore the best conditions for competition - is not tenable either. 
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Figure 5.4 Substitution curves and expansion paths for cowmen (K) and large 
farmers (G) 
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Figure 5.5 Summary (for a production of 500,000 kg) for cowmen (K) and large 
farmers (G) 
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Farming is a socially regulated practice; different farming styles manifest 
themselves. Every farming style is characterised by: 
a particular substitution relations; 
b a particular set of non-incidental shadow prices; 
c complex interrelations between economic and technical efficiency (for 
an example of how the two do not necessarily follow on from each 
other, see Rougoor 1999); and 
d a particular development through time. 
All this is supported and reconfirmed by particular relations with 
markets, technology supply, and policy. 
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This multiformity implies that neoclassical analysis produces a persistent 
distortion of the actual dynamics of the agricultural sector. This raises a 
great intellectual challenge: how to develop more accurate 'middle-range' 
models that better describe the particular dynamics, possibilities, and 
constraints of the different farming styles (Renkema 1998). 
5.2 Again, dancing through time or the indefinable nature of farm 
development 
Chapter 3 contains an example of an analysis of farming styles based 
upon data from 1990-1991 that relate to 300 specialised dairy farms in 
Friesland. The 1997-1998 farm accounts of 200 of these farms were 
subsequently collected with the help of AVM/CCLB.11 With these two 
data sets, a constant sample can be constructed, enabling an analysis of 
differential farm development patterns in the medium term. 
It is not my intention to repeat, in the following analysis, the conclusions 
contained in Chapter 3. In summary, the argument was presented that 
various farming styles usually react in highly different ways to general 
changes in markets, society, and technology. What matters here is 
something different. First, farm development represents a constant 
adventure: a movement forward towards a generally uncertain future. 
Future conditions, regardless of their nature (economic, cultural, 
ecological, technological, etc.), can and will be decisive in the ongoing 
process of variation and selection. Conditions that are highly limiting, if 
not prohibitive, to one style have little effect or maybe in favour to 
another style. 
In this sense, farm development (or more generally, the unfolding of 
future projects) can be seen as a form of 'gambling' on the future. This can 
occur deliberately, carefully, provocatively, or sljuchtwei (with eyes half 
closed). Ready-made answers to uncertainty and turbulence cannot be 
developed anywhere in advance. Only time will tell which decisions were 
good ones at the time. In other words, every farming style is a 
development opportunity confronted with constantly changing, partly 
unknown conditions. 
However, not every farming style faces the future's uncertainties in the 
same way. Further development is largely supported historically in some 
styles. The resources employed, and on which the future is founded, are 
one's own: no future liabilities press on them. Both agenda and calendar 
are open and flexible. In contrast, further development in other styles is 
pre-eminently future dependent. Resources have been mobilised through 
markets, and they will have to be valorised in the future. Where the future 
can be faced unencumbered in the previous example, it is to some extent 
mortgaged in the latter. 
It goes without saying that in this latter situation an encounter between 
any given project and future conditions will be much more inflexible and 
will contain less degrees of freedom and possibilities for adjustment. In 
other words, internal relations are just as important as external 
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considerations in the process of variation and selection, and in the way 
one is prepared and covered for future malheur. 
Even though every farming style represents a particular development 
opportunity, these opportunities vary widely among styles - especially 
regarding resistance capacity, when adverse and/or unforeseen 
circumstances are to be faced. The extent to which farms are market 
dependent or self-sufficient, in terms of both the most important resources 
and financing, is decisive in this. In this respect, the old farmers' wisdoms 
of Chapter 2 merge seamlessly with the latest insights from neo-
institutional economics (Saccomandi 1998). 
Conventional agricultural economists express the view, with an almost 
Archimedean certainty, that continuous farm enlargement is necessary. 
Closer examination shows that this view is rooted in the following 
assumptions: The expected future conditions are considered to be fixed 
and unmediated points of reference. Further, the crucial balance between 
one's own and external resources is ignored. Finally, only one 
development opportunity is usually involved in the analysis: growth. 
Hence it is not surprising that more growth excels over less growth -
particularly if the costs related to growth (for example, rapidly increasing 
financial costs) are obscured. 
This does not alter the fact that some in the sector blindly follow such 
analyses and the predictions (or 'promises') inherent in them. I will return 
to this issue in the following chapters, particularly in the discussion of 
institutional reliability of the expert system. That story will result in a 
discussion of growing distrust - that is, the deep-rooted suspicion that 
spreads when it becomes apparent that future conditions, presumed and 
therefore predicted by the expert system, cannot be fulfilled. 
The dance towards the future is not easy (and sometimes far from 
aesthetic), and not in the least unilinear. In the following analysis, I will 
address the issue of composition and change in the cost price of 100 kg of 
milk. Normally this is assumed to be a non-issue. It is taken for granted 
that the largest and rapidly expanding farms achieve the lowest cost 
prices. Table 5.1 presents a number of important indicators in this respect. 
The data differentiate between the different farming styles discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
Table 5.1 Total output, variable costs, and margins per 100 kg milk, 1990 (in Dutch 
guilders) 
Farming style 
Ordinary farmers 
Large farmers 
Intensive farmers 
Machinemen 
Economical farmers 
Cowmen 
Breeders 
Total 
output 
87.3 
88.1 
86.3 
87.2 
92.4 
87.8 
93.6 
Variable 
costs 
28.0 
25.7 
33.7 
28.6 
27.9 
30.4 
31.5 
gross 
margin 
59.3 
62.4 
52.6 
58.6 
64.5 
57.4 
62.1 
overhead 
costs 
41.8 
37.9 
41.1 
42.7 
43.1 
40.7 
46.5 
net 
margin 
17.5 
24.5 
11.6 
15.9 
21.4 
16.7 
15.6 
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There are striking differences in total outputs realised per 100 kg milk. 
Total output per 100 kg milk comprises the revenues from milk (partly 
dependent on butterfat and protein content and the distribution of milk 
production over summer and winter), output and volume change dairy 
cattle, and a few minute entries. Economical farmers and breeders realise 
the highest output per 100 kg milk, which relates directly to a higher 
output and volume change dairy cattle, to higher percentages of protein 
and fat, and a higher proportion of winter milk. These are not incidental 
features. They are anchored in the particular organisation of the 
production process. For the economical farmers this is due to a 
combination of a slightly lower milk yield per cow, a slightly longer 
productive lifespan and slightly more protein-poor feed rations. Breeders 
in turn achieve this higher output by keeping a lot of youngstock. The 
cows, such as they have been 'constructed' within the two styles, are 
slightly different from those encountered in the other styles (a bit more 
Dutch-Friesian instead of Holstein-Frisian, slightly lighter in weight, 
slightly smaller, slightly better roughage eaters, etc.). 
Of course, the slightly higher outputs per 100 kg milk represent a certain 
fragility. No one can predict the development of the markets for in-calf 
heifers and sturdy export cattle. On the other hand, farm management of 
large farmers (and hence the economics of their farms) partly revolves 
around a different issue: bulk bonuses awarded by the dairy industry to 
the larger producers. On average, large farmers will receive about NLG 
0.02 cents more per kg milk than economical farmers. 
Interesting differences can also be encountered in the variable costs (here, 
the sum of purchased roughage and concentrates, purchased fertilisers, 
contractors, and other costs). Although they seem to involve minimal 
gradations at first glance, there are significant differences here. Intensive 
farmers realise the highest costs (which is not surprising, it is logically 
related to their style), while large farmers and economical farmers achieve 
the lowest cost levels. 
In the case of large farmers, this is related to, inter alia, relatively low 
expenditures on contractors and to bulk discounts on the purchase of 
concentrates and fertilisers, while general costs can be spread over a much 
larger production volume. In the case of economical farmers, low costs are 
a result of relatively low expenditure on feed and fertiliser. 
Collectively, total output and variable costs result in the gross margin. In 
practice, this is what is left per 100 kg milk in order to remunerate the 
mobilised production factors (labour, capital, and land). The gross margin 
is that which gives farmers 'scope' for action. Table 5.1 demonstrates that 
systematic (and, according to standard deviation analysis, also significant) 
style differences exist in this respect. 
Moving from the economical farmers to the intensive farmers, a difference 
of almost NLG 12 occurs per 100 kg milk (it is similar to the famous '10 
cents difference in the milk' of which farmers like to talk). The highest 
margins are generated by large farmers and economical farmers. In the 
remainder of this discussion, I will concentrate on these two styles. 
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Table 5.1 also summarises a number of overhead and general costs - in 
this case, those costs relating to plant and machinery, costs connected 
with the purchase of additional quotas (in the previous period), costs 
related to land and buildings and (as far as general costs are concerned) 
expenditure for electricity, soil surveys, accountancy, transport, and so on. 
Large farmers excel in keeping these costs to a minimum: they realise the 
lowest overhead costs per 100 kg milk, largely as a result of their much 
higher production volume. In 1990, large farmers milked on average a 
quota of 972,840 kg, almost twice that of economical farmers: 507,880 kg 
milk. Incidentally, it should be mentioned here that it is possible that a 
distortion exists in the 'overhead costs' presented in Table 5.1, since the 
calculations of the norms upon which the presented figures are based 
assume equal depreciation terms. As we have seen economic farmers tend 
to buy second hand machinery keeping it for longer - thus, their real 
depreciation costs are likely to be lower. Furthermore, a calculated 
interest is included in the calculations as a matter of course. In other 
words, an abstraction has taken place from the possible differences in 
assets (that is, possible differences in the proportion of liabilities to net 
worth are ignored). I will return to this issue later. 
Subtracting the expenditure involved in the 'overhead costs' from the 
gross margin in Table 5.1 results in the net margin. In overall terms, this is 
the amount available to reward labour and other assets and to further 
develop the farm. 
Table 5.2 represents the development in the medium term (from 1990-
1991 until 1997-1998). 
Notice, first, that highly unequal developments have taken place in the 
total output per 100 kg milk. There is a sharp decrease, particularly for 
economical farmers and breeders, which goes back to the outbreak of BSE 
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy or 'mad cow disease') in the 
Netherlands and, later, to the collapse of the Russian market. Both 
developments had dramatic consequences for the price of export cattle 
and for meat prices. That is why the 'output and volume change dairy 
cattle' per 100 kg milk decreased most in those styles that were more 
attuned to these markets. 
It is, at the same time, remarkable that the styles in question could react 
most flexibly to these setbacks. According to Table 5.2, breeders and 
economical farmers were able to reduce variable costs more than the other 
styles. It is perhaps even more remarkable that they were also able to 
reduce their overhead costs (by NLG 3.10 and NLG 4.70 per 100 kg milk, 
respectively). Economical farmers were able to reduce overhead and 
variable costs by NLG 6.80 per 100 kg milk in total, whereas large farmers 
reduced them only by NLG 2.20. Again, this illustrates an important 
difference in the capacity to react to adverse circumstances (note that 
during this period everyone knew that price cuts would occur; it did 
really happen by the late 1990s - 1 will discuss this further below). 
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Table 5.2 Development of output, costs, and margins per 100 kg between 1990 and 
1997 
Farming style 
Ordinary farmers 
Large farmers 
Intensive farmers 
Machinemen 
Economical 
farmers 
Cowmen 
Breeders 
Ordinary farmers 
Large farmers 
Intensive farmers 
Machinemen 
Economical 
farmers 
Cowmen 
Breeders 
Output 
1990 
87.3 
88.1 
86.3 
87.2 
92.4 
87.8 
93.6 
1997 
83.0 
84.0 
83.3 
81.6 
83.6 
83.7 
85.5 
A 
-4.3 
-4.1 
-3.0 
-5.6 
-8.8 
-4.1 
-8.1 
Output 
1990 
87.3 
88.1 
86.3 
87.2 
92.4 
87.8 
93.6 
1997 
83.0 
84.0 
83.3 
81.6 
83.6 
83.7 
85.5 
A 
-4.3 
-4.1 
-3.0 
-5.6 
-8.8 
-4.1 
-8.1 
variable costs 
1990 
28.0 
25.7 
33.7 
28.6 
27.9 
30.4 
31.5 
1997 
26.2 
24.1 
30.9 
26.2 
24.8 
27.8 
26.8 
A 
-1.8 
-1.6 
-2.8 
-2.4 
-3.1 
-2.6 
-4.7 
overhead costs 
1990 
41.8 
37.9 
41.1 
42.7 
43.1 
40.7 
46.5 
1997 
41.0 
37.3 
39.7 
41.0 
39.4 
39.6 
43.4 
A 
-0.8 
-0.6 
-2.4 
-1.7 
-3.7 
-1.1 
-3.1 
gross margin 
1990 
59.3 
62.4 
52.6 
58.6 
64.5 
57.4 
62.1 
1997 
56.8 
60.0 
52.3 
55.5 
58.5 
55.9 
58.7 
A 
-2.5 
-2.4 
-0.3 
-3.1 
-5.7 
-1.5 
-3.4 
net margin 
1990 
17.5 
24.5 
11.6 
15.9 
21.4 
16.7 
15.6 
1997 
15.8 
22.7 
13.7 
14.5 
19.4 
16.4 
15.3 
A 
-1.7 
-1.8 
-1.9 
-1.4 
-2.0 
-0.3 
-0.3 
Large farmers and economical farmers generated the highest net margins 
in both 1990 and 1997, with the large farmers always doing slightly better 
than the economical ones. The net margin can be regarded as the ultimate 
'scope' for action at the farmer's disposal - at least assuming that the 
overhead costs in the calculations are really 'inevitable' (or 'inflexible') 
ones. In general, however, this assumption does not hold. 
Large farmers rely upon borrowed capital much more than economical 
farmers. Therefore, permanent financial burdens (interest payments and 
depreciations) are pressing on them (see Table 5.3) 
Table 5.3 Liabilities per farm, specified for various farming styles, 1990 (in Dutch 
guilders) 
Farming style 
Ord ina ry farmers 
Large farmers 
Intensive farmers 
Mach inemen 
Economical farmers 
C o w m e n 
Breeders 
Long- term 
liabilities 
643,200 
1,473,000 
737,200 
732,800 
598,500 
885,000 
707,400 
shor t - term 
liabilities 
75,600 
164,100 
95,500 
188,400 
72,700 
68,100 
88,900 
quota 
464,050 
972,840 
517,370 
561,920 
507,880 
583,170 
386,700 
interest costs 
per 100 kg 
9.00 
10.40 
10.00 
10.50 
8.00 
10.10 
12.80 
If the difference in interest paid is included in the previously calculated 
net margin, the differences between large farmers and economical farmers 
become minimal. This would certainly be the case if redemptions were 
included in the calculations. The same holds true when we follow another 
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route - to calculate the sum of all actual monetary payments over one 
year and to add to this the interest paid. This results in an amount of NLG 
41.80 + NLG 10.40 = NLG 52.20 per 100 kg milk for large farmers, which 
leaves (at an output level of NLG 88.10 per 100 kg) an amount of NLG 
35.90 per 100 kg for redemption, payment of family labour, and 
reinvestments. In the case of economical farmers, those figures are NLG 
43.60 + NLG 8.00 = NLG 51.60, which (at 1990 output levels of NLG 92.40) 
amounts to NLG 40.80 per 100 kg for labour, redemption, and 
reinvestments. This is more than remains for large farmers. 
What I have done in the previous paragraphs is simply moving from a 
conventional neo-classical analysis (in which farms are regarded as the 
meeting place of markets and in which, therefore, net worth and liabilities 
are subjected to the same interest rates; LEI 1992) towards what is regarded 
internationally as the 'Chayanovian approach' (Chayanov 1966; Van der 
Broek 1988a; for a summary of a contemporary application in farm 
accountancy, see, inter alia, De Bruin et al. 1997, pp. 108ff.). Thus, the 
change in perspective (to one which fits better with the viewpoint of 
farmers and also with the notion of the suyvere deel used in the past) 
dramatically alters the outcomes of these calculations. 
However, it is not my intention here to compare the styles of large 
farmers and economical farmers in terms of better or worse. I want to 
make a different point. The unfolding of a farming style (its development 
along style-specific lines) implies repeated encounters with initially 
unexpected but definitely uncertain conditions: the market for export 
cattle could collapse, interest rates could rise (or fall) unexpectedly, the 
milk price could develop in perhaps a not completely unexpected but 
certainly unfavourable way, the prices of means of production could vary, 
et cetera. These changes have differential effects. The collapse of export 
markets for cattle (the borders were closed at the time of the BSE crisis) 
will hit breeders in particular, and to a lesser extent economical farmers. 
Large farmers and breeders are particularly vulnerable to a rise in interest 
rates. A sharp fall in milk price will hit those with high monetary costs 
and high financial burdens (for example, large farmers) considerably 
harder than those who, according to the rural vernacular, are 'less heavy' 
(who have a 'free farm', such as economical farmers). A sharpening of the 
environmental policy could hit (depending on its precise form), for 
example, intensive farmers or economical farmers and breeders. 
This is not the end of the story. For, even though every farm is involved in 
its own 'dance through time', some farmers are more successful than 
others in handling unexpected circumstances on the dance floor. The 
threat of increases in interest rates and/or reductions in milk price can be 
anticipated and offset through a number of ways; by accelerated 
redemption of loans, by diversifying the output (that is, by producing 
other products and services alongside milk, meat, and cattle), by 
increasing the technical efficiency (Yotopoulos 1974), by enlarging the farm, 
or by utilising substitution possibilities contained within one's own style. 
Similarly, it will matter whether the loans in question have been entered 
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into mainly within the family or at a bank, and whether the diversification 
of output occurs via institutional associations or via anonymous markets. 
In short, every farming style will contain a particular range of possibilities 
for anticipating difficulties (not all of the above-mentioned options can be 
applied simultaneously, since one excludes to a certain extent an other) 
and every socio-technical network (the set of concrete connections 
between a farming style and other actors, institutions, and artefacts) will 
contain particular opportunities and constraints. This also implies that an 
a priori definition of the most desired (or 'superior') dance is impossible. It 
is only possible a) by abstracting from the broad diversity of styles and 
the differential possibilities for reaction inherent within them; b) by 
ignoring the playing field constituted by the relation between internal and 
external resources; and, finally, c) by making a number of assumptions 
within the sea of uncertainties about future conditions, which are 
subsequently introduced into the analysis as fixed beacons. 
Yet, an a priori definition of the superior farming style is routine in the 
expert system that seeks to guide Dutch agriculture. By way of this 
routine, virtual patterns are described (for example, the only way forward 
is via accelerated farm enlargement) over which it is very easy to fall on 
the real dance floor. What really matters outside of such virtual images is 
always the strategic anticipation of, and the reaction to, actual and 
expected developments in markets, technology, and policy. Relations and 
developments in these areas do not determine the state of affairs in 
agriculture. It is the combination of these relationships and developments, 
together with the strategic actions of farmers and other rural actors, that 
constitute the (always changing) nature of agriculture. 
5.3 From malleability to disciplining 
In both this chapter and the previous one, I have described the degree of 
malleability of various internal farm relations (both technical and 
economic). I have emphasised time and again that 'external' relations can 
be moulded and particularised too. All the more since, as argued in 
Chapter 2 and 3, the essential balance between external and internal 
resources can be changed both in the short and the long run. 
In these terms, a number of remarkable processes occurred in the second 
half of the twentieth century. Initially, an all-inclusive macro-project was 
presented: the modernisation project in agriculture. Here, the expert 
system oriented agricultural and horticultural enterprises towards new 
goals: towards expected developments in various markets and towards 
new technological (and professional) models. Multiple malleability was, 
in a way, substituted by a single, new development opportunity, 
proclaimed by the expert system as the preferred one. 
Critical to this endeavour is the assumption that institutional reliability 
(North 1990; see also De Hoogh 1987) can actually be achieved. Those 
future conditions that are presumed initially and also held out to farmers 
are created through market ordering (De Hoogh and Silvis 1988), 
corporatist arrangements (Frouws 1993), and a particular technology 
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development (Van der Ploeg 1987; Frouws and Van der Ploeg 1988). I will 
discuss this further in Chapter 6, where I argue that the expert system did 
not achieve this reliability despite promises to the contrary. 
The limits to the modernisation project become apparent by the end of the 
twentieth century. If the required institutional reliability could initially be 
produced, the turbulence in and around agriculture considerably 
undermined it from the 1980s onwards. First, the environmental pollution 
required drastic measures to offset the practices advocated by the expert 
system. Furthermore, a process of liberalisation gradually occurred, 
starting out from the first Uruguay Round of negotiations under the 
General Agreements of Tariffs and Trade and continuing at the next 
round of talks of the World Trade Organisation. Its effect has been 
twofold: prices came under pressure and, above all, the initial long-term 
security in prices eroded. Price fluctuations became an increasingly 
frequent phenomena. 
During the modernisation project, Dutch agriculture was highly oriented 
towards export to the world market. Hence, it became susceptible to 
economic developments that took place elsewhere (in e.g. Russia, the Far 
East and Latin America). Unexpected price fluctuations emerged and a 
dramatic fall in the milk price occurred in 1999. 
Turbulence also increased as a result of the modus operandi of the food 
industry (Van der Ploeg and Ettema 1990). The longer and more dramatic 
the string of food scares, the larger the shock waves onto consumer 
markets and the more turbulence for farmers. At the 'cost side' of the 
farm there was also an increase in turbulence. The almost unpredictable 
developments of the land market (and hence the fast increasing land 
prices), the introduction of tradable quotas, and the associated price 
increases resulted in considerable and often unexpected cost increases. 
As a result, a new contradiction emerged at the end of the twentieth 
century. On the one hand, turbulence increased everywhere; on the other 
hand, farmers were advised more and more to ground their projects in 
those very commodity markets which are subject to the greatest 
turbulence. Thus, a contradiction emerged that will appear impossible to 
hold in the long run; as a result, agriculture might explode both literally 
and figuratively. 
Meanwhile, the reaction to this is threefold. Some farmers who faced 
problems from the increased turbulence react by demanding a recovery of 
the former institutional reliability, expressing a lot of resentment, hurt, 
and sometimes violence. A manifest expression of this is formed by the 
union of pig farmers (NVV) and to a lesser extent by the union of dairy 
farmers (NVM). A similar reaction can be encountered elsewhere. The 
guerra da latte, the milk war in the north of Italy is a striking expression of 
this (Bussi forthcoming). Alongside such convulsions, a second and more 
widespread reaction can be noted. A large number of farmers orient their 
farms toward new beacons, reaching beyond the large commodity 
markets: they (again!) distantiate farm management and development 
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from the prevailing market and price relations and the turbulence 
contained therein. Hence, a new current emerges, one of rural 
development, which I will discuss in Chapter 9. A third and final reaction 
exists: a relatively small portion of agricultural producers are able to 
successfully orient to the world market. However, this is not occurring in 
the historically large production branches, but more in the niches formed 
by fresh flower production, the growth of plant propagation material, and 
so on. 
One concluding remark concerns effects on farm economics of the change 
from institutional reliability to turbulence. To illustrate this point, I return 
once more to the comparison between the style of sunig buorkjen (farming 
economically) and the style of the large farmers. If the latter was seen as 
the promise for the future in the early 1990s, while the former was 
generally assessed as 'too small' and 'not modern enough', by 1997-
1998 the gap between the two was closing, according to Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Calculated income situation for large farmers and economical farmers in 
1997 
Indicators 
Gross margin 1997-1998 / 100 kg 
Minus paid interest / 100 kg" 
Minus differentiated depreciation / 100 kgb 
Available for labour, general costs, and growth/100 kg 
Total farm result 
Labour units 
Total farm result/labour unit 
Calculated remuneration for labour (labour units * 80,000) 
Remaining for general costs and growth 
Farming style 
large 
farmers 
60.00 
10.40 
21.80 
27.80 
270,400 
2.34 
115,556 
187,200 
83,200 
economical 
farmers 
58.80 
8.00 
13.50 
37.30 
189,500 
1.63 
116,258 
130,400 
69,100 
Notes: 
' It is assumed that the financial position in 1997-1998 is identical to 1990-1991. 
b
 The exact depreciations are known. With an eye to the different time horizons, the annual 
depreciations have been increased by 25 per cent for large farmers, those for economical 
farmers have been decreased by 25 per cent. By implication, the depreciation period used by 
economical farmers in their calculations is 50 per cent longer than the one used by large 
farmers. 
Table 5.5 Results for large farmers and economical farmers after a dramatic drop 
in the milk price 
Indicators 
Variable costs/100 kg 
Interest/100 kg 
Depreciation/100 kg 
Total costs/100 kg 
Output/lOOkgmilk 
Result /100 kg milk 
Total farm result 
farming style 
large farmers 
24.10 
10.40 
21.80 
56.30 
60.00 
3.70 
36,000 
Economical farmers 
24.80 
8.00 
13.50 
46.30 
60.00 
13.70 
70,000 
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If the analysis is extended to 1999, the year in which milk prices suffered a 
severe drop (see Table 5.5), it shows that a radical turnover of 
interrelations is not to be excluded: in a situation of crisis economical 
farmers perform relatively better than large farmers. That is, at the 
interface of former security and new turbulence, the virtual guarantees 
that supported the ambitions of large farmers, are dwindling away quite 
quickly. 
Notes 
1 By way of this segmentation, H is imagined out of existence, as it were (see Figure 4.18), 
positioning only the immanent 'laws' of G (regardless of whether this is cows, crops, soils, 
farmers, markets, or whatever else) at the centre of attention. 
2 The chronic misunderstandings between agricultural economics and theoretical agronomy 
are not only rooted in conceptual and /o r methodological details and difficulties. The shoe 
really pinches because two different claims to hegemony are presented. The question at the 
end of the day is whether the agronomic production potential or the set of (liberalized) 
market relations should be regarded as the regulatory system. This does not alter the fact 
that for conjunctural reasons coalitions can exist every now and again. These always revolve 
around the issue of cost price reductions. They are, according to theoretical agronomists, 
highly possible, whereas economists regard them as necessary. Viola, the temporary 
congruence between the two. 
3 The central resource is labour, of course. Labour plays a crucial role in the agricultural 
production process. At the same time, the mobilisation of labour and its importance are both 
subject to complex processes. Labour is required to convert natural resources into end 
products. It is an essential production factor. Moreover, labour is, in the modern family 
farm, the 'carrier' of knowledge (with entrepreneurship and craftsmanship constituting 
essential aspects). Finally, the remuneration of the farmer, and perhaps others, occurs mainly 
via the same factor labour. 
4 Analyses of the interrelations between utilised and/or utilisable resources are usually 
restricted to the difference between the three most important production factors (labour, 
capital, and land) and the so-called non-factor inputs (such as animal feed, fertilizers, 
energy, seeds, etc.). Non-factor inputs are those resources that cannot be regarded as part of 
the so-called production factors; these are resources that are fully consumed within one cycle 
and that, therefore, will always have to be mobilised somehow at the start of every new cycle 
(via markets or through home production). 
5 This type of substitution has been analysed in various studies as part of a general process 
of externalisation. That is, various particular tasks (geared towards the production of certain 
goods and services within the farm itself) are externalised to (i.e. are taken over by) external 
institutions. Primary production, as it were, becomes interwoven within an expanding 
division of labour. It is important to note that the degree of externalisation is also highly 
variable at present (Long et al. 1986; Leeuwis 1989; Van der Ploeg 1990) 
6 Those who produce at a level outside of the optimum as defined by markets and 
technology are viewed as inefficient technically and/or economically. This implies that the 
'whiplash of competition' will lead to lower incomes and eventually to farm closures. 
7 This is preluded more generally in theorisations about 'technological trajectories' (see, 
inter alia, Hodgson 1988; Rutten 1992; Dosi et al. 1993). 
8 Including costs for custom work. 
9 The following calculations and representations are based upon farms as a whole. They 
have been conducted similarly at the level of input, labour, and machine use per hectare. 
This resulted in similar figures. 
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10 This involves the following equations: 
cowmen 
quota = -3,401,100 + 774,700 logmach + 497,300 logvak (r2 = 0.87) 
std.err. [502,700] [104,300] [119,000] 
sign. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
economical farmers 
quota = -2,160,200 + 445,700 logvak + 517,100 logmach (r2 = 0.59) 
std.err. [849,200] [202,900] [178,500] 
sign. (0.016) (0.036) (0.007) 
machinemen 
quota = -2,245,900 + 1,128,600 logvak + 542,600 logmach (r2 = 0.78) 
std.err. [950,900] [186,700] [191,600] 
sign. (0.026) (0.000) (0.009) 
intensive farmers 
quota = -3,770,900 + 840,400 logmach + 562,900 logvak (r2 = 0.74) 
std.err. [707,900] [147,200] [185,400] 
sign. (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
breeders 
quota = -1,868,300 + 444.500 logmach + 467,000 logvak (r2 = 0.57) 
std.err. [646,500] [143,700] [220,600] 
sign. (0.011) (0.005) (0.045) 
large farmers 
quota = -3,678,100 + 1,588,300 logvak + 770,100 logmach (r2 = 0.73) 
std.err. [1.614,600] [410,400] [332,700] 
sign. (0.034) (9.001) (0.031) 
where logvak = logarithmic expression of labour input; logmach = logarithmic expression of 
mechanisation costs. 
11 Of the initial 300 farms, 93 ceased maintaining farm accounts in the period in question. In 
29 cases this had to do with farm closure (24) or migration (5). In 64 cases, other reasons 
were involved (other bookkeeping system, other activities, circumstances, economising, 
other accountancy firm, etc.). Even though no importance can be ascribed to this, it is 
intriguing that two thirds of the abandoned farms were sljuchtwei boeren (ordinary farmers). 
Generally, farm closures amount to 1 per cent per annum (for the whole of the initial 300 
farms). If the data are viewed in more detail, it shows that farm closures are most common 
among ordinary farmers and breeders. With an eye to the current problems in the market for 
breeding cattle this is no surprise. Emigration is exclusively located in the styles of intensive 
farmers and large farmers. 
12 That is, a similar level of 'output and volume change cattle' cannot be realised without 
difficulties in other styles. 
13 The analysis is complicated here by the inclusion of calculated interest in this entry and 
the following ones. Below, I will also present data that refer solely to actual monetary 
expenditure. Furthermore, I will also discuss the debt position and the actually paid interest. 
14 The latter will occur if a livestock unit norm is introduced. The absurd situation will then 
occur that economical farmers and breeders, who produce sustainably since they realise a 
low milk yield per cow, are punished by the environmental policy. 
151 am very aware that the economical farmers who I used in calculations in this chapter are 
still milking 60 per cent more than the average farm does. In Chapter 9,1 will further discuss 
the situation and perspectives of farms that are smaller than average. 
Part IV 
Disciplining: 
The Future Dominating the Present 

6 Expert System and Modernisation Project: 
Controlling the Future 
In this chapter, I will discuss the role and position of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the set of knowledge institutes that form part of this 
ministry. Throughout most of the post-war period, these institutes (the 
former Wageningen Agricultural University, the many agricultural 
research institutes, field research, advisory services, etc.) were all under 
direct state control. In the 1990s, they were largely privatised and 
regrouped into new associations. Nevertheless, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the knowledge institutes can still be regarded as one 
organic unit, because, despite all these recent administrative changes, 
there remains one, commonly shared set of axioms that together define 
the virtual farmer. This generally shared set of axioms makes the ministry 
(within which divisions such as DWK, BSB, DL, and MKG are operating) 
and the different institutes into one organic whole, within which there is 
one core element: the ministry itself. The ministry is the cupola in which 
relevant knowledge is collected, combined, and converted into policy. 
Moreover, knowledge production is largely directed from within this 
'dome'. In other words, the Ministry of Agriculture is an obligatory passage 
point. 
Thus, in this chapter I will analyse the Ministry of Agriculture (and the 
associated agricultural knowledge network) as an expert system - that is, 
'a system of technical accomplishment [and] professional expertise that 
organises large areas of the material and social environments in which we 
live today' (Giddens 1990, p. 27). This sizable expert system represents a 
particular practice from which the development of the agricultural sector 
is directed. 
Knowledge plays a crucial role in the Ministry of Agriculture as expert 
system. However, the knowledge that is produced and applied does not 
concern so much agriculture as it is now, let alone (recent) agricultural 
history. The expertise involves agriculture as it is expected to look like in 
the future. Furthermore, it defines the trajectory that has to be travelled 
between now and then, the way in which this needs to happen, and the 
means by which this has to occur. Finally, this professional expertise also 
creates the rules that define and authorise 'participants', and which 
distinguish them from those who are, as it were, in their way. In short, the 
expert system embodies the knowledge and expertise that imply and 
define agency: rules, participants and resources - in short, the capacity to 
make a difference. 
Knowledge about agriculture is derived knowledge: it concerns 
contemporary agriculture in so far as it is relevant to the trajectory to be 
230 The Virtual Farmer 
covered. Therefore, agriculture is defined in terms of starting points and 
obstacles. The present is regarded mainly from the demands that can 
supposedly be derived from the future. The classification system that 
divides farms into categories such as 'winners' and 'losers' (viable and 
non-viable farms) is not only a remarkable expression of this (Van der 
Ploeg 1985), but also the vehicle par excellence for the action geared 
towards controlling the future. 
The Ministry of Agriculture as expert system is oriented towards a 
constant reorganisation of agriculture according to a carefully specified 
trajectory. The key word here is structural development. Through this 
process of structural development, 'considerable aspects of our material 
and social environment' are (re)organised. 
Of course, the Ministry of Agriculture is much more than an expert 
system. It is also a system that generates and distributes resources. 
Moreover, it is an apparatus that generates, implements and adjusts 
regulations. However, it is expected that the ministry conducts these 
functions rationally - that is, in a well-founded and purposeful manner. In 
other words, the expert system is not merely an element fitting into a 
more comprehensive arrangement. It constitutes the brains and the all-
encompassing legitimacy of the ministry. The ministry as a whole is an 
expert system. The mobilising and (re-)distributing of resources, as well 
as the design, application and adjustment of regulations (the 'ordering' 
activities), can only take place if they are part and parcel of and 
legitimised by the expert system. The ministry as mode of ordering (Law 
1994, chap. 1) is therefore an integral part of the ministry as expert system. 
An expert system can only function by the grace of trust (Giddens 1990, 
pp. 33ff). An expert system directs not so much its own organisation; an 
expert system relates above all to others (Dutch farmers, but also agro-
industry, banks, consumers, etc.), who consider the indications, insights, 
and directions generated by the expert system as guiding, if not 
normative, for their own actions. Trust is the key word; it provides a 
particular linkage between, on the one hand, the future project of the 
Ministry of Agriculture and, on the other hand, the development projects 
of farmers and others. Trust, the feeling that one can steer a blind course 
on the given indications, is an indispensable ingredient in this. An expert 
system does not function according to a command-and-control structure. 
The many thousands of farmers and growers do not follow the edicts of 
the ministry but must trust it sufficiently to put its recommendations into 
practice. Even though the ministry can prescribe certain tasks and even 
though it controls the allocation of certain resources, its (potential) power 
and influence lies especially in the capacity to authorise behaviour (of 
others) - to define the behaviour as rational, and therefore as desirable, 
whereas alternatives will thus appear as less rational, if not irrational, at 
the same time. 
It is probably appropriate to point out, from the outset, the theoretical 
importance of the analysis to be developed here. In the previous chapters, 
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I have formulated a critique on the economic and technological 
determinism that permeates contemporary agricultural sciences. 'Farmers 
are greatly subject to the powerful forces of nature, the market and the 
state', according to Shanin in his study of the Russian peasantry (1972, p. 
112). In this chapter, I will distance myself from the prevailing 
structuralist and evolutionary approaches, which equally contain a strong 
determinist flavour. 
This does raise another question, however: how to define and understand 
the more or less constant associations and especially the mainly unequal 
nature of the relationships that various actors enter into? How is it 
possible that certain regularities, and also unequal distributions of power, 
result from the apparently open and indefinable (or indeterminable) 
interaction between a large number of actors? Inequalities of power that 
together seem to indicate a more or less coercive 'structure', i.e. a set of 
more or less fixed relations, from which the development of the sector 
could be explained. By way of such an operation, the technological and 
economic determinism would simply have been replaced by structural 
determinism (Büttel and Goodman 1989; Büttel 1994). I will try to avoid 
such a trap. 
One of the alternatives for structural determinism revolves around a 
subdivision of actors in terms of macro-actors and mzcro-actors (see 
Mouzelis 1991). Hierarchical and asymmetrical relations in social 
constellations are central to Mouzelis' analysis: 
'In complex differentiated societies it is impossible to understand how micro-
situations are linked with macro-structures and actors, unless the analysis 
centres on the notion of social hierarchy' (1991, p. 67). 
Although I cannot share such a conceptualisation, it undeniably contains 
a certain charm. If the ministry is imagined as a macro-actor (as a 
'powerful force') and farmers as micro-actors, it is clear from the outset 
why unequal power relations exist in the sector. It seems that the 
ministry can enforce whatever it wants. Micro-actors might protest, but 
they will lose out at the end of the day. 
The Ministry of Agriculture occupies a unique position within the power 
game in and around agriculture. So much so that it sometimes appears as 
if it is indeed a macro-actor, that, by definition, has more agency at their 
disposal than other actors. It would indeed be a sign of unpalatable 
naivety if the Ministry of Agriculture and farmers (and agribusiness and 
the Landbouwschap and so on) were presented as undifferentiated actors. 
However, the opposite position - that is, Mouzelis' position - is equally 
unsatisfactory. By ascribing a priori more power or agency to certain 
actors - that is, macro-actors - it remains completely unclear how they 
acquire and maintain such power. Furthermore, it becomes almost 
impossible analytically to provide insights into how micro-actors are able 
to condition, if not negate, the power of the Ministry of Agriculture every 
now and again. Examples of the latter phenomenon will be discussed at 
length in the following chapters. 
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In the following analysis, I will first of all try to demonstrate that the 
influential position (the 'power') of the Ministry is created and 
reproduced by making different projects converge. By making the 
development projects of farmers, agribusiness, state, farmers 
organisations, and agricultural science actively converge, and therefore by 
achieving an important synergy, the Ministry obtains capacities for 
decision-making and mobilisation that not only reach far into the future 
but also contain an undeniable impact. Second, I will argue that the 
achievement of trust is crucial to the above-mentioned convergence of 
interests and perspectives. The ministry as expert system is an essential, 
but sometimes very weak, link, especially in the creation of trust. Finally, I 
will discuss a topic that is closely connected to the previous issues; 
however, it deserves separate treatment because of the theoretical 
discussion. The issue concerns the reification of the notion of structure. 
Analytically, structure is no more (but also no less) than a sometimes 
significant concurrence of circumstances. In and through the expert 
system, however, structure is made into a determining notion. 
All in all, these issues can be united into one thesis: the ministry has been 
able to manifest itself as macro-actor; not because it occupies inherently (à 
la Mouzelis) this position, but because the ministry has been able to 
operate as a successful expert system for a long time. This has generated a 
synergy of different projects: the notion of structural development was 
actually supported by it. Furthermore, a hierarchy emerged, not a priori or 
structurally determined but as a socially produced phenomenon. Because 
it seemed as if the ministry as expert system had at its disposal the most 
adequate perspective on the future, and since the already occurring 
structural development seemed to support the ministry's perspective, it 
was able to actually emerge as an institution positioned in a hierarchical, 
and directive, relation vis-à-vis the other institutes and actors. 
At the same time, however, this describes the transience of the colossus. 
From the moment the different projects started to diverge and collide, its 
foundations appeared to be made of clay. 
Box 6.1 Additional methodological notes 
I would like to conclude these introductory remarks by pointing explicitly to the 
limitations of the following analysis. Presenting a comprehensive description of 
post-war agricultural politics and of the way in which agriculture and state 
interact is far beyond my capacities. I concentrate on those episodes, on those 
aspects, that seem relevant for a redefinition of the structure concept. The 
methodological demand of symmetry, so eloquently phrased by Law (1994), is 
my guiding principle in this. 
Essentially, the demand boils down to three issues: (i) the way in which the 
relations and developments at the micro-level are explained has to be in 
accordance with the way in which, for example, the macro-level is analysed; (ii) 
an explanation of the past cannot be drastically different from the way in which 
future possibilities are described; (iii) it is not possible to use completely 
different terms to interpret 'success' from the ones used to explain 'failures'. 
I would like to elaborate further on one of these demands. In the previous 
chapters, the emphasis has, time and again, been on malleability - of both 
technology and economics as well as the ways in which to farm. At the same 
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time, we have, in particular since the mid-1950s, witnessed developments 
('structural developments') that seem to falsify this malleability. Scale 
enlargement seems to be an irreversible process. Synchronically a discussion 
about variation and selection seems acceptable, diachronically (taking into 
account the long-term processes and 'structural' relations) such an analysis 
seems futile. The balance seems to be, anyhow, in favour of selection, and the 
possible space for creating variation appears to decrease 'structurally' (or to be 
reduced to proverbial niche proportions). 
In the many discussions about research into farming styles, we have constantly 
been confronted by this dilemma. Its accompanying scepticism arose not only 
from scientist-colleagues but also from the farming sector itself: 'Is variation in 
farming styles not the result of the relative luxury we have experienced in the 
period of protected agricultural policy? Will it all disappear when we start to 
liberalise?' 
It is not possible to do justice to this theoretically and practically most relevant 
question here (nor probably in any scientific study).8 My intentions are more 
modest. I will attempt to retell post-war agricultural history (at least fragments 
thereof) in the same terms that we used to make the phenomenon of 
heterogeneity - that is, of different farming styles - plausible. 
In short, I will strive for the apparently impossible. I will try to lump together 
thesis and antithesis, variation and selection, multiformity, malleability, and the 
unmistakable development trend to larger, more standardised and more 
specialised farms. Achieving such a synthesis is far from easy, but it is probably 
obvious that it is necessary to give more consistency to the concept, and hence to 
the possibilities, of agricultural development processes. 
6.1 The need for faith: the importance of local cultural repertoires 
Farming is an activity that moves in permanent tension between 
opportunity and reality. Irrespective of the actual practice of farming, it is 
always the realisation of one of many possible alternatives. This applies 
both to the large and to the small. Every time a cow needs to be replaced, 
there is the question whether this is the right time. Should it have been 
done earlier? Or would a slight delay (perhaps wait for another calf) be 
better? An additional complication is that the questions (that is, the 
choices between many possible alternatives) are interwoven. There are no 
isolated choices in farming. Every choice moves through the whole farm 
via a chain of consequences. What would be the right heifer to replace the 
cow that needs to be culled? Perhaps a choice needs to be made between 
various heifers: choosing one implies getting rid of another. With 
hindsight, was it really appropriate to keep so many calves (today's 
heifers)? On the other hand, the absence of good heifers can lead to 
reconsidering the decision to replace the cow. And further reasoning is 
possible: from back to front, from cows to heifers, from the present to the 
future, and from the future back to the past (Vincent 1977). 
It was emphasised in Chapter 2 that it is important to create consistency. 
The many choices have to be connected coherently. Consistency needs to 
be created through the process of choosing. Out of the array of 
opportunities, one possibility needs to be selected and realised. Preferably 
the one that fits best with the previous decisions, with decisions still to be 
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made, and therefore also with the concrete farm structure as the 
materialised outcome of past and recently made decisions. 
The next layer of complications arises if we introduce into the analysis the 
interface between farm and environment. For however simple and 
uncomplicated culling an animal might seem, the decision is definitely 
not limited by the farm as an isolated unit in terms of consequences or 
even in terms of intentions. To illustrate this, I will have to set up a rather 
uneasy combination: between Lenin, party ideologist of Communists, and 
Van Aartsen, former Minister for Agriculture in the Netherlands. At the 
time of the implementation of the first land reforms in the Soviet Union, it 
was necessary to have a classification in order to distinguish between 
landless labourers, small farmers, and rich farmers. The latter needed to 
be expropriated in order to provide access to land for the landless. Small 
farmers, on the other hand, had to be exempted from expropriation (at 
that time at least) in order not to endanger the broadly based coalition 
('labourers, farmers, and soldiers one front'). A criterion was soon found: 
no or one cow stood for landless labourers, two cows for a small farmer, 
three or more for a rich farmer. 
Never did so many farmers moan so loud. Particularly those who only 
had two cows really, but who, for the love of the animal, had never been 
able to actually cull the third cow, which had not milked for a long time 
and was no longer getting in calf. The proletarian revolution, however, 
was ruthless (there never has been too much understanding between the 
radical left and farmers). Dutch farmers use a remarkable expression, the 
opposite of euphemism, to describe the route of culling. In the rural 
vernacular, it is called 'she goes out to face death'. Thus, in the Soviet 
Union the farmers themselves 'went out to face death' - precisely because 
they had not considered culling the third cow. 
Eighty years later, sheds in the Netherlands almost come apart at the 
seams. Farmers do not cull any cattle at all. At a certain moment, calf 
prices rose to unimaginable heights - inexplicably, it seemed - since no 
farmer wanted to get rid of their calves. This is the period when the 
manure laws are being drafted, and numerous farmers speculate that an 
across the board cut based on the number of cattle and/or on the total 
amount of manure produced, will be enforced. With the experience of the 
super levy (or quota system) in the back of their minds, many increase the 
number of cattle as much as possible. No cow 'goes out to face death', as 
it were. Furthermore, farmers stock their land with beef cattle, even 
though they bring in no money whatsoever. Finally, they also exaggerate 
numbers at the annual May counts, when every animal is counted (as a 
result, no one knows exactly how many animals there are in the 
Netherlands). 
In short, the decision whether or not to cull cattle is not an easy one to 
make and can have far-reaching consequences. And to think that this is 
only one of thousands of decisions that a farmer has to make. Even 
though numerous decisions have been routinised, the examples of Lenin, 
Van Aartsen, and their relationships with farmers show that routine 
decisions can have far from routine consequences. 
Expert System and Modernisation Project: Controlling the Future 235 
In a recent study, Gerry van der Ven (1996) closely analyses grassland 
utilisation and the production of maize on dairy farms. Taking an 
apparently simple (perhaps even simplistic) model as a starting point, 
she arrives at 320 alternatives for action concerning grassland utilisation 
and at about 500 alternatives for maize production. Chapter 4 already 
described at length the need for various cultivation measures in grassland 
production. Because every cultivation measure involves certain 
alternatives, a gigantic matrix appears defining numerous possible types 
of 'grassland management'. If internally inconsistent combinations are 
removed from the matrix, 320 valid combinations remain. The same 
applies to the cultivation of maize. If grassland production and maize 
cultivation are combined (which is the case especially on sandy soils), 
mathematically 320 * 500 concrete alternatives for action emerge. It needs 
to be said that Van der Ven's is a relatively coarse-mesh analysis. 
Furthermore, these are only two of many more farm tasks. Be this as it 
may, choices have to be made in this virtually endless sea of possibilities. 
Farmers are not unfamiliar to this: they literally see an 'endless' sea when 
they look around; they also make frequent use of the possibilities that it 
contains. A farmer can realise only one single option (one combination of 
alternatives) on their farm. In addition, today's choice can have enormous 
consequences for tomorrow's situation and opportunities. 
How to manoeuvre in this sea of uncertainties? How to choose a concrete 
way of working from the whole gamut of alternatives for action? 
Before answering these questions, it seems appropriate to present a few 
additional arguments. First, I would like to emphasise that there are no 
strictly 'technical blueprints' with which to solve the described problem. 
Apart from the fact that all attempts at achieving this have proved to be 
futile and unsuccessful, the craftsmanship-like nature of the agricultural 
production process and the fact that its labour objects belong to the 'living 
world' (and as yet not unravelled 'nature') exclude every standard 
procedure. Standardisation can only imply vulgarisation. Furthermore, 
the current search for a more sustainable agriculture implies a more 
precise attuning of farming to local ecology. This also excludes, by 
definition, any kind of blueprint (Bouma 1977a, 1977b; Dicke 1988; Van 
der Ploeg 1994a; Van Lenteren et al. 1995; Bruchem et al. 1996, 1997a, 
1997b; Mansvelt et al. 1999). In this respect, I would like to return again to 
the culling of cows. The sustainability discussion implies a review of 
'culling strategies' and therefore also of breeding policy and selection 
practices (Beaudeau 1994). The 'sustainable cow', a cow that lasts at least 
five, but preferably more, lactation periods has become a new concept. 
Former axioms are reviewed - the objectives to which production is 
oriented change. 
In other words, the coordination of production - attuning the set of 
technical actions to each other and to objectives relevant to the actors 
involved - cannot be but social coordination (see Koningsveld 1987). This 
is all the more the case since that which appears as a cultivation measure 
in a strictly agronomic analysis is part of the labour process in the practice 
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of farming or, more broadly, is part of the life and work of farmers, 
neighbours, participants, and so on. A cultivation measure is not only 
meaningful and significant strictly within the domain of production, it is 
also significant in the domain of family and community, the domain of 
economic and institutional relations, and the domain of reproduction. 
A cultivation measure (and the same applies to what appear to be strictly 
technical actions in the shed) can seem significant within a strictly 
technical framework, but undesirable since it demands more labour than 
can possibly be mobilised by the family and /or via neighbours. It is also 
possible that one is of the opinion that a certain way of working 
introduces too much stress (see Mok and Van den Tillaert 1987), or that it 
collides with one's own identity (for example, arable farmers 'do not want 
to get their hands dirty'; Wiskerke et al. 1994), or that it endangers soil 
fertility in the long run, or that - according to those involved - it is not 
economically sensible. Farm labour manifests itself in various domains, 
involving an ongoing 'transfer of meaning'. The technical is, especially in 
agriculture, an integral aspect of the social. And vice versa. 
Finally, it is important to note that the problem of choice does not 
decrease with growing knowledge, but rather increases. Historically, the 
balance between possibilities and reality has been subject to considerable 
changes: whereas local ecology, climate, plants and animals represented 
sources of uncertainty in the past, the increased control of at least the 
majority of 'growth factors' has not reduced but enlarged the range of 
alternatives for action. This is emphasised by the fact that the variability 
in 'modern' agricultural systems is considerably larger than the 
variability of 'traditional' agricultural systems (Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 
1985; Jollivet 1988; Steenhuizen de Piters 1995; Jongerden and 
Ruivenkamp 1996). 
Farming was, and still is, like sailing in a sea of uncertainties. The number 
of uncertainties increases with the progressing of agricultural 
development, because the number of alternatives to choose from grows 
with the increase in available knowledge. 
Sailing in a sea of uncertainties demands beacons; and when there are no 
beacons, a well-tried course of action is necessary. Such courses for action 
have been created. Over time, local farming styles emerged, cultural 
repertoires that contained a detailed specification of how one had to farm. 
One repertoire is described in Chapter 2 (on the history of Frisian 
dairying). 
More generally, Hofstee described a farming style as 'a way in which one 
has to organise and manage a farm that is generally accepted by a more or 
less connected group of farmers'. He continues: 
'This farming style can relate to various aspects of farm management, such as 
the nature and type of machines, the way horses are hitched up, the types and 
organisation of sheds and barns, the type of carts, and many other more or less 
important details of farm management, but equally [. . .] to the general 
structure of the farms' (1985, p. 227). 
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Numerous agronomie classics, such as Columella (1977), Zacaria (1802), 
Barigazzo (1980), Cupari (1869), and Marenghi (1923), but, for example, 
also the descriptions of the early Staatscommissie (1912), can be 
understood as accurate and extremely detailed descriptions of local 
farming styles. Why did farming styles come into being? Hofstee 
answers this clearly: 
'A farming style has, just like every real style, a social-coercive character [. . .] 
The habit obtains, when established, a more or less self-evident, normative 
character. Things do not only happen like this, they should happen like this'' 
(Hofstee 1985, p. 229). 
A farming style provided something to hold on to. Beyond the boundaries 
of the 'generally acceptable' and the well-tested, only uncertainties 
existed. In this respect, Hofstee (1985, p. 271) speaks of 'the fear for the 
uncertainty that would appear as a result of change'. Herrera's (1984) 
work is also very clear about this. In summary, his thesis comes down to 
the following: small changes, even small déviances from the well-tested 
path, could have an extremely disruptive effect. The farming style did not 
exclude change, but measured it very carefully. 
Former (highly localised) farming styles were institutionalised codes (and 
hence clearly defined patterns of action) with which to sail the sea of 
uncertainties (or, as we would say nowadays, to address the almost 
endless matrix of alternatives for action). A style indicated a well-tested 
path, a style provided the opportunity to interpret, to evaluate, and to 
manage déviances. Thus, a style transformed change into a controllable, 
manageable, and non-threatening process, and into a progressively 
occurring process. Without a style, change would be repeatedly a 
potentially threatening jump into the dark. In other words, local farming 
styles provided faith - that is, the security that a certain approach would 
provide more prospect for continuity and for social recognition than 
another, deviant approach. 
A farming style is essentially the institutionalisation of a number of 
interrelated choices. The potential choices are made into something that is 
self-evident: 'that is just the way it is'. Thus not every choice requires 
endless deliberation (in other words, transaction and transformation costs 
are reduced). Moreover, the risk of inconsistencies creeping into farm 
management is avoided. Furthermore, a farming style (as a set of 
institutionalised choices) is also the framework for ordering, interpreting, 
and evaluating experiences. Communication becomes possible and 
ordered and both the delineation and the accumulation of knowledge 
become structured. 
Through the ages, farm labour has been oriented towards the search for, 
and the guarantee of, continuity. 'Keeping the name on the land'1 should 
in this respect be regarded as a striking metaphor. The future was 
confronted by facing the 'immediacies of context' (Giddens 1990, p. 28), 
the many immediate dangers and uncertainties. Markets, as well as the 
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town-countryside relation in which they were embedded, represented a 
wide range of possible threats. Notions such as the 'free farm' and the 
suyvere deel (clean part) provided farmers with the instruments to 
establish their positions within this arena. The norm of self-sufficiency 
had a similar effect. All in all, the local farming styles of the day can be 
understood as a script (as experiential knowledge that has become 
normative) with which a farming style could be guided along the many 
cliffs towards the future. 
Crucial and eye-catching elements include the decisive importance 
attributed to having one's own resource base, the extent to which one's 
own resources are understood as the fruit of one's own labour, and the 
certainty that the future can be faced with a sufficiently developed set of 
resources. 
Resources are valued on the basis of their use value - that is, their value in 
securing a future. If we return one more time to the cultural repertoire of 
farmers in the Frisian clay area (see Figures 2.7-2.14), it is not only the 
central position of the cow that strikes the eye. What is especially 
intriguing is its subtext: 'if you have good cattle, everything will turn out 
fine'. It is emphasised that these are dairy cows fol fan bilofte [full of 
promise]. Lan en folk binne seinige mei dy [With you, the land and its people 
are truly blessed; see Figure 2.5]. These cattle 'proudly carry their gift 
home every morning and evening' (Figure 2.9). However, there is one 
condition: work has to be carried out properly (Figures 2.10,2.13). 
Another condition is that cattle are 'made' in such a way as to be a real 
promise. This is emphasised in Figure 6.1 with reference to the horses: 
they are worth exactly what they have been 'imparted with' (or more 
literally 'how they have been created'). 
Thus unfolds the faith implicit in the former cultural repertoires that 
inspired concrete farm labour: a future could be developed by working 
steadily with a high-quality resource base. In this way, past, present and 
future became merged in one graceful movement into an 'organised flow 
of activities through time' (Vincent 1977). Every style contained its own 
future project, a locally defined way for farm development. This attached 
significance and meaning to the, often hard and merciless, slaving of 
farmers. 
From the 1950s onwards, however, the development projects entailed in 
the different styles became increasingly expropriated. Or worse, the 
relation between now and then, between present and future, would be 
turned dramatically on its head. 
6.2 From faith to trust: the rise of the Ministry of Agriculture as expert 
system 
In the 1950s, a new project emerges that will dramatically change the 
Dutch countryside and the agricultural sector: the modernisation project. 
One of its essential ingredients is the gradual delegitimation and 
marginalisation of former farming styles and the rise of the new expert 
system. Well-tried ways of working and the already developed resource 
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base were considered superfluous (see Figure 6.2). They had to make way 
for new practices. The cement changed dramatically too: faith gave way to 
trust. 
Figure 6.1 From resources into promise: the creation of faith 
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4' deBaerch How they have been created 
Tells a lot 
The modernisation project comprises in essence a radical, comprehensive, 
and far-reaching process of restructuring of agriculture. Farming has to be 
disconnected from its local parameters (from the 'immediacies of context') 
in order for it to be oriented towards new, more universal, beacons such 
as markets and technology; beacons that already (and later increasingly) 
surpass the local (Van der Ploeg 1992). 
This modernisation project supposes above all the development and 
institutionalisation of a new expert system. In the words of Giddens: 
'Expert systems are disembedding mechanisms because [. . .] they remove 
social relations from the immediacies of context' (1990, p. 28). At the same 
time, an expert system has to guarantee the raised 'expectations across 
distantiated time-space locations' {ibid.). 'Institutional reliability is 
essential, because it means that even as the network of interdependence 
caused by the growth of specialisation widens, we can have confidence in 
outcomes that are necessarily increasingly removed from our personal 
knowledge' (North 1989). In summary, farming is disconnected from the 
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former guiding beacons, while new beacons and new guiding principles 
are introduced and institutionalised. 
Figure 6.2 That which had been developed became superfluous 
Too expensive to keep: 
Uproot them! 
In sociological terms, the Ministry of Agriculture as expert system can be 
understood as a relativisation, if not denial (and subsequent 
marginalisation), of the practical knowledge and the innovative capacity 
of farmers. Thus the establishment of this new expert system is, as it were, 
the completion of another project that had been initiated a few decades 
earlier in the sphere of agricultural sciences. I have already discussed this 
paradigmatic change which led to farming becoming part of a Cartesian 
theatre. From then onwards, agriculture was understood as the (more or 
less perfect) unfolding of different rules - from which 'maxims' could be 
deducted on the basis of which the sector could be organised. In short, 
this is the historic and epistemological basis for the Ministry of 
Agriculture as an expert system. 
From the outset, modernisation is understood as a rationalisation, as a 
reorganisation, of the sector according to the models and procedures 
developed within the sphere of agricultural science. Thus, new elements 
and relations are introduced almost self-evidently. In this respect, I would 
like to refer to prediction, prescription, and intervention. Whereas the 
future was understood, within former farming styles, as completion of the 
present (further quantification was unnecessary), prediction becomes a 
crucial element in the new expert system. The same applies to 
Expert System and Modernisation Project: Controlling the Future 241 
prescription: if former rules were largely internalised (and understood as 
being actor-dependent), the required behaviour is now made explicit 
and largely objectified. Finally, intervention: in order to make the 
predicted situation become 'true' (that is, realisable, plausible, obvious 
and effective), a number of instruments is needed to adjust the conditions 
under which farming is carried out in order to actually realise the 
predictions. 
In a technical sense, the modernisation project can be imagined as the 
transformation of farming into a new, scientifically defined optimum. 
This newly imagined agriculture would be considerably larger in scale 
and much more intensive, than agriculture at that moment. Moreover, 
these two developmental tendencies that had previously been completely 
separated (Van der Ploeg 1987), would now be forged systematically into 
a single unity on the farm of the future. This is presented in Figure 6.3. 
which also shows that the initial diversity (partly expressed by differences 
in scale and intensity) would make way for a more homogenous 
agriculture. 
If the image described in Figure 6.3 was initially regarded as a prediction, 
later it is presented increasingly as an inevitable process, indeed as the 
application of laws implicit in technological development ('the laws of 
nature') and in market relations and market tendencies ('the laws of 
society'). These laws are above all known by the expert system. The future 
is determined, as it were, and the science used in, and by, the expert 
system manifests itself increasingly as 'legitimating rhetoric' (Szerszynski 
et al. 1996, p. 8). 
Figure 6.3 The contours of the modernisation project 
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Why would the jump represented in Figure 6.3 occur? In which way and 
upon which principles was this image of the future founded? The starting 
points used were essentially constituted by market and technology; not by 
the market relations and technology of the day, but rather by the expected 
market relations and the expected technological development. It was 
assumed that better conversion opportunities (of inputs into outputs) and, 
therefore, more efficient production functions were inherent in the 
expected technologies. Future market relations would determine the 
optimal points on these functions. By 'reading' the future in such a way, it 
became possible to achieve an accurate specification of the future farm. 
The situation in which the modernisation project was first formulated had 
a number of remarkable features. Agricultural production had returned 
to, and was exceeding pre-war levels and, following post-war 
reconstruction, was already producing a surplus. The European market, 
situated further afield, started to become attractive. However, it was a 
market in which one could only operate if a competitive advantage 
existed. During the reconstruction era, all labour was considered 
indispensable in achieving further growth. Therefore, technological 
development was based, in those years, on the premise that the available 
amount of labour should be mobilised as fully as possible. From the mid-
1950s onwards, however, a more urban demand for labour was felt, as a 
result of industrialisation. Thus the question of whether agriculture could 
operate with less labour arose. The then familiar technological trajectory 
(continuous intensification grounded in the quantity and quality of farm 
labour) is compared with other, alternative trajectories, in particular those 
which are based upon a completely different scale - that is, upon a 
different relation between the number of labour objects and the amount of 
labour needed. American agriculture became an important point of 
reference, first for those who designed the modernisation project, later 
increasingly for farmers themselves. 
From the mid-1950s onwards, the modernisation project is presented, and 
increasingly accepted, as a new expectation, related to various social 
developments and projects and especially to the possibility of combining 
these developments and projects in new and solid ways. By modernising 
agriculture, a competitive advantage could be achieved in new markets. 
In addition, an important contribution could thus be made to keeping the 
shopping basket cheap in the Netherlands itself. Furthermore, 'hidden 
unemployment' in the sector could be eliminated, releasing surplus 
labour for the rapidly expanding industrial sector. Finally, the incomes of 
the remaining farmers could be increased. An essential condition for this 
was a rapidly increasing production volume per farm. Equally important 
were an increased investment rhythm, considerable loans, and 
specialisation - in short, market integration. By way of such farm 
adjustments (that is by way of farm modernisation), farm incomes were 
assumed to increase continuously. 
If all this sounds very plausible to those who witnessed the success of the 
modernisation project, and if it sounds inevitable for those schooled in a 
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form of technological and/or economic determinism, it did not seem so at 
the time. For farmers (Roep 2000) and their wives (De Rooij 1992; De Rooij 
et al. 1995), the modernisation project implied a radical change: not only in 
terms of the guiding beacons but also in terms of the concrete labour 
process itself. The modernisation project would only achieve much later 
its halo of self-evidence. At the time - that is, in the mid-1950s - it was 
thought that an agriculture that oriented itself too much towards 
prevailing market relations could easily become victim of this orientation. 
According to the collective memory of the time, some distance vis-à-vis 
markets would do no harm, The same reservations were expressed about 
technological development. 'The newest is not always best'. Many years 
later agrarian historian Slicher van Bath delivered a lecture of this title. 
But such views were already well-embedded in the Dutch countryside. 
The temporal and spatial differences in the adoption of the new 
technological model (initially represented by cubicle sheds) illustrates 
this: those dairy farmers who were most convinced of their own ability 
and their own future opportunities - that is, in the north and west of the 
country - were the last to adopt this innovation. 
In short, the creation of trust took quite a long time. One of the most 
important conditions for trust was that modernisation would prove to be 
a workable, successful, and reliable trajectory in practice. Hence, 
intervention became essential. This brings us to the active intervention of 
the state into the then prevailing set of economic relations. 
6.3 State and market: driving structural development 
In spite of, or probably because of, the scepticism of the time, the 
realisation of the modernisation project was undertaken energetically. 
From the mid-1950s onwards, agricultural policy was increasingly and 
systematically oriented towards the realisation of a modernised 
agriculture. " The realisation of a jump as presented in Figure 6.3 became 
the goal, the raison d'être, and the legitimation of the (new) agricultural 
policy and, perhaps even more importantly, the design principle upon 
which various specific interventions were based. 
Land consolidation, interest subsidies, guarantee funds, 'life-jacket 
regulation', advisory services, applied research, 'counter insurgency' (see 
the columns of Spil magazine in 1977-1978), production management, the 
policies for nature and landscape conservation, manure and quality -were 
all separately and collectively (see, inter alia, Van den Brink 1990; and, 
more specifically, Frouws and Van der Ploeg 1973) geared towards 
realising the planned changes. Thus, the policy of the Ministry of 
Agriculture became largely a 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. 
By developing a set of instruments oriented towards the realisation of the 
supposed optimum, modernisation was de facto realised. All the more 
since the predicted future (again, see Figure 6.3) would only be granted to 
some farms. Hence, the image of the limited good2 became, ironically, 
one of the structuring elements par excellence in the practice of Dutch 
agriculture: the future was represented as a scarce good. It seemed that it 
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was better to ensure a piece of the future before someone else did (before a 
neighbour did, so to speak): growth thus became a battle for the future. 
Before I discuss these more surreal aspects of contemporary agrarian 
history, I have to raise a number of more profane issues. The first issue is 
evident. I have discussed this endlessly with a number of friends, among 
whom the eminent agricultural economist Jerry de Hoogh. In essence, de 
Hoogh's thesis comes down to the following: The modernisation of Dutch 
agriculture represents not so much a socio-political project but should, 
above all, be seen as the logical unfolding of economic relations (of 
markets and the relations and developments contained therein) as they 
were at the time and have been ever since. Labour became more 
expensive (partly because of the pull from the industry), capital and 
energy became cheaper. Added to the new technological opportunities,26 
no other development than the ones we have observed seemed possible -
however painful this path appears. It was implicit in the economic laws. 
De Hoogh adds that it was not so much the Ministry of Agriculture that 
initiated this inevitable disconnection. In his view, agricultural 
entrepreneurs experienced these changes in factor prices, and became, in 
turn, a driving force of what would later appear to be modernisation. The 
Ministry of Agriculture followed this farmer-initiated process out of 
necessity. 
From 1957 onwards, a remarkable reduction took place in agricultural 
employment. At the same time, there were dramatic and continuous 
changes in the relation between labour and capital. Labour became more 
expensive, capital relatively cheap. These changes in relative factor prices 
caused, so it is assumed, a reduction in agricultural employment. The 
change in relative factor prices can be regarded as the causal complex; the 
reduction in agricultural employment as the outcome. 
Both aspects (cause and effect) are contained (and inter-related) in the 
concept of structural development. Structural development is an 
ambiguous concept: it refers to changes in structure (in this case relative 
factor prices) that are regarded as all-determining. The concept refers also 
to the effects: to the adjustments of agriculture (the scale of farms, their 
sizes, the number of farms, agricultural employment, etc.) to these 
economic laws. Incidentally, it should be noted that the connection 
between the reduction in agricultural employment (an often harrowing 
and controversial process) and the economic laws is not only made with 
hindsight. Even though I opened this section with a reference to Jerry de 
Hoogh (partly to indicate the high esteem in which I hold him), the same 
reasoning was already functioning as justification and legitimation at the 
time. By the late 1970s, the Dutch Agricultural Youth Organisation 
(NAJK) expressed a sharp critique of agricultural policy. It used the 
striking title: 'Keep on farming'. Thus, they distanced themselves from a 
selective agricultural policy which was geared to large farms and 
resulting in the neglect of the interests of others, especially of (young) 
farmers on so-called medium-sized farms. All this occurred at the cost of 
employment, according to the NAJK. In this respect, they talked in terms 
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of a 'failing agricultural policy'. The reaction from the expert system was 
typical. They claimed that the Ministry was not responsible for 'the fall in 
the number of farms and thus in employment - the reduction is inherent 
in the economic laws'. By 'attributing structural development completely 
to the 'failing agricultural policy", the NAJK, according to the experts, 
'ignores completely other important factors that have promoted these 
developments and that were located outside of agriculture and the 
agricultural policy' (my emphasis). Reference is made to 'technological 
development and to the important fact that economic growth has resulted 
in a rapid increase in wages at the cost side under the influence of the 
general increase in labour productivity'. 
Labour had become more expensive. Therefore, a larger volume had to be 
produced by less labour. According to the ministry, 'NAJK's critique 
treats agriculture completely in isolation, as if it does not form part of the 
national and international economies'. It is, therefore, wrong to attribute 
what happened 'solely to a failing agricultural policy'. For, 'even if large 
farms would no longer receive any state subsidies, they would be able to 
grow on their own account' (Ministry of Agriculture, press release 382, 
1979). 
The creation of synergy 
In many ways, the modernisation project initiated in the 1950s is an 
admirable project. The gradually realised synergy between the 
government's project and various development projects of the organised 
business community, agro-industry, trade, science and of an increasing 
number of farmers is remarkable. Today we would say that the extent to 
which an increasing number of 'stakeholders' were integrated into the 
modernisation project is and remains admirable. In an article I co-wrote 
with Long (1995), we highlighted this issue. Congruence - that is, synergy 
between development projects - is crucial for any development process. It 
is striking that such accordance is usually unachievable when considering 
the history of development projects at the global level, particularly in the 
Third World. The modernisation of Dutch agriculture is a remarkable 
exception within this otherwise rather depressing panorama. 
Contemporary analyses of agriculture increasingly use the concept of 
district. South-Holland greenhouse farming (Vijverberg 1996), Chianina 
production in Italy (Venture 2000), or any other 'system', are regarded in 
these analyses as 'economic districts', each one with clear regional 
benefits. The district concept refers to the clustering of similar and 
complementary activities within a clearly defined social space providing 
an unmistakable economic advantage to those involved (Porter 1985). This 
advantage is not to be related only to physical vicinity; it relates above all 
to shared knowledge development, to co-operation and to confidence. If a 
seed supplier in the Dutch Westland district would supply a grower with 
low-quality and/or relatively expensive materials, the grower will 
inevitably let colleagues know and the supplier will find a large part of 
their market at risk. Vijverberg (1996) provides many other illustrations 
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(especially on the subject of technological development). The concept of 
district emphasises above all the importance of convergence and synergy. 
When the projects of growers, suppliers, sellers, researchers, and advisors 
converge, an extra ability, an extra 'capacity' emerges. This occurs partly 
because transaction and transformation costs are reduced considerably, 
but also as a result of the increased confidence. 
What happens in the typical districts happened in and around the 
modernisation project of the Ministry of Agriculture. Convergence, and 
later synergy, was created around the notion of modernisation. The more 
successful it became, the more advantages the participants achieved, 
while the project as a whole appeared as better, and more obvious, than 
other development trajectories. The achieved convergence can also be 
read differently. If we concentrate on the actors involved (and to a lesser 
extent on their projects, as was done previously), we can say, following on 
from Szerszynski, that from within the expert system 'actor networks 
[are] constituted of which they [the experts] are the key members, but 
which stretch far beyond science to materially order society' (1996, p. 8). 
Following on from this observation, I would like to emphasise that this 
'material ordering' came to include an impressive and increasingly 
irreversible co-construction of the material and the social as the 
convergence of projects and the growth of the 'actor-networks' expanded. 
The integration of applied agricultural research into the all-encompassing 
modernisation project implied, for example, that cows were created and 
criteria for bull selection were introduced, that fitted in with the newly 
considered optimum (and that made any other constructions hardly 
possible). The same goes for rural space: through land consolidation, low-
level drainage, spatial separation of agricultural and non-agricultural 
functions, the space that was best suited for the realisation of the 
predicted optimum, was created. Other types of farming became 
suboptimal by default - simply because they did not contain the high 
degree of mutual attuning of space, cows, and farming that would 
become so typical of the fully modernised pool. 
Initially, the modernisation project was, because of its uncertainty, an 
adventurous project. 'It really was an adventure to us [. . .] we could only 
hope that it would succeed' (Mansholt 1995, p. 76). Whether structural 
development would succeed was a continuing source of concern. 
'Technocrats always want to know everything, but I was not too certain 
about it', again according to Mansholt (cited in Delaunay 1974). By the 
early 1960s, the question was seriously raised whether the brightest and 
the most enterprising farmers would be the ones who would abandon 
agriculture, leaving it as a reservoir of backwardness. However 
adventurous and uncertain (both aspects often go together) the 
modernisation project initially appeared, in retrospect it is represented 
almost without exception as the logical and unavoidable unfolding of the 
structural laws ruling the sector. 
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Different positions are taken in the debate about the relation between 
state and market. Various arguments are contrasted with counter-
arguments. I would like to discuss some of them. First, it can be stated 
that markets never speak a 'language' of their own. Markets are not 
depersonalised or 'disembodied' entities. Markets are without exception 
institutionally embedded; they function via market-agencies (Saccomandi 
1998). The latter not only represent specific interests but also actively 
articulate the presumed rationale of the market towards other 
stakeholders. It is hard to imagine how a market can be stripped of the 
institutions that compose it. To present these abstracted markets as an 
Archimedean point from which optimal developments and relations 
could be derived seems to me too much like a salto mortale. Authoritative 
agricultural economists (such as De Hoogh) also recognise that it is 
impossible to speak of agricultural markets nowadays without an 
intervening and regulating state. 
A second argument touches more on the particular importance attributed 
to 'markets' within the modernisation discourse. The issue was not so 
much the market as it manifested itself at a particular time but rather with 
expected economic developments, the market of the future. Actual steps 
were taken to actually create the expected market on the basis of these 
expectations; to anticipate future markets, according to the jargon of the 
day. Thus projects arose, or more specifically, the modernisation project 
emerged. The point, though, is that after a certain moment such a project 
becomes 'coercive' - not because this is implicit in the past, but because it 
has been invested in with an eye to the future. The project becomes an 
interest in itself. Once the conviction became rooted that an ongoing 
conquest of foreign markets was an attractive, if not the most promising, 
perspective for Dutch agriculture, a number of practices were reorganised 
according to this conviction. In order to actually realise, utilise, and 
further unfold the competitive advantage, mergers and scale enlargement 
within the processing industry became of essential importance. The same 
goes for developments in dairy farming itself. A considerable flow of milk 
from large, specialised dairy farms to the dairy factories becomes 
necessary. Because the output price at farm level is identical to the cost 
price of the factories, cost-price reduction and scale enlargement on the 
farm emerge, certainly in the long term, as essential conditions for, and 
indispensable ingredients of, the project as a whole. 
However, this only describes the beginning. Once the sector became, to a 
certain degree, dependent on export markets, a continuation of the same 
path was necessary. Moreover, this very path implied that other 
development trajectories increasingly lost their relevance, if they were not 
de facto hindered. The infrastructure was tailored to large-scale bulk 
production, to the extent that other possible alternatives hardly fitted in. 
Future-oriented actions are not neutral. Neither are they a logical 
completion of the relations at the moment on which a decision on action is 
made. In other words, projects are not a unilinear expression of the 
'structure' at that particular moment, nor of the structure contained in 
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'opportunities and limitations'. Such opportunities and limitations stem 
from the project as such, from its development, and above all from the 
interaction between the project in question and other projects. In so far as 
there is a 'structure' (a set of propositions that regulate and condition 
actions), these are above all 'emergent properties' - opportunities and 
limitations - that emerge during the course of the process. 
The modernisation project cannot be understood as a logical unfolding of 
the structural relations and tendencies inherent in markets. The 
modernisation project was rather an attempt to step beyond the then 
prevailing relations. The role of institutions was pivotal in this. Without 
the explicit interventions of, inter alia, the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
modernisation project could never have occurred, at least in the form it 
took. 
A completely different issue is, of course, presented by the fact that the 
modernisation project has, over the course of time, been made into 
(because it is increasingly understood and represented as) the logical, if 
not 'systematic', unfolding of structural relations in which agriculture 
was embedded. In particular the foundation of this apparently 
'unavoidable dénouement' on a scientific discourse has contributed 
significantly to this. Thus, the initial prediction acquired an aura of 
indisputability. 
In retrospect, one cannot but wonder about the nature of science practised 
at the time: a temporally and spatially confined empirical reality (the 
modernisation project as defined in North-west Europe) was generalised 
into a universal and ahistorical law. I will discuss this issue further in 
Chapter 7. 
Incidentally, punishment for the sins was not a long time coming: the 
foundation on (assumed) scientific laws resulted in the expert system 
becoming more rigid, which became evident in the 1990s. The real 
relations in practice had shifted and new types of development, and new 
interventions, were necessary. However, the expert system was not 
capable of recognising this, let alone capable of adequate reaction. 
Whoever founds their knowledge on ahistorical laws places himself de 
facto outside of history when the times are changing. However, before we 
move into the turbulent 1990s, it might be a good idea to deal once more 
with the more orderly 1970s. 
Actual state intervention in various markets expanded rapidly in the 
1970s, in order to accelerate the modernisation project. State intervention 
initially concerned the land market (including land consolidations), the 
labour markets (socio-economic advisory), and the technology market 
(initially through technical advisory services and later increasingly 
through a deliberate technology policy). Direct intervention in the capital 
market also took place in the 1970s. The objective was to make capital 
cheaper. By means of a comprehensive interest subsidy programme (later 
supplemented, expanded, and continued by the guarantee fund, the so-
called 'life-jacket regulation', the Investment Regulations Act (WIR) and 
fiscal laws, respectively), the price of capital was reduced both directly 
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and indirectly (De Bruin 1997a). Together with the high social costs of the 
factor labour, this implied that relative factor prices (the prices of capital 
and labour vis-à-vis each other) were changed considerably to the 
advantage of the factor capital. Heavy investments and the substitution of 
capital for labour are thus made into obvious operations. 
If Hayami and Ruttan (1985) state in their, by now classic, work that 
agricultural development is a function of relative factor prices (which is 
also adopted by De Hoogh 1987), recent Dutch agrarian history shows 
that government in particular organises relative factor prices in such a 
way as to actually support the intended development project. This 
conclusion can be substantiated further by referring to the tax-free 
imports of concentrates through the Port of Rotterdam, the energy policy, 
the encouragement given to automation (Frouws and Van der Ploeg 
1988), and the first trials of the environmental policy. 
Again and again, government, or in concreto the Ministry of Agriculture, 
appears as a macro-actor, as a ubiquitous agency actually intervening in 
the development of markets and technology. Capital, energy, 
concentrates, and certain technologies are made cheaper on purpose. The 
opportunities to make labour relatively 'cheap' are ignored, at times 
scandalously so.' Hence, beacons are created that are often highly 
directive in micro-situations. 
6.4 Rural exodus as structural outcome of structural development 
Sociologically speaking, structure is that which directs and guides human 
action, in the widest sense of the word: including technical, economic, 
cultural, and political actions. Structure is that which orders complex and 
multiple action. If action displays certain regularities, it is very tempting 
to relate, if not reduce, this to an coercive, structural pattern. 
The key questions of the social sciences are: (i) what do we owe 
structures, in so far as they exist, to? and (ii) wherein are such structures 
situated? Are they situated in the set of values and norms (for example, in 
the cultural repertoires that I discussed earlier in this book), in the 
prevailing power relations (such as suggested by the terms micro- and 
macro-actors and discussed systematically in more detail by political 
economy), or in the straitjacket of economic and technological relations? 
As far as the first question is concerned, a series of answers was and is 
possible. To summarise the previous explanations for the sake of this line 
of argument: Structure (that which is directive to human action) is above 
all contingent. It is sometimes more or less accidental, but on other times 
the purposefully directed concurrence of 'things'. When concurrence occurs, 
structure appears, generating its own immanent persuasiveness. Where 
its specific roots lie (in the norms, in already created practices, in power 
relations, etc.) is always a matter for empirical research. 
Alongside the role of the state in influencing, if not actively changing, 
relative factor prices, a second cause célèbre is riddling the agricultural 
* Translator's note: The author refers to the refusal of the Dutch Ministry of Agriculture to 
implement the EC regulation for financial assistance to small farmers. 
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science debate, especially in the Netherlands. That is the continuous 
exodus of labour from agriculture that occurred since 1957. The total 
number of workers in Dutch agriculture rose between 1850 and 1957 from 
about 300,000 to about 570,000.35 A reversal of this trend sets in after 1957. 
In 1995, the total number of workers in agriculture is about 250,000. The 
trend seems obvious: agricultural employment falls inevitably and, so it 
seems, constantly. It is like the water flowing through the Rhine from the 
Alps down to the North Sea: it is a fact that happens whether you like it or 
not. Not only today, but every day. Apparently, there are coercive, 
'structural' patterns and/or relations (if not 'laws') that result in this 
constant decrease. 
The explanation is obvious. Again, labour becomes more and more 
expensive, capital cheaper. In other words, Dutch agriculture cannot 
develop other than through a continuous exodus (that is, via a constant 
reduction of agricultural employment). If this were not the case, the 
'whiplash of competition' would be merciless. 
The latter notion forms one of the central and connecting assumptions on 
which the Ministry of Agriculture as an expert system is based. The 
design of new policy aspects starts out from, and takes place via, the 
assumption that agricultural employment (and therefore the total number 
of farms) will fall. Or rather, the presumed decrease acts regularly as the 
solution tout court to any problem. In addition, the flipside of such a 
decrease (the concentration of production in a reduced number of farms) -
usually defined as structural development - has become the norm to 
evaluate policy as a whole and also its constituent parts. 
Structural development is the imperative with which the expert system 
perceives, organises, reorganises, develops, adjusts, and evaluates its 
'area of competence'. Structural development is the notion with which the 
Ministry of Agriculture has made Dutch agriculture what it is (which is 
largely a success story). However, it is also the notion with which Dutch 
agriculture is guided towards its own downfall. In so far as a structuring 
moment did exist in the past decades or exists today, it has above all been 
situated in this notion of structural development, in the practices 
associated with it and reorganised by it, and in the inability to move 
outside of its scope. 
The undeniable reduction in agricultural employment is the result of 
always unique constellations, characterised by the interlocking of 
different and always varying projects. From the mid-1950s onwards, 
urban-industrial demand for labourers increased considerably. At the 
same time, unknown opportunities for mechanisation presented 
themselves to the agricultural sector. This resulted in a sizeable 
movement of agricultural labourers from the rural sector to the urban 
economy. The bitter taste left after the large agricultural labour strikes in 
the late 1940's added impetus to this first 'round of reorganisation'. 
The small farmers followed the agricultural labourers. In the former rural 
economy, larger and smaller farmers were connected by a complex web of 
services. Small farmers usually provided labour to large farmers. They 
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helped out in milking and haying, or took care of the heavy work in the 
autumn (the cleaning out of ditches, for instance). Large farmers, on the 
other hand, provided other services: supplying a few extra horses or, later 
on, a tractor and/or a good bull. These were transactions conducted 
preferably at a charge agreed beforehand or else settled on mutual terms. 
However, mechanisation on larger farms made this socially regulated 
exchange obsolete; hence, the maintenance of smaller farms was severely 
threatened (for a similar analysis of developments in the French 
countryside, see Eizner 1985). 
Other episodes would take place later. In the late 1970s, a subgroup of 
dairy farmers specialised completely on milking. The growth of forage 
crops and the breeding and raising of youngstock became 'externalised': 
delegated to other (often smaller) farms. In the early 1980s, this process 
accelerated. The long-awaited quota system was about to be 
implemented. For some farmers, this was reason to utilise all available 
shed space, labour, and money to maximise milk production. Youngstock 
was grazed out, as it is called. Thus, a new type of division of labour 
emerged between farms: some farms specialised exclusively in milking, 
other farms specialised in the care of youngstock and/or in fodder 
production. The quota system drew an abrupt line through this pattern: 
the highly specialised farms again obtained space as a result of the quota 
system and 'took back' the breeding and rearing of youngstock. 
Consequently, the raison d'être for the other farms suddenly disappeared. 
They had none or hardly any quota and the youngstock by which they 
earned their livelihood had been taken away. 
Numerous similar episodes can be described. First farm labourers leave, 
then farmers' sons, subsequently farmers on smaller farms, then those 
who provided services to the larger farms. The obligatory introduction of 
the 'milk tank' forms a separate episode, resulting in numerous mixed 
farms giving up dairying out of necessity, while many small dairy farms 
retire early and /or cannot be continued. 'The final phase of the 
introduction of the milk tank has resulted in accelerated redundancy', 
according to the Minister for Agriculture in an answer to parliamentary 
questions (Tweede Kamer 1981-1982, 17100, chaps. XIV and C, nr. 12, p. 
43). 
From the second half of the 1980s onwards, a period arrives when the 
entry of non-farmers into the agricultural sector is blocked almost 
completely. In the period 1970-1980, 2.7 per cent of new farms were 
added annually, either by founding new farms (1.4 per cent) or by 
enlarging farms above the bottom line of 10 standard farm units (SFU) 
(1.3 per cent annually). Without the entry of new farms, the annual 
decrease in farm numbers would have been 4.9 per cent instead of 2.3. 
'The increased interest to start a farm is apparently an important factor' 
(LEB 1981, p. 43, table 2.2). Finally, the period arrives when farmers on the 
large farms go broke. 
As indicated in Figure 6.4, the episodes are always specific ones, each 
with its own dynamics, its own beginning and end, and also more or less 
disconnected from the other episodes. The outcome, however, is always 
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the same: reduction in agricultural employment. First, as a result of an 
initial concurrence of circumstances, subsequently as a result of a second 
concurrence of circumstances, etc. Time and again, it involves an 
interlocking of particular circumstances: hard-headed farmers, a broken 
farm labourers' strike, opportunity to find employment in the ports or in 
industry - or the opportunity to start a small farm and expand it 
gradually. Numerous other episodes are added to this, such as the typical 
Dutch variant of the quota system, the unwillingness to pass available EU 
support on to small farms, and so on. 
Furthermore, there are several more continuous processes, each 
representing the interlocking of particular partial interests and projects. In 
this respect, I refer to succession,3 migration, the occasional 
hopelessness, the loss of 'pleasure' in the farming vocation, and the 
tension between 'living poorly and dying rich'. 
Figure 6.4 A deconstruction of rural exodus into different episodes 
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In the world as described by the expert system, the reduction of 
agricultural employment is disconnected from all these defining episodes 
and processes. The reduction is very much represented as a structural 
outcome of 'structural developments'. Both occur without doubt: it 
cannot be denied that the relative factor prices have changed largely to 
the disadvantage of labour between the mid-1950s and 1995. The same 
applies to the redundancy of labour from agriculture. Of course, the key 
question is what kind of relationship exists between the two. Although it 
is a silly and well-trodden example, a parallel can be made with the 
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irrefutable fall in the number of storks, coinciding with a similar trend in 
the number of births. It is well-known that this coincidence does not say 
anything about the relation between both developments. 
Let us first take a close look at the arguments as they are presented and 
then look for the 'black swans'. In their preface to an important collection 
of agro-political essays, Maris and Rijneveld point to the rise in real 
incomes in the Netherlands, about 50 per cent between 1950 and 1960. 'If 
income development of the agricultural population wants to keep in step 
with this, agriculture should follow the increases in productivity in other 
branches of industry. But how?' (1963, p. 5). The answer is typical of the 
extent to which the modernisation project was generally accepted at the 
time: 'A sufficient rise in labour productivity can only be achieved by a 
strong reduction of the number of labourers' (ibid.). 
Of course, these authors were aware that this is only half the truth. An 
increase in labour productivity can be supported by a reduction in the 
number of labourers or by intensification (produce more per unit of land 
and animal at equal scale)4 or by a combination of scale enlargement and 
intensification. Continuous intensification, however, was rejected because 
this 'would lead to new difficulties in marketing' (ibid.). This is a strange 
argument, for two reasons. First, a rise in production could be sold via 
foreign markets (which actually happened later on), and, second, it would 
soon become clear that large-scale farms would produce much more 
intensively than smaller ones. 
The argument by Maris and Rijneveld was hardly disputed. This is typical 
of the extent to which the modernisation project had become taken for 
granted. It is also shown by the language used: 'Agriculture is thus [sic], 
according to the number of people working in the sector, a declining 
branch of industry and has to be [sic] like this in order to carry on'. On the 
next page, 'necessary scale enlargement of agriculture' (1963, p. 6) is 
mentioned and elsewhere in the collection, Maris and Galan speak of a 
'compulsory demand' (1963, p. 133). 
6.5 Black swans,* or the micro-macro problem in agricultural economics 
The agricultural sector is a complex aggregation of ten thousands of 
farms, their interrelationships, and their relationships with other agencies 
and actors representing the non-agricultural sectors. This refers, en 
passant, to the aggregation issue or the micro-macro issue: one of the 
most tricky questions of the social sciences. Can the 'behaviour' of a 
sector be presented in the same way as the actions of an individual 
entrepreneur multiplied by a hundred thousand or more? Could the 
rationale and development of a sector be equated with those of the actors 
that comprise the sector? Can the situation at the level of the sector be 
imagined (and thus calculated and predicted) as if it concerned the 
simple, straightforward addition of all entrepreneurs involved? And can 
Translator's note: the presence of black swans proves that the statement 'all swans are 
white' is untrue; hence, they represent the Popperian falsification principle. 
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that which emerges as regularity at the sector level be considered typical 
of the individual farm? 
A classical mistake in the complex translation from the micro- to the 
macro-level and back again is the so-called 'phallacy of the wrong level'. 
What applies to the one level is, as it were, automatically attributed to -
that is, applied to - the other level. It can be stated that the expert system 
in agriculture has elevated this typical mistake to its raison d'être. 
At the macro-level, an undeniable and irrefutable relation seems to exist 
between the fall in agricultural employment and the changes in relative 
factor prices. However, market relations do not affect the sector as such. 
The 'sector' is an abstraction, a complex aggregation that cannot be 
equated with one farm (whether or not it is multiplied by a hundred 
thousand). Market relations affect individual agricultural enterprises. It is 
either one or the other: either they influence them or they do not influence 
them at all. 
Let us first pursue the a contrario argument, however and assume that 
relative factor prices enforce their 'logic' on the sector as a whole. Capital 
becomes cheaper and labour becomes more expensive. It implies that 
scale enlargement, and hence reorganisation or redundancy, would 
become inevitable; for the sector as a whole but also for all the farms that 
compose the sector. It can be argued that some farms will react 
appropriately to this (by introducing the necessary structural 
adjustments), other farms will not do this or do it too late. The latter 
group will be punished by the 'whiplash of competition'. Incomes will be 
relatively low, and their most likely fate is marginalisation. Only the 
farms from the first group will be able to continue in the long term and 
will excel through higher incomes in the short term. 
In the early 1980s, I conducted a research with Eppo Bolhuis in the Italian 
region of Emilia Romagna. The available material enabled us to build a 
constant sample, consisting of thirty farms over a ten year period (see 
Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 1985; Van der Ploeg 1990). Although the 
situation in Emilia Romagna, with its distinguishing characteristic of 
Parmesan cheese production, cannot be compared easily to the Dutch 
situation, the relative price relations between capital and labour in Emilia 
Romagna were and still are also subject to impressive changes. 
Our findings have been summarised in Figure 6.5. In the period between 
1970 and 1980, some of the farms involved increased their scale of 
production considerably, whereas intensity was only increased modestly. 
This group operated, as it were, largely according to the logic of the 
market. The second group, however, of the proverbial 'black swans', 
realised a highly contrasting development trajectory during the same 
period. The scale of farming was only increased slightly; intensity (in this 
case production per cow and/or per ha), on the other hand, was increased 
dramatically. In other words, they continued on the path that had 
previously been dismissed by Maris and Rijneveld e tutti quanti. However, 
this 'deviation' did not result in demonstrable income deprivation, nor in 
lower prospects for farm continuity. 
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Figure 6.5 Empirical deve lopmen t pa t te rns in the dai ry sector of Emilia Romagna 
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Source: Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg (1985). 
Within one and the same economic setting, various types of economic 
organisation and various types of farm development are possible. Later, 
this was also shown for the Dutch situation (see Figure 6.6 that relates to a 
constant sample of 117 Frisian dairy farms). 
Figure 6.6 Empirical development patterns in the Frisian dairy sector (1963-1992) 
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What are these different farm development processes based on? Which 
(differential) mechanism supports them? Why are those in the expert 
system so blind to the meaningful diversity within empirical reality? 
The studies summarised in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 relate to farming in 
otherwise homogenous situations - that is, the same set of economic, 
institutional, ecological, and technological conditions applies to all farms 
involved. Nonetheless, highly diverging farm development processes 
exist which can, first, be traced back to the highly variable ways in which 
farms are related to markets. The way in which the farm relates to the 
prevailing technology supply is also highly variable. Moreover, relations 
with both markets and technology supply are the object of strategic 
choices made by the actors involved. Second, income aspirations and the 
organisation of time can vary widely between farms (see De Bruin et al. 
1991). Finally, a wide range of alternatives for action exists in principle 
with which farmers can parry possible pressures on their incomes. 
The elements mentioned above are of great, if not decisive, importance to 
the concrete form of the development process in agriculture (and 
therefore to the concrete form of the developing farms). At the same time, 
they are almost completely absent from mainstream theorising: the virtual 
farmer is fully integrated into markets; they always apply the latest 
technologies (and preferably before others do); their strategic choices 
follow the model of the homo economicus; their time horizon coincides with 
fiscal depreciation opportunities (and is hence standardised too); and one 
ubiquitous criteria is used to describe income aspirations: profit 
maximisation. 
If farm income is under pressure (as a result of falling prices, rising costs, 
rising income aspirations, family enlargement, and so on), various 
reactions are imaginable. 
1 Attempt to reduce costs; for example, by 'doing more yourself' (see the 
substitution curves in Chapter 5). 
2 Increase technical efficiency so that the same amount of resources 
produces a larger volume. Craftsmanship is the key here. It should be 
mentioned that 1 and 2 are often combined in various ways. 
3 Scale enlargement: the number of labour objects per labour unit is 
increased. This can happen step by step or in leaps. The latter usually 
demands investments, for example in new technologies (and land-
dependent branches will mostly have to invest in extra land). 
Implications for the cost structure can be considerable. Scale 
enlargement can also have negative effects for the output per labour 
object (3a). In combination with output-increasing technologies, 
however, both scale and intensity can be increased (3b) (see De Veer 
1986). 
4 Resign oneself to income reduction: a certain degree of marginalisation 
occurs. In this case, it is possible that additional non-agricultural 
income is sought. 
5 Close the farm and sell the land, animals, machines, and buildings. 
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6 Pursue higher value added per unit end product by way of price 
increase of the product in question. This can be done by direct 
marketing, on-farm processing, and/or a change to quality production. 
All of the mechanisms mentioned above are valid in theory. To what 
extent they are also valid empirically is subject to numerous temporally 
and spatially dependent factors, including the scale of income reduction 
and whether it occurs abruptly or gradually. 
Take an imaginary agricultural sector comprising 100 farms. Assume that 
10 farms close down (category 5, above). The resources of these 10 are 
taken over by 10 other farms that are part of category 3. The remaining 80 
farms can be divided into categories 1, 2, 4, and 6. The net result of this 
exercise is that the average farm has enlarged somewhat, the number of 
farms has decreased (from 100 to 90) and total production has increased 
(contribution from 2, 3b, and probably 6). 
This artificial example demonstrates that 'macro-data' (such as falling 
farm numbers, increased production) should not be interpreted as 
indicative of a generally occurring process of scale enlargement. Scale 
enlargement is above all a localised phenomenon. It is only one of many 
mechanisms to offset income reduction. Structural development is not 
more but certainly no less than one of the many 'local developments' 
taking place in Dutch agriculture. 
This conclusion can be supported further by the outcomes of the so-called 
'mutation analyses'. The development within various size categories is 
presented in Table 6.1 for the period 1975-1980. 
Table 6.1 Differential development processes in Dutch agriculture, 1975-1980 
size 
category in 
1975 (in 
SFU)' 
10-70 
70-130 
130-200 
>200 
Total 
absolute 
number 
in 1975 
58,200 
44,800 
33,400 
26,200 
162,600 
Disappeared 
<%) 
34 
10 
7 
9 
Reduced 
56 
20 
13 
10 
same 
(%) 
45 
48 
grown 
10 
25 
32 
81 
absolute 
number in 
1980 
38,250 
40,200 
31,300 
23,900 
133,700 
newcomers 
since 1975 
5,800 
1,800 
1,600 
2,100 
11,300 
Note: SFU: standard farm units 
The total number of farms fell from 162,600 to 145,000 between 1975 and 
1980. However, the reduction in farm numbers was not exclusively 
situated in the 'too small' group (in the early 1980s, a farm that could 
provide work for one labourer was defined by the Agricultural Economics 
Research Institute (LEI) as requiring at least 130 standard farm units 
(SFU); in 1984 this line was raised to 150 SFU per farm). The 1983 
parliamentary 'Explanatory Statement' explains that 'it has to be 
expressed that a considerable number of farms are still too small. As a 
minimum for a farm to provide enough work for one labourer, the LEI 
used a limit of 130 SFU for 1981. Using this norm, 43 per cent of Dutch 
farms would be too small' (Tweede Kamer 1982-1983, vol. 17600, chap. 
XIV, no. 2, p. 36). 
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However, examination of Table 6.1 shows that at least one quarter of the 
farms operating initially below 'this minimum' (the farm size category 
70-130 SFU) were developed further. The difference from the farms that 
were larger initially (130-200 SFU) is only gradual in this respect (25 
versus 32 per cent). In contrast, Table 6.1 shows that 'stagnation' and/or 
farm reduction is not restricted to 'farms that are too small'. The same 
phenomena occur in the larger farm size categories as well. In short, there 
are plenty of black swans! 
'Farms that are too small' do sometimes grow and 'large farms' come to a 
halt or stagnate at times too. No watershed exists in this respect. The 
notion of the 'farm that is too small', with no other option than closure is 
therefore a virtual image that does not correspond with the world as it is. 
Of course, it is equally obvious that smaller farms are closed relatively 
more often and larger farms grow relatively more often (at least during 
the modernisation period). However, to relate this to underlying 
mechanics, to a causal complex constituted by prevailing economic 
relations, is untenable. 
The aforementioned balance (more reorganisation of smaller farms, more 
growth of larger ones) is, above all, the outcome of an agricultural policy 
that is inspired by the premise of unavoidable structural development 
and that gears its policy towards it. 'The structural policy', according to 
Appendix XV (19.5/2955) of the Explanatory Statement, 'intends to arrive 
at the optimal combination of production factors entrepreneurship, 
labour, land, and capital' (p. 8). In the knowledge that 'building units of 
an adequate size has been central to Dutch agriculture over the past 
decades' (ibid., p. 4), it cannot but be concluded from Table 6.1 that 
creating this 'optimal combination' has succeeded at least in part. 
So far for the empirical processes of reorganisation and enlargement. We 
have to take one more complementary step. For even if it appears that 
smaller farms can indeed realise continuity, they still seem to be doomed. 
In the long term, they supposedly lack continuity and reasonable incomes. 
6.6 The commodity fiction 
Between the early 1960s and the mid-1990s, an almost endless stream of 
publications appeared which argued time and again that larger farms are 
generally characterised by better farm economic performances than 
smaller farms. Stable anchors in this stream are the Farm Management 
Survey publications, which report annually on the results of farms whose 
accounts were collected by the Agricultural Economics Research Institute 
(LEI). More convincing proof of the necessity of scale enlargement was 
almost unthinkable. Larger farms realised better labour incomes, better 
entrepreneurial incomes, and better net results. 
These systematically produced findings are apparently at odds with the 
above mentioned black swans. Yet, the one is not a negation of the other. 
The economics of the farm can be approached, represented, and analysed 
in different ways. It is possible to start out from the real situation on the 
farms, especially where the empirical relations between commodity and 
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non-commodity circuits are concerned. In the previous chapters, it has 
been made sufficiently clear that such a difference is of essential 
importance in various ways. Different farming styles are partly based 
upon these purposefully produced differences. 
However, a different approach is also possible. The neo-classical approach 
consistently takes for granted consistently what Polanyi (1957) defined as 
the 'commodity fiction'. This means that all resources, irrespective of 
mobilisation and use, are considered to be commodities. 
Accordingly, the farm was and is conceptualised as a 'meeting point of 
markets'. It is regarded as irrelevant that parts of the used resources are 
not mobilised through markets (and do not appear as commodities in the 
actual production process). 'A good entrepreneur is supposed to calculate 
and act as if these resources were acquired through the markets in 
question.' Thus it is made plausible that the prevailing market prices are 
introduced into the analysis for all the resources used. The farm is 
translated into a series of costs and a series of outputs. 
Initial criticisms of this approach argued that these devices for calculating 
farm incomes obscure and sometimes completely misrepresent the actual 
situation on a farm (Vondeling 1948). Be that as it may, the difference 
between the thus constructed costs and outputs - that is, the net result -
soon appeared as an apparently objective, indisputable, and trustworthy 
measure to distinguish good from bad. It was not too difficult. Good soon 
appeared to be almost identical to large, and bad to small. 
For example, in 1991-1992, the net return of the smaller, highly 
specialised dairy farms was NLG -82,218 and on the farms defined as 
large NLG -74,513. 'Loss' was suffered everywhere. However, the loss 
was worse on small farms than on large ones. If family farm income was 
NLG 67,000 on larger farms, this was less than NLG 36,000 on smaller 
farms, according to the LEI (Van Dijk et al. 1993). Labour is insufficiently 
remunerated on smaller farms (at least worse than on larger farms). 
Smaller farmers continue only through 'self-exploitation'. The possibility 
of maintaining the farm and letting it grow would be correspondingly 
smaller. Sooner or later smaller farms would have to disappear. 
There are a few arbitrary moments in the prevailing calculations of the net 
return (and to a certain extent of family farm income), which are inherent 
to the neo-classical perspective. These are arbitrary moments that imply 
foremost a bias against smaller farms. In order to calculate the net return, 
a number of costs have to be calculated: the monetary value of labour of 
farmer and family members, the monetary value of the land, animals, and 
machines, and their respective interest rates - that is, the remuneration of 
net worth. The following issues are decisive in this: 
1 the interrelations between assumed values of capital, labour, and land; 
2 the introduced time horizon; 
3 the assumption that farm and farm family coincide not only 
analytically but also in reality; 
4 the assumption that every farm represents a point in a unilinear 
development; 
5 the assumption that outputs coincide with saleable products. 
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As discussed in Chapter 5, the subjective assessment of factor prices 
varies considerably. 'Economical farmers' will consider labour to be 
relatively cheap and capital (and non-factor costs) relatively expensive. 
Hence, economical farmers will pursue the replacement of labour by 
capital to a lesser extent than, for example, machine farmers. Land is the 
expensive factor par excellence for intensive farmers: they will minimise 
the input of land. And so on. The introduction of one set of calculable 
prices (the agreed wage for labour and the interest of government bonds 
for capital) cannot be but arbitrary. 
We might conclude therefore, as a first issue, that the points of reference 
are highly variable in practice. Whichever the standard chosen, some 
farming styles will be calculated as richer, some as poorer. More 
specifically, this type of reasoning can be geared towards the assumed 
interest rate: 7 per cent will not be high enough for some farm types and 
will, vice versa, go far beyond the reproduction rhythms that apply to 
other situations. A second issue concerns depreciation, which is calculated 
according to a certain time perspective. However, the social organisation 
of time in agriculture is very variable. Machines are replaced every few 
years on some farms (in order to sell them at an attractive residual 
value), whereas there is a preference on other farms for working with 
second-hand machines, which are used as long as possible, partly through 
well-attended maintenance. A similar variation can be found with cows: 
cows are only milked for 2-3 years on some farms, whereas this is 8-10 
years on others. Again, it will be clear that a 'golden road' is completely 
fictitious. The purport of these first two issues can be illustrated by 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8. 
Figure 6.7 A neo-classical representation of the income situation in various 
farming styles 
NLG 1 million 
total output ibid ibid ibid ibid 
labour income 
as % of total output 
Ama, = 32 % 
> A = 20 % 
economical cowmen ordinary machine- large 
farmers farmers men farmers 
inputs investments in 
land, buildings and 
'ZA machines 
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In Figure 6.7, the neo-classical approach is applied to a number of farming 
styles. In Figure 6.8, the Chayanovian approach (Chayanov 1966; Van den 
Broek 1998a) is applied to the same database. 
One of the striking differences is that the income component of, for 
example, economical farmers rises from 34 per cent to 42 per cent of total 
output. This is a considerable difference in practice. However, the 
difference is eliminated systematically in the construction of the virtual 
agricultural world (see LEI 1996, pp. 62-66). 
Figure 6.8 An application of the Chayanovian approach to farming styles in the 
Netherlands 
total output= 
100% ibid ibid ibid ibid 
family farm income 
depreciation 
50%-
29% 
13% 
II 
27% 
14% 
i 
22% 
13% 
i 
16% 
13% 
I 
23% 
13% 
I 
economical cowmen ordinary machine- large 
farmers farmers men farmers 
family farm income plus 42% 
depreciation as 
% of total output 
41% 35% 29% 
monetary 
expenditures 
36% 
Third, there is the issue of pluriactivity. In some situations, this 
complements the income considerably, whereas it is of marginal 
importance in others. Such additional on-f arm and/or off-farm activities 
occur both on smaller and larger farms, but not randomly so. Pluriactivity 
is comparatively more important on so-called smaller farms. The 
subsistence base has been widened. 
Of course, the commodity fiction was not without its critics. Perhaps the 
most remarkable annotations were raised by Jan de Veer, vice director of 
the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) at the time. In an 
article in the 1977 annual report, he questions whether/and if so how, 'the 
farm results as determined by the LEI fulfil the function of assessment 
criteria and warning signal' (LEI 1978, p. 9). He investigates two 
approaches. 'First, one can examine whether remunerations charged for 
means of production correspond with the assumptions of maintaining the 
continuity of the enterprise.' Furthermore, account is taken of 'the 
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assessment of levels of consumption and savings realised in practice'. 
Both approaches are typical of the commodity fiction. The conclusion 
reached by De Veer is plain as day: 'Neither of these approaches has 
arrived at tenable conclusions. A final assessment needs to be supported 
in both cases by subjective and socially informed considerations' (ibid.). 
Astute observations hide behind this general conclusion. 'Despite 
negative farm results [i.e. a negative net return], farms have succeeded on 
average to maintain their net worth and to adapt to the demands of 
technical and economic development.' Despite the negative results, 
'considerable investments in expansion and modernisation' have been 
made (ibid., p. 23). Analysis of consumption and savings results in similar 
observations. In short, '[a] negative net result, calculated on the basis of 
assumptions made by the LEI, does not have to imply that the possibilities 
of spending and capital formation by entrepreneurs and their families 
have to fall below the level required for maintaining continuity'. And vice 
versa it applies that 'a positive net result does not imply that a situation is 
achieved in terms of possibilities for spending and capital formation by 
which farm continuity is assured' (ibid., p. 42). 
The quoted reflection by De Veer is the outcome of a solid analysis, based 
upon rich empirical material. Interestingly, it is an immanent critique. De 
Veer uses the neo-classical method to analyse the range, limitations, and 
therefore the validity of the then established neo-classical approach (in 
which the commodity fiction is both starting point and raison d'être). In 
addition, Jan de Veer occupies a prominent place within the expert system 
(both then and later). Therefore, it is all the more remarkable, and 
intriguing at the same time, that his critique hardly caused a stir. Initially, 
there were a few ripples, but it all died down after a few years. Thus, in 
his introduction to the 1979 Budget (Tweede Kamer 1978-1979, vol. 
15,300, chap. XIV, nr. 13), the minister remarked that the figures of net 
value added and factor costs in agriculture should be interpreted 
carefully. 'The absolute value of the factor costs is highly determined by 
the assumptions used in the determination of the remuneration claims for 
labour, land, and capital' (ibid., p. 2), referring indirectly to De Veer's 
article. One year later, the 1979 Landbouw-Economisch Bericht appears. The 
ritual statement has once again found its pre-eminent place: 'It appears 
from farm economic data that about 75 per cent of farms achieved a 
negative net result. This means that the used production factors are not 
remunerated according to the rates on these farms'. The commodity 
fiction has returned in full. Even though an objection à la De Veer follows 
('a negative net result cannot be seen as a sign of the continuity of the 
farm coming under threat'), it is no longer seen as very important: 'The 
above mentioned figure indicates that a considerable proportion of 
agricultural labour has no continuity in the long term' (LEB 1980, my 
italics). This quote sharply reveals the true nature of the expert system. 
De Veer shows in a meticulous and extraordinarily thorough manner that 
one of the foundations of structural development - that is, larger farms 
having more chances of success than smaller ones - is untenable both 
methodologically and empirically. In name of the future (the long term), 
Expert System and Modernisation Project: Controlling the Future 263 
however, this discovery is put aside. The notion of structural 
development might not be right at present, it should be right and will be 
right in the long term. The predominance of theory over practice, of future 
over present, emerges here quite dramatically. 
There is no longer a place for empirical reality. In the 1981 Budget 
(chapter XIV on agriculture and fisheries), normality has been re-
established. In this text, the expert system announced by way of the 
minister that 'space for as large a number as possible of socio-
economically viable family farms depends largely on the profitability of 
agriculture' (Tweede Kamer 1980-1981, vol. 16,400, chap. XIV, nr. 2, p. 
54). It is stated, needlessly, that 'farm development policy cannot surpass 
this either' (ibid.). 
The story about Jan de Veer, or rather the story about the sticky mud in 
which his statement eventually went down, is not unique. There are 
plenty more of these anecdotes - and that is precisely what is made of the 
matter. The issue in itself does not alarm me. What seems worrying is the 
nature of the notions concerning the 'long term'. All in all, it involves 
conventions, axioms, that are shared within the expert system. These are 
axioms that do not need to be specified, let alone need any support or 
proof. These are the axioms that are shared across the network on which 
the modernisation project is based. 
Careful empirical studies and/or thorough theoretical discussions do not 
matter. In so far as they identify complications, they are at the most twists 
and turns in the road to a 'long term' when everything will eventually be 
as it 'should' be. Furthermore - and this should also be an issue of careful 
attention - these conventions (or maybe I should say these virtual images) 
inform the development and implementation of policy, after which series 
of frictions, unintended consequences, problems, and missed chances 
emerge. 
The previous analysis can be summarised briefly and concisely. 'Small 
farms', as defined and understood within the expert system, do not exist. 
Indeed, there are smaller and larger farms in Dutch agriculture. The size 
of farms is one of many dimensions along which farms can be 
distinguished. However, in so far as 'small farms' are defined as 
productive units that are doomed to disappear, those small farms do not 
exist. The notion of 'small farms' is an 'artefact', it is a construction 
created and reproduced by the Ministry of Agriculture as expert system. 
'Small farms' figure in the expert system as a defect, as an aberration -
that is, as insufficiently large farms, as farms on which no reasonable 
income nor continuity can be realised. 'Small farms' are the flipside of 
'large farms', which embody a magical capacity to participate in a future 
from which small farms are excluded. 
Judged by the contemporary diversity and dynamics of the sector, this is a 
completely untenable notion. Small farms too demonstrate dynamics, 
small farms too can be made successional (De Bruin 1991). Unfortunately, 
ideas do not have to be 'true' to still make an enormous impact. 'Things 
are real, if they are real in their consequences.' It is a basic principle with 
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which every social scientist is made familiar. The notion of 'small farms', 
as carried by the Ministry of Agriculture as expert system, is a textbook 
example of this. 
It was mentioned at the start of this chapter that the expert system is not 
so much concerned with today's agriculture. The knowledge that is 
accumulated is particularly involved with the supposedly necessary 
transformation of agriculture to a future that is represented as being 
inevitable. In combination with the discussed commodity fiction, this 
results not only in the construction of the aforementioned artefacts, but 
also in further far-reaching distortions. 
In the early 1990s, I was involved in an interesting research project with 
the acronym DOBI. The research followed on from concern about the 
stagnation of automation in agriculture. One of the diagnosed causes was 
that too little was known about the different objectives, strategies, and 
information needs in the agricultural sector. Hence, the software 
developed was often too crude; it resulted in coarsening instead of the 
necessary fine-tuning. 
One of the aspects of the research project concerned an application of the 
methodologies that we had already developed within the research into 
farming styles to the database of the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI). The objective was to map out the differentiated 
information needs more precisely. The work was carried out with great 
enthusiasm. Relations were excellent on the work floor and the end result 
did not look bad either. 
Still, there was a hitch. It appeared that there was something strange: the 
LEI sample (the databases that provides information about Dutch 
agriculture) appeared possibly biased. To cut a long story short, the style 
of farming economically is underrepresented within the LEI sample. 
Checks and rechecks were conducted, but the conclusion was final: there 
is something wrong with the LEI dataset that is supposed to represent 
Dutch agriculture as a whole. The technical cause was tracked down too. 
It is probably a case of negative self-selection. 
The importance of such a bias should not be underestimated. By 
underrepresenting the style of farming economically, smaller farms are 
once again represented as economically uninteresting, as a cul-de-sac. 
A second implication (which was particularly important in the widely 
debated manure issue of 1994-95) is much more serious. Since the style of 
farming economically is generally characterised by low input levels of 
minerals and by a high internal efficiency, mineral surpluses are 
relatively, if not very low. A timely correction would have been very 
expedient. An important study such as 'the socio-economic implications 
of N, P, and K policies' (Projectgroep Verliesnormen 1995) would have 
turned out decisively different - if they had included an adequate sample 
entailing also the economical farmers. In our naivety, we initially assumed 
that there was no problem whatsoever. Our task is to conduct scientific 
research. If this shows that a certain database (in this case the LEI sample) 
no longer meets changing social trends (increasing attention to farming 
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styles, for instance), there is no problem at all. Criteria change and the LEI 
should have reacted positively to these changes by saying 'This is an 
important signal. We will analyse this further and review its implications 
for our work. For it is very important to us to constantly improve our 
database and to adjust it to changing circumstances'. 
However, this appeared to be a misperception. Even though the initial 
text was censored, even though LEI employees wrote various and 
increasingly concealing sections to replace earlier versions, the text was 
shelved. It became increasingly obvious that publication was being 
delayed (it appeared eventually in April 1996). Meanwhile, I found myself 
in an impossible position. In legal terms, publication (and any other type 
of communication towards the press or otherwise) is only possible after 
approval by the client. Only nine months after an agreed publication, has 
the researcher the right to express his own opinions about the research. I 
checked this again with old hands in my own field. They were unanimous 
and outspoken: 'Don't do anything foolish. Just wait and do whatever 
you like afterwards'. 
More generally, this incident shows the extent to which, once it has been 
created, a (mis)representation starts to generate an interest in itself - more 
precisely, an institutional interest. The LEI wishes to maintain the 
monopoly on the representation of Dutch agriculture. Every correction or 
self-correction appears potentially threatening in this respect. Admitting 
that a mistake has 'simply' been made is, within this track of thought, so 
much as admitting that a mistake can potentially be made again. The 
results could, in principle, be disputed and criticised. This clashes with 
institutional interests. 
In all likelihood, the same applies more generally to the expert system as a 
whole. The taken position becomes a onerous burden, which begins to 
influence 'imperatively' the further unfolding of events. (Incidentally, 
agricultural research institutes such as the LEI have to earn an increasing 
proportion of their budget through the market: maintaining 'institutional 
rights', or rather 'institutional infallibility', thus becomes a material 
interest too.) 
6.7 Interim summary: the pillars of the expert system and the 
modernisation discourse 
Wandering through the recent history of Dutch agriculture, we have 
encountered a few 'axioms' that constitute the core of the Ministry of 
Agriculture as expert system. These are axioms that are shared across a 
wide network; axioms that are so self-evident that they do not need to be 
tested or discussed; axioms, finally, that provide coherence to policy for a 
long time, if indeed they were not the origin of it. In summary, the 
following axioms are involved: 
1 Modernisation is a necessary and inevitable process. It is driven by 
general economic laws (especially the change in relative factor prices) 
and by technological development. Markets and technology compose a 
structure that rules Dutch agriculture. This structure (this 'causal 
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complex') generates a 'structural outcome': the constant reduction in 
the number of farms and employment in the sector. The continuous 
nature of this reduction emphasises the stable and dominant nature of 
the structure. Frictions, deviations, and the fact that a constant 
reduction in farm numbers takes place via different episodes do not 
matter. 
2 By way of a continuous rural exodus, the necessary space is created for 
ongoing scale enlargement. Exodus and scale enlargement merge 
together into structural development. Structural development is a 
'compulsory demand'. Without structural development, the future is 
unthinkable. 
3 The Ministry of Agriculture is actively involved in designing, 
implementing, and legitimising structural development as a concrete 
process. In the discussion about this, however, the ministry presents 
itself as being almost devoid of agency. At most, the ministry follows 
the structural imperative contained within markets and ongoing 
technology development. 
4 The development of the sector as a whole is interpreted as an 
illustration of the development of its constituent parts (the 'phallacy of 
the wrong level'). In so far as a differentiated view of the sector is 
necessary, it is derived from the extent to which structural 
development is realised. There is a leading group, a middle group, and 
a group of laggards, the 'farms with a productive disadvantage'. The 
one-dimensional, unilinear, and normative character of this division is 
shown most clearly in the further characterisation of the middle group: 
'This group contains those farms that either will join the leading group 
in the long term or will fall back towards the laggards' (Memorie van 
Toelichting 1977, 19.5/1635^, p. 6). This classification scheme leaves 
no room for black swans. 
5 The agricultural sector contains a considerable number of laggards, the 
smaller farms. They are not able to generate an acceptable income, nor 
are they able to realise continuity. That is why they are disappearing. 
6 The only right way to gain insight into the relations in and 
development tendencies of Dutch agriculture revolves around the 
consequent application of the commodity fiction. This is another 
reason why black swans remain unseen. 
7 Even though various developments (dynamic processes) take place in 
Dutch agriculture, only one development is, on the whole, really 
important: structural development. Therefore, the notion of structural 
development constitutes the conceptual framework with which 
empirical developments are perceived and/or filtered away (resulting 
in the production of knowledge as well as ignorance). 
Collectively, these axioms constitute the rigid benchmarks from within 
which the modernisation discourse is (re-)composed time and again. 'At 
the core of the modern project [. . .] is the notion that there is a small class 
of phenomena, objects or events [or rules] that drives everything else - a 
suggestion often linked to a belief [institutionalised in the 'expert system'] 
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that [. . .] these root phenomena [are firmly] understood' (Law 1994, p. 
12). On the whole, these 'root phenomena', as previously summarised, 
permeate in the notion of the 'vital agricultural sector' (Rijksbegroting voor 
het jaar 1981,16.400, chap. XIV, p. 3). 
Such a 'vital' sector 'is of great importance, for more than one reason' 
(ibid.). It supports employment, the export surplus on the balance of trade, 
food security, the liveability of the countryside, and the appropriate use 
and management of 'our' rural areas. 'A strong agriculture is 
indispensable' in all this (ibid.). In other words, a 'vital or strong sector' is 
in the public interest. ' The subsequent translation of this public need into 
a strong sector is determined completely by the pillars of the 
modernisation discourse: 'We have to bear in mind that this [that is, a 
vital sector] is only possible if farm results are such that the continuity of 
the farms is not endangered' (ibid., my emphasis). The commodity fiction 
rules clearly here; a translation into the doctrine of small farms is not 
absent either: 'The amount of production factors (land, labour, and 
capital) mobilised in agriculture, expressed in standard farm units, is a 
standard for measuring the income capacity of the farms' (ibid., 33). It is 
established then, and later, that 'a considerable proportion of farms are 
too small. The LEI set a boundary of at least 130 standard farm units'. 
Ergo, 43 per cent of farms were too small. They do not meet the necessary 
level needed to make and keep the sector 'healthy'. 'Continuity has not 
been guaranteed sufficiently for anywhere near all farms' (Eerste Kamer 
1979-1980,15800, chap. XIV, no. 49a, p. 35, answer to question 67).53 
Therefore, far-reaching 'efforts by industry as well as government' are 
necessary (Tweede Kamer 1980-1981, 16400, no. 2, p. 3). It is mentioned 
'that government policy concerning the agricultural sector aims at 
improving, and at making easier, the adjustment of farms to the socio-
economic and technical developments instead of taking away the effects 
of these developments [that is, rural exodus]' (Eerste Kamer 1979-1980, 
XIV, 48a, answer to question 67; my emphasis). 
Thus the modernisation story is told and retold. Although the nuances 
and accents vary, the core remains the same. It is barely possible to adjust 
the discourse significantly. The underlying axioms do not allow any other 
'solution' than the one outlined above. The discourse thus produced is 
suitable for an interpretation only of those empirical developments that 
conform with and confirm the story and the axioms. By ignoring all 
possible alternatives the expert system renders itself both deaf and blind. 
The more the axioms are confirmed, the blinder it becomes. A cataract 
develops more and more obviously. 
Finally, maintaining the axioms becomes an institutional, if not material, 
interest. I already referred to the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI) in this respect. Of course, this process extends further. The 
more the modernisation policy becomes based upon the convergence of 
projects, the more 'accomplices' there are, the more established interests 
to defend, the more the axioms become reified. 
268 The Virtual Farmer 
In the early 1980s, there was much discussion about the apparently 
inevitable production controls. Initially, the debate involved the so-called 
'co-responsibility charge', while possible forms of quota restrictions were 
brought in later. However, the Minister for Agriculture mentioned as 
early as 1981 that 'the EC problems cannot be allowed to be shifted onto 
the more modern, specialised farms [. . .] It would imply a punishment of 
efficiency and good entrepreneurship' (Memorie van Toelichting, Tweede 
Kamer 1980-1981,16400, XIV, no. 2, p. 3). 
In reference to theoretical concepts used previously in this chapter, I 
would like to point out here that the expert system had raised expectations. 
Guarantees had now to be proved, the reliability of the Ministry of 
Agriculture was in fact to be confirmed. This happened in statements 
such as quoted above. 
Once trust is created, it becomes a structuring moment par excellence. Trust 
has to be constantly reconfirmed. The 'best pupils in the class' (I use an 
expression of Eizner) should be not only rewarded but also be helped 
along the chosen path. The 1990s will show some striking examples which 
I will discuss in more detail later. 
Once a policy is institutionalised, it becomes an interest in itself. I was 
confronted by this during my involvement in the search for a solution for 
the ammonia problem in south-east Friesland with two colleagues, Klaas 
van Egmond and Lense Koopmans. The way in which the pursued policy 
(laid down in the Temporary Act on Ammonia and Livestock Farming, 
IAV) became a determinant of possible solutions, soon became apparent. 
Whatever the solution for south-east Friesland, it had to be formulated in 
such a way that other regions would have no grounds to dispute 
agreements already made on the basis of the IAV. To do so would mean 
that all policy would have been made redundant and lead to a flood of 
compensation claims. Once a policy has been adopted (however 
unfortunate the policy, as was clear in the case of the IAV), it becomes one 
of the most persuasive arguments in pursuing and improving continuity 
of policy - not only because interests are involved in the policy pursued 
thus far, but rather because policy itself now represents an interest. 
The modernisation project not only embodies a discourse, it is also a mode 
of ordering, a way of designing, of ordering, the world (in this case Dutch 
agriculture). The modernisation project extends beyond its own 
boundaries, '[because it is] performed or embodied, in a concrete [. . .] 
manner in [a] network of relations' (Law 1994, p. 20). The initial project of 
the expert system has become rooted in associations and arrangements 
with certain groups of farmers, exporters, banks, industry and farmers 
organisations. Convergence occurs. Stakeholders and shared interests 
emerge. 
Importantly, this convergence is not created haphazardly. There is a clear 
pattern: potentially interested parties as well as 'laggards' are defined 
clearly, at least as abstract categories. Thus, the modernisation project is 
largely a 'self-generating process' (Law 1994, p. 15). It creates and 
demonstrates its own necessity. As mentioned previously, it is a self-
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fulfilling prophecy. Hence, the concrete development of Dutch agriculture 
cannot be understood as the 'structural unfolding' of 'structural laws'. It 
is a process that has been actively created over time - it is also a process 
that became entangled with its own compulsions. It appears to be very 
difficult to turn back once the road has been taken. The self-created 
compulsions prompt continuation. 
Notes 
1 It is hard to draw the boundaries in black and white. The expert system extends, as it were, 
partially into the research and planning departments of large agribusiness groups as well as 
into various autonomous research institutes. Furthermore, the expert system increasingly 
branches off into and intertwines with 'Brussels', the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and the Environment (VROM), as well as provincial departments for the development of 
agriculture and the countryside. 
2 DWK is the Department of Science and Knowledge Dissemination (the directorate 
instructing the knowledge organisations), BSB is the bureau for strategic policy development 
(Bureau Strategische Beleidsontwikkeling), DL is the Department of Agriculture, and MKG 
is the Department of Environment, Quality and Health. 
3 In so far as can be examined, at least 10,000 people work within the expert system. This 
number is rising. The estimated number of academics working at the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries (including the agricultural research 
institutes (DLO), the advisory service (DLV), experimental stations, the Forestry Direction, 
and the National Inspection Service for Livestock and meat (RVV), but excluding 
Wageningen University and the agricultural educational colleges) was almost 2000 in 1986, 
2350 in 1991, and 2459 in 1996 (data from the Personnel and Organisation Department of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management, and Fisheries and of the National Council for 
Agricultural Research - NRLO). In 1978, 869 agricultural academics were working in the 
ministry and/or one of its associated knowledge institutes. In 1983, the number had risen to 
1094 (data are from the 'Netherlands Institute of Agricultural Engineers', NILI). 
4 Not only in their relationships with the Ministry of Agriculture, but also in the 
relationships among themselves. For: 'To be able to have confidence in dealing with 
individuals of whom one has no personal knowledge [. . .] a third party is necessary in the 
exchange, namely the government, which specifies property rights and enforces the 
contracts and secondly norms of behaviour to constrain the parties in the interaction with 
respect to opportunism, cheating, etc.' (North 1990). 
5 Authorisation relates to influencing and controlling human activities, while allocation 
relates to the possibility of controlling directly the material substrate, the 'object world' of 
human activities (Giddens 1984, p. 51). 
6 The unequal power relation is inherent to the notion of macro- and micro-actors. Macro 
actors occupy a 'location that enables them to take decisions which extend more widely in 
time and space' (Mouzelis 1991, p. 39). For micro-actors, on the other hand, the 'social 
system' is much more an 'external' - that is, unchangeable - fact, for 'his or her participation 
does not dramatically affect [the] structural features [of the social system]' (ibid.). 
7 The problem inherent in such concepts is the a priori assumption of a certain hierarchy. Its 
application inevitably leads to reification. Incidentally, it is remarkable that usually a 
previously selected group of empirical facts and assumptions is used in the analysis. In the 
Dutch case, it could be stated that the 'macro-actor' is often the prisoner of the 'micro-
actors'. The development of manure policy over several decades is a clear expression of this. 
8 A group of researchers in Australia has conducted a wide range of studies of farming 
styles under the supervision of Frank Vanclay, in the aftermath of the liberalisation of the 
trade in agricultural products. The overpowering conclusion is that reactions to liberalisation 
varied widely within an already highly heterogeneous agriculture. In short, diversity 
increased; see, inter alia, Vanclay et al. 1998. 
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9 The question about the culling of the cow in question will lead eventually to the existing 
architecture, the available shed space, as well as available land, the desired stocking density, 
etc. 
101 started this example with a decision about culling cattle. A French veterinarian, François 
Beaudeau, has devoted his whole Ph.D. thesis to culling. He shows there that culling is never 
an isolated action, but is part and parcel of a more comprehensive strategy that also relates 
to breeding, selection, feeding, the relation between milk and meat production, and so on. 
Further, he demonstrates in the study that the culling strategy is inspired by a number of 
more general opinions (for example 'let nature do the job' versus 'pursuing the highest level 
of profitability'). Equally, the culling strategy appears to be related to the farming style as a 
whole. And, third, a culling strategy leaves an unmistakable mark on the presence, 
frequency, and intensity of various cattle diseases. In the Netherlands, Roep et al. (1991), 
among others, have paid attention to different replacement patterns and their relations to 
farming styles. 
11 Western European 'Russian experts' will frown here, as the usual version of this story 
involves horses. This is also much more in line with typical Leninist analyses. During my 
visits to Russia, however, I have heard the story being told constantly as if it involved cows. 
Apart from the fact that this suits me much better in terms of the storyline, a classification in 
terms of horses must have been impossible because they were all comandeered by the Red 
Army in order to fight the Belarussians and the imperialists. 
12 Whoever takes note of Tables 2.1 and 4.1 in Van der Ven's Ph.D. thesis will realize 
immediately that too few variables have been taken into account. Van der Ven is the first to 
admit this. Within the DOBI project (see below) she developed a more detailed, and very 
powerful, method of analysis. 
13 This occurs by way of study groups, the systematic comparison of farm economic data, 
farm visits, cattle inspections, field trips, the farming press in which farm reports are 
constantly included, and so on. 
14 For a more extensive discussion about different domains of farm labour, see Bennett 1981; 
Van der Ploeg 1987,1990. 
15 Initially, farming styles were highly local and/or regional in nature: they were answers to 
local history, to the local ecosystem, to local relations between town and country, and so on. 
Farming styles manifesting themselves today (and as described in Chapter 3) are highly 
intralocal and/or intraregional. This is a logical effect of the shift in ordering principles. It is 
no longer the local setting, but the general context of markets and technology development 
that prompts new answers, new development opportunities. This results in the phenomenon 
of intraregional styles. 
16 In more general terms: 'Unity of style [. . .] is, just like every other unity of culture, a 
precondition for real communication. If one does not know of others why they do things the 
way they do, a discussion about each other's actions, and hence a good relationship, 
becomes impossible' (Hofstee 1985). 
17 According to the title of the well-known study by Arensberg and Kimball (1948) about 
Irish agriculture. See also De Haan (1993). 
18 Reference should be made in this context to the process of historically guaranteed, 
relatively autonomous reproduction (see Van der Ploeg 1990; Saccomandi 1991). 
19 This pattern contrasts sharply with the relations that are institutionalised during the 
period of modernisation. If the modernisation project is characterised by an accurate 
definition of the farm that is regarded necessary in the future (the 'vanguard farm') - which 
differs dramatically from the contemporary farm - the farm of the future is considered in 
this pattern to be the completion of current farms. If discontinuity rules in the one case, 
continuity prevails in the other. Furthermore, it is remarkable that the act of warding off the 
'immediacies of context' received a lot of attention in the former farming styles, whereas this 
is remarkably absent from the contemporary modernisation discourse. I will return to this 
issue in the following chapters. 
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20 Evidently, conflicts (such as described in Groun en Minsken and the Nijboer fan 
Lycklemastate) and tragedies (the first reaction to the high butter prices) were needed, in 
order for these norms to emerge and to make them permanent. 
21 Beyond doubt, a smaller farm could be expected to do things differently from a larger 
farm. The latter was regarded to take more risks (although, conversely, it was considered 
that 'pride goes before a fall'). Both Hofstee's work and many regional novels are proof of 
the highly anthropocentric nature of the earlier nuances within a farming style. 
22 In this respect, the fence rack is an interesting synecdoche: widely recommended until the 
mid-1950s, after which it became above all an indicator of the traditional farmer (see Frouws 
and Van der Ploeg 1973). 
23 Realisation of the modernisation project included both a development policy and a policy 
aiming at accellerated exodus. The latter policy aspect was used to create space (first land, 
later market shares, later again quotas and 'environmental space') for the 'growers'. 
Development policy was geared towards this group in particular. The 1977 Budget of the 
Ministry of Agriculture states: 'Highest priority should be given to strengthening the 
development policy' (Tweede Kamer 1976-1977,14000, chap. XIV, no. 2, p . 3). 
24 The Explanatory Statement of the Minister for Agriculture (Memorie van Toelichting 
1979, 10/5193-6, p. 5) quotes approvingly an article from the newspaper Nieuwe Rotterdamse 
Courant: 'Recent history of Dutch agriculture of the past, say 20 years can really be defined 
as a success story [. . .] All this is not due to an advantageous concurrence of circumstances, 
but due to a restless effort [. . .] Constantly anticipating new developments, technical and 
commercial innovations - in short, staying wide awake to everything that happens and 
changes - that is the way to keep your head above water'. The Minister adds: 'Agricultural 
policy has continuously encouraged and united these developments. And that is what I want 
to keep doing in this term, both nationally and internationally'. The remainder of the 
statement is evidence of this. I quote the citation here partly because, at other times, the 
expert system represents the state, and the Ministry of Agriculture in particular, as almost 
devoid of any agency. I discuss this elsewhere in this chapter. 
25 'The model of cognitive orientation that seems to me to best account for peasant behavior 
is the 'image of the limited good' [. ..] broad areas of peasant behavior are patterned in such 
a fashion as to suggest that peasants view their social, economic and rational universes [. . .] 
as one in which all the desired things in life, such as land, wealth, health, friendship and 
love, manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety exist 
in finite quantity and are always in short supply [. . .] there is no way directly within the 
peasant's power to increase the available quantities' (Foster 1965, p. 296). I use 'ironic' here, 
because this image of the scarce good is usually used strictly in the analysis of irrational 
'peasants' far away. However, it appears to be the key to understanding the race forward 
and, more specifically, the crazy competition for quotas in the 'highly developed and 
rational Netherlands'. 
26 Following Hayami and Ruttan, it is assumed that technological development is 
'endogenous' in character - that is, driven by relative factor prices. 
27 See the 'golden mountains of technology', an article in which De Hoogh (1987) presents 
his arguments most accurately. De Hoogh felt hurt particularly by the exploitation of the 
Third World (and by the obvious wastage in Europe). 
28 Here I quote a press release of the Ministry of Agriculture (nr. 382, 9 November 1978) 
entitled 'Comments of Minister Van der Stee to 'Boer blijven". More in-depth discussions 
can be found in the parliamentary discussions. 
29 Incidentally, a few other reasons are given in this text, such as the 'general economic 
growth that has supported the demand for high-quality products' and the 'establishing of 
the EC, which has resulted in a considerable enlargement of marketing opportunities for 
Dutch agriculture'. A pleasant aspect of these 'factors' is of course that they could have 
implied, in principle, a (relative) increase in the number of farms and employment. But I will 
leave this aside. 
30 One of the strong points of the modernisation project was that it unfolded gradually into 
an agenda for all theactors involved: government, farmers, advisors, agribusiness, 
technology designers, and so on. Thus emerged what we now call mutual reinforcement or 
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synergy. Similarly, axioms were created. Moreover, coordination and simultaneity emerged, 
precisely because a clear 'magnetic North' existed. It was clear whither agriculture was 
moving. 
31 Of course, this surprise took effect in two directions. I remember vividly the comment of 
my friend Bruno Benvenuti, the Italian agricultural sociologist who knew the Dutch 
situation very well. He was surprised time and again at the possibility of announcing in the 
Netherlands that half of the farmers had to disappear 'without it leading to a farmers war -
which would occur elsewhere and in different times'. 
32 All the more remarkable is that modernisation settles into an undisputable norm from the 
1970s onwards. This applies above all to administrators. In the early 1990s, we developed a 
number of 'building blocks for an agricultural development plan for Friesland' (Van der 
Ploeg et al. 1992). Together with previous studies of farming styles, this resulted in 
numerous discussions in the province of Friesland. I remember vividly the comments by 
Geert Hofstra and Pé Miedema, both great men. As a result of numerous comments from the 
floor ('well, we haven't done that badly as economical farmers'), these Frisian foremen 
concluded in a conversation: 'hell, Jan Douwe, it's wrong. It'll lose its fire. They will stop 
investing, that shouldn't happen'. 
33 This is actually encouraged by the system of volume premiums and discounts, which had 
been introduced in the late 1960s. Specialisation is actually encouraged by the 'milk tank 
regulations' of the 1970s. 
34 Here, I refer to the structure concept that is in common use in contemporary social 
sciences and that is highly influenced by Giddens' work. 
35 Incidentally, these figures are controversial. Instead of 570,000 jobs for 1957, the figure of 
650,000 is also quoted. Primary employment (on farms) comprises over 250,000 jobs in 1995, 
whereas employment in the agro-industry as a whole (including service industries) 
comprises 250,000 jobs too. Between 1957 and 1995, an incontestable process of 
externalisation takes place: part of employment localised directly on farms in the past 
remains in existence but 'moves' to agencies such as contractors. For a further discussion, 
see Chapter 7 of this book. 
36 I did not dream up this comparison: it was brought forward in a debate by Gerrit 
Meester, professor at the University of Amsterdam and Director of the Bureau for Strategic 
Policy Design of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
37 The intragenerational reproduction of the farm is possible only if the future farmer's 
siblings agree with a transfer price well below the market price (De Haan 1993). If solidarity 
within the family decreases - that is, if the siblings let prevail the perspective of immediate 
monetary benefits over the continuation of the parental farm - farm closure is the only 
option. 
38 A considerable number of Dutch farmers have sold their belongings here in order to buy 
a larger farm and/or a farm with more future prospects elsewhere. They have used the 
dramatic differences in land prices, and later in quota prices, largely to this end. This stream 
of migration is largely directed at Canada, the US, Australia, France, Portugal, and more 
recently at Denmark and eastern Europe. 
39 The importance of the modernisation message should not be underestimated: farmers and 
especially their successors were always presented with the idea that a large group of farms 
would be 'non-viable' - that is, would contain only 'leavers'. As a result, in many situations, 
it was decided 'to sell the lot while the price is still right'. 
40 The term 'enjoyment' is from Hofstee (1982, pp. 3-14). Hofstee warned, at that time 
already, that farmers could lose their enjoyment in work. The conditions under which they 
(want to remain) work(ing) cannot be stretched infinitely. 
41 This is a classic description with which farmers like to characterise their situation. 
Incomes can be subject to great pressure, while the total amount of capital is enormous. If the 
farm were to be sold, they could live very comfortably off the revenues for the rest of their 
lives. 
42 It is stated in one of the essays in the collection that 'labour productivity in agriculture 
has increased initially [until about 1955-1957] above all through productive changes [that is, 
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through intensification]. In particular, large improvements in cultivars, breeds, fertilisation, 
feeding, and disease prevention have resulted in increases in matter output per ha and per 
animal' (Maris 1963, p. 11). 
43 Penders is the editor of a jubilee volume of the Coöp. Centrale Boerenleenbank (now 
Rabobank), published in 1951 (the cover states: 'no people is stronger than its farmers'). In 
this collection, Staf, then director general for agriculture, writes: 'At this moment, when a 
further recovery of our national economy is of vital importance to us all, there is very little 
time even for a satisfactory retrospective and all attention should be directed towards the 
task at hand. Only by means of further intensification and rationalisation of farm 
management will Dutch farmers be able to fulfil their part of this task of greater agricultural 
production and export'. 
44 By way of a 'highly reduced number of labourers,' and the resulting 'considerable 
improvement of the structure, an important contribution can be made to the reduction in the 
supply of agricultural products'. This is the rather altruistic sounding argument of Maris 
and Rijneveld (1963, p. 11). Such a contribution has never been made (on the contrary, see 
Van der Ploeg 1987). 
45 This is analytically identical to de-externalisation and hence decommoditisation. For a 
number of empirical illustrations, see Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 1985; Roep et al. 1991. 
46 At least, since (i) it is not known which dynamics occurred within the size categories, nor 
(ii) is it known which dynamics occurred beyond the indicated time limit. 
47 'The actual amount of labour conducted by the entrepreneur and contributing family 
members is accounted for on the basis of the number of hours worked at the prevailing 
agreement rate for permanent workers, increased by employer's contributions [. . .] On the 
basis of the profitability of state bonds (which are the starting point for the interest rate for 
net worth) an interest rate has been calculated of 7 per cent for durable means of production, 
excluding land [.. .] In the definition of costs, an interest rate for land is calculated of 2.5 per 
cent as if the farm was completely owned' (Van Dijk et al. 1993, p. 19). 
48 Such a course of action is particularly inspired by the fiscal policy. 
49 Incidentally, I would like to point out that Vondeling had already introduced a similar 
issue in the early 1950s. In this respect, it is also remarkable that accountancy firms maintain 
considerable distance from what they call the 'LEI doctrine'. The former CBTB accountancy 
firm, which now has become Alpha, has developed an elegant alternative. 
50 I have experienced numerous incidents since (the same applies to my colleagues), which 
return always to the same crucial point: criticism is taboo in the expert system. When a 
university and an expert system are joined together (in the case of the Wageningen 
University and Research Centre), this results in difficult relationships. 
51 To a certain extent, this reflects the supposedly vital convergence and synergy of different 
projects, such as the industrial need for a positive balance of trade, the consumer demand for 
cheap food and their need for food security, etc. However, the way in which these needs are 
linked to the particular development project of agriculture is a very special one. 
52 Such a position constitutes a constant through time. In 1985, for example, it was said that 
'it is important generally for the agricultural sector that healthy, viable farms are maintained 
or established. Modern farm management should exist expressing responsible entrepreneur-
ship' (Memorie van Toelichting, Tweede Kamer 1984-1985,18600, chap. XIV, nr. 2, p. 5). 
53 'Farm economic data show that about 75 per cent of the LEI sample farms had a negative 
net result in the period from 1972-1973 to 1976-1977 [. . .] The above-mentioned figure 
indicates that a considerable proportion of agricultural jobs do not have continuity in the 
long run' (LEB 1979). 
54 Which resulted in one of the most painful episodes of recent agricultural history. Smaller 
farms, extensive farms, farms that had not or hardly increased production in the past years 
were cut, whereas 'growers' received extra space because they had invested so much in the 
future. This provoked severe criticism in parliament. 
Redundancy as Contemporary Drama and 
the Production of Myths 
In the virtual world of agriculture, redundancy is regarded as a pre-
condition for structural development: it is an explicit ingredient of the 
modernisation process. Redundancy implies the ongoing elimination of 
farms: farmers and their family members leave agriculture. Redundancy 
is regarded as a sign of progress. In the 1970s the expert system became 
concerned about the, then decreasing, level of redundancy: it was thought 
that less redundancy implied less room for structural development. The 
expert system saw redundancy as a kind of thermometer: if it went too 
low, the structural development project was cooling off. 
A supposedly too low level of redundancy has frequently been used to 
portray smaller and/or part-time farmers in a negative light. By not 
giving way to others, they block structural development. 
Today, we have left behind us this period within which the term 
'postman farmer" was widely used, in a derogatory sense. All the same, a 
significant minority of Dutch farmers still understands and imagines the 
'crisis in agriculture' as arising from too slow a process of redundancy 
(Van der Ploeg et al. 1994). 
Within the expert system, the notion of redundancy is one of the 
cornerstones of the way in which agriculture is understood and 
represented. Progress can be imagined only in combination with a 
considerable level of redundancy. Within the virtual world that the expert 
system created, development and redundancy are two sides of the same 
picture. This very combination makes redundancy into a normative 
notion with a very particular content: it is acceptable for small farms to 
fall by the wayside; only the disappearance of larger, so-called efficient, 
farms poses a problem. 
Redundancy is, according to the prevailing ideology in and around 
agriculture, an inevitable effect of economic and technological laws. The 
competitive relations within which the primary sector has to operate 
worsen. Output prices stagnate and costs (including costs of living) rise. 
The classic answer to this, i.e. farm enlargement, can only be achieved on 
larger farms, especially since new capital-intensive and labour-reducing 
technologies can be applied on those farms. 
Translator's note: A highly pejorative term for someone who buttered their bread on both 
sides. It was the last expression of the uncaptured peasantry, a hindrance to development. 
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That is why redundancy always exists at the 'bottom end' of the 
agricultural sector. Smaller farms are confronted by a pressing income 
question. Or else, they face a successional problem: they will not be taken 
over by the next generation. They are so small in size that they do not 
have any prospects for the future. They are not competitive. Hence, there 
is, sooner or later, no option but farm closure. 
The case seems to be incontestable. For many decades, the number of 
farms has decreased by about two per cent per year. This fairly stable 
percentage supports the image of redundancy as an inevitable and 
continuous process. Redundancy is a stable phenomenon - one on which 
policy is actively based. 
I will show in this chapter that, however improbable it may seem at first, 
redundancy understood as the inevitable disappearance of smaller farms 
- in other words, as the constant closure of farms because of economic 
laws - does not exist in Dutch agriculture. The way in which redundancy 
is usually understood is a myth. It is part of the virtual reality that we have 
created for ourselves. It is a logical component of the whole worldview 
that encompasses the virtual farmer, virtual agriculture, virtual structural 
development, and so on. If judged by empirical evidence, the notion of 
redundancy is nothing but a virtual concept. 
It is unarguably true that farms disappear every year. It is also true that 
poverty and despair exist in some farming communities. However, the 
ongoing reduction in farm numbers does not necessarily imply that the 
redundancy process is a necessary ingredient of agricultural development 
tout court. However, in scientific analysis as well as in political discourse, 
the reduction of farm numbers and the inevitability of redundancy as 
outcome of structural development are related to each other in such a way 
that one becomes the 'proof' of the other, and vice versa. 
I will try to disconnect one from the other and at the same time I will offer 
an alternative explanation why farm numbers fall. Through this the real 
dangers and threats to agriculture in the Netherlands can be uncovered. 
The development of farm numbers is first determined by farm 
'succession'. Fathers Work for their Sons - according to the beautiful title of 
a study by Berry (1985). Sons continue, in turn, the work of their parents. 
'Keeping the name on the land' (Arensberg and Kimball 1948) is the 
prevailing imperative. Intragenerational continuity is the link connecting 
past, present, and future, often by means of the most exotic of 
mechanisms - such as a pact with the devil (De Jong 1979). 
Two complementary movements occupy the left and right sides of the 
main movement. Alongside the existing farms that have and are likely to 
successfully meet the challenges of succession, new farms can be started. 
On the other hand, the dance through time, the constant succession of 
existing farms, can be discontinued. Hence, farms will disappear. 
The total number of farms at any given time is the outcome of two 
movements: of the setting up of new farms and of the closing of existing 
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farms. The net result of both movements shows the development of farm 
numbers. 
Table 7.1 provides data about both movements. It demonstrates that the 
creation of new farms is lower than the closure of existing farms. This is in 
itself historically unique.2 More importantly, the rate of decline has fallen 
considerably from 4.9 per cent in the first half of the 1970s, to 3.5 per cent 
in the second half of the 1970s, to 2.3 per cent in the 1990s (in fact, over the 
1990-1997 period). If 5760 farms were closed annually in the second half 
of the 1970s, this number had fallen to 2890 farms per annum in the 1990s. 
Table 7.1 Outflow and influx of farms (percentage per year) 
Outflow 
Influx 
net reduction/year 
1970-1975 
-4.9 
+ 2.7 
-2.2 
1975-1980 
-3.5 
+ 1.4 
-2.1 
1990-1997 
-2.3 
+ 0.6 
-1.7 
At the same time the number of newly created farms (the influx) has also 
been in decline: from 2.7 per cent per year in the first half of the 1970s to, 
ultimately, 0.6 per cent per year in the 1990s. 
Taken together, a net reduction in farm numbers of about two per cent per 
year has indeed occurred over the past decades. The 1996 Landbouw-
Economisch Bericht mentions an average net reduction of 1.7 per cent per 
annum for the period 1976-1994. This number included an average 
reduction of two per cent in the category 'farming main occupation', 
while the percentage was considerably lower in the category 'part-time 
farms'. 
At the same time, Table 7.1 indicates that the apparently stable figure of 
annual net reduction of farm numbers is the product of highly changeable 
movements. Both influx and outflow decrease. This is sufficient reason to 
investigate carefully both movements and their interrelations. 
7.1 Influx 
If the rate of influx had remained constant during the 1970-1997 period (at 
about 2.7 per cent), the number of farms would have remained stable, or 
risen slightly. The influx, however, fell sharply. In an analysis devoted to 
'mutations' over the period 1995-1997, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) states 
that 'the number of farm creations was still about 1200-1400 per year in 
the late 1980s, [whereas] these figures have more than halved in the 
period 1995-1997' (CBS 1989, p. 57). 
The influx of farms is the result of numerous processes, the result of 
various projects that do or do not interlock. Starting a new farm, however 
microscopic, has for a long time been experienced as an important step in 
the emancipation process of those involved. It was remarkable that 
young people from non-farming families too tried to develop their own 
farms. At present, young people who want to set up a new farm (and 
more specifically, non-farming young people who want to set up an 
organic farm, for instance) seek refuge elsewhere; not in the Netherlands, 
but in Denmark or Germany, France, Italy, Ireland or Spain. And fathers 
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who want to organise a farm for their second or third sons, turn their gaze 
towards Portugal, eastern Europe, or Canada. In other words, a 
considerable influx still exists, but this influx no longer materialises in the 
Netherlands but rather elsewhere. 
Setting up new farms in the Netherlands has become increasingly 
difficult. Extremely high land prices, high quota costs (irrespective of 
whether this concerns milk quota, ammonia emission rights, pig rights, 
and so on), very high transaction costs (to acquire access to existing 
supply and distribution circuits, to obtain loans, to acquire recognition 
and support in the immediate environment, etc.) and a set of 
institutionalised rules that regulate the distribution of available resources 
(for example, who received land in the Flevo-polders for what reason, 
who received interest support for what reason) - all of these issues have 
turned the 'creation' of a new (small) farm into a 'heroic deed'. It is 
hardly possible at all. Not because the markets rule out this possibility in 
themselves, but because of the way that these markets are ordered 
institutionally. Elsewhere in Europe, these same markets are regulated 
differently, allowing many more young people (ironically, including 
many Dutch youngsters) to create new farms. In the Netherlands, 
however, this has been made almost impossible. The way in which 
government projects (fed on the idea of continuous redundancy as 
favourable and unmistakable condition for structural development) and 
the projects of young farmers and young non-farmers who would like to 
become farmers relate to each other is such that any kind of substantive 
influx is made impossible. This is the very reason why the actual influx 
has reduced so sharply. The desire to become a farmer has not 
disappeared. 
Does the influx of new farms constitute a direct threat to the development 
opportunities of already existing farms? Does influx occur at the cost of 
the expansion opportunities of established farms? Is there a zero-sum 
game (Van der Ploeg and Nieuwenhuize 1986) in the sense that 
opportunities for one group (newcomers, for instance) occur at the cost of 
development opportunities for the others (in this case existing farmers)? 
Although I will address this crucial question later in more general terms, I 
would like to introduce a particular situation at this stage. It involves an 
exemplary case: a large estate in the Netherlands on which numerous 
tenants make a living. The maintenance and further development of 
landscape and ecological values is one of the aims of the landlord. An aim 
that collides in various ways with the wishes of some tenants to realise 
massive scale enlargements. 
The following question arises in this situation: do we encourage the 
development of smaller, mixed farms as well as the development of 
organic farms (which correspond better with the aims of the leasing 
association) or do we provide space to a small group of fast-growing 
farms? In short, do we provide space for newcomers and assume that 
'growers' have to 'hold up their own trousers', or is all available space 
reserved for the latter group? Of course, the interesting issue here is that 
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the said situation (of landlord and tenants) does not involve anonymous 
land and quota markets. The landlord needs to purposefully allocate 
quota and land among the tenants. Which line is chosen eventually is not 
even that important (interested readers are referred to Van Broekhuizen 
and Van der Ploeg 1999). The point is that the definition and distribution 
of opportunities emerge here as a fundamental moment of choice, and 
that the opinions about the most desired future image is pivotal in this. 
Influx and, hence, the number of future farms can be influenced - it can 
even be enlarged. Whether this will happen, however, depends upon the 
'battle for the future', a battle that interferes in various ways with the 
already established interests. In this sense, the estate in question is a 
fascinating microcosm, in which part of the conflict awaiting the sector as a 
whole is played out already. 
7.2 Outflow 
Let us now examine the outflow. What farms close down and why? 
Usually, two types of outflow are identified: 'voluntary farm closure' and 
'early or compulsory retirement'. I will follow this distinction here. 
'Voluntary retirement' 
Voluntary retirement (a somewhat euphemistic term) occurs especially 
where farms are not succeeded. Tntergenerational reproduction' (De 
Haan 1993) is, for whatever reason, blocked. A multitude of (sometimes 
interlocking) demographic, cultural, political, and economic changes play 
a part in this. It is important to stay with this issue a bit longer. Especially 
since it demonstrates that 'succession', as it is called in the agricultural 
world, has become increasingly difficult, at times almost impossible. 
However, this is because of other reasons than presented by the 
redundancy myth. 
1 First, demographic changes. It was customary in many areas that 
farmer sons would marry at an older age (at 30, for instance). Usually, 
this coincided with the time when they could take over the parents' 
farm. It implied that the son's children would reach their marriageable 
age at the moment their father became tired of work (say at 60). This 
scheme has given way to another pattern. Although the differences are 
apparently subtle, their implications are far-reaching (for a more 
general discussion, see Van den Broek 1998a). 
Assume the average son marries at 25 and has children. Assume that 
he wants to farm on average until he is 65 years of age. Finally, assume 
that his son in turn marries also at 25, has children and has to provide 
for a family. By implication, father and son (if the latter wants to take 
over the farm) have to both work on the farm for 15 years and have to 
draw two family incomes from it. Now, this happened in the past too, 
but the point is that because of the changed demographic cycle, the 
period over which this has to happen has become longer. At the same 
time, the preconditions under which such is possible are increasingly 
absent. Generating two family incomes implies that the production 
volume has to be increased at least temporarily. This was not too 
Redundancy as Contemporary Drama 279 
problematic in the past. Nowadays, because of the quota systems in 
dairying and in intensive husbandry, it has become almost impossible. 
'In the past things could take their time - now, everything is turned 
upside down', is an often heard statement. A son who wants to take 
over will therefore choose another job temporarily, which usually 
results in the son and/or his wife, after about 10-15 years, not wanting 
to return to the farming occupation, which they have become alienated 
from anyway. This is one of the reasons leading to 'not taking over'. 
A second demographic factor of unarguable importance is the highly 
reduced family size. Even though, in agriculture, there are less 
proverbial two-children families than elsewhere, it is obvious that 
'recruiting' a successor has become much more difficult at the current 
family size (of two to three children) than previously. All the more so 
since the assumption that one of the children will take over has all but 
disappeared and the children's horizons are infinitely wider now than 
they were in the past. 
The next factor is of an economic nature. Because of the sharp increase 
in the value of land and quota, the inheritance sum has increased 
dramatically. Even though it is traditional in agriculture to keep 
market prices 'outside' - farms are generally passed on at about 50-60 
per cent of their market value - such an amount and the necessity to 
enter into high loans can become increasingly prohibitive, particularly 
on larger farms. All the more if two additional factors are taken into 
account. First, brothers and sisters are entitled to part of the mentioned 
take-over sum. They have to agree on the undervaluing of the farm. 
This becomes increasingly difficult as a result of the actual degree of 
commoditisation. 
Furthermore, every take-over (and hence the take-over sum that goes 
with it) is viewed in the light of the future prospects of, and on, the 
farm. Is it possible to generate adequate income in the future in order 
(a) to pay and redeem financial obligations that have been entered 
into, (b) to produce a reasonable family income and, finally, (c) to save 
an adequate amount to 'keep the farm up with the times', as they say? 
Here above all future prospects inform today's actions (whether or not 
to take over). A farm take-over does not take place on the basis of 
today's relations and data; deliberating about whether or not to take 
over takes place via the future. 
Here another factor enters into the story. Thinking and talking about 
farm succession is largely objectified by the expert system which 
highlights the viability of the farm in objective and 'undisputable' 
terms. A farm is viable if it is of sufficient size, and only under this 
conditions can the farm be taken over. Thus, viability functions here as 
an intrinsic feature of the farm. It is a 'structural fact' that determines 
'actions' (for it determines whether or not the farm can be taken over). 
This contrasts highly with the ideas circulating amongst the Dutch 
Agricultural Youth Organisation (NAJK). The central question there is: 
how do you prepare the farm for take-over (for a more extensive 
discussion, see De Bruin 1991). Thus the following paradox can occur 
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in practice: young people take over a non-viable farm and develop it, 
often in an original way, into a prosperous enterprise. How is this 
possible? Precisely because they prepare the farm for take-over. They 
examine the farm to be taken over from a different future project, as a 
result of which the apparent lack of viability disappears. Again, black 
swans arise; they remain largely unacknowledged, however. They are 
'hidden novelties'. 
Since the expert system puts forward a different view, these black swans 
remain at best 'refrigerator anomalies' (according to the poignant term by 
Koningsveld 1976). Hence, young people who consider farm take-over are 
confronted mainly by the standard story (in the agricultural education, 
accountants, advisory services, agro-political discourse of farm 
organisations, press, etc.). Of course, all this does not lack impact. In too 
many occasions, farm take-over is abandoned because the farm is 
represented as too small and therefore as not viable. In combination with 
the, often, extremely high value represented in a relatively small farm (a 
farm of, say, 20 hectares and a relatively small quota of 200,000 litres 
easily represents, depending on its location, an amount of NLG 1.8-2.5 
million), the dominant view of the expert system ('there is no prospect for 
non-viable farms')3 results in the often encountered statement 'let's sell 
the lot dear while we still can'. 
Thus, various projects interlock (the willingness of 'growers' to pay large 
sums for land and quota, the political arena in Brussels generating 
uncertainty about the future value of quota, the way in which the expert 
system represents the future, and probably the tendency of brothers and 
sisters to make the best of a bad bargain). As a result, there is great 
pressure on farmers to retire from agriculture. 
Still, outflow of farm numbers has fallen from about 5760 per year for the 
period 1970-1975 to, on average, 2980 farms per year in the first seven 
years of the 1990s. Outflow fell not only in absolute terms but also in 
relative terms, from 4.9 per cent, to 3.5 per cent, to 2.3 per cent (see Table 
7.1), and to 1.9 per cent in 1997. 
The actual reduction in outflow is remarkable, because all relevant 
preconditions (whether demographic, political, cultural, economic, etc.) 
tend toward the opposite. Apparently, a remarkable 'resistance' is hidden 
in the sector, a determination to keep farming, against all opposition. I 
will return to this below. 
As an interim conclusion, we can state that in Dutch agriculture of today, 
not taking over of farms not only informs about the supposed poverty 
and hopelessness, but it refers also and particularly to the impact of 
changing demographic, political, cultural, and economic relations within 
which a succession has to be realised. 
'Compulsory redundancy ' 
Alongside voluntary farm closure, so-called compulsory farm closure 
exists. This term refers usually to farms with an entrepreneur younger 
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than 55 years of age on which the process of farm closure has started. 
Succession is not yet a relevant issue on these farms. Thus, the absence of 
a successor can not (or hardly) explain this type of farm closure. 
'Compulsory farm closure often relates to farmers younger than 55 years 
of age. Furthermore, this group is often defined by the term 'early 
retirees'. Financial and economic factors play an important role in this 
type of closure, such as not being able to fulfil financial obligations' (LEB 
1998, p. 110). 
Table 7.2 provides an overview.1 More than half the number of farm 
closures falls in the above-discussed category of lack of succession. One 
third falls in the group of early retirees. I have introduced the age 
category of 55-60 as an interim category. 
If we search for (sociological research is sometimes like investigative 
police work) farmers who, conform to the redundancy myth, have to close 
their farms because of poverty and hopelessness, we will have to focus 
our search among the group of early retirees. This involves an estimated 
990 farms per year. Usually, farm closure in this category is associated 
with the idea of defeat. 'I can't do it anymore.' The farm cannot be 
continued, which is considered, certainly in agriculture, as personal 
defeat, as proof of failure - since 'the good entrepreneur will make it'. 
Those who do not 'make it' are left with the unenviable destiny of 
becoming a bin man (according to the communis opinio within the sector). 
Table 7.2 Farm closure and age, plus an indication of 
category 
voluntary 
closure; age 
>60 
interim 
category; 
55-60 
early 
retirement; 
age < 55 
percentage 
55% 
12% 
3 3 % 
number 
of cases 
per year 
1570 
330 
900 
demographic 
and cultural 
complications 
at succession 
++ 
+ 
sell the lot 
dear as 
long as it is 
possible 
++ 
+ 
? 
possibl 
dis-
ability 
0 
++ 
+ 
e causes 
divorce 
+ 
bank-
ruptcy 
+ 
migra-
tion 
+ 
It should first of all be mentioned that the number of early retirees as a 
whole is less than one per cent per annum. This is in noticeable contrast to 
the 'mortality rate' (it is, admittedly, a morbid expression, but the word is 
used in the technical language in question) encountered in small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). All in all, the 'birth rate' is about 10.8 
per cent per year there, and the mortality rate is 5.7 per cent per year. 
At any event, a number of factors and circumstances play a role in the 
phenomenon of 'early retirement'. These are of a completely different 
nature to the ones that played a role in the so-called 'voluntary closure' 
encountered among older farmers. 
1 If we look more closely at the category of early retirees, we have to 
refer first to the considerable and rather fast growing group of 
'migrant' farmers who sell their farm here in order to set up a new and 
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larger farm abroad. This is estimated at present to be about 250 farms 
annually. 
2 The next issue is the divorce issue (again a cultural change directly 
affecting the development of the agricultural sector). Divorce implies 
almost inevitably farm closure, certainly if one is married in 
'community of property'. The reaction from within the sector came 
very quickly in the form of changing earlier, and more en masse than 
elsewhere, to marrying with 'marriage settlements' (Bernet 1997). Still, 
a certain number of farms (an estimated 100 per year) will necessarily 
close as a result of divorce. 
3 A third factor is disability.9 More than 100 farmers per year become 
permanently disabled (GUO 1995, 1996; UVI Jaarverslag 1998).20 In the 
past, this was solved usually within the setting of the extended family 
and/or by early mobilisation of children; nowadays, however, 
disability often implies farm closure. Apart from physical disability, 
stress can result in severe mental problems, which manifest 
themselves, for example, in the neglect of farm animals. This too can 
result in compulsory farm closure (in this case through the AID). The 
number of cases involved annually is not known. Van den Broek 
(1998b) concludes on the basis of empirical research that problems of 
(severe) neglect occur on about one per cent of Dutch livestock farms. 
4 Furthermore, there is a category that is hard to situate within the 
subdivisions used in Table 7.2. These are mostly farms that are 
compulsorily bought out: farms that have to make room for city 
enlargement, nature reserves, and/or infrastructural works. However, 
a number of these farms will be continued elsewhere (they provide the 
opportunity to others to 'sell the lot dear'); others will emigrate. And 
finally, an (unknown) proportion will decide to live off their capital. 
To avoid double counts we will leave this category outside of the 
analysis entirely. 
5 Next, we have to point to those farms that get into acute problems due 
to an increasing friction between investment obligations arising from 
the prevailing regulations and their own financial space and 
investment cycles (see Frouws et al. 1996). 
If we combine migration, divorce, and disability (ignoring the categories 
of friction and expropriation), we are left with an early retirement figure 
of 250 + 100 + 100 = 450 cases per year. This is about 50 per cent of the 
total number of early retirements. Again, these cases cannot be gathered 
together under the banner of the redundancy myth. Irrespective of what 
informs about what, it definitely does not refer to the inevitable poverty 
and hopelessness, which, in turn, necessarily, would result in farm 
closure. It involves other issues (however sad they may be). 
6 Finally, we are left with a group of farms that have entered into too 
high financial costs. Part of these (especially the supposedly 'viable' 
farms) are saved by regulations for the self-employed. This involves on 
average about 500 cases per year. Furthermore, there are about 115-
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200 cases that face inevitable bankruptcy. An interim category (of 
about 300-400 farmers per annum) exists between these two - farmers 
who cannot, or do not want to, use the 'life-jacket regulation' and 
hence avoid bankruptcy. These farmers close their farms of their own 
free will, because they did not succeed in achieving their future project 
due to a mismatch with other projects. Heavy investments have been 
made (through external capital) in a certain future project (usually a 
future project aligned with the predictions articulated by the expert 
system). Disappointing revenues (a slight fall in the milk price, for 
instance) make the path between imagined future ideal and the 
present situation impassable. This will result in ruin. 
Thus we have finally arrived at one category to which applies that 
economic and financial reasons are a direct cause for farm closure. What is 
important here theoretically is that this category does not consist of 
smaller, 'failed' farms, but rather of larger farms moulded according to 
the modernisation logic. 
Mathematically, at most 540 farms per year are involved in this. Again, 
these are not farms that are ruined by poverty and hopelessness. It 
generally involves dairy farms with quotas of over 1 million kg (in south-
east Friesland, for instance). In greenhouse horticulture, it involves young 
entrepreneurs who have expanded their farms quickly and hence have 
entered into high financial obligations. The category that we talk about 
represents therefore (perhaps not fully but at least to a considerable 
extent) the folly of the modernisation race. However, it does not, or to a 
limited degree at most, involve an expression of redundancy as the 
necessary elimination of the 'bottom end' of farms. 
7.3 On which farms does outflow occur? 
Within which category does outflow occur most? Conventional wisdom 
provides an explanation: Outflow (both 'voluntary' and 'early 
retirement') will occur on smaller farms in particular. The argument is 
obvious. Large farms can generate more revenues as a result of their size 
than smaller farms and, therefore, bear the brunt and/or setbacks and 
meanwhile free up sufficient resources to keep on growing. Smaller farms 
can do neither. They have no choice but to suffer defeat or fall behind 
even further. In summary, decline occurs on smaller farms, continuity and 
growth on larger ones. 
Every statistic related to farm results and incomes seems to emphasise 
this 'iron law' (even though it requires certain ingredients, such as the use 
of misleading averages, the consequent use of the commodity fiction, 
ignoring essential differences in styles, and so on). Recent memory - for it 
was always said that smaller farmers became redundant - emphasises this 
iron law once again. Who pays attention to the fact that we deal with 
completely different episodes? And who has taken into consideration that 
a remarkable number of large agricultural enterprises have come onto the 
market in the past years? In short, it seems an almost ludicrous enterprise 
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to dispute the iron law that smaller farms become redundant and larger 
ones continue to grow. 
Table 7.3 is based on an analysis of the most recent mutation files of 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS). The total number of farms and the number 
of farm closures is shown for different farm sizes and age categories. The 
number of farm closures is also expressed as a percentage of the total 
number of farms for each category. All data refer to 1997. 
Table 7.3 Mutation data, 1997 
Very small farms 
3-24 NSU" 
Small farms 
2 4 ^ 0 NSU* 
Medium-sized farms 
40-70 NSUa 
Summary 
24-70 NSU* 
Middle large farms 
70-100 NSU" 
Large farms 
> 100 NSU" 
Summary 
> 70 NSUa 
farmer < 55 
13,972 farms, 
354 closed 
(2.5%) 
5748 
63 
1.1% 
11,364 
86 
0.7% 
17,112 
149 
0.9% 
10,495 
46 
0.4% 
15,622 
65 
0.4% 
26,157 
111 
0.4% 
farmer 55-60 
4453 farms 
156 closed 
(3.5%) 
1733 
30 
1.7% 
2991 
30 
1.0% 
4724 
60 
1.2% 
2471 
12 
0.5% 
4039 
19 
0.5% 
6510 
31 
0.5% 
farmer > 60 
16,309 farms 
949 closed 
(5.8%) 
3715 
104 
2.8% 
4990 
74 
1.5% 
8705 
178 
2.0% 
4142 
21 
0.5% 
5875 
24 
0.4% 
10,017 
45 
0.4% 
Note: Netherlands size unit 
In 1997, 2033 farms were closed for good: they were not taken over within 
the family. The table demonstrates that farm closures are divided among 
all farm size categories and among all age categories. At the same time, it 
is clear that this division is highly unequal. 
The bottom three lines of Table 7.3 present farm closure data for the larger 
size categories. They contain the farm size category that includes 70-100 
Netherlands size units (NSU) and also the category of farms over 100 
NSU. The figures have been summarised in the final line, referring to all 
farms over 70 NSU. I want to bring to mind that the rule of thumb used 
usually within the expert system states that farms of over 70 NSU are 
situated in the 'green zone'. The Rabobank in particular, which is of 
course an important institution here, excels in such representations. 
It appears from the table that a closure percentage of 0.4-0.5 per cent per 
year exists for every age category in this group of larger farms. It is a 
figure that, it seems to me, refers above all to the things in life that can go 
wrong: divorces; death; disability; migration; bankruptcy; and/or 
'compulsory' farm closure, which represents avoidance of permanent 
bankruptcy. 
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All in all, this percentage (0.4-0.5 per cent) refers to solidity, to the 
resistance capacity of Dutch agriculture. Moreover, the growth of small and 
medium-sized enterprises is more than sufficient to compensate this 
figure. The table informs also about the situation in the 'orange zone', the 
so-called medium-sized farms in the 40-70 NSU category, and about the 
small farms (24-40 NSU) that are situated in the so-called 'red zone' -
according to the Rabobank classification. It shows that closure 
percentages are still relatively low. Take the small farms (24-40 NSU) 
with farmers over 60 years of age. This is a group in which potential 
successors are confronted directly with the expert judgement that take-
over would be irresponsible. The farm is too small, it is situated 
permanently in the 'red zone'. If it is assumed that continuing to farm 'till 
death' as a phenomenon has almost disappeared and that the idea of 
'let's sell the lot dear while we still can' will take root here in particular, 
farm closure will take place when the present farmers reach about 70 
years of age (although my impression is that 65 years of age is a more 
realistic figure today). If this were the case there would be, every year, a 
cohort of 10 per cent (or, assuming a lower retirement age, 20 per cent) 
within which no other opportunity than farm closure would exist. 
However, the actual closure rate is not 10 per cent, let alone 20 per cent, 
but only 2.8 per cent (and taking into account the 'things that go wrong in 
life' and the increasing importance of disability and death amongst this 
older age group, the percentage of closure due to lack of any prospect 
would be even lower). In any event, it is not remarkable that 2.8 per cent 
of farms in this category are closed per year. It is miraculous that from the 
yearly cohort of 10 to 20 per cent, 7.2-17.2 per cent are continued trotzdem 
alles. This highlights the resistance capacity discussed earlier, especially 
within this age and size group that is seemingly 'doomed'. 
Finally, there is the last category of minute, almost microscopic, farms. 
The top row in Table 7.3 concerns those farms that are between 3 and 24 
NSU in size of which there are nearly 35,000. However, they are hardly 
farms in a strict sense; their size is simply insufficient.26 Besides 'farms' 
that only have residential functions (Van der Vaart 1999), it will mainly 
involve part-time farms. Closure percentages within this category rise 
with an increase in age from 2.5 to 3.5 to 5.8 per cent. 
I would like to make three remarks with regard to these figures. Realising 
that this category of minute farms involves mainly residential units with 
some land and part-time farms, we have to establish first that overwork 
(especially in the latter category) and hence farm closure will occur here 
more often than in other farm size categories. Furthermore, the choice to 
dedicate all time to the actual main occupation (i.e. to stop with farming) 
will occur more frequently on these types of farms, especially in periods 
when 'farming' is put in a bad light and/or because of the 
disproportionately high transaction costs of running a farm (albeit a small 
one) under the increasingly stringent state regulations. If we pay specific 
attention to the group of older farmers within this category (closure 
percentage 5.8 per cent), it should be remembered that these are minute 
farms that are of importance to the next generation (which undoubtedly 
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meanwhile works elsewhere and mostly lives elsewhere too) either 
because of their monetary value or their attractiveness as a future 
residence. 
Although a comparison can no longer be drawn well as a result of 
changing classification schemes, I would like to refer to the 1976 
Agricultural Census. At the time, there were almost 15,000 farms of less 
than five ha, where the farmer was over 50 years of age. Ignoring farms 
without a successor, the available data show that from the then present 
successors, more than 600 were over 22 years of age, working elsewhere, 
and/or students. Hence, more than four per cent of the theoretically 
required successors were already integrated actively into other circuits 
and networks: in work outside of agriculture and/or in academic 
education. Since then, the proportion of students and/or children 
working elsewhere will have increased considerably. Hence, it is amazing 
that at the end of the day only 5.8 per cent of these minute farms with 
heads over 60 years of age are closed annually. This percentage should be 
much higher, precisely because the children (the potential successors) 
have long since found their destination elsewhere. However, against all 
expectations many minute, 'non-inheritable' farms are still somehow 
continued. 
This leads to the second remark. It is gradually becoming bon ton to 
recognise that the urban Dutch have rediscovered the value of the rural 
(RLG 1997). What is forgotten, however, is that there is a subcategory of 
people who are privileged in this respect: they know the charm of rurality 
and can use family networks to re-establish a foothold in the countryside. 
This subcategory contains the sons and daughters, sometimes nephews 
and nieces, and /or grandchildren of the farmers of old. The movement 
towards the countryside (that which Kayser (1995) has pointed to as the 
'repeuplement de la campagne') is marked amongst these people, and they in 
particular have at their disposal the means to fulfill their dreams: they can 
take over the 'farm' (De Haan 1998a). 
In other words, what is remarkable here is not so much that 
approximately six per cent of the smaller farms run by an older farmer 
close annually. What requires attention above all is that an equal, or even 
much larger, proportion is continued (mathematically, between 10 and 20 
per cent of these farms should be closed per year). What prevails is the 
take-over by family members who prefer an attractive place of residence 
with some agricultural activity over immediate monetary gain. 
This phenomenon is not restricted to the minute and/or smaller farms. 
There is a number of larger, sometimes even very large, farms in the 
Netherlands, on which either the man or the woman or both have a (part-
time) occupation outside of agriculture, often involving professions that 
require high to very high qualification levels. The combination of jobs is 
considered attractive and hence continued. At the same time, the farm as 
such can be managed more flexibly, and it can be developed further if 
necessary. 
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In thinking about agriculture, we usually imagine a whole that can be 
defined in terms of many dimensions (spatially, socially, culturally, 
economically, etc.). This is partly due to the way in which the words used 
have become established (and are reified by conventional statistical 
representations). However, the concepts and particular realities to which 
these words refer can be subject to considerable changes. Thus the 'farms' 
that I discuss here can no longer be regarded as the farms of old. Even 
statistical concepts such as 'agricultural enterprise' and/or 'part-time 
farm' are hardly adequate, certainly not if these terms refer to completely 
contrasting constellations. In fact, what is discussed here is a category of 
units that was initially managed as a farm, but which has become in the 
meantime largely 'socialised' in the sense that their maintenance is based 
upon ongoing transactions between the rural and the urban. In a spatial 
sense (and according to the conventional definition of Statistics 
Netherlands), there might still be an 'agricultural enterprise'; 
economically, however, it concerns units maintained (also in an inrra-
generational sense) by transactions between the city and the countryside. 
For this very reason they have been immunised against the economic 
'laws' that are said to rule agriculture as a whole. These (residential) 
farms (regardless of their nature and size) can be maintained due to the 
incomes earned in the city. Thus, the spatial and economic dimensions no 
longer coincide as they did before. Symbolic transactions are clearly 
involved too - the value and attractiveness of life in the countryside are 
communicated to the cities, whilst urban concerns will be articulated 
towards the agricultural sector. 
Of the undifferentiated set of 110,000 'agricultural enterprises', we can 
thus already 'define' one part (at least in theory). This is illustrated in 
Figure 7.1. 
Let us also approach this issue from the perspective of the remaining, 
'real' farmers. In the world of virtual farmers it was thought that the 
reluctance of small farmers (i.e. the 'postman farmers') to give up, 
introduced a brake on structural development. 
Together, farms smaller than 24 NSU represent a production capacity of 
395,743 NSU. This is five per cent of the total production capacity of 
Dutch agriculture. If these farms were expropriated as part of a dynamic 
structural development and re-allocated to farms in the 'green zone' - the 
so-called viable farms - growth of 9.2 NSU, or on average six per cent, 
could be realised per 'viable' farm. Hence, the assumption that closure of 
smaller farms could support structural development in and of Dutch 
agriculture (I recall that this assumption is one of the bridging if not 
constituting pillars of the expert system) is no more than hot air. 
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Figure 7.1 The socialisation of pa r t of agr icul ture 
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Finally, I would like to present a more mathematical argument (which is 
related, incidentally, to the previous one). Table 7.3 and the associated 
discussion inform about different constellations and the closure 
percentages related to these constellations. Young farmers face different 
issues, prospects and problems than old ones, and large farms differ in 
this respect from smaller farms. However, within the conventional 
representation all farms that are closed, irrespective of the particular 
constellation of which they are part, are added up and divided by the 
total number of farms, in order to present a supposedly universal 
redundancy percentage, which is claimed to represent inevitable trends 
and their equally inevitable causes. It is like adding oranges to apples and 
dividing them by rabbits to prove that magpies are born to steal the silver. 
Farm closure is a concept that, in scientific terms, should be dissected into 
new and complementary notions, which constitute each individually, but 
above all collectively, as adequately as possible a representation of the 
multiple adaptation and transformation processes that occur in 
contemporary agriculture. For example, it is much more important to 
know how many, and which, farms change from being full-time to part-
time (and to know whether this is temporary or permanent) than it is to 
know how many minute residential farms with six sheep and a goat are 
closed in the municipality of Drachten, because the sons and daughters 
now work in Tilburg and no longer want to move back north. The same 
applies to the concept of succession. I will discuss this further in the next 
section. 
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7.4 Succession: the big enigma 
Many of today's scenario studies and foresight models are no longer 
based upon historical redundancy percentages, they are derived from 
expected redundancy trends. The latter trends are usually founded, in turn, 
upon the 'greying' of the farming population and on the anticipated 
unwillingness of young people to take over the parental farm. Figures 
about the succession situation act as statistical foundations of this. 
From the mid-1970s onwards, the annual agricultural census has been 
used to provide information about this situation. The outcome is largely 
the same every time: 'greying' (that is, a farmer older than 50 or 55 years 
of age) occurs on more than half of the number of farms, and no successor 
is present on the majority of these farms. Consequently, it is concluded 
that over one quarter of farms will disappear in the foreseeable future. 
The use of these succession figures is very deceptive, however. 
Agriculture comprised 156,463 farms in 1976. Of the farmers, 74,960 were 
over 50 years of age (48 per cent). Of those, 63 per cent did not have a 
successor. If a cohort analysis is conducted (the age distribution is 
known for the whole population) over the period 1976-1996, and 
assuming, in line with the discussion above, that prospects have not 
become brighter, at least 72,000 farms should have been closed between 
1976 and 1996 due to the absence of a successor. However, the total 
number of farms did not fall to about 84,000 - there were still over 110,000 
farms in 1996. The conclusion cannot be but that, in contrast to the initial 
figures, many more farms were continued than was initially expected. At 
least 36 per cent, although probably a much higher figure. 
The use of succession expectations at face value introduces gross 
distortion in any analysis. Yet it is still done in almost every future 
projection or scenario study concerning Dutch agriculture. The 
unreliability of listed succession prospects can, incidentally, be explained 
quite easily. The succession situation will be uncertain in many cases. To 
be on the safe side, many respondents will decide to state that there is no 
successor. If succession prospects improve, this is psychologically more 
attractive than the reverse situation. Furthermore, sons or daughters who 
did not want to know about take-over initially (also in order to avoid 
work under the authority of padre padrone; Ledda 1978) may frequently 
change the minds and decide to make the best of a bad job later. And 
finally, some respondents will be of the opinion that such family matters 
are of no business to government. Hence, the statement of succession 
prospects probably tells us more about intra-generational relations and 
conflicts, and about the tension between the farming population and the 
state, than about 'objective' trends. Attempting to extrapolate succession 
trends on the basis of such responses is a deceptive enterprise. 
The notion of succession is a social definition. The prevailing statistical 
definition reflects largely the notion of 'take-over' as it was developed 
decades ago within the framework of the modernisation project. What we 
need today is a redefinition in terms of expectancies (and not in 
intolerable black-and-white terms of whether or not succession takes place). 
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7.5 What else happens within the category of 'winners'? 
Table 7.4 (again based on recent Statistics Netherlands (CBS) mutation 
analyses; see Liefaard 1998) relates to changes in the sector of grassland 
farms (in overall terms: dairy farming plus extensive livestock farms). The 
changes concern one agricultural cycle, 1995-1996. The farms are 
divided into size categories (expressed in NSU) and the extent to which 
they have grown or decreased. Here we can regard 'decrease', especially 
if it involves a large reduction of the number of NSUs, as an indication of 
a (beginning of a) redundancy process. 
Of course, the data in Table 7.4 should be interpreted with caution. 
Cyclical changes can have a certain influence. Similarly, decrease can be a 
temporary phenomenon: keeping more or less youngstock can result in 
shifts (just as a different cropping plan can produce similar shifts in Table 
7.5). Furthermore, care should be taken of the almost 'optical illusion' 
inherent in both tables. The importance of a reduction of 2-4 NSU in the 
size category of 3-8 NSU cannot be compared with a similar reduction in 
the much larger size categories. Having said this, I think that a number of 
observations can be made. 
Table 7.4 Growth and reduction processes on grassland farms 
NSU 
3-8 
8-16 
16-24 
24^10 
40-70 
70-100 
>100 
Reduction 
<-10 
-
0.2% 
3.3% 
7.7% 
8.5% 
10.0% 
19.5% 
4169 
8.2% 
-10—6 
-
2.4% 
6.1% 
6.4% 
7.7% 
10.4% 
12.2% 
3520 
6.9% 
- 6 - -A 
0.1% 
4.6% 
6.5% 
6.6% 
7.0% 
8.2% 
7.1% 
2987 
5.9% 
-4—2 
2.9% 
9.9% 
10.9% 
11.1% 
11.0% 
10.7% 
8.3% 
4631 
9.1% 
stable 
-2-+2 
85.8% 
67.8 
52.2% 
41.8 
31.2% 
24.9% 
18.1% 
21,267 
42.5% 
growth 
2-4 
5.7% 
7.0% 
9.3% 
10.1% 
11.6% 
10.0% 
7.4% 
4442 
8.7% 
4-6 
2.0% 
3.0% 
4.0% 
4.8% 
8.1% 
7.6% 
6.5% 
2827 
5.6% 
6-10 
1.4% 
2.4% 
3.5% 
5.1% 
7.6% 
9.3% 
8.5% 
3058 
6.0% 
>10 
2.0% 
2.2% 
4.1% 
6.5% 
7.3% 
9.0% 
12.9% 
3588 
7.1% 
total 
7313 
6650 
3585 
4551 
9322 
9466 
9662 
50,849 
100% 
If we operationalise the conventional ideas, as summarised previously, 
into the structure of Table 7.4, we should expect that reduction should be 
found in the 'top left-hand' corner (that is, the smaller farms), whereas 
growth should be concentrated in the bottom right-hand corner. 
However, this is not the case. 
If we consider these figures systematically, we have to draw the following 
conclusions: 
1 reduction and growth are divided over all size categories - reduction 
occurs equally on larger farms; 
2 'stability' predominates on smaller farms, 'turbulence' increases as 
farm size increases (that is, reduction and growth collectively 
determine the picture more than stability does); 
3 reduction is at least equal to growth on the larger farms: 19.5 per cent of 
the largest farms were reduced by over 10 NSU in this year, while 12.9 
per cent of this group grew more than 10 NSU; 
4 especially in the category of larger farms, a dual development seems to 
occur: either they succeed in growing considerably or they have to 
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reduce considerably (we are dealing with a normal distribution in the 
case of smaller farms, while a U-curve emerges on the larger farms). 
The results of a similar calculation for arable farms is summarised in 
Table 7.5. The distribution of the cells emphasises the conclusions drawn 
previously. Reduction occurs mostly on the largest farms. Again, this 
implies, measured by the present facts, that redundancy as the necessary 
disappearance of farms at the bottom of the echelon is a myth. 
Table 7.5 Reduction and 
NSU 
3-8 
8-16 
16-24 
24^10 
40-70 
70-100 
>100 
number 
1990 
1904 
1179 
1612 
2754 
1930 
2091 
growth processes on 
Reduction 
<-10 
-
0.3% 
5.0% 
7.0% 
11.1% 
11.8% 
21.7% 
1104 
-10—6 
-
4.1% 
5.6% 
6.5% 
4.5% 
7.4% 
6.9% 
712 
- 6 - - 4 
0.4% 
5.0% 
6.5% 
6.2% 
3.8% 
5.2% 
5.3% 
651 
-4—2 
3.5% 
10.6% 
11.6% 
9.8% 
4.6% 
9.4% 
6.8% 
1130 
arable f 
stable 
- 2 - + 2 
76.2% 
57.5% 
45.4% 
39.2% 
34.2% 
26.3% 
17.2% 
5593 
41.6% 
arms 
growth 
2^1 
8.0% 
8.5% 
7.1% 
9.8% 
4.8% 
8.9% 
6.2% 
1095 
4-6 
4.1% 
3.9% 
5.8% 
5.5% 
3.4% 
6.1% 
4.9% 
706 
6-10 
3.4% 
4.3% 
5.1% 
7.1% 
4.8% 
8.5% 
9.2% 
932 
>10 
4.3% 
5.7% 
7.9% 
9.1% 
11.4% 
16.4% 
21.9% 
1537 
7.6 From farms to employment: another paradox 
In the current conjuncture, farm numbers fall with by 1.7 to 2 per cent per 
year. However, employment in agriculture falls considerably less rapidly. 
In the period 1992-1997, the total number of workers fell only 0.6 per cent 
per year (Landbouw-Economisch Bericht 1998, tab. 7.7). In 1998 there even 
was a slight increase in total agricultural employment (of +0.6 per cent). 
Behind these figures there are differences. The number of family workers 
(say, the farmer and helping family members) falls by 1.4 per cent per 
year. On the other hand, the number of non-family workers rises by 2.2 
per cent per year. The total number of people economically active in 
Dutch agriculture was 282,480 (excluding 'non-regular and temporarily 
working non-family labourers') in 1997. Of these, almost 68,000 were 
contract labourers. Five years previously this number was 61,000. The 
increase in contract labourers shows that a high increase in production 
volume on rapidly expanding farms (a subgroup of the remaining farms) 
demands an increasing labour input. 
The combination of a falling number of farms and nearly stable on-farm 
employment is telling. First, it shows that the often hypothesised 
phenomenon of hidden unemployment, a certain degree of 'idleness' on 
smaller farms, does not exist or hardly at all. If this were the case, the 
reduction in farm numbers would be translated into a proportionate, if 
not even sharper, fall in agricultural employment. For if production 
volume shifts from 'less efficient' to 'more efficient' farms (following the 
logic of structural development), labour input would have to fall more 
than proportionately. This, however, is not the case. Additional labour is 
required in order to achieve the rise in production volume on growing 
farms. It could be hypothesised here that the so-called 'structural 
development' takes place faster than technological development does in 
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fact justify. Or formulated differently, the actually occurring scale 
enlargement is driven not so much by advancing technological 
development (as is usually postulated) but by other considerations and 
processes, such as the representation of the future as limited good. 
In fact, primary employment falls even more slowly than the figures 
quoted above suggest. For, apart from a rising number of salaried farm 
workers, there is a tendency to use increasingly the services of contractors 
and custom workers, i.e. entrepreneurs who carry out certain work for the 
farm and who have the necessary machines and labourers at their 
disposal. 
Systematic and completely trustworthy data on the development of 
agricultural contracting are not available. It is clear, however, that 'after 
an initial fall in the period 1975-1990, their number has been restored to 
the level of 1975' (Reinhard 1993, p. 10). In 1990, over NLG 900 million 
was spent on custom work in agriculture. This is a considerable increase 
since 1975. The price index rose from 100 to 175, the volume index rose 
from 100 to 102. 
The number of labourers employed via custom work amounted to about 
20,000 in 1998 and there are indications that this number is rising slightly. 
Data from ASF and GUO/SGG (relating to pensions and salary volume, 
respectively) also emphasise the possibility of an ongoing increase. 
Almost every farm uses custom workers. Their reasons for doing so vary 
considerably, however. On the one hand, there are smaller farms that 
cannot afford expensive, specialist machinery. Custom workers are 
employed here to save on the factor capital. On larger farms, on the other 
hand, it is not so much the costs of new technologies that is the 
prohibiting factor, but insufficient labour that is the issue. Through the 
use of custom workers, savings on labour are made. 
A smaller dairy farm of, say, 40 NSU spent on average NLG 6,500 on 
custom workers in 1990; a large dairy farm (of about 150 NSU) spent NLG 
23,000. Similar sums were spent by other types of farms, although it 
should be noted that these amounts are considerably higher for arable 
and mixed farms (Reinhard 1993, Table 2.3). 
A restructuring is taking place in Dutch agriculture, which implies a 
remarkable concentration of production volume in an increasingly smaller 
segment of the very large, and growing, farms. However, this process of 
restructuring does not result in a remarkable rise in efficiency, either at 
the sector level nor at the farm level. The required labour input hardly 
falls for the sector as a whole. If the total amount of labourers falls by only 
0.6 per cent per year (partly because the number of contract labourers 
rises on larger farms) and if the total amount of custom work stays the 
same or perhaps rises slightly (especially because the use that the larger 
farms make of it) and if the services of accountants and legal supporters 
increases in volume (especially for the larger farms), then it can be 
assumed that the total amount of labour in agriculture stays roughly at 
the same level. At the most a re-allocation of labour occurs: various goods 
and services that were produced initially by available family labour are 
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now generated by contract labourers and/or other enterprises that 
provide custom work (or services). 
7.7 Resistance capacity: a differentiated fact 
The developments in contemporary agriculture cannot be understood 
without taking explicit account of the resistance capacity of farmers. 
Everything is done in order to maintain the farm. To this end, different 
strategies are employed that correspond partly with the various 
constellations that have already been discussed. 
We can be brief about the situation of the 'socialised' farms. They have 
effectively moved away from (distanced themselves from) markets. Their 
income is completely, or at least largely, earned elsewhere. The farm is an 
attractive place to live and stay, and the agricultural activities are 
experienced and organised above all as 'hobby'. Large macro-economic 
developments barely effect this category; they have been immunised. 
As shown in Figure 7.2, the total income of Dutch agriculture has come 
under pressure since the late-1980s. Total revenues stagnate (certainly if 
we account for inflation), while costs continue to rise, sometimes abruptly. 
How can this trend be reconciled with a slowing down of the fall in farm 
numbers and with an almost stable employment level? 
Figure 7.2 A stylised overview of the development of total benefits and costs of 
post-war Dutch agriculture 
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Apparently, something is amiss. Production factors have become more 
expensive (labour and land have tripled in price over the past decades, 
accounting for inflation), and output prices stagnated (the milk price fell 
by 50 per cent, accounting for inflation). From the viewpoint of neo-
classical agricultural economics, farm enlargement and a simultaneous 
redundancy are therefore necessary, now more than ever before. Yet, it is 
hardly occurring. 
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This apparent contradiction can be explained by the existence of a number 
of movements that fall outside of the scope of explanations provided by 
the theories of the virtual farmer and virtual agriculture. These are 
movements, expressions of new strategic repertoires, that have only been 
recognised recently and whose value still has not been assessed. I will 
discuss the most important strategies here one by one. 
1 First, I must refer to the importance of 'farming economically', a 
strategy that has been put into practice by an increasing number of 
farmers since the late 1980s. Farm management is organised in such a 
way that - 1 use a term that is popular internationally - a 'low external 
input agriculture' emerges: self-sufficiency has increased in various 
ways, in order to minimise the purchases of fertilisers, roughage and 
concentrates, livestock, labour, machine services, and various other 
services. Farm development too is adjusted substantially, to keep 
material investments as low as possible, as a result of which the 
balance between liabilities and net worth is maintained. Financial costs 
are kept as low as possible. Farms grow gradually, step by step and 
not abruptly, which would result in otherwise high financial costs and 
a considerable increase in the degree of commoditisation. 
Various elements play a role in the development of the style of farming 
economically - including collective memory. As has been pointed out 
in various publications (Vondeling 1948; Wiskerke 1992; Van der Ploeg 
1995), farmers dealt with the crisis of the 1930s by starting to farm 
economically (see also Chapter 2 of this book). Furthermore, a sizeable 
strategic arsenal was available to draw upon at the moment the 
'squeeze' (Owen 1966), as represented in Figure 7.2, was felt (from the 
early 1990s onwards). Maybe the farming styles studies that we 
published from the early 1990s onwards have contributed somewhat 
to this. The style of farming economically was recovered from 
anonymity. The sunige boer became an intersubjective point of 
reference once again, a rationality that was widely recognised. 
At the Research Institute for Animal Husbandry (PR) in Lelystad, an 
experimental set-up for a 'low-cost dairy farm' has been constructed 
alongside a 'high-tech' farm. The former experimental set-up is largely 
inspired by the approach of the 'economical farmers'. The high-tech 
farm, on the other hand, stands for technological optimisation 
(including e.g. robotised milking). The set-up is a valuable novelty: as 
far as I can tell, it is the first time in the contemporary western world 
that contrasts are purposefully built into applied agricultural research. 
It involves a comparison of different technological trajectories - in short, 
trajectories that engage with the practice of 'vanguard farms' and with 
the contrasting one of 'economical farmers'. The starting point of both 
farms is that one full-time worker should be able to earn a standard 
labour income by working fifty hours per week. To achieve this, the 
low-cost farm requires a quota of 400,000 kg milk, whereas the high-
tech farm requires a quota of 800,000 kg milk. Projected onto the 
sombre perspective contained in Figure 7.2, this implies that 
employment (and the number of farms) in the sector is not a 
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unequivocal function of exogenous pressures. The 'squeeze' can be 
parried by a change in style. By farming economically, the cost line in 
Figure 7.2 has in fact been lowered (without it being reflected in 
conventional statistics). 
A second strategy for cost-price reduction can be defined analytically 
as reducing labour costs. What I want to point at is that, by means of 
pluriactivity, part of the labour available at the farm is mobilised and 
remunerated elsewhere, resulting in a reduction of labour that has to 
be remunerated by actual agricultural production. According to the 
most recent Landbouiv-Economisch Bericht, the average farm income (of 
about NLG 48,000 per year) is supplemented by almost NLG 25,00040 
of off-farm income (LEB 1998, p. 191). This involves various types of 
income. It can involve a full-time or part-time job elsewhere - of either 
man or woman. It can involve performing activities for, or with, other 
farmers. However, it can also involve benefits and/or revenues from 
capital (dividends, rents, tenure payments, etc.). 
Pluriactivity is a widespread phenomenon in Dutch agriculture. 'The 
specialised Dutch agriculture' is a myth just like 'the specialised farm'. 
According to a relatively recent study by De Vries (undertaken in the 
region Land van Maas en Waal), about 67 per cent of farms realise part 
of their family income from outside of the farm (De Vries 1995; for a 
more general discussion, see Marsden 1990). 
Apart from pluriactivity, another phenomenon is important - that is, 
earning complementary revenues within one's own farm. I point here 
to the multifunctional farm, on which, alongside conventional 
economic pillars (such as producing milk or potatoes), new 
complementary pillars have been developed, such as farmer-led nature 
management, agri-tourism, production of specialities with high value 
added, processing and marketing of one's own produce, introduction 
and integration of care tasks, and so on. 
A rapid expansion of the multifunctional farm has occurred in the past 
years partly under the banner of rural development and/or rural 
renewal. Van Broekhuizen et al. (1997) estimated that in 1996 an 
additional net income of about NLG 440 million per year was 
generated by multifunctional farms. They also pointed out that this 
amount could grow to NLG 1.2 billion per year in a relatively short 
period. It also appeared that the group of 'diversifiers' was of 
considerable size and above all rapidly growing. 
A fourth type of cost-price reduction that plays a role in Dutch 
agriculture of old revolves around increasing the technical efficiency. 
This concept is used to refer to the relation between the total amount of 
mobilised production factors and the production value realised by 
them (Yotopoulos 1974). The more production is realised by a given 
amount of production factors, the higher the technical efficiency. 
Under today's conditions (summarised in Figure 7.2) increasing this 
technical efficiency is of the utmost importance. This type of cost-price 
reduction (I would like to recall that cost price is a relative concept: it is 
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always cost price in relation to the realised output price) is empirically 
based in the farming style of the 'cowmen' and 'ten-tonne-wheat-
growers' - that is, in those styles in which fine-tuning and 
craftsmanship are decisive (for a more extensive description, see 
NRLO 1994; Wiskerke 1997). 
5 Finally, I would like to refer to a sheer indestructible response, 
building on and drawing from a rich historical tradition. That is the 
(gradual) change to a more intensive farm set-up: arable farmers 
increasingly shift to the cultivation of trees and ornamental plants, or 
to laying hens; small farmers in the province of Limburg expand their 
asparagus cultivation; small dairy farmers on the northern sandy soils 
change to the cultivation of potted plants, ornamental shrubs, and so 
on - the morphology is too rich to discuss exhaustively here. The 
constant increase in the total number of NSU in Dutch agriculture 
documents the significance of this trend. 
What is important each time is that the number of labour objects (the 
number of standard farm units or Netherlands size units) increases for 
any given land area. Hence, smaller farms 'grow'. A small dairy farm 
of about 10 ha is thus converted into a large potted plant farm of 10 ha. 
Collectively, the different strategies for cost-price reduction (each 
representing an aggregation of development projects of particular groups 
of farmers) explain why redundancy, in the classic sense, hardly occurs at 
all under current macro-conditions. Adverse conditions (the squeeze 
described in Figure 7.2) are actively warded off by means of a broad and 
flexible strategic repertoire. Thus the contrary takes place, on the whole, 
to what would normally be expected, i.e. a dramatic increase of 
redundancy brought about by unfavourable market conditions. The same 
elements (particularly 1, 3, 4, as well as 5) also explain why total 
employment remains stable. Graphically, these countermovements can be 
defined as 'lowering' the cost line in Figure 7.2 and 'raising' the output 
line. Thus emerge the contours of what I will analyse as rural 
development in Chapter 9. 
The strategic repertoire that I have pointed at previously is widespread in 
Dutch agriculture. This emerges, inter alia, in the pattern of answers to a 
simple question posed to farmers in a national survey (Boerderij 1998). The 
question was: 'What are the characteristics of a beautiful and well-
organised farm?'. The answers are summarised in Table 7.6. 
Various elements of the broad strategic repertoire I referred to emerge in 
Table 7.6. The most remarkable contrast appears between the top three 
rows (a, b, and c) and the bottom two (i and j). 'Producing high quality', 
'the ability to carry out the work well', and 'avoiding stress' all refer to 
'farm-internal elements' (elements that concern the farm - family 
relationship in particular) - that is, elements that can be influenced and 
adjusted without directly involving the market as a determining factor. 
This contrasts highly with the nature of i and j : 'being larger and more 
modern than others' and 'producing as much as possible at the lowest 
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possible labour input' can both only be realised via markets. These latter 
two strategies are classic responses to the squeeze. Almost three-quarters 
of the surveyed farmers (N = 683) consider such answers 'irrelevant', 
while the reverse image can be found 'at the top' of the table - that is, 
involvement in new responses. 
Table 7.6 Farmers' definitions of a 'beautiful and well-organised farm', 
percentages 
Characteristics 
a. produce high quality 
b. ability to carry out the work well 
c. avoid stress 
d. produce large volume at low costs 
e. good balance of liabilities and net worth 
f. good technical results 
g. farm as economical as possible 
h. invest carefully 
i. be larger and more modern than others 
j . produce as much as possible with as little 
labour as possible 
irrelevant 
14 
1 
5 
13 
12 
23 
15 
15 
74 
74 
important 
60 
76 
74 
64 
70 
60 
69 
66 
23 
25 
decisive 
26 
22 
21 
21 
18 
17 
16 
9 
3 
1 
A large (and growing) portion of Dutch farmers define 'the beautiful and 
well-organised farm' in a way that implies that they become relatively 
independent from global market and price conditions. This is shown in 
the responses to the question of 'whether the beautiful and well-organised 
farm can counterbalance price reductions and price fluctuations'. On 
being asked, 91 per cent of respondents answered affirmatively. 
This self-confidence vis-à-vis markets is also reflected in questions relating 
to strategies by which farmers expect to de facto parry possible price 
reductions. The answers are summarised in Table 7.7. 
Table 7.7 Strategies to parry price reductions 
Strategic answers 
a. pursue high yields 
b. invest carefully 
c. increase flexibility of farm 
d. farm more economically 
e. develop more branches 
f. anticipate markets earlier 
g. anticipate policy earlier 
h. enlarge the farm 
irrelevant 
9 
13 
4 
17 
24 
29 
32 
57 
important 
65 
64 
73 
65 
59 
55 
64 
32 
decisive 
24 
21 
19 
16 
15 
12 
7 
6 
Again the contrast is remarkable: increasing technical efficiency (a), 
farming more economically (b and d), and diversifying the economic base 
of the farm (c and e) are considered more 'decisive' than sheer classic 
farm enlargement (h). 
Adding this broad repertoire to the graphical representation in Figure 7.1, 
a new picture emerges, that is presented in Figure 7.3. Alongside the 
newly emerging multifunctional farms, a third constellation has been 
defined in Figure 7.3: the 'growth pole'. It is a category that distinguishes 
itself clearly from the other two. The image of the virtual farmer has 
become most internalised in this category. Ongoing specialisation exists in 
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contrast to multifunctionality, 'investing ambitiously' and growth exist in 
contrast to the 'economical'. A multifunctional farm set-up is understood 
as an obstacle for the further growth and expansion of one's own farm 
(which is the right conclusion within this particular strategy). Numerous 
other differences can thus be pointed out. I will discuss these further in 
the next chapter. 
Figure 7.3 Contrasting constellations in Dutch agriculture 
small 
t 
farm 
size 
Y 
large 
socialisation of 
farm and 
landownership 
multifunctional and 
economically 
managed farms 
growth pole: 
accelerated 
scale enlargement 
and industrialisation 
highly dependent 
on agricultural 
markets 
embedded in more 
comprehensive 
socio-economic 
arrangements 
I would like to make one more observation to avoid possible 
misunderstandings. As has been pointed out implicitly in Figure 7.3, the 
constellations that I describe here can and should not be reduced simply 
to differences between small and large farms. Large farms too can unfold 
explicitly along the track of multifunctional farm development. And 
smaller farms can stake everything on continued expansion too. 
7.8 There is none so blind as those who will not see: the danger of 
myths 
The role of labour can be explained from various perspectives. With 
regard to contemporary Dutch agriculture, the thesis can be defended that 
the factor labour should be perceived, above all, as human capital. Labour 
is necessary in order to make agriculture more sustainable, in order to 
reorient it from bulk to quality production, and in order to give it a more 
multifunctional character (Van der Ploeg 1993a, 1993b). Within the expert 
system, however, the vision predominates that labour is pre-eminently a 
cost and that a considerable part of it is superfluous, it is a barrier to 
further 'structural' development. 
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An agricultural policy fed by such perception cannot but result in the 
introduction of frictions and distortions that will have to be paid for in the 
end. This is particularly relevant when considering the design of new 
agricultural policies, technologies, and market institutions. Indications of 
success and failure are necessary in all design processes (see 
Staudenmaier 1985). A failure indication indicates that the design is not 
adequate, as it collides somehow with the set of conditions within which 
the eventual design has to be situated. In short, a failure indication 
indicates the necessity of redesign. 
The processes of design realised within the Ministry of Agriculture (and 
its subcontractors) do not consider a decline in employment as an 
indicator of failure. On the contrary, a reduction in employment, labour 
input, and/or farm numbers is understood as being inevitable. 
Acceleration of this process is even regarded as desirable within the 
expert system. A striking example can be found in agri-environmental 
policy: early versions predicted a reduction of farm numbers of 
approximately 40 per cent without this being understood as an indication 
of failure. 
The virtual world view also implied that the Dutch Ministry of 
Agriculture failed to recognise until very late the vast array of new 
activities that was developing in Dutch agriculture. In turn, this resulted 
in a policy for rural development that failed to match with actual 
dynamics and renewal (see further Chapter 9). Summarising, it could be 
said that the ship steams ahead. Work proceeds self-confidently in the 
operations room. Red lights indicating that radar and sonar no longer 
function properly and that the windows are steamed up, are missing. One 
has no idea about the sinking of a similar 'mega project'. For Titanic was 
only a film. 
Steamed-up windows: how many farms are there in the Netherlands? 
The expert system in and around Dutch agriculture is partly based on a 
number of carefully kept registration systems. Import and export of 
agricultural products, the number of farms, the number of hectares under 
sprouts, the cost price of these sprouts - everything is registered with 
precision. In comparison to numerous other systems elsewhere in the 
world, the Dutch expert system is without doubt one of the most 
developed. 
There is only one weak spot (which is possibly bigger here than 
elsewhere): the interface between registration systems, on the one hand, 
and the practices they inform about, on the other. Registration is based 
upon historically anchored concepts and categories that are out of tune 
with the complex and heterogeneous nature of contemporary practices. 
Moreover, the provision of information by farmers has long become part 
of a well-considered game in which their estimation of the (future) use of 
the data by the Ministry of Agriculture constitutes usually the starting 
point. 
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I would like to illustrate this by way of a discussion of the total number of 
agricultural enterprises in the Netherlands. This number is officially about 
110,000 (1999). It is based on the so-called May survey, which registers 
annually (in the past through direct contact, now by post) the most 
important data for each farm. Apart from a small group of chronic 
refusers (and recently a small but persistently growing group of 'new 
refusers'), farmers carry out their duty. Thus a so-called 'relation number' 
appears for every farm. It is assumed that each farm has just one relation 
number. Hence, the total number of relation numbers should equal the 
number of farms - at least on paper. 
In practice, though, some farms have more than one relation number for 
various reasons. Take a closed pig farm that is managed in partnership by 
father, mother, and son. This constitutes one relation number. 
Furthermore, the farm also has a small dairy branch in the father's name. 
This is the second relation number. And finally, the son has started his 
own activity, for example the cultivation of lilies, which is relation 
number three. The complex and lengthy succession (or take-over of the 
farm) results in a multiplication of relation numbers. Another frequently 
occurring situation involves the housing of several (intensive livestock) 
farms within one enterprise. For whatever reason (and these can be 
numerous), the constituent parts are mentioned as separate enterprises in 
the May survey. Although one entrepreneur thus runs six or seven 
'branches' of the same farm, they appear in the survey as six or seven 
separate farms. A third situation also often occurs. In some regions, the 
extended family has existed for a long time, grouped around the farm 
(incidentally, there are a great many regional nuances involved here). This 
results in various sections of the farm being registered in name of 
different family members. Again, this implies that one farm enterprise 
emerges within the statistics as several units. 
There are more relation numbers than farms, yet this is not explicitly 
recognised by the registration system. We have frequently encountered 
expressions of this. Say, in municipality X the number of farms should be 
400, according to the statistics. After a painstaking search, including 
systematic consultation of regional experts and comprehensive checks 
(just visit all potential farms), there turned out to be only 200 agricultural 
enterprises. The same happened to us in the Gelderse Vallei. According to 
available survey data, there is an almost endless number of farms, so 
small that it is impossible to imagine anything but poverty. Driving 
around the area with the concentrate suppliers, we visited every farm, 
after which arrangements were made for further discussions, which soon 
showed that 'apart from cows, we have pigs, but they are in my uncle's 
name'. And so on. 
By digging patiently into the organisation and construction of the 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS) databases (for which I owe many thanks to 
René Liefaard of CBS), it appears eventually that more relation numbers 
disappear per year than can be explained by take-overs and/or closures 
of farms. All things considered, if one farm is closed or taken over, on 
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average 1.47 relation numbers disappear. This average is not constant for 
different subgroups, however. 
A more differentiated picture is presented in Table 7.8. It shows that more 
relation numbers occur on larger farms than on smaller ones (although an 
upward trend can be seen on minute farms). Furthermore, there are 
relatively more relation numbers per farm on those farms where the 
farmer is younger than 55 years of age. This reflects without doubt the 
complexity of take-overs under current circumstances. 
Table 7.8 The average number of relation numbers per farm (my calculations 
based on CBS data) 
3-8 NSU 
8-16 
16-24 
24-40 
40-70 
70-100 
>100 
age of farmer 
<55 
2.30 
1.43 
1.75 
2.18 
2.41 
2.57 
2.47 
55-60 
1.75 
1.28 
1.27 
1.43 
1.60 
1.57 
1.51 
>60 
1.30 
1.12 
1.08 
1.00 
1.04 
1.00 
1.12 
These data have been translated into the number of farms per category in 
Table 7.9. Of course, no 'iron' sense of reality can be associated with the 
projection of possible mistakes to the universe as a whole. Still, this 
exercise makes plausible the thesis that we do not know how many farms 
there are in the Netherlands. The systematic mismatch between the 
number of farms and the number of relation numbers, implies that there 
possibly are only 60,000-70,000, instead of some 110,000 farms in the 
Netherlands. More importantly, the number of farms considered as the 
promise for the future by the expert system is not 15,662 but 6325. Hence, 
numerous assumptions have to be reviewed. 
Table 7.9 A recalculation of the number of farms in the Netherlands 
initial NSU 
category 
3-8 
6-16 
16-24 
2 4 ^ 0 
40-70 
70-100 
>100 
Total 
<55 
2115 
3778 
2117 
2637 
4715 
4084 
6325 
25,771 
age of farmer 
55-60 
901 
1302 
953 
1212 
1869 
1574 
2675 
10,486 
>60 
5549 
5312 
2913 
3715 
4798 
4142 
5246 
31,675 
total 
8565 
10,382 
5983 
7564 
11,382 
9800 
14,246 
67,932 
reduction vis-à-
vis CBS data 
37% 
20% 
26% 
32% 
41% 
43% 
44% 
37% 
Table 7.9 takes us to a world of uncertainties. Ironically, this is the very 
opposite of what registration systems are designed to achieve. It is 
possible that a more pronounced dualism exists between large and small 
farms in the Netherlands than anyone has yet been able to identify. The 
production volume of (the smaller number of) large farms will be much 
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higher per farm than is assumed on the basis of non-adjusted data (such 
as included in the conventional farm survey). At the same time, it is 
conceivable that the smaller farms are not as small as is usually assumed. 
The question of interrelations is also to be reviewed: is there a connection 
between 'large' relation numbers and other 'large' numbers? Or will it be 
a connection of 'large' and 'small' numbers (in the sense that - as the 
Italian case shows - large farms control a considerable group of smaller 
farms)? Such crucial issues are not known. Although an incredible 
amount of data is registered, frightfully little is known about what 
actually goes on. 
Perhaps the various figures that have been calculated and presented in 
this book should be fundamentally revised too. I referred previously to 
the very low percentage of closures in the group of large farms. If it 
appears that this group is much smaller, redundancy will increase 
correspondingly (towards over one per cent per year, which is higher 
than the redundancy percentage for all size categories!). 
The expert system, however, does not entertain such questions and 
doubts. According to the system's parameters, they involve at most hair-
splitting distinctions. 'Redundancy' continues without any doubt, while 
'structural development' remains central. The Titanic will undoubtedly 
sail on. 
Notes 
1 This was obviously the case, for example, at land consolidations. The same applied to 
advisory services, in the interest subsidy policy, etc. (Frouws and Van der Ploeg 1973; De 
Bruin 1997a). It undeniably played a role in the initial designs of the environmental policy 
too. 
2 I pointed out previously that both the number of farms and the agricultural working 
population rose constantly between 1850 and 1957. Historians speak of re-peasantisation in 
this respect. Incidentally, such growth occurs in other regions in Europe too: Tràs-os-Montes 
(through the return of migrants, former agricultural labourers who start a small farm, 
usually part time) and Scotland (through the increase of crofters, particularly young people 
who get chance as a result of special government programmes) are notorious examples. 
What will happen in eastern Europe remains open to speculation. 
3 It should be mentioned that figures about 'outflow' are slightly inflated by the ever 
changing 'thresholds'. About 3000 farms 'disappeared' in the period 1990-1997 because they 
fell below the threshold of 3 NSU. If we correct our calculations for this, the actual outflow 
would amount to 2.0 per cent per year and the net reduction to 1.4 per cent per year (instead 
of 1.7 per cent per year). 
4 I refer here to the wrotters of the Fryske Walden: former agricultural labourers or the 
second or third son of a farmer, who through hard labour built up a beautiful farm (De Bruin 
and Van der Ploeg 1992). Similarly, reference can be made to the gardeniers. 
5 Please note that some presented figures about the current influx are probably 
overestimated. They include the phenomenon of children of extended family members 
taking over part of the farm, for example in order to start a 'tree nursery farm'. This 
provides them with the right to farm buildings and a house. Subsequently, the trees are 
allowed to grow wild into a park and an attractive residence has been established for oneself 
or which can be sold as an expensive villa. Profits are gigantic in such operations. All things 
considered, this does not concern the establishment of new farms, but quasi-legal 
mechanisms to convert agricultural land into building land. The inability of policy makers to 
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formulate an effective policy in which 'red pays for green' enables the continuation of this 
creeping type of suburbanisation. 
6 In the two-year period 1995-1997, 917 new farms were established. Their average size was 
7.2 ha, or 34.7 NSU per farm. The majority are arable and livestock farms. The 'heroism' is 
therefore twofold. It concerns not only the founding of a new farm, but also a new farm that 
is so small, according to the criteria of the expert system, that it will be defined as 'non-
viable'. 
7 This appears from the number of students in agricultural colleges, from their chosen 
educational paths, and also from the eager use made of the Tante Agaath regulations (see 
Boerderij 1998). Similar indicators appear in Bock and De Rooij's research on social exclusion 
(2000). 
8 The more farms become larger and large scale, the more problematic the Taboriousness' of 
plots with high ecological and landscape values. 
9 When the father retires, reductions could again be made. Or use was made of the already 
progressed technological development in order to produce the same volume by one labourer 
(i.e. the remaining son). The French INRA studies are particularly important in this respect, 
indicating that the most important 'determinant' of farm size (in land-dependent sectors) is 
the number of working family members. 
10 Venema and Overgauw (1994) refer to a balance sheet total for the average grassland farm 
in 1975-1976 of almost NLG 480,000. This figure had risen to NLG 1.65 million fifteen years 
later. 
11 For example by combining a relatively small quota with a new cheese-making operation 
and direct sales. Numerous examples exist. 
12 A very remarkable expression can be found on the island of Tholen, where of old open 
vegetable cultivation (mostly combined with the production of 'firsts') has resulted in a 
flowering sector, composed of (in terms of amount of land) rather small farms. However, 
they are constantly represented as 'too small' within the current vision. Hence, the result is 
that take-over levels are very low (all things considered, inconceivably low). 
13 The sheer undeniable logic of this argument is nothing more than a tautology. It would be 
worth analysing the dominant view in terms of such tautologies. 
14 There is a lot of doubt among farmers about the 'stability in value' of quotas, as they are 
part of the political game in Brussels. 
15 I have derived this table from data presented in LEB (1998). The data refer to the period 
1990-1997. More detailed data for the latter two years (1995-1997) can be found in CBS 
(1998). They show that the number of farms fell from 113,202 to 107,919 between 1995 and 
1997. The net result of farms emerging above the threshold and those that fall through it is 
1440 (for example, in 1995-1996, 1006 farms appear above the threshold, whereas 1724 fall 
through). The total number of closures in the two-year period is 6393. On the other hand, 917 
new farms were founded (541 in 1995-1996, 376 in 1996-1997), while the 'net gap' (say, the 
farms that were lost) amounts to about 1700 farms. Most recent figures are in line with and 
emphasise the analysis of this chapter. 
16 Again, a remarkable tautology, especially if the fact is taken into account that 'good 
entrepreneurship' can only be determined ex post facto. 
17 The figures concern 1996. These figures are remarkably stable over the years; it should be 
noted, however, that the number of starters (as represented by the 'birth rate') follows a 
slightly counter-cyclic movement. Cohort analyses emphasise the stability of these figures. 
After five years, 60 per cent of the cohort is still active, after ten years about 40 per cent. I 
owe many thanks to Gerlof Rienstra of Kolpron for the collection of these data. 
18 Approximately 1 per cent of all marriages in the Netherlands ends in divorce per annum. 
This would imply that a divorce would occur annually on about 570 farms (on which the 
farmer is younger than 55 years of age). Assuming that farmers divorce less often and taking 
into account the type of marriage (marriage settlement as opposed to community of 
property), the figure given here (100) should be considered a conservative estimate. 
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19 Agriculture is one of the most dangerous sectors in this respect (De Rooij 1990). There 
were 22,841 'benefit cases' among the self-employed put forward in 1995 (which occurred at 
the time through AWW), involving 4 million benefit days and a total amount of benefits of 
almost NLG 300 million. Among these benefit cases, injuries to the back and limbs are the 
most frequent, which is evidently related to heavy work. Stress and related psychological 
disabilities and 'illnesses of the nerve system' come second (GUO 1995, tab. 3.3.5). A similar 
picture is presented by GUO (1996). 
20 It appears from GUO (1995, tab. 3.3.1) that about 8000 self-employed people in the 
agricultural sector are registered as disabled to the extent of 80-100 per cent (they were 
covered under the law relating to incapacity for work (AWW), and are now covered by the 
law on insurance against incapacity for work by self-employed persons - WAZ). A number 
of these cases are 'closed' annually as they reach the age of 65, due to death, and /or as a 
result of recovery or re-examination. At the same time, there is a new 'influx' from which 
new benefit cases emerge (between 1000 and 1100 per year). If the generally applicable 
distribution of categories of disability is applied to the latter figure, the new number of cases 
of complete disability amounts to 280. This concerns in part entrepreneurs younger than 49 
years of age (GUO 1995, tab. 3.3.2). The thus presented problem could be solved in a number 
of cases within the family and/or through a farm care worker. In a number of cases, this will 
be impossible. Hence the estimate of 100 cases of disability per year that result in permanent 
farm closure. Consultation with experts shows that this is a reasonably conservative 
estimate. 
21 This estimate is based upon various sources. I refer, inter alia, to GUO (1995) in which 
bankruptcies are mentioned in so far as they take place on farms that use external labour. 
This involved 92 farms in 1994 and 70 farms in 1995. However, it concerns only a subset. 
22 I owe many thanks to René Liefaard of Statistics Netherlands (CBS) for his help in the 
construction of this table. 
23 The distribution of farms in size categories that are associated subsequently with the 
colours of traffic lights ('red': beyond help, you'd better stop; 'orange': the farm is in a 
danger zone; 'green': plenty of possibilities for continuity) is typical of the extreme degree of 
objectification and especially of the induction of symbols that have to support trust! 
24 I know from my own contacts that this occurs on a regular basis. 
25 Taking up residence in the former farmstead after a longer period of time is a different 
matter altogether: land, quota, emission rights, livestock, and so on are almost always 
disposed of much earlier. 
26 A careful nuance is necessary here, however. Our experience in empirical research in the 
Gelderse Vallei (De Bruin et al. 1991) shows that only part of the production capacity falls 
within the 'white' circuits on part of these farms. It can be outnumbered considerably by the 
proportion that falls within the 'grey' circuits (and which does not appear in the farm 
surveys). 
27 A considerable number of horticultural firms will have been among these: small in terms 
of land size, relatively large in terms of production capacity. If we take this into account, 
however, the subsequent conclusion becomes much stronger. 
28 It is remarkable that a city such as Leeuwarden appears to have both the highest number 
of unemployed people per 100,000 residents as well as the highest number of jobs per 
100,000 residents. This paradox can be explained by the fact that a considerable number of 
workers prefers to live outside of the city (and can afford to do so), whereas the unemployed 
live in the city (personal communication, H. Apotheker, then mayor of Leeuwarden). 
29 A similar calculation is made in the 1994 farm survey for those who have a part-time 
agricultural job: in other words, small farmers with a non-agricultural main occupation have 
been filtered out. As a result, there appear to be 110,074 full-time farms. Of these farmers, 
58,374 (53 per cent) are over 50 years old. Of those 33,371 (57 per cent) are said to have no 
successor. 
30 In the calculation of the minimum effect, the complete reduction of farm numbers is 
attributed to the closure of farms by farmers of over 50 years of age who previously did not 
indicate that they had a successor. On the whole, this is not right: there are other farms that 
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are closed for other reasons. If this effect is included into the calculation, the 36 per cent 
estimate appears too low. 
31 It should be mentioned that a similar analysis is conducted on the subsequent agricultural 
cycle in order to check thoroughly whether or not accidental distortions occur within one 
year. However, the results of the analysis for the period 1996-1997 emphasise the 
conclusions drawn in the text below. 
32 Source: my processing on the basis of CBS (1998, p. 60, tab. 3a). 
33 Which, it is self-evident, should be checked preferably by painstakingly longitudinal 
research. 
34 Analysis of 'factory farms', horticultural firms, and mixed farms leads to the same 
conclusion. 
35 Incidentally, it is remarkable that a detour through the employee insurances (see GUO 
1995, tab. 3.1.4) shows that there were 100,000 insurance person-years (in which part-time 
jobs are converted to full-time jobs) of employees in salaried labour in 1995! This was 96,400 
in the previous year. Hence, there are apparently considerable and systematic misestimates 
and/or distortions built into the conventional registration systems. Furthermore, it can be 
assumed that the figures from employees insurances are the most trustworthy (although 
they do not present the complete picture either). 
36 There are various causes for this, such as the grey zone between agricultural and non-
agricultural custom work, the fact that part of agricultural custom work is conducted by 
farmer colleagues, as well as the occurrence of definition changes in data systems, as a result 
of which comparison of multi-year data becomes extremely difficult. Despite all this, a 
number of interesting studies are available. I would like to refer to Reinhard (1989, 1993) in 
this respect. Furthermore, data that I have used in the following discussion were supplied by 
BOVAG, CUMELA, and ASF. 
37 I owe thanks to André de Swart of BOVAL, Jaap Nieuwenhuize of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Nature Management and Fisheries, and Henk Ligtenberg of ASF for collecting 
the data used here. Ad de Rooij of Stigas supplied further data. The number of insured 
employees in 'enterprises exploiting agricultural machines' rose from 16,177 in 1994 to 17, 
418 in 1996. 
38 I would like to recall again that the statistical representation of Dutch agriculture is based 
largely on the commodity fiction. In addition, the samples used are usually biased against 
'economical farmers'. 
39 I think that this aspect is chronically neglected in conventional statistical representations. 
If one third of total labour on a farm is employed elsewhere, an income from the farm of 66 
per cent of the conventional income is not an indication of poverty. It is a comparable income 
if related to the proportion of labour that is dependent on the farm! Or rather, if one would 
take account of (a) the integration of farm and family and (b) the fact that many farm 
families realise income elsewhere, the so-called net farm result would look decisively 
different, as it would be much less negative than is represented at present. 
40 Of course, this is a snapshot. The percentage will fluctuate with an improvement or 
deterioration of the milk price. 
41 A full-time job elsewhere of the woman is often an essential condition for take-over, for 
'enabling take-over', of the farm. 
42 In fact, it is a particular type of the past: at the time, larger farmers could only work their 
farm due to the labour input from other, smaller farmers. This happened all year round, for 
example, in milking, or at certain peak periods, such as haying time and/or in the autumn 
when ditches had to be cleared. Sometimes this work was paid for, sometimes remuneration 
occurred in the form of 'counterservices', such as the use of machines that the smaller farmer 
did not have at their disposal. Nowadays this mutual division of labour can be found in 
'rounding up and taking care of youngstock', conducting agricultural custom work, 
producing maize, etc. 
8 Structural Involution and the Erosion of 
Trust 
Increase in output per farm can be realised through various means. One 
of the possible mechanisms is scale enlargement. It involves an increase in 
the number of labour objects - hectares, livestock units, or, in summary, 
standard farm units (SFU) or Netherlands size units (NSU) - per labour 
unit. Scale enlargement can occur abruptly or gradually over time (Van 
der Ploeg et al. 1990). The magnitude of the scale-enlargement operation 
can vary considerably. Scale enlargement might contain a self-accelerating 
momentum: the more the margin per unit of end product is reduced as a 
result of the previous scale-enlargement process, the more scale 
enlargement will become necessary in the future. 
In the 1980s, Van Driel (1982, 1984) pointed out that the rhythms of scale 
enlargement vary greatly in Dutch dairy farming. Proportionate growth 
occurs on the smaller farms as well as on the so-called medium-sized 
farms (Van der Ploeg 1985, 1997); the level of growth realised is largely a 
function of the farm's internal dynamics and resources. Investments 
follow the rhythm and the limitations of one's own savings. 
Disproportionate growth, on the other hand, occurs on the larger farms. 
Here, growth is based particularly upon the mobilisation of external 
resources, which enables this acceleration. A breakdown of all dairy farms 
(Van Driel 1984, Table.1.1) shows that 52 per cent of the medium-sized 
farms increased the number of SFU/farm by between 5 and 40 per cent in 
the period 1975-1980. The biggest expansion (disproportionate growth) 
was found on the larger (vanguard) farms: 31 per cent increased the 
number of SFU/farm by over 40 per cent in this period. Only 12 per cent 
of medium-sized farms grew at the same rate. Disproportionate growth is 
grounded on considerable loans and implies high financial costs. 
Disproportionate growth is not a one-off operation; it becomes an ongoing 
process. It is a fuite en avant as imaginatively described in French studies. 
This distinction is crucial to an adequate understanding of the scale-
enlargement process as it takes place today. Some farms will try, if the 
opportunity presents itself, to acquire a small additional quota in order to 
obtain a more 'balanced' farm. Other farms will try to purchase vast 
quantities of, if not as much as possible, quota. Continuous growth is the 
norm there; it is necessary for they think they are engaged in a battle for 
the future. These farms are characterised by continuous and 
disproportionate growth, which finds expression in the size of quota 
purchases. 
The unequal nature of growth, together with the now established zero-
sum situation (in which growth of A is only possible at a simultaneous 
Structural Involution and the Erosion of Trust 307 
and identical reduction of B), cannot be neglected in the analysis of scale 
enlargement as contemporary phenomenon. The implications of the 
substantial quota transfers and concentrations that take place nowadays 
are described in Figure 8.1. Starting from existing empirical data (derived 
from the Agricultural Economics Research Institute database), 
disproportionate growth under current conditions can be imagined as the 
reallocation of the quotas of smaller farms (managed according to the 
strategy of farming economically) to fewer large farms (operating 
according to another strategy, the one of large or vanguard farmers). 
Figure 8.1 The impact of quota transfer 
1 million kg milk 
economical farmers large farmers 
1.97 farms • 
^ L_- 9 7 I 
3.38 farms 
11^ 1 
A quota/farm + 72 % 
A farm income +36 % 
A total income - 21 % 
The transfer involves one million kg milk. Initially, the total amount of 
quota (in this example) was utilised by 3.38 farms. After quota transfer, it 
has become concentrated on 1.97 farms, which were already milking over 
500,000 kg milk per farm. As a result of the transfer, the quota on the 
latter farms increases by 72 per cent per farm. However, income increases 
only by 36 per cent on these farms. The costs involved in quota purchase 
have not been taken into account. If they were introduced into the 
analysis, the income rise would be much lower, if not negative -
especially in the first years after quota purchase. More importantly, the 
total income earned by this transferred quota of one million kg falls by 21 
per cent. The reduction is inherent in the greatly varying cost structure: 
the economical farms are structured in a way that differs (in terms of 
costs, outputs, and particularly the relationship between the two) from the 
one of the larger farms. 
The implications of different rhythms of scale enlargement to total 
agricultural income at the regional level have been examined by Antuma 
et al. (1993) in a study conducted at the request of the Frisian farmers 
organisations and the province of Fryslân (Friesland). The base year was 
1990, while 2005 functioned as reference year. Assuming different 
scenarios, the optimal development trajectory for different farming styles 
between 1990 and 2005 was examined, using linear programming 
techniques. In 1990 there were 5500 dairy farms in the province of Fryslân, 
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generating a direct employment of 9300 jobs and a total agricultural 
income of NLG 426 million. Three possible scenarios were identified and 
calculated for the road to 2005 (see Figure 8.2). One of the characteristic 
differences between these three scenarios was the extent to which scale 
enlargement occurred. 
Figure 8.2 Regional outcomes of different development processes 
situation in 1990 
5500 farms 
9300 jobs 
12000 indirect jobs 
426 NLG million 
income from 
dairy farming 
free-trade scenario 
year 2005 
3550 farms 
5300 jobs 
9000 indirect jobs 
216 NLG million 
sectoral income 
year 2005 
1940 farms 
3100 jobs 
5000 indirect jobs 
114 NLG million 
sectoral income 
year 2005 
4700 farms 
7600 jobs 
11000 indirect jobs 
379 NLG million 
sectoral income 
Only a small reduction of the number of farms occurs in the diversity 
scenario (based on a number of assumptions that we define nowadays as 
rural development). A high degree of scale enlargement occurs in the 
current policy scenario (based on policy that was 'in the pipeline' at the 
time). However, the most far-reaching degree of scale enlargement occurs 
in the free-trade scenario. The number of farms falls below 2000: the average 
quota increases from about 320,000 kg per farm to 1,130,000 kg per farm. 
In terms of the regional economy, the essential result in this respect is the 
sharp fall in the total sectoral income: from NLG 426 million per year in 
1990, to 378 (diversity scenario), to 216 (current policy scenario), to a 
meagre NLG 114 million per year in the case of the most extreme type of 
scale enlargement (see also LUW/AVM/IKC 1993, tab. 6.1). 
This study raises a number of issues. First, it demonstrates that it is 
possible to imagine and calculate the future in various ways. This is in 
sharp contrast to the way in which the expert system envisages the future. 
Different scenarios can be considered that emerge from particular 
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arrangements of various projects. Second, the study identifies a crucial 
tension: i.e. the relation between rationality at the micro-level and 
rationality at the macro-level. Accelerated scale enlargement can be both 
attractive and the natural thing to do at farm level; at a higher level of 
aggregation, however, the implications of the same behaviour can have 
different effects. Higher revenues at the farm level can result in sharply 
falling benefits at the regional level. Finally, reference can be made to a 
more theoretical implication. I referred in the previous chapter to the 
'squeeze on agriculture' (Cochrane 1981). Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show that 
this squeeze does not necessarily result from relations situated outside the 
agricultural sector. It can also be tightened from within the agricultural 
sector itself. Such a phenomenon takes place when scale enlargement 
occurs through the displacement of economical farming by more capital-
intensive (and possibly less efficient) approaches. 
Figure 8.3 The vulnerabi l i ty of rap id ly g r o w n farms 
economical farmers large farmers 
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0.38 
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LM 
85,133 
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116,107 
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in output prices 
of 20% 
•96280 
19,827 
• 54075 
31,058 
at an assumed rise 
in costs 
of 30 % 
•84420 
31,687 
Under the current circumstances, there is hardly any discussion of the 
macro-economic effects of disproportionate scale enlargement. The focus 
is on private economic advantages, limitations, and dangers. However, as 
the discussion of Figure 8.1 shows, these private economic benefits are 
rather fragile. The direct implication of accelerated growth is usually an 
increase in the cost price (as a result of the enormous financial obligations 
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related to quota purchase). The counterargument is generally that 
substantial scale enlargement is required in order to build up a farm that 
can survive the coming competitive struggle. One should expand now, 
make the farm viable, in order to face more adverse conditions later 
(falling prices, rising costs). This assumption can be checked somewhat by 
means of the data in Figure 8.3 (which builds on Figure 8.1). First, the 
effects of a 20 per cent reduction in output prices have been calculated. 
What is intriguing is that it shows that large farms do not really have the 
best chances. The same conclusion appears if a comprehensive cost 
increase of 30 per cent is assumed. 
The private economic benefits of considerable scale enlargement are 
rather doubtful under current conditions, especially in the longer term. 
Antuma et al. emphasise this. The unique, and attractive, aspect of their 
study is that the point of departure was not an 'average' or 'optimal' 
farm, but rather that the implications of various scenarios were calculated 
for different farming styles. The differential implications are summarised 
in Figure 8.4. Grutte boeren (large farmers) whose strategy revolves around 
constant expansion, had at their disposal the largest quota (718,000 kg 
versus, for example, 508,000 kg for the sunige boeren - economical 
farmers). Between 1990 and 2005, these large farmers would be 
confronted by a reduction in labour income of NLG 75,000. Labour 
income (a proxy for actual income) would be NLG 36,000 in 2005. 
Expansion of the farm (by leasing 185,000 kg milk) would give a bit more 
flexibility: labour income would increase by NLG 3000. Any further 
expansion is impossible, due to the limited environmental space 
(especially phosphate regulations) (see Antuma et al. 1993, pp. 40-43). 
If this position is compared to that of the economical farmers, several 
remarkable issues appear. Economical farmers (who manage on average 
rather smaller farms) are also confronted by a substantial reduction in 
income (- NLG 67,000). In 2005, however, their calculated labour income 
differs hardly from the one of the large farmers (34,000 versus 36,000, 
respectively). If economical farmers could increase the technical efficiency 
on their farms, they could raise their income with another NLG 5000 
(Antuma et al. 1993, p. 45). The conclusion is evident. Even though it is 
assumed usually that large, expanding farms have the best chances for the 
future, careful empirical analysis indicates that this is not necessarily the 
case. 
A further step can be taken. It is assumed generally that the quota system 
poses an obstacle to milk production, especially to the rapidly expanding 
farms. Quotas make growth expensive. In other words, the quota system 
is a hindrance to structural development. Therefore, the possible 
implications of (careful) liberalisation of the quota system have also been 
calculated in the study by Antuma et al. For this purpose, A and B quotas 
were introduced into the analysis. A protected price is set for the so-called 
A quota, which equals 75 per cent of the current quota. 
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Figure 8.4 Differential development in the Frisian dairy sector between 1990 and 
2005, assuming a continuation of current policy 
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No quantitative restrictions apply to the B quota, which is at world-
market prices. Figure 8.5 shows the results of this calculation. 
Remarkably, the re-introduction of 'milking for the sake of milking' 
results in relatively low incomes, particularly for the large farmers. 
Figure 8.5 Differential development in the Frisian dairy sector, assuming a free-
trade scenario 
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The calculated labour income in 2005 (NLG 10,000) lies far below that of 
the economical farmers (NLG 31,000). This shows just how fragile the 
development project of the expanding farmers is, especially if they were 
to achieve their political-economic aims (i.e. abolition or loosening of 
quota restrictions). Under the current circumstances, a large farm is not 
necessarily a better spring board to the future; neither does an 
acceleration of growth offer, even under relatively favourable 
assumptions, better chances of survival than prudent farm development. 
Agriculture has reached a turning point; a transition is taking place. 
Nowadays, and in contrast to earlier phases, accelerated scale 
enlargement entails enormous transaction costs (both at the private 
economic and the macroeconomic levels). The prevailing technological 
regime has reached its limitations: further development along existing 
lines (embodied in the constantly expanding farms) increasingly results in 
counterproductivity. Structural development increasingly resembles 
'structural involution' (Geertz 1963). 
8.1 The specificity of scale enlargement as contemporary episode 
Scale enlargement cannot be regarded as a limitless process, nor as the 
permanent and structural outcome of laws inherent in economics and 
technology. As always (see Chapter 6), we are dealing with a particular 
period: form and context are decisively different now than they were 
before. 
If we take a close look at the type of scale enlargement under 
consideration here, acceleration catches the eye first: the gap between the 
scale of the ideal farm and the empirical average , expands at breakneck 
speed. If the gap was about 50 per cent by the late 1970s (De Bruin 1997, p. 
100), in the second half of the 1980s the viable farm was thought to need 
an output of at least 400,000 kg milk per farm, compared to an average 
milk production of 230,000 kg at the time. The gap between ideal and 
reality was about 70 per cent. A considerable acceleration of scale 
enlargement as a project has occurred since then. I have summarised 
several of the most remarkable indications of this growing gap in Figure 
8.6. 
In the autumn of 1995 and especially in early spring of 1996 - when I was 
writing the first fragments of this book - a new round of debate about 
structural development in the dairy sector sparked off. It was y 
considered that Dutch agriculture was on the eve of another round of 
radical reorganisations. Initially, the emphasis was on the implications of 
the manure and ammonia policies, whereas it later it shifted to the 
anticipated liberalisation of European agricultural policy. Arguments that 
attracted attention came first from the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI). The realisation of the Integrated Plan* would imply a vast 
Translator's note: the main objectives and mechanisms of the Dutch agri-environmental 
policy were stipulated in this Integrated Plan (Integrale Notitie). 
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reduction of farms and hence of employment. Subsequently, statements 
emerged from the side of the industry barons. Aalbers, of what was then 
Friesland Dairy Foods, predicted a halving of the number of farms within 
15 years. He was seconded by my colleague Dijkhuizen, at that time 
professor at the Agricultural University, who stated that the minimum 
size of a viable farm would be 800,000 litres of milk. At the same time, 
there were plenty speculations that the quota system would come to an 
end after the year 2000 as well as persistent, mutually reinforcing reports 
about continuous price reductions. The accession of central and eastern 
European countries to the European Union and the second GATT round 
both had significant influence on this debate. 
Figure 8.6 The acceleration of scale enlargement as a project 
1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 time 
Dijkhuizen's statement merits further discussion. The touchstone of 
800,000 kg milk per farm that he proposed (which is also presented in 
Figure 8.6) meshes wonderfully well with the idea, already playing a 
guiding role in the expert system, that about 7000-8000 greatly expanded 
dairy farms (each producing about 1 million litres of milk or more) would 
be able to produce 60-70 per cent of the total Dutch quota. It was assumed 
that this would result in lower cost prices, which was illustrated by 
referring to current cost price differences between smaller and larger 
farms. Another, intriguing element is the assessment of the quota system. 
According to Dijkhuizen: 'It is a blessing today, but it will be a source of 
worry in the future'. His argument goes as follows: 
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'Growth is necessary, but is restricted by production quotas. If the quotas 
disappear, growth will be possible again. In order to be prepared for this, 
however, farms will have to be expanded towards 800,000 litres in the 
meantime. ' 
Thus a remarkable tour de force is created: comparing current cost prices 
with the ones of the imagined future situation in order to make a 
reasonable case for the latter. However, today's cost prices are a reflection 
of historical growth processes, when (at least a large part of) production 
rights were not obtained via the market and, further, when no extreme 
form of acceleration existed. In other words, the present cost prices can 
hardly be used to support and legitimise a highly accelerated growth 
(occurring partly through quota purchases). Still, such a course of action is 
rule rather than exception in the expert system. 
At that time, I had many invitations to do external lectures - usually twice 
a week. Sometimes they took place in small backrooms of local branches 
of farmers organisations, at other times at mass meetings boiling with 
agitation and heaving with excitement. Furthermore, my usual work 
continued and thus I would repeatedly spend a whole afternoon or 
evening sitting around a table for a long discussion with one farmer. 
These encounters linked together into an extremely significant research 
experience. Through them I have first hand experience of how 'structure' 
works. The outbursts of anger at meetings, the debates, the individually 
expressed disgust or despair - an engaged researcher could not wish for 
more, especially if he wrestles with the question of how different 
processes weave into that which we eventually (and particularly with 
hindsight) name structure. 
'Farmers became depressed.' If there is one summary of the events of that 
time, it has to be that one. Time and again the word appeared: depressed. 
On the one hand, the knowledgeable part of the nation (the 'people who 
have studied for a degree') state that you will have to milk at least 800,000 
litres in future. On the other hand, you know that you will never really 
succeed at it. The costs involved are so high that they (a) cannot be 
financed and (b) cannot be solvable (that is, they cannot be compensated 
by enlarged output). Apart from this, personal reasons ('if it has to be like 
this, I quit') and/or other restrictions (for example, the available 
environmental space) were other important factors excluding such an 
expansion. 
Statements such as Dijkhuizen's result in disillusion and hopelessness, 
leading to decisions to either 'sell the lot while we still can' or to 'get by 
for a while'. The same processes occurred a few years previously, when 
400,000 litres was mentioned as the critical threshold. 'Many got 
depressed', farmers remembered later, 'at that time, it was thought that 
they wouldn't be able to continue to farm, that the game was no longer 
theirs .... that's why many people quitted'. 
The beacons defined by the expert system generate not only feelings of 
depression, they have a structuring effect too. Let me quote a discussion 
partner from the Frisian Woodlands, Geale Atsma: 
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'I'll tell you what happens? If such stories go round and the local board of the 
bank has to assess an application of a smaller farm, the application is looked 
upon rather more critically. 'Is this really possible', they ask themselves, 'there 
really isn 't a prospect for farms like this ' . . . Well, that application will be 
returned. And that farmer is told to think things over very carefully. The man 
loses courage, he'll think, 'I'll never get through there'. He will think, 'it won't 
make any difference. ' 
A climax was reached in the second half of the 1990s (see also Figure 8.6). 
In a scenario study conducted by two agricultural research institutes, 
published as Koeien en koersen (Cows and Courses), large, non-land 
dependent farms of approximately 1000 cows each are introduced 
(LEI/SC 1996).10 At a high level of production this implies easily a total 
production per farm of about 10 million kg or more. By implication, the 
average rural community in the Netherlands would have less than two 
dairy farms. Acceleration of scale enlargement is dazzling and scary in 
this case. 
I would like to describe two other aspects of contemporary trends. Both 
are closely linked to the acceleration issue. The first involves financing. 
Under current circumstances, it is no longer possible to create large-scale 
agriculture from private resources, or even justify a loan to do so. 
Additional benefits do not compensate for the huge investments in 
quotas, land, technology, etc. Thus, state intervention will be necessary, 
not only in order to create spatial and legal preconditions," but also to 
finance the intended transition. By the second half of the 1990s, such plans 
for restructuring did indeed emerge. The Plan Martens covered the pig 
sector. It anticipated a forced reduction of the number of pig farms from 
approximately 22,000 to 6000-7000. Every mixed and smaller farm would 
have to leave the field in order for the larger farms to continue growing. 
Equally, the Hoogervorst Plan (concerning horticulture) envisaged a 
reduction of the number of greenhouse farms from 8850 to 2790 (to be 
realised within 10 years). This Plan Hoogervorst was partly developed by 
the Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI 1998, p. 45). Both plans 
claimed that the proposed scale enlargement should be financed with 
public funds. They estimated the costs at NLG 500 million and NLG 475 
million for greenhouse agriculture and intensive husbandry respectively. 
The plans stressed that continuous scale enlargement is no longer a 
profitable project in private economic terms. This point of view returned 
repeatedly in later plans (including government plans) and the required 
sum of public funding increased further. It is highly questionable, 
however, whether parliament will accept plans which imply such 
considerable public expenditure. They are likely to ask why they should 
invest so much money in the elimination of employment and why it is not 
possible for the large, so-called viable, farms to take care of themselves. 
The second aspect that I think is quite unique to scale enlargement as 
contemporary episode is the deep and widely spread scepticism among 
farmers. In a survey conducted in mid-1997 (among a sample of about 700 
farmers), extensive enquires were made about their opinions on sector-
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specific p lans a n d projects w i t h respect to the supposed ly requi red scale 
(Boerderij 1997). Table 8.1 refers to the outcomes of the survey. The 
response percentages refer to the re sponden t s opera t ing wi th in the 
indicated subsector. 
Table 8.1 Farmers' opinions about drastic scale enlargement 
Dairy farming 
It has been said for a while now that 800,000 kg milk is necessary to call a farm 
viable. Do you think this is realistic? 
yes no don't know 
15% 71% 14% 
Do you think it is desirable for the sector to grow towards such farms? 
yes no don't know 
11% 72% 17% 
In a recent report by two research institutes, the idea was put forward to have 
dairy farms of 1000 cows per farm. Do you think it is worth while that this idea is 
considered at all? 
yes no don't know 
5% 78% 17% 
Arable agriculture 
It has been stated recently by people from DLV" and by people from Cebeco that 
arable farms will have to grow towards 200-300 ha in the coming 10 or 20 years. 
Do you think this is realistic? 
yes no don't know 
12% 86% 2% 
Do you think it is desirable that arable agriculture develops into that direction? 
yes no don't know 
18%15 77% 5% 
Horticulture 
It has been stated in the horticultural sector lately that in the future a few 
hundred very large horticultural firms could look after the export market and 
that a further few hundred could produce for the national market. Do you think 
this is a realistic appraisal? 
yes no don't know 
35%'6 60% 6% 
Do you think it is desirable to move in that direction? 
yes no don't know 
U%'7 83% 6% 
Intensive pig husbandry 
It is assumed in many recent plans that the required size of a healthy farm in 
2001 is at least 500 sows or at least 5000 porkers. Do you think this is a realistic 
appraisal? 
yes no don't know 
25%18 50% 25% 
Note: * DLV: advisory service 
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In summary, the project is fragile and it is difficult to justify private 
economic funding. It is not really attractive from a regional-economic 
perspective. And it is subject to increasing scepticism, if not rejection, by a 
majority of farmers. Furthermore, there is a second group of factors that 
make the scale-enlargement project extremely improbable under current 
circumstances. These factors are situated on the axis between society and 
agriculture. Collectively, they imply that the required synergy of a wide 
range of projects (including those of consumers) will be hardly if at all 
possible to realise. 
Accelerated scale enlargement cannot but result in the creation of mega-
farms. The required scale levels would make a further industrialisation of 
the agricultural production process inevitable. This collides increasingly 
with the desires of consumers, both at home and abroad. The most 
dramatic expression of the new consumer awareness took place at the 
time of the large outbreak of swine fever in the late 1990s. The writer Koos 
van Zomeren identified the choices facing us: 'It is either our morality that 
extends into the pig sector or the morality of the pig sector that extends 
into society at large' (NRC, 20 December 1997, p. 73). 
Mega-farms presume optimised production circumstances. This requires, 
left, right, and centre, a reconstruction of rural space that is at odds with 
the desires of society (see RLG 1997,1999). The required optimisation will 
also run counter to ecological conditions. An example in this context is the 
high 'turnover rate' of sows and cows on today's large-scale farms: 
animals have become largely 'throw-away animals' on these farms (Van 
der Ploeg 1998). 
The law of diminishing returns has been appropriately renounced in 
theoretical agronomy (see Chapter 4 of this book). However, this 
renouncement does not exclude the emergence of new constellations at a 
higher level of aggregation, that result in diminishing returns both at 
micro- and macrolevel. The contradictions between accelerated scale 
enlargement and its socio-economic implications refer to a technological 
regime stuck in its own logic. Further developments along these, already 
exhausted, lines can only result in increasing counterproductivity. 
8.2 Why does scale enlargement occur anyway? 
The previous section argues that accelerated scale enlargement cannot be 
understood as a very convincing project either in the sector itself, nor at 
the level of society as a whole. Nevertheless, there is a significant 
tendency towards continuous and highly accelerated scale enlargement in 
Dutch agriculture. At the same time it should be noted that this tendency 
stems from a local process, situated in one part of the agricultural sector 
(the segment defined by the bottom left-hand corner in Figure 7.3). This 
results in a number of questions. First, why does disproportionate scale 
enlargement actually occur here? Second, why does the expert system 
keep producing projections (such as summarised in Figure 8.6) that seem 
to make accelerated scale enlargement into an almost inevitable 
phenomenon? Third, what is the interrelation between the first two 
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questions - that is, between the practice and theory of accelerated scale 
enlargement? 
A fairly well-definable group of farms can be distinguished that have 
developed a continuous, disproportionate, and increasingly accelerated 
growth into a systematic practice. Approximately 750 dairy farms in the 
Netherlands in 1996 housed more than 120 cows each (which is roughly 
equal to a quota of 1 million kg milk per farm). Remarkably, the number 
remained fairly stable during the 1990s: sometimes it rose slightly, and 
subsequently it fell again. This is partly due to generic quota reductions 
and to the steady increase in the milk yield per cow. Above all, however, 
the more or less constant number of mega-farms indicates the fragility of 
this construction. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that part of these 
very large dairy farms cannot be understood as mega-farms. They are 
multi-person farms (for example, several brothers working together), 
which are comparable in terms of scale to the smaller family farms and 
which are often active in processing and marketing. Mathematically, the 
number of mega-farms in the dairy sector does not exceed about five per 
cent; and if we take this nuance into account, the proportion of large-scale 
farms based purely upon accelerated growth will be considerably lower 
than the figure mentioned above. 
Let us turn to the other sectors. There were 136 intensive livestock farms 
with over 4000 pigs in 1990. In comparison, the average number of pigs 
per farm was 476 in the same year. By 1996 there were 231 farms with 
over 4000 pigs (including some with 20,000-30,000 pigs), whereas the 
average number of pigs per farm was 679 pigs. Hence, the number of 
mega-farms in the pig sector rose by 70 per cent between 1990 and 1996. 
Nevertheless, these mega-farms constitute only a fraction of the total 
number of farms: between two and four per cent. This does not alter the 
fact that this fraction produced almost six per cent of the total number of 
pigs in 1990, while the same group produced over ten per cent of total 
supplies in 1996. The tendency towards concentration is clearly visible, 
although it is still modest in scale. 
The number of arable farms of over 100 ha rose by 27 per cent during the 
period in question (1990-1996). However, it remains a fraction of the total 
number. The most consistent trend can be distinguished in greenhouse 
horticulture: the number of greenhouse farms with over two ha under 
glass increased from slightly less than 700 to over 900. Again, this is less 
than five per cent of the total number of greenhouse farms. 
Thus, a subgroup (of about five per cent) of very large farms can be 
distinguished. Continuous and disproportionate growth is of strategic 
importance to these farms: the necessity of continuous growth has become 
so much as a structural feature of the farm set-up. The high levels of 
growth realised so far, the financial costs related to this, and the high 
degree of externalisation and commoditisation imply a cost structure and 
cost-benefit relation of such proportions that these farms will suffer 
considerable problems when faced with price reductions. The margin 
between costs and output prices is very small, especially when compared 
to the room created in other farming styles. 'You can see at the moment 
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that the larger farms in particular, due to their investments, find it more 
difficult to meet their payment obligations as a result of the falling milk 
prices', according to LEI researcher Van Burgsteden in the farming press. 
The project of the 'growers' carries with it an explicit ordering of the 
future world. First, the 'growers' imagine the future as a 'limited good', a 
scarce good (Foster 1965). In the agriculture of the future, there will be 
room only for a limited number of large to very large farms. Expansion at 
the farm level is probably boosted more by the desire to be part of this 
agriculture of the future than by its material necessity. The modernisation 
project is highly internalised. It is also constantly reconfirmed. A debate 
took place in the first half of the 1990s about the rationality of further 
growth (partly initiated by the Dutch Agricultural Youth Organisation -
NAJK). It was clear by then that accelerated growth would result in an 
increase of cost prices and a simultaneous decline of profitability. 
However, this was not seen as a problem, according the Landbouwschap 
(the national representative of farmers organisations, and an undeniable 
element of the expert system): 'Don't listen to your accountant, operate 
like an entrepreneur'. According to them, investing in the future should 
take priority over the rationality of today's actions. 
An important element in the 'moral economy' of the 'growers' concerns 
their perspective on redundancy as it occurs at present. In contrast to their 
colleagues, they regard the rate of the current exodus as too low. If there 
is a crisis in agriculture, in their eyes it is due precisely to the low level of 
exodus. The outflow should be accelerated. 
The undeniable ability of the 'growers' to expand their farms is rooted 
largely in a particular socio-technical network. The 'growers' use their 
relations with banks, agro-industrial enterprises, and government bodies 
knowledgeably and in such a way that various projects become 
interlocked. In this respect it is important that Dutch agro-industry 
follows a development trajectory that is usually characterised by the term 
bulk production. The comparatively low dairy value realised by the 
Dutch dairy industry is a concrete expression of this (see Figure 8.7). 
Since milk is valorised only to a relatively low degree by the Dutch dairy 
industry, a low farm gate price and a large volume of production per 
supplier are important elements in the project of large businesses. In order 
to encourage this as much as possible, a complex system of differentiated 
bonuses has been developed - not only by the processing industry but 
also by the supply industry and banks. The larger the farms (that is, 'the 
more able to anticipate the interests and expectations of the industry'), the 
higher the financial advantages they are able to obtain. Often one income, 
or even a few incomes, are derived from the many reductions and 
bonuses connected to the scale of the very large farms. Thus, the 
convergence of different projects results in a particular ordering of market 
relations - an ordering that, in turn, interweaves with continuous growth 
as a material interest. Similar linkages can be identified in the relations 
between the project of 'growers' and government. These relations are 
to earn a living'. 'In the 1930s . . . you'd nad to IOOK ror customers 
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largely the outcome of the large modernisation project of the 1960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s. Hence, continuous growth is still tax deductible, which in 
practice appears to be one of the driving forces of continuous expansion. 
Once again, this demonstrates a particular combination of projects. On the 
one hand, it is a very solid combination, with its own materialisation; on 
the other hand, it is an extremely limited and increasingly contested 
combination of projects, in which the Ministry of Agriculture as expert 
system plays an important part. 
Figure 8.7 The dairy value of Dutch milk 
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The reality of 'growers' is constituted not only by a particular socio-
technical network - that is, by a number of converging projects. This 
reality contains a moral order too. The ordering of the world imagined by 
the 'growers' has a highly normative content. Small farmers are 'failed 
farmers', who have missed the available opportunities. In this respect, 
they are sometimes talked about as ninnies. Hence, their expectations and 
interests are perceived as being illegitimate: 'They should have seized 
their opportunities much earlier'. In contrast, the survival and the further 
expansion opportunities of the farms of the 'growers' is considered a 
moral right: 'Efficient farms should not be punished'. From this point of 
view the (re-)ordering of markets and policy is scrupulously followed, 
commented on, and guarded. It happens with respect to leasing of milk, 
the high proportion of costs of purchased quota in the total cost price, 
whether or not to end tenure relations between government and farms in 
the polders, etc. 
The language used in this 'moral economy' is intriguing. Incidentally, it is 
interesting that the 'moral economy' (Scott 1976) is thus absolutely not 
restricted to small farmers and/or peasants in the Third World, but is also 
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explicitly present among the most modern farmers in the world today -
that is, the 'growers' in the Netherlands. They make no reference to own 
interests ('I want to take over the land of my neighbour'). Rather, a de-
subjectified language is used ('the mobility of the production factors 
should not be frozen') - in short, a language referring to the same 
presupposed laws that were drawn from for the benefit of the large 
modernisation project of the government at the time. 
The power of the 'growers' draws partly on the way in which language is 
actively ordered. An important part is played by the terms that I will 
describe, for lack of a better word, as sandwich concepts. It works a bit like 
this: at a meeting someone stands up and declares that 'development 
should be able to go ahead, because stagnation means decline'. The other 
people present can only nod in agreement to such a statement. All farms 
are thought of in terms of development; whatever the nature or type of 
farm, real development opportunities are pursued on every farm. 
The point is, however, that these developments are extremely 
heterogeneous and that they could easily exclude each other. In 
contemporary agriculture, the concept of development summarises these 
different practices and ideas, whilst at the same time attributing a 
particular legitimacy to the specific project of the 'growers'. If necessary 
other sandwich concepts are mobilised. For if confusion arises at the 
meeting, the previously quoted speaker can stand up again and say that 
'development should not occur at the expense of efficiency' (which 
implies that whatever development occurs, it may not be detrimental to 
the large and quickly expanding farms). If necessary he or she will add 
that 'there is no point in throwing good money after bad'. 
The moral order and the language used by the 'growers' constitute an 
intriguing reflection of the modernisation project. Everything that diverts 
from the modernisation discourse is normatively rejected (and usually 
with emotional ferocity), whereas that which lies in the line of their 
discourse (further acceleration of growth at the farm level, for instance) 
claims the moral high ground. 
'Nothing will come of it, it's all twaddle. Take quality production: filling 
seven pots of jam to improve my income? Farmer-led nature 
management: no tree wants to grow in our clay! .... You can't work 
without fertiliser, it won't make any money and it makes no sense either'. 
Such comments can be heard at almost every farmers meeting.23 They are 
spoken mainly by 'growers', although they are not the only ones to voice 
such opinions. Of course, the inborn conservatism of the farming 
community cannot be held responsible for the disbelief and, hence, the 
fatalism heard in these statements. More important than all -this is the 
widely shared indignation. An often expressed sentiment at meetings 
literally goes as follows: 'Stop pissing about, it's absolutely hopeless if 
you can't earn it in all honesty and decency by milking'. What is 
important here is 'by milking alone'. Reference is made often to the past: 
'In those days farmers had to take an axe into the woods in the mornings 
to earn a living'. 'In the 1930s ... you'd had to look for customers 
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yourself, to see whether you could sell some of your produce at a better 
price.' Farming women in particular can explode with rage: 'It's 
completely hopeless, we already have a double burden, the farm and the 
family, and now we have to take on something else as well, a camping site 
or an extra job; it is scandalous that you'd have to do something like that'. 
I have heard dozens of such objections (although they were often the 
sounds of a minority and were often refuted by others in the same room). 
Something different emerges through such, always well-meant, objections 
- something that refers, above all else, to a presumed discontinuity 
between past and present, to the stranglehold that can arise from previous 
experiences. 
The echo of the earlier modernisation project resounds clearly in the 
quoted objections. For was the modernisation project not an attempt to 
finish with the past once and for all? The modernisation project would 
offer security, at least to those who modernised their farms. Wasn't 
poverty a thing of the past? According to many people, much was asked 
of the farming community, enormous risks were taken, hard work done, 
farms specialised, many investments made - all in order to create a 
successful and prosperous agricultural sector. Everything has been staked 
in the search for and construction of the optimal farm, and now it appears 
that it is insufficient! This is where the wrath stems from. It is an 
annoyance that reflects the pretences and promises of the former 
modernisation project, which now has become increasingly blocked. 
Farmers are aware of this. Never is the buzzing of voices in the room 
louder than when you mention that farmers nowadays have lost the art of 
seeing their farms through difficult times. 
Deviations from, and alternatives to, the (former) modernisation project 
cannot be accomodated into the moral order of the 'growers'. They are 
unable and unwilling to countenance a shift in direction. In contrast to 
this unyielding position, new moral claims are unfolding left, right, and 
centre. 'Growers' have invested in optimal farms and have come to expect 
that government and society continue to create the conditions for them to 
continue their project. 'Government, the minister, society and consumers 
don't want to listen, they don't want to understand us'. The implicit 
criticism is obvious: they do not want to give us the room to which we are 
entitled. 
Trust, which I have already referred to in previous chapters (see Chapters 
1 and 6 in particular) was an essential ingredient of the macro-project that 
has been realised in the recent past. Trust presumes, in turn, 'institutional 
liability' (North 1989). Actions are performed on the basis of the beacons 
of the expert system, in the expectation that these beacons are indeed 
guides to the future and that recommended actions will be rewarded. This 
expectation has been particularly internalised by the 'growers'. The 
expected 'reliability' is now brought forward by them as a moral claim. 
Typically, one of the terms that is used most, in an accusatory sense, is 
'the untrustworthy government'. 
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The second half of the 1990s was characterised by waves of vehement 
protest. At the core, they were always led by 'growers', farmers who are 
deeply frustrated by their expectations about the desired conditions for 
further expansion along the 'beaten tracks'. If 'growers' were initially, 
and I use an expression of my colleague Eizner, 'the best pupils in their 
class' and were the embodiment of trust, they are now the group of 
farmers that is most opposed to government. 
8.3 The erosion of trust 
Farmers and their partners are generally pleasant and friendly people. In 
contrast to the established image, which often suggests dourness and 
distance, they are above all people who know the art of connecting with 
(or dissociating from) others when necessary. The active operation of 
actor-networks (or socio-technical networks) forms the core of their 
professional practice. The same goes for the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Compared to numerous other ministries of agriculture elsewhere, this is a 
rather efficient organisation, staffed by capable people. Foreigners often 
look with some jealousy to 'our' ministry and to 'our' expert system. And 
yet something is fundamentally amiss in the relationship between the 
two. Farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture appear to have reached an 
impasse, a paralysis in which rage, anger, and dissatisfaction mount left, 
right, and centre. Neither party is solely responsible; the problem lies in 
the link between the two. 
If trust, and hence the convergence of projects into one comprehensive 
macro-project, existed in the heyday of the modernisation epoch, the lack 
of trust has now become the predominant structural feature of Dutch 
agriculture. Figures from a survey conducted in 1995 (Ettema et al. 1995) 
emphasise this dramatically. Farmers were asked the question from 
whom they expected support in practical changes. They were also asked 
whether they were satisfied with the actual support they received. The 
(national) government stood out as the institution with the widest gap 
between expectation and satisfaction. Eighty one per cent of farmers 
expected support from the government in The Hague; only four per cent 
(!) were satisfied by the support actually available. 
Numerous elements and processes have played a role in the erosion of 
trust. I will discuss a few of these here, concentrating on two important 
aspects: the irreversible nature of the erosion of trust and the special role 
of those who used to be 'the best pupils in the class'. For although this 
erosion of trust is found throughout the length and breadth of agriculture 
(see the social map of Dutch agriculture in Figure 7.3), it is most marked 
amongst 'growers'. I will concentrate on one subgroup - pig farmers* to 
illustrate this point. 
* Translator's note: they constitute an interesting subgroup, all the more as they conducted a 
kind of 'guerilla warfare' against the state during the 1990s. 
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1 We have already seen how Dutch agriculture has arrived at a zero-sum 
situation. In such a situation the notion of common interests, which is 
rooted in the convergence of different development projects at the 
micro level, will increasingly become problematic. If proportionate and 
disproportionate growth patterns were able to co-exist within the 
productivist era, they now collide head-on. Hence one of the pillars of 
trust has been swept away: interests perceived at the micro-level no 
longer follow automatically from interests defined at the macro-level. 
'The' interest of the agricultural sector is, at least in the eyes of many of 
the parties involved, no longer the obvious sum of interests at the farm 
level. Moreover, the different micro-interests are at odds with each 
other. Or rather, the political economy of the sector is subject to several 
broad movements, collectively implying a further undermining of trust. 
If in the past the benefits of the modernisation project ended up with 
'growers' and costs were localised in 'small, non-viable farms', a 
reversed flow of income takes place nowadays. 'Growers' have to pay 
the farms that were once defined as non-viable in order to obtain the 
necessary room for further expansion. This occurs directly, through the 
leasing of milk quotas, the renting or purchasing of environmental 
space (regardless of its operationalisation), the purchasing of pig rights, 
and indirectly through shifts in subsidy flows. The expansion of 
'growers' thus becomes a source of revenue for non-growers (showing 
evidence that the supposed lack of entrepreneurship within 'non-viable 
farms' may be an overstatement). 
The discongruity that this created (at least from the perspective of the 
'growers') not only undermines the modernisation project as such, it 
also undermines trust - precisely because the Ministry of Agriculture 
and the expert system are less able to guarantee the institutional 
preconditions for further and successful growth at the farm level. It has 
become the (uncontrollable) business of others. 
2 The process of scale enlargement has accelerated most sharply in 
intensive husbandry and greenhouse horticulture. In these areas and 
due to particular technological developments, the production process 
(and, hence, the development process) became increasingly 
disconnected from a number of, thus far, limiting factors - especially 
'nature' (Van der Ploeg 1992). The internalised need for further 
expansion is greatest in these sectors. The large, highly modernised and 
highly capitalised farms in these sectors are especially at risk from 
bankruptcy: further growth is believed to be the only way to prevent 
this from happening. The involved entrepreneurs believe to be 
involved in a competition with others revolving around the 'future as 
limited good', i.e. in a battle for the future. 
The notion of the 'top farm' (which embodies the same idea as the 
vanguard farm, the efficient farm, the optimal farm, etc.) functions, in 
the modernisation discourse, as the link between the present and the 
future. Only farms with the highest possible levels of production, the 
largest possible size, and the most modern technology will be able to 
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take the leap from present to future. At the same time it should be 
mentioned that the top farm also functions as a sandwich concept, and 
therefore is a somewhat confusing concept. Ecological farmers and 
relatively small cheesemakers will sometimes also describe their own 
farms as top farms. However, in discussions and in the language of 
the mid-1990s, the concept basically referred mainly to the large, 
modern, and rapidly expanding farms. 
The figures in Table 8.2 (derived from the third Boerderij survey 
conducted as part of the Ter Zake (Get to the Point!) debate - see Ettema 
et al 1995) show that 40 per cent of entrepreneurs in agriculture claim 
to pursue a 'top farm'.26 This percentage is significantly higher in 
greenhouse horticulture and intensive livestock husbandry (59 and 54 
per cent, respectively), especially in comparison to dairy farming (30 
per cent). The strategy of continuous expansion (further scale 
enlargement) has been internalised and institutionalised significantly 
more in greenhouse horticulture and intensive livestock farming than 
in other branches of farming, whose production processes are much 
more dependent on natural circumstances and the quality of labour. If 
we concentrate on pig farming as such, we can see that large pig 
farmers in particular (those over 50 NSU) opt for development towards 
the top farm, whereas far fewer smaller pig farmers do so (66 versus 28 
per cent, respectively). Accelerated growth has been internalised to a 
far higher degree amongst large pig farmers. 
The remaining information in Table 8.2 expands the picture: large pig 
farmers relate to their colleagues as competitors much more than small 
pig farmers (51 versus 26 per cent, respectively)—and more than Dutch 
farmers generally. They expect to be able to survive in, if not 'triumph 
over', an open world-market ordering much more than small pig 
farmers (see row 2 in Table 8.2). This corresponds with various 
journalistic reports of late 1995, which stressed that the mentality 
among large pig farmers was 'let's sit it all out, we will win in the end'. 
The information in rows 8 and 9 emphasise this: small pig farmers 
think (slightly more often than large pig farmers) that the problem is 
that there are too many pigs in the Netherlands. Large pig farmers, on 
the other hand, take the view that there are too many pig farmers (41 
versus seven per cent respectively). 
The events of the 1990s can be approached well from the perspective of 
the lack of trust. Attempts to control the manure question via co-operation 
and self-disciplining (including a co-operative plant for the 
transformation of manure) were consistently rejected by large pig farmers 
from the southern regions.2 They did not see the advantage of collective 
arrangements, and saw no benefit in co-operation with those they 
regarded as their competitors (see row 1 in Table 8.2). They preferred 
individual solutions, in the expectation that they can thus both serve their 
own advantages and speed up the demise of their competitors - that is, 
the smaller pig farmers. (Incidentally, the same large pig farmers from the 
southern provinces also undermined the halt on further expansion in the 
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pig sector, as the then Minister for Agriculture, Braks, attempted to 
implement in 1987). 
The pig farming sector has developed along the lines of the modernisation 
project more than the other sectors. This remoulding did not occur 
without any resistance. Smaller pig farms campaigned constantly against 
the emergence of what were then called 'mammoth farms'. There have 
also been frequent debates in politics about the possible unfavourable 
effects and high social costs of pushing scale enlargement to extremes, 
thereby burdening the Netherlands with gigantic environmental 
problems while offering only few economic benefits. However, these 
developments were regarded as inevitable by the expert system -
anything else seemed unimaginable. This view coincided with the 
particular interests of the southern, Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 
dominated farmers, which implied that the mammoth farms could 
expand at will. Thus a project was consolidated that would influence 
radically the future course of events. Every compromise for the Dutch 
agro-environmental issue was rejected by the southern bloc of large pig 
farmers - the outlaws or cowboys as they became characterised in public 
debate. 
This example shows how modernisation in extremis is able to wield 
powers that override every possible moderation or adjustment of the 
project. Again, the development of agriculture should not be seen so 
much as a logical unfolding of general laws, but rather an extension of 
that which has gone before and the interests this has created. Agricultural 
history revolves around the always recurring creation of 'emergent facts', 
emergent features that subsequently (and depending on the power 
relations at the time) appear as structuring elements. All this implies that 
history puts a leaden pressure on the present, yet, at the same time, it 
contains the seeds of a bizarre volatility. 
Rows 5, 6, and 7 of Table 8.2 illustrate the extent to which large pig 
farmers regard their own project (growing, at all costs, towards a top 
farm) as being in conflict with the projects of the Dutch Organisation for 
Agriculture and Horticulture (LTO), the regional organisations (such as 
the Catholic Farmers Union of North-Brabant-NCB) and the Ministry of 
Agriculture. When the ministry confronted the pig farming sector with 
the (socially and environmentally no longer acceptable) consequences of 
continuous growth, it was those seen as the cause of the problem that 
were least willing to address the issue. The prospects of the large pig 
farmers and the ministry became disarticulated and a deep-felt distrust set 
in. 
The data in Table 8.2 also help explain why the events of 1995 and '96 
unfolded as they did: the large pig farmers (mainly represented by the pig 
farmers union, NVV) withdrew into an isolated radicalism. Neither the 
national government in The Hague nor the farmers organisations (nor 
science, for that matter) were regarded as potential allies. The NVV 
isolated itself by disputing the competence of anyone with an opinion 
about the agro-environmental question. It was looking for a radical 
confrontation. 
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Table 8.2 A few comparative data about pig farmers and greenhouse farmers 
(affirmative answers only) 
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However, because these farmers chose to turn their backs on the 
democratic process and because they neglected to build alliances with 
other farmers in similar situations (in the north, in arable agriculture, in 
dairy farming), the NVV's protests amounted to little more than a fire in 
a carbide container: flaring up and rapidly burning itself out. Though it 
seemed spectacular at the time, in the long term it was probably 
inconsequential. The problem, though, is that some are very afraid of the 
next bang. 
The 'outlaws' constituted (and still constitute) the hard core of an 
otherwise more inclusive protest against the environmental policy of the 
Ministry of Agriculture. Even though much reference was and continues 
to be made of the emotions of small pig farmers and their partners, the 
emphasis on an optimal agriculture and, particularly, the embracing of 
the Plan Martens (which envisaged a reduction of the number of pig 
farms from 22,000 to 6,000-7,000) shows a continuity of opinion that can 
be traced from the large, highly specialised pig farms to the 
environmental protest that swamped the Netherlands in 1995. This 
environmental protest was one of the most radical expressions of the 
erosion of trust, which in the past connected the growth pole of the sector 
with the expert system. The best pupils in the class are today's outlaws 
and cowboys. The same pattern recurs in other sectors. The dairy farmers 
union (NVM), comprising large dairy farmers, is a shining example of 
this. Internationally parallel movements can be found too: the COBAS, 
which fought the guerra da latte (milk war) in Italy, emerged out of the 
very large dairy farms of the Po plain (see Bussi forthcoming). 
3 The disarticulation between expert system and the 'growers' is not just 
a temporary phenomenon. It is the expression (one of many, but 
probably the most dramatic) of a deeper problem. A problem that also 
explains why not only vanguard farmers but also various other, types 
of farmers have lost trust. 
The modernisation project not only resulted in a 'risk society' (as 
argued by those who reduce 'risk' to a technical expression of the 
environmental issue), it introduces a range of completely new risks. 
Modernisation discourse relates to a healthy agriculture. The viable farm 
is specified in meticulous detail. However, the question of who is able to 
realise such a viable farm, who is allowed to join in the promised land 
and what has to be done to achieve this; these questions remain 
essentially unanswered. An answer does exist, but it is a disembodied 
one. 'The viable farm', according to the discourse, 'is developed by the 
good entrepreneur'. The problem with this notion is, however, that good 
entrepreneurship can be established only through ex post facto analysis. 
In a period when the expert system could control 'large areas of the 
material and the social environment' and, hence, could effectively 
guarantee (self-proclaimed) 'expectations', the distinction between ex 
ante prescription and ex post facto guarantee was relatively futile. 
However, when turbulence increases, various preconditions become 
less controllable (Szerszynski et al. speak about an 'exhaustion of the 
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very modernist ideas of technical prediction and control' 1996, p . 2). 
That is, if the controllable conditions can no longer be geared to specific 
interests, the entrepreneurial ideology will emerge as hollow rhetoric. 
The provision of institutional reliability becomes, from the viewpoint of 
the state, increasingly more difficult. As a consequence, it becomes 
unclear and uncertain what good entrepreneurship entails (what 
seemed to be acceptable initially can manifest itself as a serious mistake 
after five years). In the current era, entrepreneurship no longer involves 
a (measurable) risk; it emerges increasingly as a risk tout court. The 
same story applies to those who have been seduced by descriptions of 
viable farms that reach far beyond their own possibilities. The 
acceleration of the modernisation project introduces a risk for them too 
- that of not being able to remain in farming. In short, if the 
modernisation project initially seemed to offer prospects and security 
to those who conformed to it, it now seems to result in a multiplication 
of risks. Inevitably, this is leading to an erosion of trust - sometimes 
gradually but sometimes almost explosively. 
4 Growing uncertainty and risk have provoked a multitude of alternative 
responses. One of these can be described, for want of a better term, as 
style consciousness. The impossibility of relating the expert system's 
projections (see Figure 8.6) to one's own farm has generated a new 
drive among farmers to search for and make explicit their own paths 
and to replace the disappeared trust with rediscovered self-confidence. 
The rapidly growing self-identification in terms of 'farming 
economically' is a clear expression of this. The same applies to the 
many different innovations that will later be summarised by the term 
rural development (see Chapter 9). Of course, increased consciousness 
of one's own style is also an important contributory factor in the 
erosion of trust. The insight that there are more alternatives to farm 
management and development than those defined by the expert system 
has undermined stealthily, and later unstoppably, the credibility of the 
modernisation discourse and its claim to represent the only viable 
future for farming. If farmers would say semi-apologetically in the 
1980s that they 'no longer work by the book', by the 1990s they are 
exerting a newly found self-confidence: 'they can say what they like, 
but I have already made up my mind'. 
The uniqueness of their own, strategically created, situation, the 
specificity of the opportunities and limitations contained within that 
situation, and the notion that there is more than one way to move 
forward, form a new starting point for the actions of, an increasing 
number of, farmers. Prescriptive guidelines ('a farm is only viable with 
over 400,000 kg of quota', 'it is essential to keep on growing', 'the real 
entrepreneur is only concerned with the main branch', 'it is impossible 
to take over a small farm', etc.) are treated with increasing scepticism. 
Increasingly they are parried by alternative development projects that 
are made viable. Thus, farmers' own projects are becoming increasingly 
disconnected from the macro-project of the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Trust is not only being eroded, but the real basis of and for trust, that is, 
the links between, and hence the congruence and synergy of projects, is 
also disappearing. 
5 Attempts have been made from within the expert system to suppress 
the diverging tendencies within Dutch agriculture by means of a 
rapidly expanding set of regulations, that meticulously prescribe the 
practice of farming. The range of these regulations can, inter alia, be 
illustrated by the amount of time (and hence indirectly by the costs) 
spent by the average Dutch farmer in completing the many forms and 
paperwork that these regulations create (see NSS Agrimarketing 1996). 
Current regulations are highly centralised and bureaucratically 
implemented. They involve a generic prescription that has to collide 
with the diverging development tendencies that are emerging in Dutch 
agriculture. Uniform (that is, generic) rules cannot but have different, 
highly contrasting consequences in this context. In early 1996, research 
was conducted into the question of over-regulation (see Frouws et al. 
1996). The regulations that had already been set up appeared indeed to 
be oppressive left, right, and centre, as well as inefficient and 
counterproductive. Even the selective preferential treatment that 
existed before the zero-sum game had disappeared. Every dog feels 
bitten. However, the reasons why this is the case are highly variable, 
which is, in fact, the most important research result. This is emphasised 
by the demand for alternatives. What could be a solution for one 
implies a deterioration for someone else, and vice versa. Everybody is 
dissatisfied, but a uniform answer can no longer be provided. The 
modernisation project has created its own cul-de-sac, in a twofold 
sense. Not only has trust disappeared, but it is also unlikely that it 
might be re-established. 
6 If the previous point illustrates how the modus operandi of the Ministry 
of Agriculture results in increasing levels of distrust, I want to point out 
in this final argument, that the Archimedean point on which the expert 
system is founded - that is, contemporary agricultural science - has 
also become increasingly discredited. Science can be used less as an 
arbiter; the claim that something is founded in science no longer 
commands the respect that it used to. At least two elements have 
played an important part in this process of delegitimisation. First, a 
critical gap emerged between the determinist agricultural sciences and 
the social deconstruction of this determinism in practice. If science 
defines only one optimum, the multitude of farming styles that is 
developing in practice are an expression of the undetermined nature of 
socio-technical processes. Thus, the importance and value of 
agricultural sciences are being called into question and they are being 
seen as providing relative rather than absolute answers. The second 
element arises out of the contestation of environmental policy. For a 
long time, the political choices about goals, norms, procedures, 
prescriptions, regulations and rules were legitimised by the expert 
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system, as being founded in science. On closer inspection, it became 
increasingly apparent that this involved modelling studies and 
simulations based upon contestable assumptions. Since environmental 
policy touches upon a considerable (although internally divergent) 
complex of interests, many groups have become involved in attempts 
to open the black boxes of environmental regulations. As a 
consequence, the determinist character of agricultural science became 
disputed. Typically, the expert system (basically because of the extent 
to which it is trapped in determinist opinions) had no adequate 
response to these criticisms and was brought increasingly into 
discredit. What little trust there was left disappeared almost 
completely. 
8.4 'Tripartite world' 
In the autumn of 1994, I was involved with a number of colleagues in a 
comprehensive survey of farmers' worldviews, the results of which were 
published as De crisis (The Crisis) (Van der Ploeg et al. 1994). This 
research painted a picture that emphasises, and in a way summarises, 
many of the issues discussed above. 
The research showed how the world of farmers is changing into a tripartite 
world. A world in which three categories can be identified: groups that 
not only distinguish themselves from each other, but also dispute and/or 
oppose each other on a number of important issues. The tripartite world is 
a one in which a complex battle is fought over scarce resources: over 
production space, expansion opportunities, markets, recognition, the 
representation of interests, and regulations. 
The first of these three groups largely coincides with the 'growers'. It 
includes those who expect that the number of farms in Dutch agriculture 
will fall dramatically and who consider this to be a good thing. They 
believe, more than others, that there are too many weak farms in the 
agricultural sector. The 'growers' represent the project of further 
acceleration of scale enlargement. Only 17 per cent of all respondents fell 
into this category. Greenhouse horticulture and intensive livestock 
farming were more highly represented as were farmers in the south of the 
country. The second group was characterised as innovators. These 
farmers believe that redundancy will take place at a much slower pace 
than everyone else thinks. They expect that many more farms will remain 
and that there will be considerable differences in farming styles and sizes. 
They regard these trends in a positive light. The group of innovators is 
proportionally larger than the group of growers: 26 versus 17 per cent, 
respectively. It will not be surprising that this group pays a lot of 
attention to, and takes a lot of interest in, new developments such as 
farmer-led nature management, high-quality production, reintegration, 
diversification, new organisational solutions such as environmental co-
operatives, etc. The last and largest group that could be distinguished was 
the one of the pessimists. They expect a continuation if not an acceleration 
of structural development, but do not support it. This group amounted to 
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49 per cent, which reflects the atmosphere of crisis amongst farmers. 
Depression is most likely to be experienced in this group. These farmers 
want to continue farming but expect this to become increasingly difficult 
if not impossible. They are disoriented, finding it difficult to connect their 
own project (to stay farming) with the projects of those around them. 
Table 8.3 Tripartite world (n=753) 
The crisis will pass automatically. 
The crisis occurs mainly 
on weaker farms. 
It is disastrous that 
3000 farms disappear annually. 
My own income is 
very good / reasonable. 
My own farm will still 
exist in 10 years time. 
There is only one way of farming: 
supply a large stream of products 
as cheaply as possible. 
Cooperatives have to put good prices 
for their members before 
their own profit development. 
Current environmental measures 
can be fitted into my farm. 
Our leaders should, 
just like the French, 
not avoid political conflicts. 
no: 
64% 
yes: 
44% 
yes: 
47% 
64% 
yes: 
60% 
no: 
61% 
yes: 
51% 
yes: 
77% 
yes: 
48% 
A M 
no: 
71% 
yes: 
29% 
yes: 
85% 
52% 
yes: 
59% 
no: 
68% 
yes: 
66% 
yes: 
60% 
yes: 
60% 
A \ 
no: 
54% 
yes: 
27% 
yes: 
74% 
58% 
yes: 
79% 
no: 
80% 
yes: 
62% 
yes: 
73% 
yes: 
64% 
Proportion of total population 17. 49 26 
growers pessimists innovators 
A more comprehensive summary of the tripartite world is presented in 
Table 8.3. It shows that the pessimists score the lowest when asked to 
define the adequacy of their own incomes. Innovators and growers regard 
their incomes much more positively. 
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This tripartite world is illustrative of (and provides an explanation for) the 
paralysis that has gripped Dutch agriculture. This was illustrated in The 
Crisis by way of an illustration represented in Figure 8.8. 
Figure 8.8 The creation of paralysis 
Het is alsof land- en tuinbouw een driespan 
vertegenwoordigen waarbij elk paard een 
andere kant uittrekt 
It is as if agriculture represents a team 
of three horses, each pulling in a 
different direction 
Growers, innovators, and pessimists each represent an identifiable 
development project. The growers opt for further concentration. They are, 
at the same time, the ones who occupy key positions within farmers 
organisations: their influence is inversely proportional to their relative 
number. Innovators represent a completely different development 
project; one that revolves around the reduction of costs connected to the 
former modernisation trajectory and around increasing revenues by 
utilising new markets. Finally, there is the development project of the 
pessimists, which can be characterised as standing still and to trying to 
manage for as long as possible (and that can be a very long time). 
Collectively, these projects compose a constellation dominated by 
paralysis and futility. Synergy and mutual reinforcement, which occurred 
largely in the heydays of the modernisation period, no longer exist. If 
winners and losers constituted a consistent combination at the time (with 
the latter group creating room for those who wanted and had to grow), 
'growers' are nowadays confronted by pessimists who try to stay in 
agriculture for as long as possible and by innovators who try to set up 
various new activities in order to achieve this. It is not only growers who 
find their aspirations thwarted by the other groups. Innovators, for 
example, who try to develop new quality products find themselves 
generally, and on numerous practical issues, frustrated by 'growers', who 
consider this to be a direct threat to the value of their own products. 
The paralysis has taken hold at every level. It occurs at the national level, 
especially since the generic nature of agricultural policy and the 
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corporatist structure of interest representation repeatedly attempt to find 
a common denominator, a modus operandi acceptable to all parties 
involved. If one of the groups is marginalised from the discussions, the 
group in question is usually still able to undermine the emerging 
proposals. The same issue might be encountered at the local level. If a 
group of innovators is interested in farmer-led nature management or 
farm campsites, growers can and will usually attempt to block this, for 
example because they fear so-called planning repercussions. On the other 
hand, growers may suggest a restructuring of land use at the local level, 
but pessimists will do everything in their powers to prevent this, since 
they consider the resulting distribution of benefits and costs to be 
unacceptable. 
It has become increasingly impossible to make one perspective, or one 
project, dominant. Even compromises between the groups will be 
experienced as unsatisfactory - usually by all three groups. Thus, the 
Ministry of Agriculture is no longer able to operate as an expert system. 
The necessary basis of trust and mutual interest is absent. The acceleration 
of the former modernisation project will lead to increased distrust of 
innovators and pessimists alike, while growers will want this process to 
speed up even more. A new route, building on the practices of innovators, 
on the other hand, will be distrusted by growers. Thus, the conflicting 
projects create a structural setting that produces paralysis and 
hopelessness. Attempts at setting up something, at creating a break-
through, are constantly frustrated. 
Structure (the particular interaction of different projects) is active here in a 
very special way. Structure functions in such a way that it is impossible to 
create a breakthrough. Sicco Mansholt's diagnosis of the situation, 
contained in one of his last interviews, describes it perfectly: 'On the 
whole, you could say that "organised irresponsibility" exists in the sector; 
no one wants to, or is able to, do what is so very necessary' (Mansholt 
1995). 
It is worrying that the emerging distrust and inability become, in turn, the 
ordering principles with which the organised irresponsibility becomes 
more deeply entrenched. Let me offer one illustration, that of farmer-led 
nature management. (I will discuss this in more detail in the next chapter). 
A large part of Dutch farmers are now quite interested in certain types of 
nature management, because they see that it is interesting from a purely 
agricultural point of view (for example, it can result in a better animal 
feed content) and it brings in revenue. However, a large part of those 
potentially interested drop out at the start, precisely because of distrust. 'I 
won't start this', many say, 'because you'll see that when we have it all in 
order, the ministry will say: Thank you, this is great nature, we don't 
want any more farmers here, and then we'll have another millstone 
around our neck.' 
There seems to be only one way out. It is a radical choice for a multiple 
trajectory policy, replacement of the generic policy by legally conditioned, 
local self-regulation, a corresponding replacement of corporatist 
Structural Involution and the Erosion of Trust 335 
consensus by more adequate interest articulation and a far-reaching 
decentralisation of policy implementation. Within this framework, a clear 
redefinition of the goals of Dutch agriculture is indispensable as a starting 
point for the construction of new alliances, instruments and consultative 
structures. It goes without saying that the core of such a redefinition 
relates to a highly differentiated agricultural sector. 
Notes 
1 One of the remarkable features of the Dutch expert system is that 'scale' is usually equated 
with total output. Increase in production is thus identical to scale enlargement. Hence, the 
essential difference between intensification and scale enlargement is cancelled. In this 
respect the Dutch definition deviates sharply from the ones used internationally (see 
Hayami and Ruttan 1985). Provincialism appears to be a feature of the 'expert system' that is 
impossible to eradicate. Moreover, a remarkable, but doubtless highly useful, confusion 
occurs in a sociological sense: it is a truism, especially in the countryside, that production per 
enterprise has to be increased every now and again. Every farmer will endorse this. By 
linking this axiom to scale enlargement, the latter notion is manoeuvred beyond the domain 
of the discursive. The second concept hitches a ride with the first one, as it were. 
2 Scale enlargement cannot be understood as a simple multiplication of the farm. New 
technologies are required in order to change the relation between the number of labour 
objects and available labour. The relation between capital, labour, and 'non-factor inputs', 
and hence between the total costs per unit and the output price will change drastically (see 
also Chapter 5 of this book). 
3 For a more extensive analysis, see Van der Ploeg and Nieuwenhuize 1986. An interesting 
series of comments on this analysis was included in subsequent issues of the journal Spil. 
4 These scenarios were developed by the National Reference Centre (IKC). 
5 Apart from the enormous transfers of income (in connection with the purchases of land 
and quotas), other considerable (social) costs are involved. I refer to the necessity of re-
allocation of plots, of increasing the carrying capacity of the soil everywhere, etc. Moreover, 
the standardisation of natural conditions generates more expenses in terms of nature 
management and development. 
6 At the end of Chapter 5,1 pointed out that this situation becomes more pronounced at the 
interface of the old and new millenniums. 
7 I realise that various issues representing life-size question marks at present, will have been 
settled in the meantime. Formulating extensive arguments against the issues of today (that 
is, February 1996) seems superfluous to me. What is much more suitable for observation, 
analysis, and commenting is the way in which this new version of the former modernisation 
story ('on to 800,000 litres per farm') was received, contradicted, and reaffirmed. 
8 I use quotation marks because it involves expectations that are presented in ever changing 
ways. In and around agriculture, however, these expectations are constantly selected and 
presented as facts, that appear to stress, above all, the necessity of further scale enlargement. 
This applies a fortiori to the 'expert system'. 
9 In addition, (a) I had made a stand in the media against those who wanted to boycott the 
environmental policy; (b) I had published previous research results in these media, showing 
that an adjustment of the apparently inevitable rural exodus could readily be imagined; and 
(c) I was, in spite of my intentions, promoted to one of the advocates of the notion of rural 
renewal or rural development. All this made the discussions into interesting confrontations, 
in which the 'flipside' of the many axioms that paralyse everyday discussion were 
investigated. 
10 One of the worrying aspects is that, by operating within the already created virtual 
knowledge markets, research institutes tend to create as distinct a profile of themselves as 
possible. Projections that are more extreme than those of others receive extra attention and 
value and raise the profile of the institute. 
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11 It is as if the modernisation project ends in a Bacchanal, a drunken orgy in which 
everyone eventually loses completely the few sober insights they once had. The last glass is 
drunk ad libitum. This is precisely what we are experiencing today. Scale enlargement is 
preached left, right, and centre. This does not even sound strange in the current state of 
intoxication. Anyone investigating the details will realise that sobering cannot be avoided 
indefinitely. 
12 The effects of a critical comment of mine in a weekly, Boerderij, were remarkable. I was 
told by various directors that such comments were not appreciated at all. They thought that I 
should share the axioms of the 'expert system'. I have had the opportunity to taste such 
experiences many times more since then. 
13 The plans aim at forced state intervention into existing relations (including property 
relations). There is already speculation in the horticultural sector about statutory regulations 
to compel small farms to closure. For even though the superiority of larger farms is constantly 
praised to the skies, it is still the case - in both sectors - that smaller farms are not closer to 
bankruptcy than larger farms. Sometimes it seems as if the opposite is true. Hence, smaller 
farms have to be coerced out of the sector. This brings a rather ugly, if not completely 
unacceptable, quality to the current projects of scale enlargement. 
14 A different dynamic will be initiated in private financing from banks or investment funds. 
Here the question arises of why the investment should be located where the prices of labour, 
land, environmental space, and production rights are about the highest in the world. 
Transfer of production elsewhere (to eastern Europe, for instance) becomes obvious. 
15 A remarkable difference exists around these figures with regard to the current farm sizes 
of the respondents. Thirty-five per cent of large arable farmers (over 50 NSU) answered 
affirmatively, as against only seven per cent of the smaller farmers. 
16 Again, these are the larger growers in particular (41 v. 23 per cent). 
17 This is a remarkably low percentage compared to the degree to which this development is 
regarded as realistic. 
18 It is remarkable that smaller pig farmers in particular regard this a realistic estimate more 
often (39 per cent) than larger ones (17 per cent). 
19 These and the following data are derived from Agrarisch Dagblad (1997). 
20 A remarkable phenomenon in the second half of the 1990s was that a number of very 
large farms of over 1 million litres quota were closed one after the other in the most large-
scale dairy region in the Netherlands, south-east Friesland. It is also remarkable that more 
and more very large farms are offered for sale in the agricultural media. 
21 Again, a crucial difference exists between size and scale. The size of a farm refers to the 
absolute number of labour objects (for example, operationalised as number of Standard 
Farm Units (SFU) or NSU per farm), whereas scale refers to the relation between the number 
of labour objects and labour input (for example SFU/labour unit or NSU/labour unit). A 
farm of over 1 million kg managed by four brothers is a small-scale farm. 
22 Tracy (1997) arrives at a similar conclusion regarding the EU as a whole by the late 1990s. 
23 The notion that 'something that is good is good for everyone or for no one at all' can be 
heard in the counterarguments as well. The idea of a multi-track development is emphasised 
increasingly within the general discourse on rural development. Where is it suitable? Where 
is it possible? Where is it enjoyed? Is it right to do this or that (cheese-making, setting up a 
farm campsite, and so on)? The idea of multiplicity, and hence of flexibility and one's own 
choice, appears increasingly in empirical studies about emerging forms of rural 
development. However, many in the countryside find such views difficult to handle. I 
regard this as a reflex of the former modernisation period. At that time it was clear what 
everybody had to do. One had to be a 'good entrepreneur'. 'Deviations' such as the 
'postman farmer', biodynamic farmer, small farm, etc. were ruthlessly delegitimised. A hard 
core of highly defined parameters existed: a good entrepreneur had to act in a well 
prescribed way (build a cubicle shed, pursue high milk yields, buy the newest machines, 
etc.). This gave them something to hold on to - on their own farm as well as in their contacts 
with others. Those who could not, or did not, want to conform to this withdrew from public 
discussions. Hence, only one opinion was heard - and conformism became dominant. 
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24 This was and still is clearly the case in the unions of pig and dairy farmers (the NVV and 
NMV, respectively), driven by the very large farmers. The desire to be able to expand further 
unconditionally is also voiced their programmes. This does not alter the fact that these 
unions have been able to recruit many smaller farmers into their rank and file. The NVV also 
counts on the support of one of the most 'parasitic' categories of the working population: the 
livestock traders, manure distributors, and jacks of all trades in the feed circuit. Time and 
again, the latter groups provide the heavy materials in campaigns (such as lorries and other 
means that pig farmers do not own themselves). 
25 This means that the survey results presented below should not be understood in an 
absolute sense. The relative differences between sectors, subsectors, and size categories are 
particularly significant. 
26 This percentage seems to collide data to be presented further on, i.e. the 17 per cent of 
Dutch farmers who believe that further scale enlargement and reorganisation are both 
inevitable and desirable. These are the 'growers' who will be discussed below. The 
difference can be explained easily. The 40 per cent presented here include those farmers who 
pursue a level of production that is as high as possible within their own conditions and who 
pursue a farm that has the size to fit their own labour supply. In other words, this is an 
'inflated' figure. However, this does not present an insurmountable problem to the further 
comparisons made in the text below. We are looking not so much for the absolute level of a 
certain response percentage, but rather for relative differences. 
27 An additional element is that the former tradition of co-operation and solidarity has been 
undermined, particularly in the pig sector by an influx of newcomers: builders, smart farm 
advisors, etc. who saw pig farming as a remunerative opportunity. At the same time there 
were numerous large pig farmers who held different views. 
28 Partly because further adjustment of political-economic relations is expected and feared: 
even though pig farmers claim that theirs is the world's cleanest production sector, they will 
increasingly have to pay arable farmers in order to dispose of their manure. 
29 An important detail here is that a number of chief officers of the NCB, all large pig 
farmers, formed an important bridge between NVV and NCB. 
30 It is typical of the Ministry of Agriculture as 'expert system' that it was the last institution 
that granted 'recognition' to the actually occurred differentiation. This very late reaction 
increased the disconnection between theory and practice and further undermined trust. 
31 The problem of a generic approach appears also in a geographical sense. If an intolerable 
situation arises due to local misgovernment of the pig sector in a certain location (for 
example, Ambt Delden), a set of rules (in this case the Temporary Act on Ammonia and 
Livestock Husbandry) is designed that is applicable at the national level. As a result, new 
chains of problems are generated. 
32 The research was conducted as part of the national debate on agriculture organized by the 
Stichting Ter Zake (Get to the Point!). A critique of the debate as a whole, and our research in 
particular, was formulated by Koning and Weerkamp (1995), to which we subsequently 
wrote a response (Van der Ploeg and Van Broekhuizen 1995). Two similar surveys were 
organised after the first one. They were published as De vernieuwing (Renewal) (Ettema et al. 
1995a) and De toekomst [The future) (Ettema et al. 1995b). An Italian translation of De crisis, 
containing comments by Sicco Mansholt and Vito Saccomandi (former EC Commissioner 
and former Minister for Agriculture in Italy, respectively) was later published. 
33 In strict sociological terms it is not correct to speak of groups. For the sake of convenience 
I will do so anyway, also because they are 'emergent groups'. 
34 Incidentally, this category is defined in the publication in question as saneerders. It should 
be clear that these are not the farmers who want to become redundant themselves. They 
think that others have to leave agriculture in order to make way for further growth on their 
farms. I will use the more neutral term 'growers' in this text. 
35 Few systematic data are available to situate this slice of (on average) 17 per cent within a 
long-term trend. This seems to be a very low amount figure, highlighting the extent to which 
Dutch farmers have bid farewell to at least a number of important elements of the former 
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modernisation project. It is interesting to point out that the number of 'growers' fell even 
further in the first half of the 1990s (see Ettema et at. 1995). 
36 This geographical and sectoral division is also reflected in numerous other questions. For 
example, the preference for maintaining the quota system is highest in the north of the 
country, lowest in the south, and so on and so forth. See further Ettema et al. 1994,1995. 
37 Of course, this involves temporarily confined indications, which relate to the nature of the 
questions. Later surveys confirmed not only the general proportions as shown here, they 
illustrated also the further increase in the group of innovators (see Boerderij 1997). 
38 'They are moving fastest', as farmers tend to say. In addition, their opinions are often 
reinforced by identical positions taken in policy, science, and the agro-industry. 
39 I am increasingly struck by the 'everyday language' used to define the presumed 
'structural setting' . I have noted them down for a while after lectures: 'it'll never work', 
'it'll soon come crashing down' . . . These are all statements that (a) reflect and summarise 
the fruitlessness of former attempts, (b) provide a striking summary of prevailing power 
relations, and (c) offer some of the vehicles for the continuation of the existing paralysis. 
9 The Battle for the Future: Current and 
Countercurrent 
The last years of the 20th century have been years of great confusion. The 
once self-evident axioms of the expert system are no longer universally 
shared; at best they are claimed, by the expert system, to be unavoidable. 
Yet, their exclusive nature has led them to become increasingly contested. 
Hence, the potential for conflict in and around agriculture increased 
exponentially. At the same time new perspectives, new forms of rural 
development (RD) have emerged and unfolded. These forms of rural 
development have manifested themselves through an endogenous 
process, one that is defined and controlled by the actors involved and 
that is largely based upon resources at their disposal. This new 
perspective is increasingly seen as a threat by those who favour 
accelerated scale enlargement. 
Most strikingly, the new RD perspective has been taken up by the expert 
system: by the end of the 1990s it had been incorporated into a new 
macro-project. Rural development and multifunctionality, which were 
once rejected or treated with indifference, have now become key concepts 
(Vos et al. 1998). This embrace is characterised, however, by two 
remarkable facts. First, RD is imagined in juxtaposition to conventional 
agriculture (LEI 1999). According to the new idea, space should be 
provided for new RD activities alongside the conventional type of 
farming and agricultural development. The notion of niche markets is one 
of the key connecting, theoretical links here. Alongside the competitive, 
large-scale, high-tech agriculture producing for world markets, the 
potential of a diversified agriculture producing for various niche markets 
has been recognised. Thus two separate worlds are conceptualised, as 
existing in a ratio of about 80:20. The real thing, as it were, supplemented 
by 'something nice for the people'. Voilà, a new moral order beginning to 
influence the expert system in the late 1990s. Secondly, the increased 
institutional attention to rural development has been, and remains, highly 
disconnected from the practices of diversification and innovation. Hence, 
the Ministry of Agriculture appears relatively powerless in this field. 
Powerlessness and inability have become, in fact, important ordering 
principles. 
9.1 The new current 
Diversification of the agricultural economy has grown into a considerable 
movement in the 1990s. An ever growing number of farms have expanded 
to become multifunctional enterprises. This takes on many forms (for a 
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summary, see Van Broekhuizen et al. 1997). Management and 
development of nature and landscape is now an established practice on 
numerous farms. New organisational relations have appeared, such as 
societies for farmer-led nature management. Similarly, new programmatic 
formulas emerge, such as the so-called 'loose-coat approach' and the 
'flying hectares'. Accordingly, it has been discovered that the adaptation 
of farmer-led nature management can, when well-done, result in a 
considerable rise in revenues (Van der Ham in LEI 1998; Van der Ham in 
IBN-DLO and LEI-DLO 1998; for a further discussion of the macro-
economic implications, see Slangen 1994; for an example of an impact 
study elsewhere, see ADAS 1996). Agri-tourism has developed in a 
dynamic and innovative manner: there is a growing number of locally 
rooted arrangements, which offers a multitude of facilities to tourists and 
holidaymakers, which have created a strong identity and market position 
for agri-tourism. On-farm processing and direct selling of products, 
activities that had never disappeared completely, have been taken up 
again and built up in many places as part of the diversification of 
agricultural practice. Another important development is the emergence of 
new types of quality products: the generation of high-quality and 
distinctive products with a high added value. Alongside organic products 
and almost classic phenomena as farmhouse cheese, there is an extensive 
list of new products, often developed, produced and marketed 
individually, but sometimes collectively. 
It is interesting how various product alternatives and features, unnoticed 
and/or unexplored until then, are identified and used in the search for 
new alternatives. Rural development emerges as a laboratory in which a 
continuous stream of novelties are generated.4 It is typical that Dany 
Jacobs (an expert in the field of the knowledge economy) has pointed to 
this very aspect of rural development (Jacobs 1998, D7). 
Another expression of rural development is the care farm, on which the 
reception of, and care for, the needy (however defined) is integrated and 
interwoven with the (usually adjusted) agricultural activities. 
Interestingly, the therapeutic value of staying and working on a farm is 
discovered (or perhaps I should say rediscovered) as part of this. 
Furthermore, there has been a rapid development of new, short supply 
chains (see Van Broekhuizen et al. 1997, pp. 43-68) and the establishment 
of new, economic carriers {ibid., pp. 189-220), as well as new types of 
diversification that are as yet at the research stage, such as combining 
agriculture with water storage, water treatment, energy production, waste 
processing, and so on. The DTO (Sustainable Technological Development) 
project based in the town of Winterswijk has yielded numerous new 
perspectives, which are now being tested for feasibility (DTO 1997). 
Importantly, this has made the possibility of a rise in agricultural 
employment subject for discussion again (Saraceno 1996a; Van der Ploeg 
1995a). 
There was much speculation about the importance of the emerging 
multifunctional farms in the second half of the 1990s. Scepticism, disbelief, 
and disapproval initially dominated the discussion. This applied to the 
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direct environment of the farm: innovating farm women pointed to 
ignorance in their own social environment as one of the most important 
obstacles (De Rooij et al. 1995; Bock 1998). It also applied to farmers 
organisations, agricultural policy and agricultural science. Multifarious 
diversification is perceived as a 'deviation' from real farming, as the 
beginning of the end, as a last resort to prolong the suffering of those 
farms who are doomed to vanish anyway. However, the 1998 farm 
survey, conducted by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), confirmed that which 
insiders knew all along: the farms that diversify are not the 'failed' ones. 
Remarkably, larger farms also play an important role in this new 
paradigm. These farmers often are young, enterprising, determined to 
actively create continuity, prepared to invest heavily (but not along worn 
lines), and accepting new gender relations. These diversifiers and 
innovators believe in themselves and approach their tasks with a sense of 
bonheur. However, all this does not alter the fact that the majority of 
scientists and (in their footsteps) the majority of policy-makers persist in 
the belief that this is a short-lived 'single generation phenomenon'. 
What they overlook is, first, that maintaining competitive advantages on 
bulk markets is, in the medium term, an impossible option: land, labour, 
and growth opportunities are more expensive in the Netherlands than 
anywhere else in the world. Therefore, new responses, new development 
opportunities are badly needed if farming and the countryside are to 
survive. This leads to the second point. For however fragile it might seem 
sometimes, a new range of farm development patterns is developed and 
tested in situ. New development opportunities are created. The changeover 
from a low-cost strategy, based upon accelerated scale enlargement, to a 
strategy in which differentiation, focus, and high value added per unit of 
end product are the key words (see Porter 1985, Van der Ploeg 1998b; 
Jacobs 1999), is omnipresent in today's diversification. As explained in 
more theoretical terms by Saccomandi (1991, 1998), the creation of 
synergy can result in considerable cost benefits: the 'multipurpose 
enterprise' is characterised by lower risks and lower costs per activity 
than the highly specialised farm (see also Scherer 1975). 
In the previous chapters, I referred frequently to the indestructible 
longing for the continuation of the farm. During the latter half of the 
1990s, farm diversification - that is, the unfolding into a multifunctional 
rural enterprise - has become the primary expression of this longing. It 
represents a healthy self-interest, and results in a range of new 
development opportunities. I will discuss the current size of this new 
movement and its potentials below, but first I will focus on a few other 
types of diversification and innovation. 
The search for new types of cost reduction 
The diversification of the agricultural economy (or rural development) is 
not only geared towards the generation of new goods and services that 
can be used to break through the problem of stagnating gross output of 
agriculture (see Figure 7.2). The process also includes numerous elements 
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and practices which constitute new types of cost reduction: the art of 
farming economically is being further unfolded and expanded. 
A certain amount of institutional support is involved here, particularly in 
recent years. The strategy of farming economically has been taken as the 
basis for formulating and developing new designs at the Research 
Institute for Animal Husbandry in Lelystad. The Dutch Dairy Cattle 
Syndicate has purposefully broadened its bull supply in order to provide 
the genetic features required for this farming style. Thus, at least part of 
the discongruity between demand and supply of new technologies 
(summarised in Figure 9.1) is being redressed. 
Figure 9.1 The discongruity between supply of and demand for innovations, rules, 
technology, etc. 
(differentiated) technology supply 
technology demand 
discongruity 
correspondence 
discongruity 
Various other types of cost reduction have been developed alongside, and 
as a continuation of 'farming economically'. One of these is known as 
reintegration - that is, the reconstruction of mixed farming at the local 
and /or regional level in order to re-establish (and even introduce for the 
first time) various ecological cycles at a scale broader than that of the 
individual farm. There are a number of different examples of 
reintegration. Collaboration between livestock and arable farmers 
(through mutual supply of straw and manure) is one of these. The 
'travelling bulb stall' is another. This is a type of tenure through which 
dairy farmers and/or arable farmers lease plots of land to bulb growers. 
Hence, the latter are able to transcend the limitations of their own farm 
size and the need of crop rotation, whilst the former are able to share in 
the high profits. The same principle is increasingly applied to the 
cultivation of seed potatoes in Friesland. Reintegration enables an 
important extension of rotation schemes and makes possible a 
considerable reduction in the use of pesticides. 
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Finally, I would like to refer, in terms of cost reduction, to the emergence 
of environmental co-operatives. These are associations of farmers, who have 
developed contractual agreements with the government. To understand 
this phenomenon some reference should be made to the background from 
which they arose and to which they, potentially, form a powerful 
response (see NRLO 1997c). This background is characterised by the 
prevailing agri-environmental policy, which (a) still contains a remarkable 
confusion over objectives and means (for a general characterisation, see 
Van der Weijden et al. 1984) and (b) is highly generic in terms of the 
means prescribed. With respect to the on-farm implementation of agri-
environmental regulations, the combination of these two factors results in 
high costs, while the effectiveness is often dubious. 
Farmers often are able to identify courses of action (other means) that fit 
more closely with their practice and still meet the intended objectives. The 
costs are usually considerably lower and they are more effective. 
However, the development, implementation and further unfolding of 
such alternative approaches is usually ruled out by the inflexibility of the 
prevailing technological regime. Current regulations simply exclude any 
'deviation'. 
Environmental co-operatives have challenged the monolithic nature of 
agri-environmental policy. They are based upon a fundamental reversal 
of the generic prescription of means. Central to the notion of 
environmental co-operatives is their acceptance of specified 
environmental objectives and the associated demand for the necessary 
room to develop and apply the means that are locally most appropriate. In 
sociological terms an environmental co-operative is a 'protected space' 
(Schot et al. 1996; Lente and Rip 1998), a niche in which 'novelties' can be 
developed and perfected. In legal terms, an environmental co-operative is 
a manifestation of legally conditioned self-regulation. The prevailing 
regulations are partially lifted within a specified area, and for a given time 
period, and the co-operative has the opportunity to show that they can 
meet the environmental objectives more quickly and more efficiently than 
the prevailing regulations are able to do. Environmental co-operatives 
enable progressive movements and the development of innovations that 
would have remained blocked otherwise. In synthesis: environmental co-
operatives are given space provided that they realise additional 
environmental value. What is important is the exchange: government 
provides space, the environmental co-operative in turn exceeds the 
general environmental objectives (in terms of emissions, nature, 
landscape, recreation, water conservation, etc.; for a daring example, see 
VANW 1997). If the co-operative is not successful, the agreement is 
terminated by government and the generic regulations apply again in 
full.8 
During the term of office of Van Aartsen (1994-1998), at first five and later 
three more environmental co-operatives were given the green light: they 
were granted a number of exemptions to help them better realise the 
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environmental objectives. This move drew a lot of attention, both 
nationally and internationally, even gaining recognition from the OECD: 
'the more or less spontaneous formation of farmer-led eco-cooperatives in the 
early 1990s, and their subsequent evolution into laboratories of government 
policy, are both consistent with Dutch institutional and democratic traditions' 
(OECD 1996, p. 56). 
One feature of these co-operatives that is interesting is how the initiators 
have been able to interest and mobilise networks outside the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The prospects of this new approach were supported by some 
agricultural researchers (Hees et al. 1994), the Standing Committee on 
Agriculture of the Dutch Parliament (VCL), the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), provincial governments 
and by national environmental movements. They provided support, both 
materially and symbolically. The (potential) importance of environmental 
co-operatives was also discussed at length in the agricultural media. The 
Minister for Agriculture (Van Aartsen) committed himself personally to 
the scheme. It was largely due the combination of his positive attitude 
and the strong support in society, that the first experiments were started. 
The mobilisation of support elsewhere in society - that is, the building of 
new networks - appeared more useful than betting endlessly on changes 
within the ministry itself. The ministry as an institution only moves if it is 
urged by more comprehensive developments; and then it only operates 
with reluctance, if indeed it is not actively involved in sabotaging the 
projects. 
In any case, environmental co-operatives developed in spite of 
considerable oppression. This is not the place to develop a comprehensive 
assessment of their practices (for such an assessment, see Horlings 1996; 
VEL et al. 1997; IKC 1998; Hees 2000). I will limit myself here to the simple 
picture of the progress made by two cooperatives: the Eastermars 
Lânsdouwe Society (VEL) and the Society for Agrarian Nature and 
Landscape Management Achtkarspelen (VANLA), both situated in the 
northern Frisian Woodlands. Table 9.1 shows that remarkable results 
were achieved after only a few years of experience of self-regulation. The 
number of dairy farmers whose pollution indicators fell below the norms 
set for the year 2000 increased from 28 per cent in 1994 to 35 per cent in 
1995 (compared to only 14 per cent for dairy farmers in the Frisian sand 
region as a whole). The figures were much higher for those who 
participated in experiments with manure additives: 43 and 63 per cent, 
respectively. The most recent figures (Jaarverslag 1998 VEL, VANLA) 
indicate that the average N surplus (of 120 members) had already fallen to 
261 kg N / h a in 1997. This means that the area as a whole operates already 
below the norm for the year 2000. 
These figures in themselves only tell half the story. Underneath them was 
an enormous breakthrough. At that time farmers' unions were claiming 
that it would be impossible to meet the targets. The first environmental 
co-operatives proved this claim to be false and misleading. 
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Table 9.1 Progress m a d e along the env i ronmenta l route by VEL and VANLA, 
c o m p a r e d wi th deve lopmen t s in the wide r region (percentages) 
N surplus 
< 275 kg/ha 
P,0, surplus 
< 35 kg/ha 
VEL 
1994-1995 
28 
22 
VEL 
1995-1996 
35 
40 
VANLA 
1995-1996 
27 
38 
VANLA 19 
participants 
experiment 
1995-1996 
42 
53 
VANLA 19 
participants 
experiment 
expectation 1997 
63 
? 
averagefarm 
Frisian sand 
region 
14 
21 
The results in Table 9.1 were achieved through a number of mechanisms. 
Important in this respect were technical breakthroughs such as the 
development of a new, 'regionally specific' machine for the application of 
manure and the introduction of additives such as Euromix and EM 
organisms (see also the exposition by Hoeksma in Chapter 4). Equally 
important were field experiments; the negotiated licence to spread 
manure above ground; and the creation of an intricate web of study 
groups (see Verhoeven et al. 1998; for a very recent account, see Renting et 
al. 2001). Perhaps of equal importance is the change in the relationships 
that occurred between government and farmers. Environmental policy 
changed from a series of, mostly misunderstood, restrictions into a 
challenge, in which farmers took centre stage as serious innovators. The 
notion of kreas buorkje (farming gently) was thus revitalised and extended 
into a new area (the handling of manure and nutrients). Kreas buorkje (net 
grieme mei mineralen - that is, not to mess with nutrients) has once again 
become a generally shared norm in this part of Friesland, due to the 
environmental co-operatives. 
The common denominator: the return from rûch to kreas buorkje 
All these multicoloured initiatives, from farmer-led nature management 
to environmental co-operatives, are connected by two factors. These are, 
first, the search for new responses to the squeeze (as described in Chapter 
7) and, second the development of new responses to new social needs. 
The Council for Rural Areas points out in its first programming document 
that 'the urban and rural counterpoints presuppose and need each other 
(. . .) The rural areas constitute (. . .) more than simply 'the remainder', 
they are more than still 'barren' urban areas (. . .) The more society 
urbanises, the more the need for, and value of, rural areas will increase' 
(RLG 1997, p. 15). Today's highly urbanised society requires tranquillity, 
open space and green areas. More generally, we can say that there is a 
need for a 'counterstructure' (Turner 1974; Lengkeek 1994), for a place 
where that which is absent in the city can be found. In this respect, 
rurality represents co-production, i.e. the ongoing encounter, interaction, 
and mutual transformation of human beings and the living world. 
The urban need for the rural is expressed in numerous ways. It is evident 
in the enormous number of day trips and overnight stays in rural areas. It 
is evident in the strongly increasing preference for living in the 
countryside. It is also expressed in the increasing worry about food: in the 
need to consume high-quality, organic and/or regionally-specific 
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products. And finally, there is the ubiquitous need for maintaining, if not 
further embellishing, many cultural landscapes, for protecting and 
developing the multiple ecological values inherent in them, and for a 
general revalorisation of the environment. 
The RD current that has come to dominate Dutch agriculture from the 
second half of the 1990s onwards, gained power because it combined two 
large movements: the increasing social interest in the rural and the search 
from within agriculture for solutions that would take it beyond the 
squeeze. The multifunctional farm is the link that connects the two. 
In the latter half of the 1990s, it was increasingly emphasised that 
agriculture was facing a completely new task. Agricultural production 
would have to be made socially acceptable. In this respect, a new 
'contract' was often mentioned, a new agreement with society - that is, a 
'licence to produce'. Thus, a goal was introduced that received 
widespread public support. However, the idea that farming would have 
to follow a normative pattern is something new, is mistaken. It happened 
in the past too, but in an almost taken-for-granted manner. Kreas buorkje 
(farming gently) which was discussed in Chapter 2, was a clear expression 
of such a normative order. It defined the way that one should treat others: 
the wife, children, neighbourhood, community, but also nature, animals, 
the landscape,1 and the products supplied. Thus, agriculture was 
normatively connected to the rest of society. 
Kreas buorkje was a concrete and normative axis connecting the two. Even 
though the norms were local ones, agriculture was connected to society as 
a whole in an acceptable way through the relationships and material 
processes defined by these norms. Since then, ruptures have appeared. 
The material aspects can readily be identified. Think about landscapes 
that have been rationalised out of existence; the assault on ecological 
integrity; the rapidly increasing pressure on the environment; the series of 
food scandals; and the greatly changed treatment of animals, seen by 
many as an infringement on animal welfare. 
What is more important is what is hidden behind the widely felt 
dissatisfaction about these ruptures. This is a very essential issue. Co-
production, i.e. the encounter with nature, will never be indifferent to 
society. It is an intrinsic and important aspect of what we call civilisation 
(Van der Ploeg 1997). The nature and dynamics of agriculture are to be in 
line with society and its values. They are a mirror of the level and 
consistency of civilisation. Ramshackled pigs, the need to electrocute 
millions of piglets,* chickens that are only thought of in terms of their 
efficiency in feed conversion, disfigured landscapes, destroyed nature -
all provide indications about the lack of civilisation, in the places where 
we expect to find it (Van Zomeren 1997). 
The width of this gap became evident through the behaviour of, at least 
some of the pig farmers, particularly those that formed the NVV. They 
turned their back on civilisation in a drastic manner (see Figure 9.2). 
* Translator's note: This occurred during the epoch of swine fever in the late 1990s. The Foot 
and Mouth Disease that later struck Dutch agriculture underlines the analysis made here. 
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'Society', according to their argument, 'politics, science, the 
environmental organisations (and so on) do not understand pig farming, 
and, therefore, they have no right to meddle in it'. In subsequent actions, 
including physical threats, denying others the opportunity to speak and 
mounting blockades, they showed the degree of their own incivility. 
Figure 9.2 Turning their backs to civilisation 
How could the gap between agriculture and society grow as deep as it 
turned out to be in the 1990s? How, and why, has agriculture as co-
production become so far removed from the civilisation that it should be a 
part of? There is no point in looking for the answer to this question in the 
individual incidents themselves. Again, it involves something that lies 
much deeper, something that is much more essential. 
I think that we have to look for the answer in the extensive modernisation 
project and in the 'scientification' of farming that was part of it. 
Scientification is the reorganisation of farming according to the schemes 
that were, and are, designed in the sphere of the agricultural sciences. To 
achieve this reorganisation, agriculture was cut out of its normative 
context (out of its set of social relations, values, and norms) in order to be 
able to optimise it as an isolated, technical-economic constellation. Modern 
farming became the new norm. Scientific developments, irrespective of 
their nature, were the guiding compass. This has resulted in many bitter 
fruits, from a 'Silent Spring' (Carson 1962), to the Holocausto al Progreso 
(Van Kessel 1980), to 'Soveso' and to 'Bhopal', to genetic modification 
and 'terminator genes'. 
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The currently suggested remedy is a reintroduction of ethics into 
agricultural sciences (Veerman 1999). Such a response, however 
sympathetic it may sound, is likely to be insufficient. 
What, then, would be more appropriate? Certainly, a sense of ethical 
awareness needs to be reinstated and reinstitutionalised within 
agriculture. As for science, a threefold integration is necessary. First, the 
technical and social disciplines need to be interwoven systematically -
that is, made into one undivided whole. Second, institutionalised research 
has to be consistently connected to on-farm research and experiments, 
which implies that research is to be conducted consistently along different 
tracks. Such a change of approach is necessary in order to secure a wide 
array of alternatives from the outset. As long as only a few of the many 
development opportunities are investigated, a particular division of 
knowledge and ignorance will emerge almost inevitably - a division that, 
in turn, will have a very direct and coercive ordering effect. Third, 
agricultural research will have to be reconceptualised so that it is seen as 
operating within the social values of our civilisation (which implies that it 
is partly to be directed by farmers but also, and especially, by social 
organisations). Hence, the inevitable conflicts arising during the 
implementation of agro-scientific research will at least be anticipated and 
early enough to make a difference. 
The RD current that has come to be defined more precisely throughout 
the 1990s has grown in spite of opposition and oppression. It has not been 
encouraged by the expert system. The very reverse has happened. In 
consequence, new nuclei have appeared, outside of the expert system, 
where new knowledge and new skills have accumulated. And as the RD 
current grew stronger, the more inevitable a collision between these 
nuclei and the expert system became. 
9.2 A quantification of rural development 
In the course of 1996 and 1997, a multidisciplinary research team made a 
first assessment of the size and socio-economic implications of the 
diversification of the agricultural economy (Van der Ploeg et al. 1997). 
Different types of diversification were identified and the number of farms 
involved and the associated benefits and costs were estimated. Thus, for 
the first time, it became possible to begin to estimate the extra net value 
added. 
The results of this exercise are summarised in Table 9.2. The results drew 
a lot of attention. Few were aware of the size of rural development as its 
importance had not previously been empirically demonstrated. Rural 
renewal suddenly appeared not only as a political construction, it was 
also alive and kicking as a practice (as was illustrated also in Broekhuizen 
et al. 1997). 
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Table 9.2 The impact of rural deve lopmen t (1995 si tuation) 
A provisional assessment of the current impact of rural development (extra 
value added in million NLG per year) 
1 management and development of ecological values 
- via management agreements of BBL" 
- via provincial arrangements 
- via landscape maintenance agreements 
2 the production of high-quality foods 
- 600 cheesemakers (600 x 300,000 kg x 0.5 x NLG 0.20) 
- 25 small-scale processors 
- 600 organic farms (x NLG 40,000) 
- 300 affiliated preparers and processors x 0.5 
- successful cases of product innovation, resulting in new jobs 
- 2,000 other farms working at some form of self-processing (x NLG 20,000) 
3 marketing, direct sale of farm produce 
- 30% of NLG 500 million 
4 farm campsites and agritourism 
- 2,000 x NLG 20,000 
5 cost reduction 
- two examples 
- remainder 
6 reintegration 
7 the 'seedbed' 
- 1,000 cases at NLG 100,000 
8 care provision 
Total per year 
33 
4 
4 
18 
8 
24 
4 
15 
40 
150 
40 
1.5 
b 
p.m. 
b 
p.m. 
100 
b 
p.m. 
440 Notes: BBL: Government Service for Land Management; p.m.: pro memoria. 
What significance can be read in an estimated additional income of NLG 
440 million, generated through different RD practices? The figures can be 
read in different ways. 
a Assuming that a number of new jobs would have to be remunerated 
solely by means of diversification (or that a number of jobs would have 
to be maintained solely through diversification), the effect of 
diversification (assuming a remuneration of NLG 70,000 per labour 
unit) is equivalent to 6100 jobs. 
b Assuming, on the other hand, that mainly additional revenues are 
involved (combined with revenues from conventional agricultural 
activities), about 22,000 farms and related jobs would be maintained -
whereas they would probably disappear otherwise (assuming an 
additional income of NLG 20,000 per farm). 
c The total available income (to use as family income and /or as savings 
for the benefit of the farm) of the whole of Dutch agriculture amounted 
to NLG 7.5 billion per year in the latter half of the 1990s. We estimated 
the potential impact of rural development at the time at NLG 1.2 
billion. Judged by the annual sector income (under pressure from 
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Agenda 2000, the World Trade Organisation negotiations and constant 
cost increases), it demonstrates that diversification can never take the 
place of the conventional production (of, e.g., potatoes and milk), but 
that it can be an attractive compensation for otherwise falling sector 
incomes - that is, a means to actively parry the 'squeeze' (see Figure 
7.2). 
A lot has happened since the publication of this first estimate. Many 
subsequent studies have appeared in which close attention is given to 
specific types of diversification. Van den Ham and other researchers 
discussed further the management and development of ecological values 
(IBN/LEI 1998; LEI 1998). This showed that a sensible adaptation of the 
rest of the farm can generate further-reaching improvements of income 
than we initially estimated. Furthermore, the number of farmer-led 
projects to manage nature and landscape has increased rapidly due to 
institutional innovations and increased political support. 
Three recent developments have taken place in the generation of high-
quality products. We succeeded in improving our methods for identifying 
such enterprises and have been able to build up a more comprehensive 
database. At the same time, the practice of quality production gained 
momentum: the number of regionally-specific products, farmhouse 
products, new products, and so on increased considerably in a short time. 
And finally, we became acutely aware of various practices and types that 
had escaped our attention initially or that were left out as they were 
thought to be 'borderline cases' (in order mainly to avoid that our initial 
estimate would be too controversial). A good example is horse farming - a 
practice that had never completely disappeared, but has expanded 
rapidly over the past 10-15 years and, above all, changed in character. It 
can justifiably be stated that horse farming represents a concrete axis 
between agriculture and society (since it is often city people who keep 
their horses on the farms involved) and, furthermore, provides substantial 
additional earnings. It is estimated that horse farming represents a gross 
output of about NLG 1.3-1.4 billion and generates about 7000 jobs in the 
Netherlands. This puts it on a par with the bulb sector or the table chicken 
sector. In the same manner as traditional cheesemaking, horse farming 
represents a type of rural development avant la lettre. Furthermore, it is a 
type that is rapidly growing once again. This is the case not only in the 
Netherlands but also in the US (Broadway et al. 1994) and in Spain. 
As a side issue, I would like to refer here to one of the interesting aspects 
of socio-economic research, particularly when it occurs at the interface 
between changing paradigms and rapidly evolving practices. Initially, the 
idea of rural development only referred to one particular aspect of the 
agricultural sector. However, as a result of the rapid growth in 
diversification, the expansion of similar analysis to other European 
agricultural areas, and the deadlocking of the modernisation project, the 
necessity as well as the possibility of extending the diversification of the 
agricultural economy (or rural development) grew into a comprehensive 
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model. That is, a new paradigm of rural development arose, one which 
contrasts with the former modernisation paradigm in almost every 
relevant way and at different levels of scale. 
Just as congruence and coherence need to be created in farms and in the 
networks that support agriculture, they need also be created in research 
and the development of theory. Congruence between (a rapidly evolving) 
practice and (equally rapidly evolving) theory; coherence between the 
many dimensions and fields of attention. This gave rise to the 
development of new, more consistent responses to the apparently simple 
question: what is rural development? It also led to the re-evaluation of 
various empirical constellations that were thought to exist initially sui 
generis - that is, disconnected from rural development. 
Rural development is, first of all, a set of new income-generating activities 
that extend beyond the conventional generation of semi-finished products 
for commodity markets. Rural development comprises all those activities 
that result in the generation of supplementary revenues (through new 
outputs and/or through new cost savings) in order to maintain the farm. 
Rural development is, therefore, a new expression of what I described 
earlier as resistance capacity, of the 'culture of survival' (Kuypers 1996). 
Rural development is a new development opportunity to bypass today's 
adverse circumstances. Rural development enables farms to continue 
which would otherwise disappear - not so much because rural 
development is a last resort, but because it embodies timely anticipation. 
At the same time, rural development represents the creation and 
continuation of new relations between society and agriculture. Rural 
development is the active response of (parts of) the farming population to 
the changing needs of contemporary society. Rural development is the 
creation of an attractive countryside and an attractive agriculture - of a 
countryside and an agriculture that are 'loci of consumption' (Marsden 
1998b). 
In summary, rural development comprises a diversification of the 
agricultural economy that takes place via the creation of new axes 
between itself and society. Only when both of these conditions are met, 
can we speak of rural development. In turn, rural development requires 
a different view, as well as a radical reorganisation of, the way in which 
resources are mobilised, combined, applied, and developed. On the one 
hand, this involves a certain amount of socialisation: resources become 
increasingly a public good, 'common-pool' resources (Ostrom 1994) that 
are managed by farmers but which have to be utilised in such a way that 
the (multifarious and potential) benefits can also be enjoyed by others. 
The ever-present possibility of the 'tragedy of the commons' (Hardin 
1968) has to be avoided. This creates a completely new problem that can 
perhaps only be approached à la Ostrom. 
The definition of rural development provided here implies that important 
parts of empirical reality (such as pluriactivity, the style of the economical 
farmers, the re-emergence of horses, the re-use of farm buildings, etc.) 
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have to be rethought. Furthermore, rural development has to be 
theoretically distinguished from the former modernisation paradigm. In 
essence, the latter intended to provide equality of income by means of the 
generation of products for commodity markets alone. Additional 
revenues were taboo. Farmers who needed them were seen to be failing in 
their main concern. Furthermore, modernisation followed its own, 
undisputed course: farming was 'cut loose' from former normative 
frameworks and driven exclusively by technology and economics. Rural 
development is a decisive step beyond these restrictions (for a more recent 
discussion, see the special issue of Sociologia Ruralis 2000, vol. 40, no. 4). In 
summary, rural development is a practice that contains within it the 
seedbed of a new paradigm. 
Table 9.3 attempts to summarise the most noticeable paradigmatic 
differences between the development perspective of modernisation and 
the new development opportunities entailed in rural development. 
Table 9.3 Paradigmatic differences between the modernisation process and rural 
development 
Modernisation process 
la mobilising extra resources via markets 
for maintaining/improving incomes 
2a highly prescribed application and use 
of resources 
3a continuous scale enlargement 
(disproportionate growth) 
4a small margin per unit end product 
5a high degree of specialisation 
6a exogenous growing capacity 
7a 'turnkey' projects 
8a predominance of prevailing 
technological trajectory and TATE' 
9a output prices and markets are given 
10a substitution of labour by inputs and 
technology 
11a sustainability based upon 7a and 8a 
12a disconnected from local ecosystems 
and surrounding social environment 
Rural development 
lb 
2b 
3b 
4b 
5b 
6b 
7b 
8b 
9b 
10b 
l i b 
12 
build upon one's own resources in 
order to keep the income at the same 
level or increase it 
flexible and multiple application and 
use of resources 
gradual development (proportionate) 
higher margin per unit end product 
(and per 'service unit') 
diversified output 
centre of focus on local innovative 
capacity 
gradual increase and 'learning by 
doing' 
labour, family, and new networks are 
central 
output prices can be influenced; 
markets are actively constructed 
low level of application of external 
inputs; low financial costs 
sustainability based upon 6b, 8b, and 
10b 
explicitly reconnected to local 
ecosystems and surrounding social 
environment 
Note: ' TATE: Technological and Administrative Task Environment. 
These differences do not of course involve black-and-white demarcation 
lines. Collectively, however, they do define different ordering patterns. 
The internal relations are decisive here: la and 10a lead to 4a; while 4a 
together with 2a and 5a push onto 3a. And vice versa, the combination of 
10b, 9b, and 5b set the conditions for 4b, while 4b contains the possibility 
of 8b. And in reverse, 5b is supported by lb, 2b, and 3b.18 
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A clearer view of rural development as new paradigm brings about a 
revaluation of various empirical fields. Taking the notions summarised in 
Table 9.3 as a starting point, horse farming, for instance, emerges as a 
coherent element of rural development (more specifically: it is an 
expression of 12b, 8b, 9b, 5b, and lb). 
The same holds for the strategy of farming economically (an entry that 
was initially claimed carefully as pro memoria, see Table 9.2). It is an 
expression of lb , 2b, and 5b avant la lettre. Sunig buorkje (farming 
economically) is, more generally, not only often the starting point, but 
also the basis for the development of the multifunctional farm. In addition, 
farm development is modelled by sunig buorkjen into a process that differs 
radically in practice from the classic modernisation pattern. 
Similarly, it appeared that various other aspects of the estimate in Table 
9.2 had to be adjusted. Van der Vaart's Ph.D. thesis about the re-use of 
available farm buildings in Friesland appeared in 1999. He presented a 
convincing case that re-use (partly by former farmers) often leads to the 
emergence of various new types of activity and new income and 
employment opportunities (which is in certain respects reminiscent of the 
mezzadri (share croppers) who developed the small and medium-sized 
enterprises in northern and mid-Italy; Bagnasco 1988). 
The phenomenon of 'pluriactivity' or part-time farming also deserves 
reconsideration. This phenomenon has been considered marginal for a 
long time 1 (for the virtual farmer does not need additional revenues, nor 
does his wife; she would always be ready to step in). Yet, the figures 
suggest otherwise. Farm men or farm women earn additional revenues on 
about 60 per cent of Dutch farms (De Vries 1995). On the average dairy 
farm, 37 per cent of income originates from off-farm revenues (Silvis et al. 
1998). On the average arable farm in the province of Zeeland, 57 per cent 
of income is derived from activities other than arable agriculture 
(Wiskerke 1997). In numerous situations, additional revenues are crucial 
to either the take-over or the continuity of the farm. Two serious 
considerations should be added. First, it can be said that the (increased) 
importance of additional revenues corresponds with the more general 
tendency towards dual-income households. More specifically, a (part-
time) job outside of the farm has become already a self-evident goal for 
many farm women. The Utopian phenomenon that was described almost 
poetically by Marx at one point does now exist: farmer in the morning, 
labourer in the afternoon, poet at night. The vice-chancellor of the 
University of Twente, the chairman of the board of Wageningen 
University and Research Centre, one of the senior researchers of ILEIA, 
the member of the provincial Executive for agriculture of the province of 
Utrecht, a top civil servant of the province of Overijssel, the chairman of 
the Board of Trustees of the Rabobank, and thousands of others occupy 
this privileged position. And their number will undoubtedly grow 
further. 
354 The Virtual Farmer 
In summary, additional revenues are not marginal, neither are they 
'additional'. They constitute one of the important mainstays of Dutch 
agriculture. Additional revenues do not constitute one of the 
embarrassing black swansy - additional revenues illustrate the increasing 
interweaving of agriculture and society. They are not an outpouring of a 
past that has not passed yet - rather they are a forerunner of an unfolding 
future. 
Second, a combination of hairdresser and professor does not make the 
university a diversified enterprise, as Gerard Doornbos (chairman of the 
Dutch Organisation for Agriculture and Horticulture, LTO) pointed out. 
This is true. However, there is one strategic difference between a 
university and a contemporary farm. The hairdresser's activities are not 
necessary in order to work as a professor and/or to keep the university 
going. On the farm as a family enterprise, the revenues of the farm 
woman and /or the additional revenues of the farm man are almost 
always crucial to the continuity of the farm. 
Research into the nature of rural development is much more developed in 
the European context than in the Netherlands (see Delors 1994; Kayser 
1995; Cork Declaration 1996; Fischler 1996; Iacoponi 1996; Saraceno 
1996b). Applying the insights entailed in these overviews to the Dutch 
situation, it is estimated that the diversification of the agricultural 
economy in the Netherlands generates an additional income of at least 
NLG 2.5 billion per year (a rough summary of the calculations can be 
found in Table 9.4 below). 
Table 9.4 The quantitative impact of diversification of the agricultural economy at 
the end of the second millennium (1999) 
a 1000 organic farms, at NLG 40,00024 
b 15,000 farmers involved in nature management, at NLG 700025 
c pluriactivity, 50,000 farms, at NLG 20,00026 
d farming economically by half of the sector27 
e processing and marketing 
f agritourism 
g reintegration 
h seedbed28 
i care tasks 
j horse farming 
Total 
NLG 40 million 
NLG 105 million 
NLG 1,000 million 
at least NLG 530 million 
NLG 260 million 
NLG 50 million 
NLG 100 million 
NLG 200 million 
NLG 5 million 
NLG 200 million 
NLG 2490 million 
More important than these exact figures (which no doubt will have to be 
adjusted according to changes in both practice and theory) is the 
underlying argument, which I have outlined already: All practices that 
deviate from the model of the specialised, full-time farm as prescribed in 
the modernisation paradigm, and which are intended as ways to continue 
one's own farm and that use, therefore, new development opportunities 
that exist at the interface between society and agriculture - all these 
practices are to be understood as components of the new RD current. 
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Some of these practices occurred before 'rural development' existed at all. 
In other words, Dutch agriculture has never been totally modernised. 
Modernisation was and is a local and differentiated process. What is more 
important, is that the repertoire of already existing practices (e.g. on-farm 
cheese making, pluriactivity, horse farming) becomes revalorised and at 
the same time extended, renewed, and deepened within the framework of 
current rural development. 
The tentative indication of NLG 2.5 billion - the extra income generated 
by a set of diversifying activities - should not be treated in isolation (a 
mistake I too initially made). It is an additional income: it should be 
combined with the classic income generated via milk and potatoes. 
Assuming that about 50,000 farms are somehow (and often in multiple 
ways) involved in the diversification process and that these farms account 
for about NLG 4 billion of the total annual sector income of NLG 7.5 
billion, this implies that diversified agriculture generates a total income of 
NLG 6.5 billion on an annual basis. In addition, there are highly 
specialised farms, which follow the conventional development track of 
scale enlargement and intensification in order to realise income. 
Following Chapter 7, I estimate the size of this group at 25,000 farms. 
These specialised farms generate NLG 3.5 billion in income. ' 
That which was initially considered to be unusual has meanwhile become the 
main stream in the Dutch countryside. The RD current is quantitatively (both 
in terms of the farms involved and the income generated) considerably larger 
than its counter current, i.e. that what is thought as mainstream agriculture. 
There are - and I am acutely aware of this - various sources that produce 
a different picture. For example, the 1998 farm survey, conducted by 
Statistics Netherlands (CBS), indicated that less than 10 per cent of Dutch 
farmers are involved in innovation and diversification. And the 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) in its Atlas ontwikkeling 
landbouw (Atlas of the Development of Agriculture) (1999) identified only '53 
environmental co-operatives, nature societies, and organisations involved 
in regionally-specific products' (LEI 1999, map 6.4). I think that a series of 
distortions is present in both cases. The LEI only identifies 'four 
environmental co-operatives, nature societies, and organisations involved 
in regionally-specific products' in the province of Friesland. This was a 
severe underestimate. At the time there were, in Friesland, 27 nature 
societies, two environmental co-operatives, eight organisations involved 
in regionally-specific products, and one umbrella organisation for the 
latter. At national level there were at least 300 farmers' organisations 
(instead of 53) actively engaged in rural development activities. The 
expert system and the CBS database simply do not have the necessary 
overview nor the methods to obtain such overview. Hence, systematic 
distortions occur in the representation of Dutch agriculture, especially as 
far as the emergence of new realities is concerned. 
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9.3 The why and how of rural development 
The involvement in rural development is rooted in a combination of 
driving forces. First and foremost there is the sheer indestructible desire 
of farmers to continue their own farm, if even under difficult conditions. 
This usually involves attempts to generate more income from the 
available resources, through far-reaching particularisation and 
recombination (see lb in Table 9.3). This search becomes the inevitable 
choice as the practical possibilities to do this along the lines of the 
modernisation project (la in Table 9.3) become exhausted and/or blocked. 
By doing so, the technical efficiency of the farm is increased, in an original 
manner. What was possible with cows and fields is now extended into 
new 'fields of activity': into agri-tourism, nature management and 
development, generating and marketing new products, engaging in care 
tasks, and so on. 
This extension of activities leads to a second group of driving forces, the 
need for extending one's own craftsmanship and entrepreneurship 
beyond the ever tighter boundaries arising from the modernisation project 
(and especially beyond the boundaries currently arising from, for 
example, 'integrated supply-chain' guidelines). For many of those 
involved, rural development also implies rediscovering the joy of work, 
increasing their insight into, and the overview of, the relevant whole and 
building new socio-technical networks that reach beyond the isolation 
and alienation seemingly inherent in the modernisation project. 
According to surveys, there is a third group of driving forces, concerning 
the, apparently, intangible question of self-identity. For many people, 
rural development represents a possibility to develop and distinguish 
themselves. It involves their own work, their own initiative and their own 
personality - it involves the possibility to particularise farming into 
something that both has the right to exist in contemporary society and 
also bears the hallmark of individuality. 
The interrelations between these driving forces vary between places and 
particularly over time. One frequent starting point is the search for more 
craftsmanship and more entrepreneurship (that which farmers used to 
define as 'joy in the hobby') and/or the search for an identity of one's 
own (especially by farm women), after which the first group of driving 
forces becomes dominant in a process of professionalisation. 
Thus emerge those amazing enterprises that are unthinkable in the 
conventional view. These are enterprises that realise a milk price of at 
least NLG 2 per kg (compared to NLG 0.70 in conventional agriculture); 
these are enterprises that provide work and income for 8 to 10 labour 
units, whereas usually only 1.65 labour units would work on farms of 
similar size. Once they were refrigerator anomalies or black swans that no 
one wanted to see; now they are the anchors of a new paradigm 
(Broekhuizen et al.1997). 
Yet it should not be forgotten that generating new types of rural 
development is, in practice, always extraordinarily difficult. 
Diversification or rural development is not simply engaging in something 
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new. It does not revolve around filling seven jam jars. What is of essential 
importance is the building of new socio-technical networks, that produce 
a precise coordination of activities over time and in space, and which 
adequately connect production, processing, distribution, and 
consumption. Let us examine two examples to illustrate the complexities 
of rural development processes: the ongoing unfolding of organic 
agriculture and the construction of the first environmental co-operatives. 
Both examples involve the coordination of various projects vis-à-vis each 
other to create the required coherence. 
The ongoing unfolding of production, processing, distribution, and 
consumption of organic products raises a wide range of challenges, which 
essentially revolve around the adjustment and coordination of different 
practices and projects, both spatially and temporally. Durk van der Schaaf 
of Soune Grown (the Frisian association of organic farmers) illustrates this 
in a quote from 1996: 
'We [the organic farmers] produce too much by now for the small circuits we 
have always used, but too little for the large supermarket chains. ' 
The linking of different projects is the core of, and represents at the same 
time the greatest challenge for, organic agriculture. Everything that is 
taken for granted in conventional agriculture (because it has become 
institutionalised), is a source of constant worry in organic agriculture. 
According to Van der Schaaf, it is not only the link between production 
and consumption that is important (via various interlinkages, since 'shop 
keepers have to back it up'). Organic agriculture implies also the need for 
an often radical change in cropping plan, for example from a 1:3 to a 1:5 
cultivation. This implies, in turn, that more products have to be grown, 
more knowledge needs to be developed and more supply channels have 
to be found, since a wider range of products is provided: from summer 
greens and salads to winter root crops. More land is required in order to 
plan and coordinate cropping plans collectively. The latter is also to 
'prevent everyone from choosing the easy crops'. Overproduction should 
be guarded against, whilst a shortfall in production needs to be avoided 
too. Thus, knowledge of the market and sufficient flexibility to anticipate 
changing circumstances are crucial. If the market is an 'invisible hand', 
organic growers still have to anticipate its moves and to direct them. The 
market asks for adequate directions, interventions and arrangements 
(North 1990; Ostrom 1994). Production quality, continuity, accessibility, 
and reliable prospects cannot be guaranteed without them. 
The issue of scale becomes important, since many farms appear to be too 
large during or after conversion. A lot of labour is needed to produce 
organic crops; the relevant technology is not, or hardly, available. Thus, 
crop improvements and/or the re-adaptation of existing machinery 
become necessary. Farmers have to do this themselves or find others who 
are sufficiently interested. 
In short: the unfolding of organic agriculture (or more generally, the 
renewal of the sector) requires agency, the capacity to actively and 
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effectively influence the course of events and adjust it to own insights and 
interests. In other words, the often vague concept of agency emerges 
here as the capacity to connect and coordinate various relevant (or potentially 
relevant) projects in order to create convergence and synergy. 
An additional complication here is that the different projects (for example 
the demand for, and supply of, organic products, the processing capacity, 
the intermediary structures for distribution and supply, etc.) have to be 
attuned to each other over time. Decisions about conversion, and the level 
of ecological production next year, presume an assessment of the sales 
opportunities in two years time and beyond. The extension of facilities for 
processing, distribution and storage presume at least minimal certainty 
about future production and consumption levels. Et cetera. 
This means that agency also involves the capacity to handle uncertainties, 
to plot a course of action in situations where not everything is clear. At the 
same time, another, probably essential, feature of agency emerges. 
Agency involves not one single intervention but is a continuous process, 
which also has to be multi-dimensional: the necessary (but as yet 
uncertain) convergence and synergy need to be realised through different 
lines of communication - to create clarity where there is presently 
uncertainty. Uncertainty and lack of clarity initially dominate. They are 
reduced gradually as a result of the creation of certainties along various 
lines: experiments take place with initially unknown techniques, through 
which new knowledge is gained. Relationships with consumers become 
consolidated, again generating new knowledge and forging new alliances. 
A striking and intriguing contrast can be made with the highly formalised 
approach, embodied in the field of planning and project development 
(Long and Van der Ploeg 1990, 1995). In institutionalised planning 
procedures, the objectives are clearly defined and mostly exactly 
quantified. The same applies to the steps that have to be taken in order to 
reach these goals. However, in the (endogenous) practice of rural 
development neither the one nor the other is possible. 'The most 
important thing to do is to define the boundaries', according to Henk 
Brouwer in Chapter 1. The institutionalised planning approach suggests a 
high degree of precision and accuracy, and is more easy to be subjected to 
external control than the more 'internally-driven' development processes. 
On the other hand, if (pseudo-) precision and controllability are absent to 
a certain degree, the creation of a social basis is an essential ingredient of 
practical renewal. A solid social basis leads to the emergence of faith (I see 
faith here as the opposite of trust). Social basis increasingly provides 
support for and generalises the expectation that projects can indeed be 
brought together. 
This can be illustrated through the example of another practical 
innovation: the founding and unfolding of one of the first environmental 
cooperatives in the Netherlands, the Eastermars Lânsdouwe Society 
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(VEL) in Oostermeer, Friesland. According to Fokke Benedictus, the 
chairman of the VEL, 
'it is very important to us that research in this area showed at a certain point 
that 90 per cent of the farmers were interested in farmer-led nature 
management, provided it would not result in additional planning restrictions 
and provided there would be reasonable compensations. We knew then that 
there would be support in the area; that was a very important, maybe the 
decisive, impulse for us to get to work'. 
Support from the majority of farmers does not however imply that the 
social basis was completely in place. Social support implies the 
interlocking and mutual reinforcement of various projects. Support also 
presupposes that the government agrees with the developing project and 
is willing to create the necessary conditions for the plans. If such a 
prospect had been absent, VEL would have faced, according to Pieter de 
Jong, one of the founders, the problem that 
'our willingness would have turned out to be mere foolishness; in that case we 
would be making the area more beautiful and more attractive, after which 
government can say 'gotcha! Thank you very much, and here are some 
additional restrictions because the area is so beautiful" 
This objection deserves additional emphasis. Past experience has taught 
the farming population that today's good behaviour can too easily 
become tomorrows' millstone - if not around your own neck then around 
your neighbour's. The erosion of trust (see Chapter 8) appears clearly 
here. And conversely, the value and importance of other 'preparatory' 
activities can thus be recognised. 
With hindsight, an earlier visit (1986) by the initiators of what was to 
become the VEL, to the European Commission in Brussels turns out to 
have been very important. It provided insights into the expected changes 
in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The construction of a social 
basis will always cross 'borders'. Support cannot solely be attributed to 
'internal' or 'external' factors. Only if the two come together, the so-called 
'social basis' will begin to consolidate. In other words, the social basis is 
the virtual network as discussed in Chapter 1. This is particularly true in 
the start-up phase. 
Furthermore, it should be stressed that a social basis is never completed -
it has to be reproduced and extended continuously in order to convert 
existing uncertainties into certainties. Thus, it was very important for VEL 
that the initially hesitant attitude of the farmers organisation was 
transformed into concrete support. The coalition with environmental and 
nature organisations was also important. The granting of the Frisian 
Environmental Award to the VEL and the winning of the national prize 
for exemplary plans (given by the National Institute for Spatial Planning) 
gave the growing social basis a solid recognition. The final step in all this 
was the recognition of the society by the Minister for Agriculture Van 
Aartsen who gave VEL, in early 1996, together with four other 
environmental cooperatives the green light to realise their plans. Thus it 
was recognised that the government's generic policy had to be adjusted 
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(by means of exemptions) in order to provide the environmental co-
operatives with the necessary room for manoeuvre to achieve the general 
goals facing the sector. 
However, the initiators first had to play a game that was sometimes 
dazzling, at other times very risky. Support in the area could only be 
transformed into active participation in the VEL if government would 
actually create space (in the form of exemptions, in the form of regionally 
specific modalities for general nature and landscape programmes, etc.). 
Conversely, government was only willing to think about providing this 
space if the VEL would orient the expected support towards the 
realisation of various government objectives. From a distance, this is a 
perfect catch-22 situation (or a prisoners' dilemma; Elias 1972). Operating 
successfully in such a situation is only possible by presenting something 
(in this case the notion of a well-functioning environmental co-operative) 
that does not yet exist, but which might be achieved. Something that those 
(potentially) involved know it is better to be involved in, than standing on 
the sideline. This means operating with the possibilities inherent in the 
current situation - possibilities that can be realised if interlocking takes 
place. However, the danger of a prize blunder is never far off: the 
initiators know that they are sticking their necks out. Still a social basis 
emerges, as an initially fragile construction relating to something that 
could happen; as a construction that becomes gradually consolidated. 
This fragility is illustrated by an as yet unrevealed episode. In the week 
before the foundation of the VEL, all farmers from the area were invited 
to a closed meeting in the church of Heechsân in order to confirm the 
social basis and its solidity. The opportunities offered at the provincial 
and national levels had been explored explicitly. The crucial point at this 
meeting was to adopt a strong position that involved all the farmers in the 
area. At the last minute, however, there was threat of a hitch. The 
embargo on publication was violated in the farming press; as a result, on 
the eve of this pivotal meeting, the public (or at least the farming public) 
was already aware of the founding of an environmental co-operative in 
Eastermar. This could have been interpreted in the wrong way: 'It is 
already in the papers when we still have to discuss this!'. However, 
thanks to the authority of men like Fokke Benedictus, Hedzer Bergsma, 
and Pieter de Jong this pitfall was avoided. During the meeting, support 
was further consolidated. In fact, the VEL was established there and then 
(spring 1992), but nothing was allowed to leak out (what again almost 
went wrong). VEL was officially founded in the following week, in the 
presence of Members of Parliament, a solicitor, and the press. 
The VEL is now a thriving local organisation, and it is copied in numerous 
places. The area obtains considerable additional income through the VEL, 
as well as legal and administrative space to combine agriculture and 
nature management. The VEL has now almost become an obligatory 
passage point to all policy units that have plans for the area. 
With hindsight, this story can be told as a chain of smart moves and 
prudent steps that collectively compose a success story. However, such a 
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story would be patently untrue - precisely because it would overlook the 
considerable agency expected of the initiators and later managers. It 
would also be untrue in so far as it would bypass all uncertainties that 
occurred in the process (you can be right, but it still has to be proved). And 
finally, such a story would be untrue if it would suggest linearly growing 
support. Support (as a network connecting various projects) has to be 
continuously reproduced. Immediately prior to, and even during the 
finally successful encounter with the Minister for Agriculture, support 
was put under extreme pressure. 
Agency is crucial to the creation and reproduction of support. The leaders 
of environmental co-operatives often have to anticipate expected events. 
They have to describe to their members possibilities that are not yet 
reality. Furthermore, they have to find ways in which to obtain from their 
supporters a mandate to negotiate further. Subsequently, the leaders also 
have to anticipate the outcomes of their discussions with governments 
and other organisations: 'if you do this and that with our consent, we will 
make sure this and that will happen in our area'. In short: they have to 
play chess on two boards simultaneously and coordinate the results of 
both games in a very careful way. 
On various important issues, the leaders reach beyond existing 
arrangements and institutional patterns in order to explore the possibility 
of new connections. This requires much effort. As Peter Bol, one of the 
leaders of the environmental co-operative of growers in the Westland, 
puts it: 'You can go a long way, but there are limits . . . you are, and 
remain, responsible and accountable . . . you must always be very careful 
not to put a rope around your neck . . . and vice versa, even if the work is 
about to become a success, you'll still have to be careful'. 
In times of change, it holds even more true than at other times that 
practices have to be assessed by what they are becoming. Many practices 
are, to use an expression of Woody Guthrie, 'prayers for the future'. I 
emphasise this because several scientific publications that appeared in the 
first years of the founding of environmental co-operatives such as the VEL 
gave them a bad press (see for example Driessen et al 1995, who took 
environmental co-operatives for what they were at the time, not for what 
they were becoming.) 
Such a position is exemplary of the expert system as a whole: 
development opportunities contained within the present are ignored. 
Only grand designs count - that is, the reordering situated in the future, by 
which everything can be imagined separate from any practical restriction. 
It goes without saying that the lack of support (or social basis) is an almost 
chronic phenomenon in this. 
Whether we are talking of the production and marketing of white cheese 
or the establishment of an environmental co-operative, the difficulty 
always lies in developing adequate networks. This also defines a 
boundary. The unfolding of agency usually involves high transaction 
costs: everything has to be followed through; interventions, decisions, and 
adjustments have to be made. The development of new socio-technical 
362 The Virtual Farmer 
networks can be likened to a stone falling into the water: the ripples 
spread concentrically. When one problem is solved, another one appears. 
If in existing networks everything interlocks seamlessly, those involved in 
the building of new socio-technical networks are confronted by a chain of 
frictions. Therefore, innovation extends up to a point when everything 
becomes too much, when transaction costs (time, effort, as well as money 
involved in the realisation of something) exceed the expected benefits. 
A simple illustration can clarify this. A number of firms operating in the 
flower and vegetable sector specialise in the generation of vegetable 
matter that is further processed on a global scale. I know a few daisy 
growers who supply almost the whole world with plant material. These 
farms are exceptional because they combine the global and the local in a 
fascinating manner. Parts of the production process are realised in Poland 
and India; refrigerated trucks and planes are part of this socio-technical 
network. These enterprises (all situated around the town of Aalsmeer) 
usually employ 2-5 people who do nothing but liase with buyers (of 
which there are between 20 and 60 per farm). These people fly constantly 
around the world to consult their customers, to explore regional markets, 
to explain which new lines are being selected, and subsequently to report 
the necessary adaptations to the holding company. 
To speak of a market would, in this respect, be a very extreme abstraction. 
It is a socio-technical network with which, and as a result of which, a 
market is created and reproduced. At the same time, it is clear that this 
socio-technical network implies resources: two to five people per firm 
who make this network into a reality. In short, time, effort, and money are 
involved - embodying and representing agency. 
This is precisely where innovation can go wrong: the marketing of a new 
product, getting a new solution accepted by both government and one's 
supporters - all these activities are limited, because of the extensive 
demands that are made on agency. 
It is perhaps the tragedy of our time: an incredible amount of new 
prospects, new development opportunities, are emerging as a result of 
our capacities. At the same time, the realisation of those prospects 
demands so much agency that, by implication, most of these new 
development opportunities remain missed. Because of the ubiquitous 
nature of the prevailing technological regime, many opportunities become 
inhibited. 
These inhibitions may spring from many mechanisms. One mechanism is 
the high level of specialisation that exists within the complex state 
apparatus, as a result of which the design, interpretation and application 
of particular rules fall to one or a few specialists. In such situations, every 
trace of a trias politicas, every possibility of 'checks and balances' is by 
definition absent. Another mechanism through which the realisation of 
agency can be blocked is the attribution of absolute primacy to the 
prevailing expert system in all questions involving knowledge. In these 
situations, the expert system (which has elaborated only one type of 
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development into a technological trajectory) will tend towards extreme 
conservatism. Openness to new approaches and 'countervailing 
mechanisms' are crucially absent. Recent years have provided poignant 
cases of this. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that an important part of the 
practice of rural development follows the lines of a search for autonomy. 
It is as if the creation of freedom from is again very topical (now not so 
much vis-à-vis markets but above all vis-à-vis the institutional framework), 
in order to achieve freedom to generate innovations. The use of one's own 
resources (irrespective of their nature), a gradual, step-by-step extension 
enabling learning-by-doing (Dosi 1988) and early adjustments, the 
ongoing re-evaluation of activities, and the slow but gradual creation of 
profitability are essential elements in this. Consequently, transaction costs 
can be kept at a low level and, above all, spread over a longer period of 
time. All these elements empower the process of rural development; and 
they are essential in the discussion of the how of rural development (see 
further De Bruin 1997b). 
9.4 The impact of rural renewal revisited 
In Table 9.5, I have summarised a number of characteristics of an 
innovative farm on one of the West Frisian Islands in comparison with a 
larger group of average farms in the Frisian countryside. The farm in 
question (run by Getje and Piet van Zwolle) exemplifies the almost 
classical lagging position of the West Frisian Islands. The output per 100 
kg of milk is, due to high transport costs, lower than in the reference group 
(NLG 69 v. 72). Fertiliser costs are higher (NLG 8 v. 4 per 100 kg milk). 
They are not used excessively, but the costs of transport from the main 
land to the island are considerable. Lower revenues and higher costs: a 
classic and almost inevitable foundation for marginalisation. 
However, the farm has developed particular innovations to counteract 
this 'structural handicap'. About half the farm is under nature 
management. The associated payments are included in the entry 'other 
revenues' (NLG 11 v. 3 per 100 kg milk). High-quality beef cattle are kept 
on this natural land which find their way to local restaurants. Local and 
high-quality products are in high demand on the tourist market, which is 
very big in summer. As a result, the entry for 'output and change in 
volume dairy cattle' is NLG 21 per 100 kg milk as against NLG 9 on the 
main land. 
The net effect of this combination of innovations (each of which generates 
only a modest income effect) creates, due to synergy, a margin per 100 kg 
milk that is significantly higher than that of the reference group: NLG 73 
v. 63 per 100 kg milk. This is the well-known 'ten cents in the milk' (as it 
is called in the countryside) that make all the difference. 
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Table 9.5 Farm data of an ' innova t ive ' farm on a West Frisian Island compared to 
a reference g r o u p 
Indicator 
Total land 
Grassland (ha) 
Maize (ha) 
Milk quota 
Dairy cows 
Calves and beef cattle 
Quota / ha 
Milk /cow (kg) 
Butterfat (%) 
Protein (%) 
Output and change in volume dairy cattle / cow 
Concentrates / cow (kg) 
Revenues in NLG per 100 kg of milk: 
- from milk 
- output and change in volume dairy cattle 
- other 
total 
Costs in NLG per 100 kg of milk 
- total feed costs 
- AI/vet/other livestock costs 
- fertiliser costs 
total 
Margin in NLG per 100 kg of milk 
Innovative farm 
40 
33 
7 
330,000 kg 
45 
82 
8250 
7591 
4.32 
3.36 
1645 
2546 
69 
21 
11 
201 
12 
8 
8 
28 
73 
80 farms BEAG 
12,800 
7344 
4.48 
3.49 
679 
2035 
72 
9 
3 
84 
12 
5 
4 
21 
63 
But does the importance of the figures in Table 9.5 have a significance that 
reaches beyond the individual farm? Do they have a wider applicability? 
My experience suggests that they do. As a member of the Langman 
Commission/ which had to draw up a plan for economic and spatial 
interventions in the north of the Netherlands (Langman 1997), I obtained 
detailed data from the Central Agency for Quota Registration (COS) in the 
spring of 1997. These data relate to the development of the milk quotas 
per municipality and the number of 'quota-holders' (a new term that 
corresponds closely, although not exactly, with the more widely used 
term dairy farmer) for the 1990-1995 period. The developments in the 
province of Fryslân are summarised in Figure 9.3. 
It can be seen at a glance from Figure 9.3 that different development 
processes occur. Even though quotas are falling and the number of dairy 
farmers (quota-holders) is decreasing sharply at both the provincial and 
national levels, this tendency is not universal. There are municipalities 
that buck the trend. I have clustered the municipalities in four groups in 
Figure 9.3. In one group (cluster 1) both the number of quota-holders 
and the volume of quota remain grosso modo the same. More generally, the 
production potential in these areas is maintained at such a level that the 
associated employment remains stable. 
Translator's note: The Langman Commission was an independent entity, operating on 
request of the Dutch government, that had to search for ways to strengthen the economy of 
the North of the Netherlands. 
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Figure 9.3 Development over time of the total quota and the number of quota-
holders per Frisian municipality, 1990-1995 
A quota per 
municipality (%) 
A quota-holders 
per municipality 
Why are there such differences? It is remarkable that all three of the West 
Frisian Islands on which farming still takes place (Schiermonnikoog, 
Ameland and Terschelling) fall within this group. Diversification of farm 
development has taken place on these three islands to a much higher 
degree than on the main land.4 Alongside agritourism (for example, all 
dairy farmers on Schiermonnikoog have a mini campsite and old sheds 
converted into a series of charming apartments; on Ameland too 
agritourism has been an important fact through the ages), the generation 
of special, high-quality products (on all three islands), farmer-led nature 
management (sometimes in combination with the generation of quality 
meat - as in the example described above) and direct selling play an 
important part. In recent years, this diversification has been extended 
further. The Waddengroep Foundation (Roep 2001), a network of tens of 
producers and processors from the islands, constitutes an important 
carrier for this further development. 
The position of the three West Frisian Islands in Figure 9.3 demonstrates 
that diversification can make an important contribution to the rural 
economy. In this way, the quota (which would otherwise flow out of such 
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zones), can be maintained and, moreover, extra employment can be 
created. In other words, Figure 9.3 provides evidence of the regional 
impact of innovations at the micro-level as summarised in Table 9.5. 
We have thus encountered one strong example out of a broader range of 
potential strategies , that can maintain or create employment in the 
agricultural sector. These are strategies that have proved their value in 
practice. They are also strategies that, one would think, the Ministry of 
Agriculture as an expert system, would take note of and try to encourage 
elsewhere in order to create the 'vital countryside' that the ministry has 
spoken of. Strangely enough, this does not happen. 
9.5 The Ministry of Agriculture as non-agency: a case study 
In the spring of 1995, the then Minister for Agriculture, Van Aartsen, 
placed rural renewal and rural development on the political agenda for 
the first time (a development, which came about, interestingly, outside of 
the official channels). Dynamiek en vernieuwing (Dynamics and Renewal) was 
the title of his political manifesto. It was the first in, what will become 
later, a long line of reports. The stream of reports swelled especially 
during the term of office of Minister for Agriculture Brinkhorst and State 
Secretary Faber. The intentions that they articulate are honourable. 
However, despite good intentions, an enormous disconnection remains 
between policy and practice: between the intention to encourage rural 
development effectively and the practice of rural renewal. Thus a sheer 
virtual world is continued: both creating and frustrating illusions. The 
ministry declares itself in favour of rural development, but actual rural 
development practices are frustrated by the same ministry. Before I will 
discuss this more generally, I would like to return to one of the 
underlying themes of this chapter. 
On 3 April 1998 , Minister Van Aartsen informed Parliament that he 'has 
decided on the basis of two reports (an evaluation report of the IKC and 
the own interim evaluation of the environmental co-operatives) to 
continue the experiment, in a reinforced form'. The minister refers to 'the 
success of the environmental co-operatives, the increased zest, and the 
achieved environmental gain'. Also, 'breakthroughs have been made in 
the relationship between farmers and social organisations. A change has 
occurred in many cases in the attitude of farmers towards the 
management of nature, landscape, and the environment'. The minister 
clearly states his intention of giving the experiment 'a new impulse'. In 
fact, the exact opposite would happen, against the will of the Minister and 
Parliament. 
I have been involved, at the request of Minister Van Aartsen, in the 
development of the environmental co-operatives, and acted as chairman 
in the regular consultations between them and the ministry. From this 
position, I have come to develop some understanding of the operations of 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The directorate involved in the experiment 
was the, then, Directorate for Environment, Quality and Health (MKG). 
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The directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture each have their own 
domain, a field of activity that is regarded by the directorate in question as 
its own. The directorates guard their own domains carefully; other 
directorates are regarded suspiciously and border disputes arise regularly 
- even between the directorates and the management board (the highest 
political unit within the ministry). The experiment with the environmental 
co-operatives was experienced from the outset as a threat to and to a 
certain extent an assault upon MKG. It was an idea that originated in the 
outside world - it did not match MKG's own project. It was also a risky 
project, certainly in the eyes of MKG staff. Hence, there was no real 
commitment. 
It took MKG six months to study the plans that were submitted, on time, 
by the first five environmental co-operatives. However, at their first 
meeting the MKG director advised the co-operatives 'to make a start at 
specifying their development plans', illustrating that not only had he not 
read them, but that he was not even aware of their existence. In the same 
meeting, the farmers involved stressed that they had had frequent 
discussions with the Standing Committee for Agriculture of Dutch 
Parliament (VCL), which supported the plans. The response of the 
director in question was that 'Members of Parliament do whatever comes 
up, one day they want this, the next day it's something else, you cannot 
take them seriously'. 
Further policy preparation by MKG continued in the same vein. Normally 
directorates summarise current issues in well-organised files, and present 
the minister with suggestions for action and decisions. The same 
happened here. However, the minister rejected most suggestions made by 
MKG and decided to create substantial opportunities for the first 
environmental co-operatives. This involved great conflict with MKG, who 
saw that it's own domain was being threatened. 
From discussions with Ministry personnel I have come to understand 
'that it is quite a job to organise something if the directorate is not inclined 
towards it'. The director of MKG confirmed this, when, towards the end 
of Van Aartsen's term of office, he started to act as if 'this minister is 
leaving anyway . . . we can return to business as usual'. 
At any event, with the active support of parliament, the minister, the 
farming press, and a few regional directorates of the ministry (the 
Directorate of Northern Regions in particular) the green light is eventually 
given. The environmental co-operatives get to work and achieve a 
number of considerable successes. MKG plays a minimal role in these 
successes. The environmental co-operatives are constantly confronted 
with the prevailing technological regime when seeking to realise their 
plans. Granted some space through some exemptions, they almost 
immediately ran into new barriers. Confronted with new obstacles, the 
environmental co-operatives developed additional proposals. MKG's 
response was simply that the proposals did not correspond with 
prevailing procedures and routines, and were, therefore, unworkable. No 
effort was made whatsoever to attempt to solve the many practical 
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problems in the relationship between government and co-operatives. This 
is not only due to unwillingness, but also due to a lack of power. MKG 
has to operate alongside other directorates. The Ministry of Agriculture, 
in turn, has to share decisions with, for example, the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM). Other matters fall in the 
sphere of competence of the Provinces. All these actors are connected by a 
network, which can only function by the grace of a high degree of 
consensus, which, in turn, has to be formalised and confirmed time and 
again by an uninterrupted chain of approvals: a decision is only made 
when every authorised actor has approved the document. 
Consensus and network make the government apparatus into a well-oiled 
machine, i.e. an integral and important part of the prevailing 
technological regime, geared to continuous structural development and 
the centralisation of decisions related to this. Environmental co-operatives 
potentially collide with this regime. They represent (a modest degree of) 
local self-regulation and a (careful) diversification of farming, which is in 
stark contrast to the notion of structural development. Inevitably, frictions 
arise when environmental co-operatives became a reality. Although these 
frictions could easily be solved, MKG refused to develop the required 
agency. More generally, proposals could not proceed through the 
network of directorates, ministries, research stations and provinces, faster 
than the most conservative link would allow. Ten approvals can be 
negated by a final, eleventh, disapproval. Innovation has to be geared to 
the lowest common denominator. In practice, nothing at all can be 
changed. 
This episode teaches us that there are limits to democratic political 
control. A minister can deal with the details of a case twice, or three times, 
but not on a weekly basis. He must be able to rely on his civil servants. 
The same applies to parliament. In the end, only irritation remained: 'have 
they still not dealt with that job properly?'. 
In the first chapter of this book, I introduced the notion of non-agency. On 
the basis of the experiences with environmental co-operatives, it can be 
said that the current Ministry of Agriculture embodies this principle 
through its inability to move beyond the prevailing technological regime. 
The new impulse mentioned by the minister in April 1998 (in his last 
month as Minister of Agriculture) was effectively dismantled by MKG. 
The environmental co-operatives were told that no 'proposals for real 
self-regulation are under discussion' (after MKG had rejected them one by 
one). Meanwhile, over 300 agricultural societies involved in the 
management of nature and landscape have been founded in the country. 
Many aspire to similar agreements than the ones created by Van Aartsen 
for the first environmental co-operatives. MKG remained conspicuous by 
its non-agency: it has failed absolutely to develop any policy, not even 
three lines of text. At most, MKG made outflanking movements: 
commissioning small research activities, organising meetings, 
consultations - in short, everything necessary to put non-agency into 
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practice. The potential that has presented itself in the country is effectively 
frustrated. 
Discongruity 
Considerable discongruity exists between the process of renewal that is 
occurring in practice and the change that the Ministry of Agriculture 
wishes to supervise, facilitate, and support. In the report Kracht en kwaliteit 
(Power and Quality) of the then Minister for Agriculture, Apotheker, much 
is made of the role and importance of environmental co-operatives. In the 
meantime, the ministry has largely alienated itself from those who built 
up these co-operatives. Similarly, no effective instrument for providing 
the necessary space for the new associations is yet in place. Once again, 
innovations are suffocated; all which remains are hidden novelties. Thus 
emerges an almost hallucinatory dream-world. Judged by reality, the 
images sketched by the ministry are nothing but an illusion, virtual 
images: deceptively real, but non-existent. 
The same tension between rhetoric and reality can be found in the 
relationship between rural development as practice and the work of the 
Commission Van der Zwan, charged with implementing the 
Stimuleringkader (intended to encourage rural development). Here too, a 
rupture emerged between rural development as government project and 
rural renewal as practice. The West Frisian Islands bubbled with 
innovations and island entrepreneurs were awarded an innovation prize 
by the minister, yet the Commission Van der Zwan rejected all submitted 
proposals as they did 'not possess enough innovative potential'. The same 
fate met the pioneering proposals of the Dutch Western Farmers and 
Horticulturalists Union (WLTO) and tens of other proposals of innovators 
who were seeking to deepen and extend the existing processes of renewal. 
Pressure behind the scenes from Members of Parliament, from the 
Council for Rural Areas and from the Provinces was to no avail. The 
stronghold of the ministry increasingly withdrew. The same occurred to 
the development of regionally specific products, in the search for new 
environmental solutions, with the proposals of the Commission Langman, 
and so on. Discongruity was everywhere. 
What are the reason for such discongruity? As far as I am aware, there are 
a number of interlocking factors: 
a The new RD current is not regarded as endogenous development, as 
something that is already underway and which the ministry could and 
should join. Rural development is understood, both at the ministry and 
within the expert system, as a new project, as something that still has to 
begin. The key word is direction. The Ministry of Agriculture feels that 
it needs to give direction to rural development, just as a play needs to 
be staged. Rural development, as it exists at present, is regarded as a 
chaotic process lacking a preconceived blueprint. 
Coordination is indeed very much needed. The innovators themselves 
did and continue to ask explicitly for a framework. But in the shuttered 
wheelhouse of the expert system, there is so little connection with, and 
370 The Virtual Farmer 
knowledge of, the practice of agriculture that any direction it could 
possibly provide would become a vehicle for the opposite. 
Giving direction presumes a script. This script (what is rural 
development, how does it take place, who plays which part, who are 
the spectators, and what do they expect?) is not derived from the 
autonomous processes that have already largely changed the nature 
and identity of Dutch agriculture. The ministry wants to write the 
script itself in order to be able to claim, and effectuate, an appropriate 
directional role. Simplicity of prescription and simplicity of control 
remain the rules of thumb here, which conversely also emphasize the 
centrality of the director. 
b Subsequently, the development of the script is delegated to the various 
agencies that collectively comprise the expert system. To this end, vast 
flows of money are oriented towards the new theme of rural 
development, producing various programming studies, explorations, 
and analyses of supply and demand (AB/DLO and SC/DLO 1998; 
NRLO 1998; Vos et al. 1998; LEI 1999). Yet the independent researchers 
and institutes, which had accumulated a considerable knowledge about 
rural development as practice, are excluded from conducting the 
aforementioned studies, explorations, and analyses. Thus the expert 
system as the collection of institutional interests attempts to regain the 
lost territory. It is prepared to put up with doing an incredible amount 
of work twice, if not three times. It is apparently of little importance 
that the work produced is sometimes of painfully low quality. 
Further down the line, the knowledge agencies involved find that they 
have to distinguish themselves (to prove their right to exist). In many 
discussions the message is heard that 'it is time to make something out 
of rural development that is of real use'. Usually, it is held in social life 
that one has to look after the pennies and the pounds will look after 
themselves. In the agricultural expert system the reverse seems to 
apply. The search is for the 'pounds'. Finding the pounds provides 
the opportunity for the knowledge agencies to distinguish and present 
themselves. It is important to make a difference, to display agency (at face 
value at least). Yet, by neglecting the pennies the empirical process of 
rural development is overlooked. Hence, the writing of the 'script' is 
completely disconnected from the real RD current. 
c Once provided, the thus constructed ruptures reinforce the opinion that 
direction is indeed necessary. The ministry is presented with new tasks, 
which demand its active involvement. 
A, b and c define a network - a network which clearly and indisputably 
defines who is authorised to talk about what; a network in which there is 
consensus about which sources to tap. In that sense, there is undeniably 
an agenda. It is a network in which messages, symbols, and texts circulate 
- texts that (irrespective of the question whether they are actually right or 
wrong) become the point of reference for the trajectory ahead. 
What are the distinguishing features of this network? First, it is essentially 
disconnected from the networks that have already been developed in the 
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practice of rural renewal. Second, it contains a considerable degree of 
incapacity. Since rural development is imagined in terms of juxtaposition 
- that is, in addition to continuous structural development - it cannot be 
but an immature, half-hearted notion, especially for the agricultural 
population. Juxtaposition also implies that rural development is a not a 
comprehensive new set of tasks to be shared among the directorates that 
comprise the ministry - it can be allocated to just one directorate. 
Thus, rural development becomes the domain of one particular 
directorate, which is consequently engaged in boundary conflicts with 
other directorates and which cannot progress beyond the lowest common 
denominator as defined by the surrounding directorates. 
d Subsequently, and I return here to the sketch of the interlocking 
moments that collectively result in discongruity, new budgets are 
created for rural development. This in itself is remarkable. Rural 
development requires not so much additional funding but the removal 
of the most restricting regulations. This could result, directly and 
indirectly, in gigantic savings and hence in a powerful incentive for 
rural development. Typically (or perhaps typically Dutch), this is not 
the route chosen; instead, the preferred option is to buy off problems. 
In any event, the provision of new funds introduces new formal rules 
(and new views of those who have to oversee the application of the 
rules). Thus a new tier of formalisation emerges, a further clustering of 
the rules, and a further stifling of rural development as a new 
development opportunity. 
All in all, rural development is thus transformed from a meaningful practice with 
its own dynamics into a new macro-project that, because of the way it is 
constructed, is more likely to severely curtail the practice of rural development. 
9.6 The countercurrent 
At the same time that the future of rural development is frustrated by 
administrative incompetence, a new countercurrent is emerging. It 
revolves around the perspective of a rapid industrialisation of farming, 
which implies a simultaneous acceleration of scale enlargement. This new 
development opportunity is expressed in numerous studies and it is 
driven largely by agribusiness which see it as the beginning of a new 
macro-project. At the same time, a significant process of scale enlargement 
is taking place in parts of the agricultural sector. Although there are very 
few mega-farms (apart from the intensive livestock and greenhouse 
sectors), they constitute, together with the dominant technological 
trajectory and the perspective of liberalisation and price reduction, an 
indisputable indication of the future. At least, according to some. 
One of the new mega-farms, emerging in the dairy sector, can be found in 
Witmarsum, Friesland. In April 1996, 100 cows were being milked on 
this farm. Milking happened thrice daily, which was not that unusual at 
the time. In June 1998, this farm had 330 dairy cows. In the winter of that 
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year, the number had risen to 600, which were milked by ten milk robots. 
Further expansion was being planned by spring 1999. The farm has about 
200 ha of land, but a lot of roughage needs to be bought in (incidentally, 
the dairy cattle are kept indoors all year round). The cattle needed to 
realise the expansion are been bought in. The farm employs four full-time 
workers. In other words, the degree of commoditisation is very high. The 
owner, who lives in Monaco, regards this dairy farm as a 'thoroughly 
relaxing' activity, an accompaniment alongside his main job: 
director/owner of the TAS software company. Considerable purchases of 
quotas and land are necessary for the constant expansion of this mega-
farm, which collides of course with the growth needs of other farms. 
'They just buy everything', is a much heard complaint in the area. 
The allocation problem implied by this case can be illustrated by 
estimating the quota of this farm. This quota amounted (by early 1999) at 
least to 5.5 million kg milk (Landbouwblad 1998). Compared with the 
average farm (of about 350,000 litre) this implies that the creation of one of 
these mega-farms displaces 16 farms and that 24 jobs are replaced by four 
48 
new ones. 
Structural development represents, above all, a reversal of general socio-
economic relations and the implied principles of allocation. This had 
already become clear before the mega-farms actually manifested 
themselves in the dairy sector. 
For the sake of brevity, I would like to refer to Table 9.6 in which (starting 
from the different output-cost relations implicit in various farming styles) 
the size of farm quota has been estimated that is needed to realise an 
annual labour income of NLG 70,000 per labour unit. 
Starting from the total provincial quota for Friesland, it is possible to 
calculate the amount of space available for farms if different farming 
styles were to dominate. It follows from the data that the Frisian milk 
quota could be met by between 4600 to 6300 farms. The total agricultural 
income earned in the Frisian dairy sector would vary from NLG 490 to 
630 million per year. Within the range spanned by the empirically 
distinguishable farming styles in the Frisian dairy sector, the choice for a 
larger number of farms cannot be understood, as many would argue, as a 
'redistribution of poverty'. Instead, it implies an increase in regional 
agrarian income. It is structural development that would lead, at the 
provincial level, to a reduction of employment and of income. 
These results emphasise the extent to which structural development at the 
micro-level can go together with the opposite trend at the macro-level: 
employment and income are actually reduced. The current development 
of mega-farms is nothing but an ulterior deepening of the problem: only 
320 mega-farms, like the one found in Witmarsum, would be needed to 
meet the total Frisian milk quota. This is less than 10 per cent of the 
present number of farms. Employment in the primary sector would thus 
be reduced to about 1200-1300 jobs. 
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Table 9.6 A comparison of various farming styles in relation to the prov 
quota 
Amount of milk needed to 
realise a labour income of 
NLG 70,000 per labour 
unit (kg) 
Number of farms needed 
to milk the Frisian milk 
quota 
Provincial agricultural 
income if the Frisian quota 
is milked by one style 
alone (in NLG million) 
Dairy cows per ha 
grassland 
Milk quota per ha 
grassland (in kg) 
Area needed if the Frisian 
quota is milked by one 
style alone (ha) 
Environmental pressure in 
kg N surplus per ha 
Total N surplus in 
Friesland (in million kg N) 
intensive 
farmers 
402,000 
4650 
488 
2.0 
14,370 
130,660 
550 
71.9 
breeders 
351,000 
5325 
522 
1.4 
9770 
190,714 
348 
66.4 
large 
farmers 
406,000 
4605 
580 
1.7 
11,660 
160,290 
469 
75.2 
cowmen 
396,000 
4720 
628 
1.7 
12,212 
153,197 
399 
61.1 
incial 
economical 
farmers 
297,000 
6295 
617 
1.6 
10,090 
185,233 
354 
65.6 
In many ways, the development of mega-farms represents an involution 
(Geertz 1963). The mega-farm embodies the modern variant of rûch 
buorkje (farming roughly). Their establishmenty would lead to a loss of 
income, employment, and quality of life. Landscapes and ecological 
values would be degraded. The scale of farm management demands a far-
reaching rationalisation of fodder production and, hence, a 
homogenisation of the landscape: large plots, optimal mechanisation 
opportunities, an elevated carrying capacity and hence deep drainage, the 
absence of interfering elements such as isolated trees, wooded banks, 
contours and so on. The implications for food quality should not be 
forgotten since routine use of preventive medicines (such as antibiotics) 
will certainly prevail over early observation and specific curative 
interventions. 
9.7 Is juxtaposition possible? 
Can mega-farms and family farms, such as the ones we know at present, 
really exist alongside each other? Or are there too many tensions? Close 
observation shows that current and countercurrent (rural development 
and the creation of mega farms) are becoming involved in an increasingly 
bitter fight, a few aspects of which are described below, 
a First, a fierce struggle is taking place over the scarce development 
opportunities. The growth of the mega-farm described earlier (from 
about 1 million kg milk in 1996 to 5.5 million kg milk in 1999) implies 
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that 90 dairy farms have been deprived of the opportunity to expand 
their farm by about 50,000 kg milk. In many situations the opportunity 
for gradual farm expansion can be critical (especially at the take-over 
stage). Moreover, there is not a level-playing field. Tax-deductible 
quota purchases favour large farms more than others. 
The struggle for development opportunities takes place in numerous 
fields. It involves not only quotas, but also land, manure distribution 
options, emission rights, and, interestingly, the struggle for subsidies. 
This became clear in a somewhat surprising way when the regulation 
to encourage conversion to organic agriculture was implemented. 
During the short time that this regulation was active, 135 applications 
were submitted, collectively involving NLG 30 million. However, only 
NLG 10 million was available. After a lottery (i.e. a notarial draw), it 
appeared that the former state farm ERF (an enormous arable farm of 
about 1000 hectares) was among the fortunate ones. Thus, NLG 5 
million of the available NLG 10 million went to one applicant; the 
remaining 16 farms drawn shared the remaining NLG 5 million. The 
vast majority of farms (118) received nothing at all. More generally, the 
development of a diversified agriculture is regarded with suspicion 
from within the countercurrent: diversified agriculture is seen as a 
restraint on structural development. Land, quotas, etc., which are 
needed for a rapid expansion of mega-farms, will not become available. 
b A second arena (where things are tough too) is spatial planning. The 
key concept here is the 'shadow effects' of planning. Initiatives to rural 
development are blocked in hundreds of places (sometimes having to 
go as far as the Supreme Court of the Netherlands) because it is feared 
that they could form a hindrance to the further expansion of large 
farms or mega-farms. A proposed farm campsite could hinder the 
expansion of a neighbouring farm in the future (as regards increasing 
stench, for instance). Thus, the plan for the campsite is blocked because 
of the feared shadow effects. 
c The next arena involves the institutional framework around 
agriculture. For what reason, and for whom, do experimental farms 
operate, for instance? For an agriculture with 'future prospects' (as it is 
stated rhetorically) or as a sideshow? Only one farm (Aver Heino) in 
the national network of experimental farms was oriented towards 
organic agriculture by as late as 1998-1999. 
d More generally, a heated debate rages in agriculture, in farmers' 
organisations and within the aforementioned institutional framework 
(including the agro-industry and the ministry) about how to 
conceptualise the agriculture of the future. Is it the so-called 'world-
market agriculture' (this term was introduced into the debate by the 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute; see LEI 1999, p. 31 ff), ° or is 
it an agriculture moulded to Dutch proportions? Regional farmers 
organisations such as the Dutch Western Farmers and Horticulturalists 
Union (WLTO), the umbrella organisation In Natura, which assembles 
many farmers societies for nature management, the GLTO (regional 
organisation for farmers in the provinces of Gelderland, Utrecht, and 
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Overijssel), and the LLTB (for farmers in Limburg) make a clear stand 
for the latter perspective. However, the perspective of, and for, a 
'world-market agriculture' has already been consolidated. This 
struggle is also expressed in other ways: who is authorised under 
which conditions, for what reason, and for what purpose, to use labels 
such as quality, health, regionally specific, traditional, and so on? 
e The final arena involves the future spatial organisation of the 
Netherlands. The debate around this issue takes place at numerous 
levels, but hinges especially around the Fifth Report on Spatial 
Planning, which addresses the question where the best place is to 
situate which kind of agriculture? 
Indicative of the growing tension between current and countercurrent is 
the application of a new type of spatial development - that is, a type of 
compartmentalisation of the Netherlands. Broadly speaking, this option 
involves putting certain zones aside for 'world-market agriculture' (these 
are the zones in which various environmental and planning restrictions 
can be lifted, in order to make this world-market agriculture competitive), 
while other regions are assigned to diversified agriculture. 
I think that the effects of this type of spatial development will be 
catastrophic. I had to deal with this issue during my work for the 
Langman Commission. The ministry and the agribusiness proposed 
parceling out the north of the country into two large zones: the so-called 
Northern Shell (the northern peat region, the northern arable region, and 
the Frisian clay region), where space should be provided for accelerated 
scale enlargement, and the Drents Plateau (the province of Drenthe, the 
Frisian Woodlands, and the Zuidelijk Westerkwartier), where agriculture 
should be diversified. However, the crucial issue is of course that socio-
economic development processes cannot be confined to lines on a map, let 
alone that they can be conducted by them (for a more general explanation, 
see Van der Ploeg 1995d). In other words, a considerable conflict will be 
generated in both zones. A really systematic solution to this issue (for 
example, through extensive farm relocation) will fail on its sheer 
uncontrollable costs and, beyond that, it will only be a short term 
solution. Moreover, two more principle questions remain: why is it not 
possible to redesign scale enlargement in such a way that it fits into the 
small-scale landscape of the Drentse Plateau? And why do the qualities 
and values of, for example, the Frisian grass region have to be sacrificed 
to unlimited scale enlargement? 
Throughout this, another episode is taking place. This is the fight waging 
in the pig sector in particular - first against the manure and minerals 
policy, later against the solution to swine fever. This episode is no one-off 
incident; it is interwoven into the struggle between RD current and 
countercurrent. On a direct level it involves whether a sector that is 
largely disconnected from the society in which it operates has the right to 
exist. Indirectly it concerns the application of government finances: the 
billions of guilders required to control swine fever rendered the ministry 
somehow powerless in other domains. 
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9.8 Current and countercurrent: unmanageable tension 
I have been a supporter of a multi-track policy for a long time. In essence, 
a multi-track policy reaches beyond the selectivity built into the 
modernisation project of the time: development opportunities were 
attributed to certain farming styles, whereas other farming styles became 
trapped and were curtailed (see Figure 9.1). Diversification beyond the 
confines of the limited blueprint seemed more than desired, particularly 
since numerous solutions to the many large problems with which 
agriculture and countryside were confronted, were slumbering in the 
many ignored farming styles. 
I now incline towards a different view. Various development opportunities 
are inherent in Dutch agriculture. The associated competition (which I 
have tried to describe above), as well as the increasingly acute call for an 
agriculture that corresponds with more general social desires and needs, 
necessitates that choices are made. The development opportunity 
contained in a radical industrialisation of farming and its related 
acceleration of scale enlargement should be rejected because it results in 
an agriculture that does not fit with a highly urbanised society, and also 
because it shuts out and excludes other, more attractive types of farming. 
The two types of farming cannot happily (or otherwise) co-exist. Choices 
have to be made and these need to be made at the political level. 
Debates take place and doubts are expressed at every kitchen table in the 
Dutch countryside: what is the right thing to do? Should we take out large 
loans, buy quota, and expand the farm? Or should we prepare the farm 
for heavy weather: accelerate redemption and try to keep costs as low as 
possible? Should we diversify? Or specialise? A normative choice is 
needed given all the uncertainties. Of course, every choice, whichever 
one, will be disputed - this does not alter the fact, however, that it will be 
experienced as a relief at the kitchen table. 
Blocking the industrialisation of agriculture is definitely not a new theme. 
I remember the heated debates of the 1970s about what were then called 
mammoth farms: the large-scale, intensive livestock farms, from which 
the current mega-farms have grown. Obscured by the 'sandwich 
concepts' used within the sector ('there should be ample development 
opportunities', 'scale enlargement remains necessary'), an undercover 
operation has taken place: while the argument was put forward that 
family farms have to have growth opportunities at their disposal, mega-
farms were founded that are a severe threat to these family farms at 
present. 
In abstract terms, it is possible to imagine how restrictions could be 
implemented. Danish legislation, for example, does not permit a farm to 
have more than a certain number of livestock units. There is to be also a 
certain relationship between livestock units and the labour used. Qua 
tenor, this savours of Italian legislation about land reform, which resulted 
in the large boom in North Italian agriculture in the early 1950s. Another 
The Battle for the Future 377 
option is a flexible upper limit: those farms that significantly exceed the 
average size lose the opportunity to acquire quota and/or land. Thus, 
growth opportunities will be limited to the smaller and average-sized 
farms. When the latter grow, both the average and the upper limit will 
shift. Hence, the very much feared stagnation will not occur: after a 
certain time larger farms will be able to grow again. What is avoided here 
is that growth opportunities are purely monopolised by the large mega-
farms (as is increasingly the case today). Judging by the prevailing 
ideology, such an option is probably impossible: 'the free play of market 
forces would be disturbed by it'. 
Some research experience gained in the course of 1998 and 1999, provides 
insights into such questions. The management of the Twickel Foundation 
and its tenancy commission requested the elaboration of a development 
plan for the agriculture on the estate. Twickel is a large estate. It 
comprises 6000 ha, 2000 ha of which are agricultural land. Over sixty 
tenants live and work on the estate. From the outset it was our impression 
that Twickel is a fascinating microcosm of Dutch agriculture, in which all 
the problems and conflicts that typify Dutch agriculture can be found. 
Farming on Twickel is variegated. Different farming styles exist; the 
development projects of the tenants vary greatly. Some opt for a gradual, 
step-by-step expansion, others would rather build up a million kg farm as 
soon as possible. Overall, growth expectations exceed the amount of land 
and quotas that are likely to become available. 
On an estate such as Twickel there are unique circumstances: land is 
rented and quotas can be obtained at half price (the other half remains in 
hands of the leasing society). Access to land and quota are not mediated 
through the market here, but through a regulating agency: the Twickel 
Foundation. Hence, specific rules for land and quota allocation might be 
introduced and, eventually, be re-adapted. 
The 'Flevofarm' is a favourite point of reference for some tenants in 
Twickel ('world-market agriculture' is apparently too far removed from 
the region of Twente). The Flevofarm stands not only for a large farm, but 
above all for a farm that can be worked unhindered by regulations, 
landscape values, and ecological obstacles. The notion of the Flevofarm 
contrasts with the situation of the tenants' own farm. The protection, 
management, and further development of ecological and landscape 
values take in a prominent place in the policy of the Twickel Foundation. 
Some farmers experience this as an enormous disadvantage, if not an 
unjust barrier to structural development. Other tenants, on the other 
hand, easily come to terms with it. Many look for diversification 
opportunities although this ran, initially, counter to the policy of the 
Foundation. Careful registration of each individual tenant shows that 
diversification (irrespective of the type) is the rule rather than the 
exception. 
Eventually we succeeded in designing a development plan that was 
supported by all parties (for details, see Van Broekhuizen and Van der 
Ploeg 1999). The issue is not so much the details as how and why a 
378 The Virtual Farmer 
consensus could be reached here. Three issues are important. First, the 
notion of landscape played a highly important part. If you farm at 
Twickel, you enjoy a number of advantages; however, the ways of 
farming have to fit into the landscape and the local ecological values -
again this constitutes an exchange, an exchange principle that was 
further elaborated in the development plan. Second, as a result of the 
procedure every tenant was taken seriously (interviews with each 
individual tenant was at the heart of our approach), after which the first 
designs of the development plan were discussed in meetings at the 
tenants' homes. These appeared to be crucial: arguing here for a jump to a 
'Flevofarm' at Twickel implied outright that they had to tell the 
neighbours that they were no longer welcome. This was impossible given 
the existing local relationships. Hence, a third issue could be discussed. It 
is the search for those types of agricultural development (including 
diversification) that fit into the landscape and that do not exclude others 
(that is, they fit into local society). The role of the Foundation became 
redefined too: the Twickel Foundation will support those farm 
development plans (by means of quotas, land, and financial support) that 
fit best into the general objectives of the Foundation - that is, maintenance 
and reinforcement of agriculture and nature through a strong agriculture, 
in which the guiding principle is multiformity, multifunctionality and a 
broad basis (i.e. more, rather than less, farms). 
Of course, the Twickel experience cannot be transferred easily to Dutch 
agriculture as a whole. The crucial meetings at people's homes (about 10-
15 tenants, their partners, and successors at the time) cannot be repeated 
at the national level (although it would be a good idea if the regional 
farmers organisations would put the allocation problems, inherent in so-
called structural development, on their agendas). Typically, Dutch 
agriculture has, until now, presented its bill to others. The south 
presented the bill of its environmental problems to the north. Dairy 
farmers pursue extensification at the cost of arable farmers. Arable 
farmers, in turn, threaten to change over to vegetable growing, which will 
disrupt activities elsewhere. The 'winners' are unconcerned about the 
supposed 'losers'. Exclusion of the latter is a prerequisite for the survival 
of the former. So-called competition among farmers is an old mystery. 
Farmers are not each other's competitors when it comes to output prices 
of products. Off-farm prices are usually determined elsewhere. Farmers 
compete over future possibilities, except when a collective momentum, 
such as an environmental co-operative or a farmers' society, is created; 
everyone's existence is at stake in those cases. However, this demands a 
momentum, a programme that goes beyond mutual competition. 
The relevance of rural development re-emerges here once again: rural 
development can be the framework within which, and as a result of 
which, competition can be controlled; in particular if new connecting 
frameworks can be found (the national food supply was a similar 
connecting framework in the post-war reconstruction). I will investigate 
in the next section the extent to which the notion of landscape can fulfil 
the role of such a connecting framework. 
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9.9 Landscape as ordering principle 
Landscapes are the outcomes of co-production. Similarly, landscapes 
were and remain one of the mechanisms that regulate the further 
unfolding of co-production. Landscapes are objectified labour, which, in 
turn, partly regulate living labour, that is, the labour process. A particular 
ordering of space is implicit in all labour and production processes. 
Different farming styles result in different spatial constellations, just as a 
particular spatial constellation lends itself to certain development patterns 
and hampers others. Not for nothing is the struggle for accelerated scale 
enlargement translated into the compartmentalisation of rural areas, in 
the creation of 'free havens' or enclaves. 
For a long time, the agricultural landscapes of the Netherlands became 
more and more particularised vis-à-vis each other. This was the logical 
effect of co-production, of the ongoing encounter, interweaving and 
mutual transformation of the social and the natural. During the 
modernisation offensive, a sea-change occurred. An unmistakable process 
of homogenisation took place as a result of land development and land 
consolidation; numerous landscape and ecological values disappeared. 
Rural areas were rationalised and standardised in pursuit of a farming 
style, designed by agricultural science. Due to the resistance of humans, 
materials, and nature (Roep 2000), this homogenisation process was never 
completed. However, the economic and technological possibilities that we 
now have at our disposal make possible a completion of what remained 
unfinished during the modernisation offensive. The further 
functionalisation of landscapes for the benefit of accelerated scale 
enlargement is still possible. Pleas for such a refunctionalisation are still 
being actively put forward. Ironically, these pleas are sometimes 
reinforced by nature conservation organisations: give us the 10 per cent 
that belong to nature, the remaining 90 per cent can then be allocated to 
agriculture to do with it what it chooses. 
I think that the notion of landscape (and I define landscape also as the 
carrier of ecological and cultural-historic values, space for economic 
activities, etc.) can and should be used as the defining framework within 
which agricultural development should take place. Existing landscapes 
would thus become the touchstone which inform decisions about which 
developments can take place and which cannot be allowed. This would 
also result in the activation of a new design capacity: intended 
developments are to be designed in such a way that they do fit in with the 
existing landscapes. 
Of course, this position conjures up a simple, although not easily 
answerable, question: what is landscape? Numerous documents have 
struggled to satisfactorily answer this question (Bouma 1994; De Haan 
1998b; De Jong 1999; De Klerk 1999). Conventional descriptions only raise 
a corner of the veil. The Ministry of Agriculture states in its 1992 Policy 
Document that 'landscape is the visible part of the earth - that is, the part 
determined by the interrelations and mutual influence of climate, 
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morphology, soil, water, flora, and fauna, as well as human action'. I 
would like to try to extend this definition a few steps further. 
A landscape is not only a visible aspect. A landscape represents a typical 
ordering of many elements: of ecosystems, buildings, types of land use, 
ecological values, patterns of opening up areas, visual experience, 
accessibility, town-countryside relations, transitions, water management 
systems, history and so on. The areas of reclaimed land contain different 
forms of ordering than the more recently created polders. The ordering of 
both contrasts with that of, for example, the Frisian grassland region. The 
Beemster is different from the Wieringermeer and these two are different 
again from the large triangle between Leeuwarden, Franeker, and Sneek. 
Tuscany is completely different again - because of the forms of plots of 
land, different because of the placement of trees in the fields, different 
because of the presence of cypresses, different because of its architecture, 
different because of the way in which the vines are pruned. In short, 
landscapes are never accidental sets of loosely gathered elements. They 
always have a typical ordering, their own connectivity, that reflects the 
multi-dimensional and integrated character of co-production; a certain 
coherence that gives both identity and beauty to the landscape as a whole 
and to its constituent elements. Second, a landscape never exists as an 
isolated aspect of the earth. Each and every typical ordering is 
recognisable and gains uniqueness through context and contrast. A visit to 
the Lage Vuursche* will represent an encounter with nature to the 
average citizen from Amsterdam, an oasis in striking contrast with the 
city environment. To the field biologist the Lage Vuursche is a desert, a 
gloomy pine forest. 
This raises two important notions for evaluating landscapes: the 
comparative and the normative. It is comparisons between one landscape 
and the other that often create a sense of value. Few Dutch people would 
recognise this, but, from an international perspective, the Holocene 
Netherlands (the set of former land reclamations, peat lands, and polders 
- in short, the provinces of North Holland, South Holland, Flevoland, and 
part of Friesland) constitutes a fascinating, unique, and informative 
landscape: it tells the story of twenty centuries of struggle against water in 
order to create what exists today. At the same time, it points, at the 
national level, to the high value of the Pleistocene Netherlands: apart from 
the typical, unique, and always different values of Zuid-Limburg, the 
Achterhoek and Twente, the Frisian Woodlands and the Zuidelijk 
Westerkwartier, the value of these landscapes lies in particular in their 
evocative contrast with the Holocene Netherlands. Without the contrast, 
we would probably be hardly or not at all aware of the uniqueness and 
beauty of the polder landscapes and land reclamations. Just as, 
conversely, the scenic landscapes and their closed character form an 
attractive counterpoint to the openness and extensiveness of the polders. 
This leads to another issue. The experience of observing and valuing 
h
 Translator's note: Lage Vuursche is a well-known pine forest 25 km from Amsterdam. 
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landscapes always contains a normative moment. Zuid-Limburg will be 
like 'a Van Gogh' to some, whereas the Flevopolder will be like 'a 
Mondriaan' to others. Noord-Groningen will probably conjure up an 
association with 'a Werkman', whereas the extensiveness of water and 
pasture will evoke an association with the work of J.W.M. (William) 
Turner to some. Not everyone will like the same paintings, tastes differ. 
The same applies to landscapes. The experience and valuing of landscapes 
is highly subjective and normative. 
The conclusion is simple but important: the countryside should provide, 
both literally and figuratively, room for different values. It is also 
important to develop the social capacity to particularise different 
landscapes vis-à-vis each other. Finally, the creation of a hierarchy of 
landscapes, from lower quality to high quality, is inconceivable, although 
it is often done. 
A final observation concerns the way that landscapes enrich our lives. 
Landscapes are one of the most important outcomes of co-production: of 
the continuous encounter between and mutual influencing of humans and 
nature. Humans and society get to know their limits in, and through, this 
co-production. In other words, in landscapes we recognise the things that 
rise above us, we experience the limits of what is possible. Landscapes are 
associated with a desire for beauty, for liberation. They can be mysterious 
or command respect: 'N'aime que la beauté / et qu'elle soit pour toi toute la 
vérité' (Charles van Lerberghe and Alphons Diepenbrock, 'Berleuse'). 
Just as hundreds of thousands of Dutch people create a microcosm for 
themselves in which they can enjoy co-production on a small scale 
(allotments, home gardens, parks, the keeping of pets), individual 
landscapes, but especially the rich array of contrasting landscapes, offer 
the Dutch population as a whole and foreign visitors the opportunity to 
enjoy co-production on a large scale. In summary, our landscapes are and 
remain essential. We should cherish our landscapes, in the same way that 
we cherish the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam. 
While it might be obvious that landscapes are the outcome of co-
production, this point still needs to be reinforced because of the nature of 
current debates, which threaten to destroy parts of it. Policies towards 
landscapes and their ecological values should not seek to eliminate 
economic activities. Landscapes are a particular outcome of multiple 
human activities. Without these activities, landscapes fossilise and we will 
become alienated from them. The real art is in embedding human activity 
in such a way that the typical ordering inherent in landscapes is further 
enhanced and strengthened - that is, developing co-production in 
harmony with the available landscapes. 
Landscapes are also characterised by a remarkable slowness and solidity. 
They evolve, but at a very slow pace. A comparison of topographical 
maps of the Frisian Woodlands from 1850 with those from 1990 shows 
that much has changed; however, the indelible impression is one of 
continuity. It is remarkable how much has remained stable. This does not 
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alter the fact that our current technological capacities (and, alas, the often 
considerable cultural indifference towards landscapes) are such that we 
have at our disposal the concrete possibility to wipe out landscapes in one 
fell swoop. The heritage passed onto us by previous generations can be 
damaged irrevocably. 
Connection with and attachment to landscape certainly do not have to 
lead to conservatism. As Van Mansvelt (1999) has made clear in a recent 
publication (continuing previous work by Vos and Fresco 1994), 
landscapes can and should be understood in dynamic terms: they contain 
certain development opportunities (just as they can be embellished and 
particularised), and exclude others. 
Thus we have arrived at an issue that has received a lot of attention 
particularly in the Anglo-Saxon literature: landscapes (as part of the 
countryside) are increasingly part of a debate, they are contested 
(Marsden 1998b). These are 'controversial landscapes'. In the 
Netherlands, the most dramatic manifestation of this occurred in 
Gaasterland, where not just farmers but the complete rural population 
resisted plans to take 550 ha of agricultural land out of cultivation and to 
transform it to nature reserve for the benefit of the national ecological 
network (Nijhoff et al. 1996).63 The direct everyday living and working 
environments (including the landscape) do not leave people unaffected. 
On the contrary, they become increasingly important. 
In the Netherlands we do not have just one, or a few, landscape pearls. 
The whole of the Netherlands is one large, and well-filled, treasure trove 
comprising a set of contrasting landscapes. The treasure includes pearls, 
indeed, but also diamonds, crown jewels, emerald, pieces of jade, and so 
on. Some of these are heavily bruised and need speedy restoration (many 
urban fringes have become little more than dumping grounds), other 
areas need preservation, some further polishing. 
I think that we should not only relate the notion of kreas buorkje (farming 
gently, or the license to produce) to environmental dimensions, to food 
security and safety, and/or to issues such as animal welfare. Kreas buorkje 
implies also the license to farm in such a way (and to develop the farm in 
such a way) that the concrete values and qualities (that is, the typical 
ordering) of the landscape (and its ecological values) are reinforced. 
Develop your farm however you want, as long as it is kreas - that is, as 
long as it fits into the landscape, into the type of nature that goes along 
with it, into the other activities localised within it, and into the wishes and 
needs of others that enjoy it. This is what the Council for the Rural Areas 
describe as 'new land boundedness' (RLG 1998,1999). 
Is this a Utopian option, especially in a situation in which the countryside 
has become increasingly controversial and contested? I do not think so. 
The very fact that the countryside has become controversial indicates that 
certain democratic forces are concerned about the countryside. It is 
important (a) to build arenas in which the democratic debate can take 
place (see also Tjallingii 1996),65 (b) to make explicit the dimensions along, 
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and the concepts with which, the characteristic aspects of landscapes can 
be defined,66 and (c) to create effective guarantee systems to avoid, as 
much as possible, the potential derailments at the local level. 
9.10 The immanent decline of Dutch agriculture 
An agriculture such as the Dutch one needs an expert system. However, 
the problem is that the current expert system malfunctions. Over the past 
decades, the only knowledge that has been developed was that which met 
the needs of the prevailing technological trajectory (the modernisation 
project). This resulted de facto in the creation of ignorance about other 
development opportunities. When new tasks became clear in the 1990s, 
the expert system appeared to be empty-handed. Research had not been 
broadened in time. Even the simplest of questions (e.g. how to increase 
the nitrogen delivery capacity of the soil) could not be answered. 
Suddenly, it appeared that there was a missing trajectory. 
Perhaps even more dramatically, in the midst of the manure and nutrients 
debate, the expert system was incapable of making clear that a 
considerable number of Dutch farmers were already producing below the 
then controversial norms. This highlighted another failure: the expert 
system is highly disconnected from agricultural practice. There is little 
knowledge about what actually happens on farms or what farmers are 
involved in. It became clear that the expert system is concerned above all 
with the virtual farmer. The situation at the beginning of the new 
millennium has not changed. The expert system designs one future image 
after another. The images tumble on top of each other. Typically, 
however, almost all of these projections are disconnected from the present 
and from constants that have influenced agricultural and rural 
development through the ages (NRLO 1997b). Moreover, the expert 
system typically continues to explore only one, or a few, of the potential 
development opportunities. Alongside knowledge about these particular 
trajectories, the expert system remains systematically ignorant about other 
opportunities. Finally, the link to practice is still extremely fragile -
especially since many in the expert system imagine future developments 
as expropriation of current agriculture. 
More specifically, the expert system is, as I have explained in this chapter, 
the carrier of a self-contradictory project: on the one hand it aims for 
accelerated scale enlargement, while at the same time there is an intention 
to generate diversification. Both aspects represent a rupture from the 
present. Thus, two development routes are set out that are individually 
and collectively made fragile from the outset. Fragile since the two are not 
compatible with each other in the long term and also because opting for a 
'world-market agriculture' will emerge sooner or later as a choice for a 
'runaway industry'. Society can be blackmailed easily by such a runaway 
industry, which is what pig farmers are already involved in. 
The expert system confronts Dutch agriculture with two development 
opportunities, which, individually and collectively, are ramshackle. It 
creates despair at the micro-level (at all those kitchen tables). 'Shall we do 
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this? No, we can't do that. How about this then? No, that'll never work.' 
The result is obvious: we already encountered it in Chapter 8, in the large 
group of pessimists. 
It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that agriculture and countryside 
will be crushed by these complex tensions, all the more since every sign of 
weakness in agriculture will be exploited by powerful interests: the 
ongoing suburbanisation of the Netherlands and the acquisition of 
agricultural land for 'pure nature'. 
The farmers we know in the Netherlands are largely the virtual farmers 
described to us by the expert system. They are profit maximisers 
distrusted by contemporary society. 'Real farmers' (and hence real farm 
women, real agriculture, etc.) are insufficiently represented, and 
insufficiently used as building blocks for an attractive future, which is still 
not beyond our grasp. The real farmer disappears behind the virtual 
farmer. We turn the virtual farmer into reality, but soon there will be 
nothing behind the virtuality. Meanwhile, the real farmer, in his diversity, 
has disappeared. 
The expert system is above all geared towards the future. However, in its 
relation to the future its actions can be seen as little more than 'organised 
irresponsibility'. The self-créa ted inability to make a difference in the 
future is overwhelmingly large, especially at those neuralgic points in the 
relevant socio-technical networks where the decisive difference should be 
made. 
Perhaps Koos van Zomeren was right when he said, not without some 
irony (in the IKON TV programme 'Babylon', broadcasted 6 May 1999) 
that if all beautiful landscapes and agriculture are sacrificed to the issues 
of the day, 'we can still listen to Beethoven's 'Pastoral', read Judith 
Herzberg's poetry, and go to the museums and art galleries to look at 
those beautiful landscape paintings'. 
Notes 
1 A lot of attention has been paid to the phenomenon of endogenous development in 
comparative research at the European level in the last decade of the twentieth century. 
Endogenous (regional) development is development based mainly (although not 
exclusively) upon regionally available and/or controllable resources (Slee 1994; Lowe et al. 
1995). Endogenous development is, above all, development that contains a, usually implicit, 
local paradigm in which the combination, use, and development of regionally available 
resources is defined in a particular way. This might sound cryptic at first. The point is of 
course that certain assets (a landscape, an ecosystem, certain artefacts, knowledge, networks, 
and so on) become a resource only if we know how they can be combined, used, and further 
developed with other elements. Baldios that are situated high up in Trâs-os-Montes (stony 
and steep waste lands, high up in the mountains, managed collectively) emerge as a resource 
only if one knows how to use them. The same applies to the seemingly endless mountain 
sides in Central Italy, such as the Monte Subasio behind Assisi in Umbria. Closer to home, it 
applies to the mudflats on the other side of the Frisian dykes and the small plots bordered 
with densely grown dykswalen in the Frisian Woodlands. A farmer from the Frisian 
woodlands would feel homeless and disconcerted in Trâs-os-Montes: they would not know 
how to use the baldios, let alone would they know how to make these baldios into a starting 
point for further development. (Incidentally, this Frisian farmer would not be alone in their 
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incapacity. In the study by the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), 
entitled Grond voor keuzen (Ground for Choices), a large part of regions such as Tras-os-Montes 
is considered agriculturally less optimal land, land that can be taken out of cultivation. But 
this as a side note. Conversely, a farmer from Trâs-os-Montes would have no idea how to 
cope if he were offered land outside the dykes in the Wadden Sea (or dry land in the Frisian 
Woodlands). They would not know what to do with it or themselves. Irrespective of the way 
in which this issue is approached, the art of farming (1'arte delta agricoltura, according to 
Columella) is a phenomenon that cannot be ignored, a local phenomenon that reinforces 
time and again the particularity of the local paradigm that defines the use, combination, and 
development of locally available resources. Currently, rural development processes taking 
place in the Netherlands at present can also be described as the development of new, local 
paradigms (local in the sense that they reflect the specificity of contemporary agriculture), in 
and through which the available resources can be redefined. A field is no longer only a 
location where silage of a certain metabolised energy content can be produced—a field 
becomes also part of a landscape, it becomes a carrier of different ecological values, the 
production locality of a mixture of grasses and herbs that result in a special cheese flavour, 
etc. 
2 A poignant example is the functioning of the Commission Van der Zwan, which is to 
implement the so-called Stimulation Programme. 
3 'Flying hectares' are an innovation that originated in Friesland. Also called wjukkelbunders, 
'flying hectares' represent a flexible option of entering into nature management agreements 
on a specified number of hectares (at the moment 5500 ha in Friesland). What is unique 
about this is its free availability. No area has been marked out in advance on a map where 
(and hence where not) these agreements should be applied. Farmers can apply for an 
agreement in those areas that they think are of interest. Thus, the hectares 'fly', as it were, 
over the province, as 'unplanned' as the flight of a lapwing. As a result, a mosaic pattern 
develops at the macro-level: those 'flying hectares' can be encountered anywhere. Of further 
importance is that these 'flying hectares' cannot produce any shadow effects to 
neighbouring farmers. The agreement can be terminated by the farmer, without government 
being able to claim that the ecological values already developed are reason for continuation 
or provide a reason for applying other restrictions. Neither is it allowed to derive (planning) 
restrictions related to surrounding plots (including neighbours') from the plot with the 
developed ecological values. The enactment of this regulation (various elements of which 
can now be found in the national Management Programme of the Ministry of Agriculture) is 
also interesting from a theoretical point of view. Initially, nature organizations claimed (and 
they were not completely wrong) that it lacked any kind of necessary stability. A farmer 
could gain from the regulation, but could also withdraw at any moment. From this 
perspective, such temporary agreements for investments in nature management are 
pointless. Conversely, farmers consider the opposite—that is, permanent agreements are 
extremely undesirable. Entering into long-term, if not permanent, agreements was 
unthinkable so long as the extent to which nature management could be fit into one's own 
farm management was unclear. Hence, discongruity. Yet, it appears after several years of 
experience that continuity of agreements is very high. This can be explained partly from the 
experiences of the farmers involved: the management of meadow birds and other ecological 
values appears to fit very well with their farm management strategies and appears also to be 
attractive in other respects. The Frisian environmental organizations now support the 
measure fully. In short, congruence has been created, when it was first absent. Interestingly, 
the key has been an approach that initially seemed to be inadequate. 
4 Numerous interesting examples, also in a strictly technological sense, can be pointed out in 
the practice of Waddengroep Foundation. New, unknown medical applications of certain 
fruit crops were found. The work of the Zeeuwse Vlegel project resulted in the 
reintroduction of what was deemed impossible up to that point: cultivating bread grains in 
the Netherlands (see Wiskerke 1997). Xotus is another pearl, a horticultural firm in the 
province of Zuid Holland, which developed and perfected the theory and practice of climax 
crops (see further Van Broekhuizen and Renting 1994). 
5 A counterargument could be that economic laws, however regrettable, force to continuous, 
if not accelerated, scale enlargement in order to realise the required reduction in costs. Such 
an argument cannot be sustained, neither theoretically nor empirically. Michael Porter 
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argues in Competitive Advantage that 'both industry attractiveness and competitive position 
[of the individual firm] can be shaped by a firm'. This is, according to Porter, what makes 
the choice of a competitive strategy both challenging and exciting (1985, p. 2). 'Competitive 
strategy, then, not only responds to the environment but also attempts to shape that 
environment in a firm's favour' (ibid.). The interesting issue raised by this position is that it 
thus dissociates itself from the determinism that characterizes mainstream agricultural 
economic analysis. A determinism in which 'the market' appears (is represented) as the all-
determining factor, coercively ruling the development, and fate, of individual enterprises. 
Or, according to a complaint of the past: the farmer considers, the market decides. Porter 
introduces a number of strategical patterns: cost reduction, differentiation, and 'focus'—that 
is, the extent to which the strategy relates to a limited or broad range of products, markets, 
and resources. Collectively, these patterns span a complex scheme, containing a considerable 
series of possibilities: different strategies with which to parry adverse circumstances. If this 
scheme is applied to Dutch agriculture, its potential becomes immediately clear. Alongside 
the well-known picture of farms pursuing a continued, if not accelerated, expansion of their 
production volume at constant labour input, there are large groups of farms on which cost 
advantages are realised through the particularisation of resources. This often results often in 
improved input-output relations and in a relatively high level of value added per unit 
product. Furthermore, a growing group of farms exists on which new types of 
differentiation have been developed. Some of these farms operate with a broad focus - as in 
the types of rural development discussed here; others operate with a more limited focus -
applying strategic responses such as pluriactivity and part-time farming. 
6 It goes without saying that this very discongruity - that is, the non-correspondence 
between supply and demand of technologies, measures, perspectives, etc. - constitutes an 
important mechanism in the marginalisation of some farming styles; or in more general 
terms, in the selective nature of the current agricultural development process. Institutional 
changes are of utmost importance in changing this. 
7 Incidentally, this type of cooperation becomes increasingly difficult due to new rules 
restricting the transport of manure among farmers. Every load of manure has to be sampled 
and its weight determined on a weighbridge, which entails excessively high costs and much 
irritation. Previously, the MacSharry regulations had already created a lot of difficulties. 
8 In other words, the threat of the 'big stick' remains. More generally, self-regulation 
movements can be imagined only as existing through the grace of an underlying generic 
policy. 
9 VEL and VANLA gave rise to the idea of 240 monitored farms; this idea took the sting out 
of the parliamentary debate about MINAS. 
10 As always, this involves a norm that has to be reconfirmed time and again. The conflicts 
that occur over deviation from the norm result in its reconfirmation. Griemers (literally, 
messy people - in this context, they are polluters and cheats) are actively tackled about their 
conduct by their colleagues. Their 'free rider' behaviour threatens the set of advantages at 
the disposal of the environmental cooperative as a whole. One of the sanctions to be applied 
(which has only been imposed once) is that the griemer in question is excluded as a member. 
This implies that they can no longer make use of the exemptions and other advantages. 
Furthermore, I noticed that griemers are increasingly excluded from local land transfers. 
11 Numerous, at times moving, examples of this normative role can be found in Geert Mak's 
unsurpassable book (2000). 
12 In the Frisian Woodlands, for example, someone who dug up all their wooded banks was 
considered contemptible. It was just not something anyone would do. This may seem 
anecdotal but moral codes exist in almost every agricultural system, everywhere in the 
world. For a beautiful sketch, see Moerman 1968. 
13 This table is annotated extensively in the original publication, in which the figures are 
explained and substantiated in detail. For a critical discussion, see Van der Ploeg et al. 1997, 
pp. 80-87,98-104. 
14 During the Cork Conference, it became clear that a new paradigm is taking shape. At the 
same time, it became apparent that numerous institutional and political interests exist that 
stand in the way of making this paradigmatic change more explicit. The suggestion of 
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continuity, and the simultaneous call for 'border adjustments', is indispensable for 
maintaining authority and for protecting various established interests. 
15 I am aware that numerous definitions are in circulation. Different opinions are described 
and analysed in Van Broekhuizen et al. (1997). An opinion in contrast to the one advanced 
here, claims that rural development is to take place via a type of 'expropriation' of farmers. 
They have to make way for new types of nature, recreation, and so-called 'thin 
suburbanisation'. Personally, I am worried that this opinion will be adopted by the expert 
system. In the everyday language spoken in large research institutes such as Alterra, the 
word 'de-farm' has recently come into circulation. 
16 See note 1 of this chapter. 
17 TATE stands for 'technological administrative task environment'. This concept, 
developed by Benvenuti (see 1990) refers to the direct prescription of the farm labour process 
from various external institutions. The empirical cases analysed by Benvenuti related mainly 
to agribusiness. 
18 Studies of agricultural systems elsewhere (for example, the production of Parmesan 
cheese and Chianina meat in Italy, the breeding systems based on the utilisation of the 
baldios in the north of Portugal, the production of the jamon iberko in the dehesa system in 
Spain, etc.) were an inspiring source in the clarification of the differences summarised in 
Table 9.5. These studies were a source of inspiration in the recognition of the development 
opportunities inherent in the different farming styles. 
19 Even though we thought about treating farming economically as an integral part of rural 
development in a previous publication (Van der Ploeg 1995a, 1996a), many (international) 
discussions were needed before we could achieve a clearer picture. 
20 I base this position not only upon my own practical knowledge, but also on studies such 
as De Rooij et al. 1992. 
21 This involves an undeniable gender bias too, for farming women are often the ones who 
provide other on-farm and off-farm revenues. 
22 Even though the study by De Vries relates only to the area of the Land van Maas en Waal, 
analysis of data of Statistics Netherlands (CBS) and the Agricultural Economics Research 
Institute (LEI) indicates that the percentage provided by her (67 per cent) can almost be used 
as an average for the Netherlands as a whole. 
23 Besides, I would like to point out that this phenomenon is widespread, particularly in the 
Mediterranean part of Europe—however, I am not yet certain what conclusions to draw 
from this observation. 
24 See Boerderij 84(32), 11 May 1999, p. 15; I have taken the average of the different sectors 
here. 
25 As well as those farmers who have entered into agreements, I take into account those 
farmers who adopt local types of nature management and development without formal 
agreements. Furthermore, I have included the synergy effect, as indicated by Van der Ham. 
Finally, quasi-rent calculated increasingly with regard to landscape and ecological 
'limitations' can be considered as an 'income bonus'. The average net effect is NLG 7000 per 
farm. 
26 The underlying reasoning is that where income is insufficient, the farm could be closed in 
order to find a well-paid full-time job elsewhere. However, since both a good income and 
the maintenance of the farm are desired (which is the important issue here), so-called 
'additional revenues' are explored. Thus, the farm is maintained ( but along other lines than 
scale enlargement and intensification), while still realising good, family incomes. 
27 Based on Van der Ploeg (1995, p. 127), and subsequently generalised for the whole of 
Dutch agriculture. 
28 I include here the development of new economic carriers on farms. Alongside the striking 
and well-known examples, a twilight zone exists to which the newspaper the Gelderlander 
referred in a small article in the spring of 1999, when nearly 200 'illegal farms' were 
discovered in the municipality of Barneveld during a check. 
388 The Virtual Farmer 
29 This holds at least in a macro-economic sense and, also, in most micro-situations. It does 
not alter the fact that the 'additional income' has now become the 'main income' in certain 
micro-situations. 
30 I use milk and potatoes here as a pars pro toto for the whole range of agricultural products. 
31 Again, this is a highly simplified and schematised approach. However, the important 
point here is the underlying argument. Theoretically, the benefits of diversification cannot be 
considered in isolation; they have to be combined with the benefits of the agricultural 
production on which they are based. These benefits of diversification would not be reaped 
separate from the 'strictly' agricultural basis. Synergy (or the phenomenon of the 
multipurpose enterprise) is decisive here. 
32 From my own experience, I know the Frisian situation well. Hence I know (for example, 
through my engagement in the founding of the new associations) that the data from the 
provinces of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Limburg are wrong. The situations in Noord-Holland 
and Zuid-Holland can be checked in the first annual report of In Natura, the umbrella 
organisation of nature societies within the working area of the Dutch Western Farmers and 
Horticulturalists Union (WLTO). 
33 Initially, this seems to be a very dated observation. Relations had changed quite 
dramatically by 1999. From a theoretical perspective, however, the problems are still the 
same. 
34 Whereby organic agriculture can be understood explicitly as a 'project', as an incipient 
'mode of ordering'. Crucial here is the connection with other projects - just as in other, now 
consolidated, modes of ordering. 
35 In other words, agency is the ability to act strategically. Following the work of Giddens, I 
have written about this with Norman Long: 'The notion of agency attributes to the 
individual actor the capacity to process social experience and to devise ways of coping with 
life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion. Within the limits of information, 
uncertainty and the other constraints (e.g. physical, normative or politico-economic) that 
exist, social actors are 'knowledgeable' and 'capable'. They attempt to solve problems, learn 
how to intervene in the flow of social events around them, and monitor continuously their 
own actions, observing how others react to their behaviour and taking note of the various 
contingent circumstances' (Long and Van der Ploeg 1994, p. 66). 
36 'Agency therefore requires organization capacities; it is not simply the result of 
possessing certain cognitive abilities, persuasive powers or forms of charisma. The ability to 
influence others or to pass on a command (e.g. to get them to accept a particular message) 
rests fundamentally on the actions of a chain or events each of whom translates it in 
accordance with his/her own projects [. . .] In other words, agency [. . .] depends crucially 
upon the emergence of a network of actors who became partially though hardly ever 
completely, enrolled in the projects and practices of some other person or persons. Effective 
agency requires the strategic generation/manipulation of a network of social relations and 
the channelling of specific items [. . .] through certain nodal points of interaction' (Long and 
Van der Ploeg 1994, p. 66). 
37 I put 'preparatory' in quotation marks here as there was no purposeful run-up to the VEL 
at that time. Only with hindsight did these 'preparatory' activities acquire importance. 
38 I will limit myself to one example here: the development of climax crops and climax 
cultivations by the Xotus group of Gert Jan Jansen. Careful description of this case would 
provide a vivid account of the arrogance of the 'expert system'. Incidentally, DWK emerges 
time and again as the source of arrogance and conservatism in this and in many other cases. 
39 Cluster 4 comprises the municipalities that reflect the general trends. Cluster 2 comprises 
those municipalities where quotas increased sharply compared to other municipalities. This 
is related to the introduction of dairy farms from elsewhere into arable farming areas. 
Finally, cluster 3 represents a problem group. Ignoring Sneek (a case of city expansion), we 
arrive at Kollumerland and Achtkarspelen - an important part of the northern Frisian 
Woodlands (with an outlet into the Lauwerszee). These are areas characterised by relatively 
small farms (the average quotas per farm in 1990 were 269,000 kg in Kollumerland and 
215,000 kg in Achtkarspelen). This indicates a delicate structure, resulting partly in quotas 
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'leaking away' and in a rapid reduction in the number of dairy farms. Hence, the 
maintenance of the local landscapes is put under a lot of pressure. 
40 This can be called rightfully the 'dialectics of progress'. The disadvantageous position of 
farmers on the West Frisian Islands encouraged them, sooner than their colleagues 
elsewhere in the country, to look for what would only later be called rural development. 
41 Figure 9.3 hides more intriguing secrets. I will briefly discuss a few aspects of these as 
they underline that diversification should not be regarded in isolation but presupposes a 
wider framework. There is a second group of municipalities within this first cluster which 
are located, roughly, between the head of the Afsluitdijk and the hinterland of Lemmer. 
These are the municipalities of Wonseradeel, Wymbritseradeel, Nijefurd, and Lemsterland. 
Closer analysis leads me to the following issues. The municipalities of Wonseradeel, 
Wymbritseradeel, and Nijefurd have all been subjected, recently, to land consolidations. The 
shortcomings of external production circumstances were removed, which was perceived as 
an important impetus by the farmers concerned. The Zuidwest Hoek (South-west Corner, 
ZWH) and Zuidoost Friesland (South-east Friesland, ZOF) are both known as strong dairy 
farming areas, although there is a clear hierarchy. The latter area comes first. It is considered 
to be the best dairy farming area of the Netherlands. There are large farms and production 
circumstances are optimal. Still, a sharp decrease in the number of quota-holders occurs in 
ZOF; it amounts to between 14 and 15 per cent in the municipalities of Heerenveen, 
Opsterland, and Ooststellingerwerf. The development of quotas, however, is about the 
national average, while it is rising in the South-west Corner (Nijefurd, Wymbritseradeel, and 
Wonseradeel). 
The most important difference between the ZWH and ZOF is their structure. A striking 
duality occurs in ZOF: a large group of small farms exists alongside a smaller group of very 
large farms. This dual structure is absent in the ZWH, it is more egalitarian. Hence, farm 
numbers in ZOF decrease rapidly and total quota per municipality is reduced, whereas farm 
numbers in the ZWH area remain more or less the same and total quota rises stightly. 
A third important issue is constituted by land use security. Several years ago a large scale 
expropriation was proposed in Nijefurd in order to create nature reserves. Feelings were 
running high at the time, but after considerable protests a clear solution was chosen for the 
area in question. This has ensured long-term security for the dairy farmers. If we compare 
this with the adjoining municipality of Gaasterlan-Sleat, it appears that there was 
uncertainty for the whole of the period in question. This uncertainty resulted in widespread 
resistance towards the national ecological network (see Nijhoff et al. 1996). The same 
uncertainty also drove many farmers to relocate elsewhere, particularly in the north of 
Friesland and the province of Groningen. That is the reason for the strikingly different 
location of Gaasterlan-Sleat in Figure 9.3. Again, long-term security about the functions of 
the rural area seems to be crucial. 
Price effect seems to be a fourth issue of importance. Between 1985 and 1994, the Goede 
Verwachting in Workum was the dairy factory paying the highest milk price in the whole of 
the Netherlands (this difference has been levelled out in the meantime). The milk price was 
usually NLG 0.01-0.02 above the one paid by what was Friesland Dairy Foods at the time. 
This implies, at the level of the average farm, easily an additional revenue of NLG 6000 per 
year, or NLG 30,000 for the whole period in question. Everyone with any knowledge about 
farm economics knows that such a difference cannot be translated quantitatively into 
various investment decisions. Still, it is not unimportant. Or, as one of my informants stated: 
'Now farmers have to krimmenearjen [complain] only once instead of twice before they take 
an important decision'. More generally, I would like to say that this issue pointed indirectly 
to the importance of realising higher prices off-farm through innovation at the level of 
supply chains. This can occur within existing supply chains, and it is also possible by 
developing new supply chains. 
In summary, alongside the diversification briefly discussed above - represented by the 
position of the West Frisian Islands in particular - the generation of a more egalitarian 
production structure, the provision of long-term security about rural spaces, and 
innovations at the level of supply chains emerge as important strategies. 
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42 Letter from the Minister of Agriculture to the Chair of the Standing Committee for 
Agriculture of Dutch Parliament, code MKG.981020, dated 3rd of April 1998, concerning the 
Bestuurlijk Experiment Milieucoöperaties (TRC 98/7848). 
43 The interim evaluation was accompanied by supporting letters from the Netherlands 
Society for Nature and Environment, Centre for Agriculture and Environment (CLM), the 
provincial councils of Friesland, Gelderland, Noord-Holland, and Overijssel, emphasising 
the broad base of support that was established at this time. 
44 One of the problematic aspects of the privatisation of, at least parts of, the expert system 
is the inclination to formulate the answers to commissions in such a way that future 
commissions will follow. Thus the tendency has grown to formulate large ruptures. 
However, the 'ideological moment' still remains important: 'The challenge of the 
agricultural sciences is not in activities such as detailed descriptions of current agriculture 
and currently used techniques. Its most important task should be the design, development, 
and implementation of new techniques and opportunities on the basis of insight and 
knowledge' (Rabbinge 1999, p. 43). 
45 The 'agency' that is sought after and created exists only within a particular network - that 
is, in its relation to the Ministry of Agriculture. Judged by what happens in practice, it is not 
so much 'agency' that exists but rather 'non-agency' . The formulated plans became rigid, 
paralysing, and frustrating. 
46 This was, in essence, the heart of the so-called Spatial Planning and the Environment 
(ROM) approach that was taken in several area in the Netherlands. 
47 Incidentally, this is not the largest dairy farm in the Netherlands. The largest farm was 
producing 9.8 million kg milk by spring 1999. 
48 Even when we repeat the comparison with available data of the larger dairy farms in 
Friesland (80 or more dairy cows - 22 per cent of Frisian farms fall into this category, against 
13 per cent for the Netherlands as a whole; Arcadis 1998, p. 16), the allocation question 
appears again: 800,000-1 million kg versus 5.5 million kg milk per farm (that is, one mega-
farm or 5-7 large farms), or 10-14 jobs versus 4 jobs. 
49 This aspect emerges even more distinctly in a scenario study (especially because more 
recent data were used) conducted later on request of the Frisian farmers' organisations and 
the province of Fryslân (LUW et al. 1993). Starting from the various development 
opportunities implicit in the actual diversity, an image was projected that extended 
considerably beyond the summary of Table 9.9. By introducing assumptions about the global 
political-economic developments, the bandwidth could be extended into the future, which 
made clearly visible the effects of policy choices. To this end, three scenarios were designed 
and calculated (as described in Chapter 8): a policy trend scenario based on the existing and 
anticipated policy, a (prudent) free-trade scenario (in which accelerated growth and 
structural development becomes possible by means of A and B quotas), and a diversity 
scenario in which the contours of what would later be called rural development can be 
detected. The results are summarised in Table 8.2. 
50 More generally, it can be noted that the development of 'recruiting concepts' constitutes 
an important aspect of the implied struggle for hegemony. 
51 South-east Friesland, for instance, is situated in this 'Drents Plateau'. However, it is also 
the area with a concentration of the largest dairy farms. Conversely, numerous diversifying 
farms and related cooperative associations can be found in the 'northern shell'. 
52 The suggestion of spatial unfolding was not adopted in the final advice of the 
Commission Langman. 
53 The unasked question is what development opportunities (and for whom) and what type 
of scale enlargement are under discussion. 
54 In this respect, 'landscape' was not an abstract notion: it included the area where people 
lived and worked and where children grew up. Most of the people involved shared a 
common notion of the importance of the landscape, others reconciled themselves to its 
inevitability. 
55 See the discussion of environmental co-operatives. 
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56 Again, it is ironic that, depending on the particular situation, the pursuit of individual 
enrichment results in the impoverishment of the whole. In other words, this is the typically 
Dutch and very modern expression of a tragedy of which we thought we had left behind us: 
the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). 
57 1 return to the position of the Council for Rural Areas (Raad voor het landelijk gebied 
1999). Furthermore, I am grateful to Willem Vos for his support in the development of the 
following paragraphs. 
58 One of the gaps in scientific research of the past decades arises here. Careful 
documentation and solid understanding of landscapes in terms of characteristic ordering is 
almost completely absent. Although a multitude of elements can be taken into consideration 
by using modern techniques (for example cluster analysis), this hardly occurs. Thus, insights 
into the significant differences between various patterns of association are missing and, in 
consequence, insights into the decisive elements for identifying the typical orderings are also 
absent. Therefore, the question of which essential landscape elements should be protected in 
any given landscape cannot yet be answered. 
59 The issue of the typical ordering implicit in every landscape leads to one of its major 
threats: many contemporary activities and interventions result in the disappearance of the 
typical aspects. One thing starts to look like the next, especially man-made landscapes, 
resulting in impoverishment. From this perspective, every homogenising intervention has to 
be labelled undesirable. 
60 This refers to the necessity to maintain, as much as possible, the uniqueness of parts and, 
thus, the attractiveness of the whole. Below, we will point out that a number of threatening 
developments take place, especially in this respect. Just as the inner cities became more and 
more uniform, similar homogenising tendencies are evident in the rural areas. 
61 Think of his fascinating painting of the Noord near Dordrecht. 
62 This points, en passant, to a problem that will crop up many times in this text, that is that 
the 'design capacity' to do this is still underdeveloped in the Netherlands. Remarkably, at a 
design contest ('Who is Afraid of Empty Spaces') for the north of the country, hardly any of 
the designs built upon the typical ordering of the individual features of the northern 
landscapes. The common thread was that of substitution of these landscapes (through 
inundation, nature development, cyberspace-like constellations, and so on). It is as if we do 
not know what to do with our own landscapes. This is also repeated in the contemporary 
practice of nature development. 
63 An intriguing issue in the Gaasterland discussion was the so-called 'limitation'. Nature 
development had to take place within this limitation. On the contrary, the people involved 
in the area stated that such limitations were undesired - concrete options for further nature 
development had to be found for the area as a whole. 
64 And in a more general sense, as a settlement factor for farms. 
65 These could perhaps be environmental cooperatives and societies for farmer-led 
management of nature and landscape. An interesting fact is that many non-farmers are 
members of these cooperatives and societies. The new coalitions between farmers 
organisations, the Dutch motoring association (ANWB), Natuurmonumenten, the 
Netherlands Society for Nature and Environment, individual provincial landscapes, and so 
on, point into the same direction. 
66 Which is a formidable design exercise for the agricultural, spatial, and social sciences. 

PartV 
Actor and Structure 

10 Structure, Time, Knowledge, and Power 
At the beginning of this book, I raised the question of the ordering 
moment in contemporary agriculture. Clear patterns and regularities can 
be identified in the period of Hemmema and Koorn, as well as in the 
present era of the sunige boeren (economical farmers) and grutte boeren 
(large farmers). Similarly, numerous regularities can be identified in the 
economic and agronomic spheres on the farm, as well as in the inter-
relations between the state and the farming population. This raises the 
question of structure, of the set of relations that exert a degree of ordering. 
What is structure and wherein is it localised? 
Numerous structural notions can be identified in the contemporary 
(agricultural) sciences. Almost every discipline has its own favourite 
definition. Every discipline defines its own regulatory system (see 
Chapter 4). In spite of their differences, these notions are connected by the 
idea that it is possible to identify 'underlying' structures that bring about 
certain regularities and processes. There are, it is assumed, structures that 
underlie and determine the confusing, complex, heterogeneous, and 
dynamic world in which we live. Further, these structures are thought to 
be relatively constant and not immediately visible. The structure of 
something is its prime constituent, its core, its essence; hence it is hidden. 
The world as we experience it, is a world of manifestations, many of 
which are capricious and temporary and, hence, of no importance. Other 
manifestations are more solid and constant. They are, as it were, normal 
and natural. The latter are taken to be an expression of the 'underlying 
structure' - least in mainstream thinking and epistemology, which elevate 
these manifestations into important and significant facts: they inform us, 
as it were, about where we are going. Other manifestations (other 
empirical figurations) are less relevant: they are no more than black swans, 
capricious deviations of interest to one or two people at the most. 
The agricultural sciences form a fascinating aspect of scientific endeavour. 
They can only achieve what is expected of them through the integration of 
a multitude of disciplines. Their object (farming) represents an integrative 
moment par excellence. Agriculture cannot be imagined but as the 
concrete interlocking of the agronomic, the zootechnical, the 
technological, the economic, the social, the historical, and the future 
oriented (as well as the interlocking of agriculture and society, of the 
normative and the practical). However, within agricultural science the 
constituent parts of farming are still understood through determinist 
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notions of structure that contrast with, if not contradict, each other. Thus, 
agricultural science is as yet an incomplete science. 
In this book, I have tried to relativise such agronomic, technological, and 
economic determinism. I have pointed out that there are considerable 
degrees of freedom within each of these domains - degrees of freedom 
that emerge from the heterogeneous development processes inherent in 
co-production. Similarly, I have tried to point out that the agricultural 
sciences have to be reconceptualised by taking as a starting point the 
multiple realities contained within farming, at any time or at any place, 
and systematically taking into account the multiple development 
opportunities inherent in co-production. In the last chapters (6-9) I have, 
implicitly in part, reacted against the determinism inherent in the 
sociological approach to agriculture. Sociological determinism is usually 
defined by the term 'structuralism'. This includes all those approaches 
'which regard . . . structure as having priority over social action' 
(Marshall 1994, p. 515). These are approaches that entail an overtone of 
'necessity' (Elias 1972, p. 178): as if developments can only take place in 
one way - that is, in the manner determined by the prevailing structure. 
Many attempts have been made to answer the question: what is structure? 
I would like to discuss two of these attempts here. One because it is a pre-
eminently conventional answer, the other because it embodies recent 
developments in sociology. Yet, from the evidence in this book, neither 
approach comprehensively explains the ordering moments in 
contemporary agriculture. 
According to De Jager and Mok, structure is 'the set of positions and 
dispositions and the interrelations connecting these positions and 
dispositions (1978, p. 134). This is true, but it is also an unhelpful 
definition, because ultimately it includes everything and, hence, becomes 
meaningless. It is not evident how various key elements identified in the 
previous chapters (the dominance of the future over the present, the 
relationship between the expert system and the other actors, the presence 
of trust and, subsequently, of distrust) fit within this definition. Similar 
problems apply to the more recent definition of structure provided by 
Giddens: '. . . structures are made up of human actions and relationships: 
what gives these their patterning is their repetition across periods of time 
and distances of space' (1992, p. 19, see also 731). This definition crucially 
lacks the necessary reference to what is generated, brought forward, and 
rendered significant by this repetition. We encountered several examples 
of repetition in the previous chapters. The agricultural labourers who 
moved away, the small farmers who lost their particular place, the 
introduction of the milk tank - which presented numerous farmers with 
insurmountable investment costs - it were all separate episodes that 
became repetitions only in the context of the grand narrative of 
modernisation. 
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10.1 What is structure? 
Following the quest undertaken in the previous chapters, I think that I can 
formulate an alternative answer to the above question - at least, an 
answer that reflects the empirical constellations and complexities 
discussed in this book. 
Structure is a multi-layered concept. First, it is a set of expectations, a whole 
that indicates those actions and practices that are significant and those 
that are insignificant. Hence, structure orders numerous practices, 
including economic practices and developments. Second, structure is an 
emergent fact, since the images of what is significant and /or of what is to 
be expected can be disputed, modified, and/or substituted. This is 
possible because novelties (Van Lente and Rip 1998) are produced in 
practice (new production functions, new substitution relations, new types 
of farming sustainably), but also because various expectations of the 
expert system are adjusted and/or replaced. Therefore, structure is not a 
stable but rather an, at times, highly variable fact. Third, structure is a 
concurrence of circumstances - sometimes accidental, at other times 
purposefully instigated. The particular concurrence that coincides with 
the prevailing expectations emerges as significant and is subsequently 
defined as structure. 
Structure presupposes a locus: an instance from which expectations are 
actively produced, communicated, and implemented (through the 
reorientation of resource flows, through prescriptions, procedures, 
artefacts - in short, through a technological regime); and an instance from 
which events (the concurrence of circumstances) are actively read, 
interpreted, and represented as the inevitable outcomes of structure, and 
from which adjustments are made too. This locus is constituted by the 
expert system in and around agriculture. This leads me to the fourth 
finding. Structure is not only the product of the expert system, it is also a 
frame (a set of particular opportunities and constraints) imposed upon the 
relevant part of society by the expert system. Thus direction emerges in 
practice (via prescription and control) - a depersonalised and 
dematerialised type of direction, as it were. Apparently, there is nothing 
that, or no one who, forces us to order our actions in a certain way. 
However, if we want to act rationally, sensibly, and/or responsibly (if we 
want to avoid excessively high transaction costs), we will have to orient 
our actions to, and situate them within, the defined framework. 
All actions are future-oriented actions. However, the future is no longer 
an unfolding of that which we are involved in - the future is 
expropriated: it is the exclusive domain of the large expert systems. A 
'new feudalism' (Benvenuti 1975) emerges via a future defined and 
controlled by others (by expert systems): we are free in a formal sense, but 
our actions are largely authorised by and/or made clandestine by others. 
This points to the fifth element: the future is represented as the inevitable 
unfolding of 'iron' laws supposedly inherent in the world (in the present 
and in the past, in the material and in society). In this book, I have 
deconstructed a number of these laws which provide the basic 
398 The Virtual Farmer 
assumptions from which the expert system operates. On clear 
examination these proved not to be iron laws but artificial constructions. 
This does not alter the fact, however, that referring to such laws (as is 
daily routine in the expert system) produces two effects. On the one hand, 
the operation of the expert system is objectified and can remain outside of 
discussion and debate. On the other hand, the developed framework 
becomes even more coercive as it appears to be derived from the world of 
irrefutable facts. 
In contemporary society, knowledge development is one of the main 
ordering mechanisms. New development opportunities, new futures, 
usually emerge through knowledge development. Thus the problem of 
contemporary expert systems is not that they develop knowledge, but how 
they develop knowledge: 
a they do so in a highly selective manner (resulting in the systematic 
generation of ignorance alongside knowledge - ignorance which often 
becomes an ordering principle par excellence); 
b they claim (and sometimes realise), partly through business and 
institutional interests, an exclusive monopoly on relevant knowledge; 
c they often avoid quality controls and withdraw from any kind of 
democratic debate (as is the case in the expert system in agriculture); 
d discrepancies between their own models and 'empirical reality' are not 
regarded as 'error messages' (Staudenmaier 1985), as indications that 
the models need to be complemented, adjusted, or modified - on the 
contrary, the 'error messages' indicate at most the need to transform 
empirical reality in order to meet the models. In this respect, the 
disconnection (between future and present, between theory and 
practice, between expert system and agricultural sector) is complete 
and irreversible. 
John Berger has written an important essay (in Pig Earth) in which he 
characterises traditional thinking as a perception of the future that, judged 
by today's variation, emerges as a reduction of possibilities for action 
(1979, p. 204). The future appears as a point of convergence (as illustrated 
in Figure 6.3). This traditional thinking is in contrast to modern or 
progressive thinking (the 'culture of progress'), which implies for the 
future the assumption of an increasing number of, mutually diverging, 
possibilities for action (as illustrated in Figure 6.6, cf. Figure 1.1). It is 
intriguing that the future vision utilised and reproduced by the Ministry 
of Agriculture as expert system seems to correspond to the traditional 
thinking (the 'culture of survival') described by Berger. The future is a 
point of convergence (a vanishing point) in which only one type of 
behaviour, only one type of farming, would be possible. However, this 
thinking is not compatible with the large repertoire of farm development 
models that can be empirically identified and which are based, in turn, 
upon a set of projects contained in contemporary diversity. 
The future is open. More than ever before, it is characterised by a 
staggering complexity. Therefore, it contains almost unprecedented risks 
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(for example, in the field of food quality and health) but also numerous 
possibilities, often hardly explored, sometimes even literally unknown. 
The Ministry of Agriculture as expert system delimits and neutralises, as 
it were, the indeterminate nature and, hence, the open character of the 
future. By predicting a particular 'future' (represented as inevitable, as 
the unfolding of structural laws), by subsequently prescribing the desired 
behaviour (at different levels), and by controlling the relevant 
circumstances, the ministry creates de facto a coercive 'structure'. 
Consequently, 'structural development' makes the prediction come true 
and, hence, it is extended, almost automatically, to the next phase. 
The functioning of the expert system fails to take account of the history of 
Dutch agriculture and the longue durée inherent in it. In summarising 
chapters 2-5 of this book, I cannot but conclude that Dutch farmers have 
been as successful as they are because they have developed more than farmers 
elsewhere into 'peasants'. Throughout and as a result of history, they have 
actively distanced themselves from various markets - they developed 
their activities and resources in such a way that degrees of freedom from 
markets have been created. Similarly, the analysis of contemporary 
heterogeneity shows that the degrees of freedom inherent in the 
heterogeneity could become of decisive importance in the coming years. 
The often misunderstood multifunctional farm (that is, the farm using the 
same resource base to produce for several markets: the world market, 
national markets, different regional and/or local markets), created by the 
peasants of the past and present, is and remains an important promise. 
Yet, according to the image of the virtual farmer, the agricultural 
entrepreneur is, and should be, highly specialised: whether in production 
for the world market or in a farm campsite. It is not recognised that both 
can go hand in hand - or rather, that the one is increasingly a condition 
for the functioning of the other, and vice versa. Similarly, it is not 
recognised that the strength of Dutch agriculture lies not so much in the 
entrepreneurship advocated by the expert system, but is rather rooted in 
the capabilities of the contemporary peasant. 
Of course, these are all contentious issues. At the beginning of the twenty-
first century, we are faced with fundamental changes - for example, in the 
markets. It is possible that the expert system will seek to parry these 
changes in a fundamentally misplaced way, that is by assuming and 
promoting the virtual entrepreneur and ignoring farmers as they really 
are: peasants. Jacobs refers in Het kennisoffensief (The Knowledge Offensive) 
to institutions that become gradually blind to their environment: 
'Changes in the environment are usually understood within the existing 
frameworks of interpretation'. Concepts such as redundancy, structural 
development, viable farms, agricultural entrepreneurs, and production 
functions do indeed order the perception and interpretation of 
development in agriculture. 'If these frameworks', according to Jacobs, 
'become inadequate, they usually begin to distort the signals from the 
environment. They are assumed to be capable of reacting appropriately to 
external change, but in fact they mainly do what is best suited to them.' 
New developments are, or continue to be, black swans. Thus, what Jacobs 
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calls a 'strategic drift' emerges: 'one starts to drift away from reality' 
(1999, p. 59). This is what I have indicated in the course of this book: the 
expert system in agriculture represents a strategic drift. One that occurs at 
a critical time, when what is needed is a different approach, a different 
concept, and also a different vision. It is often said that 'the convincing 
orthodoxy of one century [will become] the historical curiosity of the next' 
(Bruce 1999, p. 2). Alas, there is no sign of this at present. Rather, it is 
possible that - as a result of this strategic drift, i.e. as a result of the 
discrepancy between the virtual farmer and today's peasants - real and 
very necessary development opportunities will be missed. Consequently, 
it may not be the current 'orthodoxy', but the real farmer, real agriculture, 
and the real countryside that will soon be historical curiosities. 
In this book, I have described at length the way in which Dutch 
agriculture has been modernised. The macro-project as developed and 
carried by the Ministry of Agriculture as an expert system (that is, the 
modernisation project) was and is the key to a proper understanding of 
this. Trust, the institutionalised faith that 'it will be all right', was 
essential. The macro-project became the goal (the 'magnetic North') to 
which numerous projects (of farmers, of industry and banks, of 
researchers) were oriented. In and through this macro-project, various 
projects began to converge, generating synergy and, above all, a 
confirmation of the macro-project: everyone could see that things were 
taking shape. The poet among Dutch farmers, Max van Tilburg, described 
this once as follows: 
Yes, you did hear more and more that things were going to go in that direction 
at the time, and you did see that farmers were doing this more and more. So you 
didn 't want to stay behind . . . As a result, we did expand and put in one of 
those sheds in the late 1960s. 
The modernisation of farming became a self-fulfilling prophecy, which 
leads me to the sixth aspect of structure. Structure refers to the interlocking 
of projects: 
Relevant structural forms can be identified in the complex encounter of projects 
[. . .] and in the variable patterns of interaction actively established between the 
actors concerned (Long and Van der Ploeg 1994, p. 75). 
As part of the large modernisation process, this was not a more or less 
incidental interlocking. The very convergence taking place was actively 
organised under the umbrella of the modernisation process and its effects 
were significant. The realised convergence resulted in an increase of trust, 
and trust, in turn, became the vehicle for the creation of further 
convergence. Thus, structure is not an a priori fact. It does not precede 
events. It emerges from the course of events as the interweaving (Elias 1972, 
pp. 149 ff; Goudsblom 1990, pp. 126 ff) of various projects. 
The six previous observations can be combined into one thesis: in 
contemporary Dutch agriculture structure largely coincides with the 
future expectation generated by the expert system.13 Structure is emergent. 
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However, it became a more or less coercive framework because of the 
increase in trust and because the course of events (that is, the 
interweaving of projects) seemed to confirm the future expectations that 
had been articulated. The knowledge monopoly of the expert system was 
decisive in creating this impression. The organisation of knowledge is one of 
the most important sources of power in contemporary society; and together with 
the production of ignorance associated with it, it is one of the most important 
ordering principles that we use to guide ourselves, or by which we are guided. 
Yet, the same 'structure' appears increasingly fragile. The moment that 
trust erodes and black swans begin to swim together, the shortcomings of 
the expert system become evident. The iron laws that were intended to 
cage the uncaptured peasantry, capture the expert system instead. At the 
end of the day, the expert system that generated and developed the 
virtual farmer is now the victim of this projection. 
10.2 The ordering elements of today: distrust and discongruity 
The weakness of the contemporary expert system emerges from the 
previous discussion. Even though new images of the future have been 
developed within and by the expert system (without having distanced 
themselves from the former models), the trust of the past has now 
turned into a widespread and deeply felt distrust, which has reached the 
point constant mention is made of the 'crisis' in Dutch agriculture. 
Manifestations of the crisis can be seen everywhere. However, it is 
important to point out that this crisis does not solely lie in the attitudes of 
farmers or only in the Ministry of Agriculture. The feeling of crisis also 
involves the development of, and the relations within, various markets as 
well as the functioning of the agencies operating within them (Ettema et 
al 1994). It concerns the direction, the nature, and the importance of 
technological development. Furthermore, the sense of crisis involves 
interest representation. And finally, the sense of crisis is activated above 
all by new, apparently inevitable, types of state intervention, which are 
increasingly in a state of crisis themselves. 
Above all, the crisis is rooted in the already existing discongruity 
between many development projects. The 'triad' identified in Chapter 8 
provides an excellent an illustration of this: the 'innovators', 'growers', 
and 'pessimists' are all in each others' way. If continuous scale 
enlargement is necessary, it needs to be on such a scale that hardly any 
farmers can contemplate it, or would require such high levels of public 
funding that it is bound to flounder. The dairy industry advocates the 
elimination of production quotas and lower milk prices; it has expected 
the government to support its aims but this is not a project that farmers 
wish to be part of. The list can be extended ad infinitum. The conclusion, 
however, remains the same: discongruity exists everywhere. Nothing 
seems to work. In practice, farm men and farm women are confronted by 
paralysing uncertainties: 'We no longer know where we stand'. 
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At the start of the twenty-first century, structure (that which orders) is 
constituted by discongruity, distrust, and non-agency: nothing is 
functioning, everything is disputed. No matter how many reports are 
produced, this can no longer be averted. Moreover, convincing policy 
positions are no longer produced as discongruity, distrust, and non-
agency predominate within the Ministry of Agriculture. The various 
directorates no longer constitute a goal-oriented organisation. The only 
thing that still 'functions' is the prevailing technological regime. It 
'functions' because it does not have to be directed. The procedures, rules, 
artefacts, and so on maintain their own 'autopilot'. But the same 
'functioning' of this regime also translates into an increasing number of 
frictions and problems at the interface between state and sector. Thus the 
Titanic sails ahead, although no one knows in which direction. 
10.3 On time, power, and social practices 
I have described the rise of a new RD current in Chapter 9. The 
agricultural economy has diversified beyond the earnings from milk and 
potatoes alone. The survival of farms is partly based upon new markets 
and upon the goods and services demanded in these markets. Thus, 
farming has become socialised: interwoven with other sectors, interests, 
and perspectives. Interestingly, this process of rural development 
manifests itself de facto in a completely different manner than imagined in 
the expert system. In the expert system, rural development is a new 
macro-project, a design situated in the future that has to order the 
development of particular practices. Subsidies, prescriptions, procedures, 
norms, and designs are created to this end, after which rural development 
can take place as a directed process. 
In the preceding chapters, I defined the power position of the expert 
system and of the Ministry of Agriculture in particular. It is symbolic 
power (the ministry as expert system defines the course to follow), yet it is 
also material power, as the ministry has the ability to allocate resources 
(subsidies, rules, etc.) according to its own views. Central to all this is the 
dominance of the future over the present. Only by claiming a superior 
insight in the future ordering of the sector can the Ministry of Agriculture 
achieve its power base. Of course, what actually happens is something 
completely different. The diversified agricultural economy as we know it is 
an outcome of the past, 'born' during and as a result of the preceding 
modernisation project. Part of the farming population has been effectively 
disassembling this project since the 1960, by developing responses such as 
farming economically, searching for additional incomes and by 
developing new types of kreas buorkje (farming gently). 
This repertoire is being built upon in innovative ways today: the highly 
varied RD current described in Chapter 9 is a result of this, and contains 
considerable possibilities for extension. Here, the future is derived from 
the potentials entailed in the present. The RD current contains a 
considerable potential power: both symbolically and materially. In the 
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battle for the future, ironically, the current that takes its starting point in 
the past and the present stands the best chance of success. 
Today's RD current is a powerful and self-enhancing movement. Rural 
development as a new macro-project, on the other hand, is powerless. It 
only generates frictions and frustrations within the current that it cannot, 
and does not want to, join. 
Thus, a paradox emerges. On the one hand the Ministry of Agriculture 
and an expert system claim power (and try to establish this with billions of 
guilders and detailed regulations). On the other hand, they emerge as 
non-agencies since they fail to communicate with, and/or gain the 
confidence of, rural development practitioners. The expert system 
produces ignorance when knowledge and capacity are needed, and hence 
the Ministry of Agriculture loses its grip on events. Most obviously, the 
ministry is insufficiently able to join the actual innovations and 
diversifications that make up the RD current. 
The power of the RD current not only lies in its size, but also resides in the 
widely shared hope that it will provide a more realistic and more 
attractive future. More realistic because it can be imagined as a 
development opportunity building upon (instead of being a rupture from) 
the present. More attractive because it contains concrete connections 
between agriculture and society as they exist now and are likely to be in 
the future. The new macro-project of the expert system, on the other hand, 
is a powerless project, especially as it requires an extent of coordination 
that is difficult to imagine in the long run. Rural development, as 
imagined by the expert system, needs to take place alongside an 
acceleration of scale enlargement. This project, however, is as fragile as a 
rural development project that does not join the existing practice of 
farmer-led innovation and diversification. In this way too, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the expert system are turned into powerless agencies: 
they represent mutually colliding and individually unrealisable or hardly 
realisable projects. 
Power is a relational concept. Power appears when different social 
projects are combined in such a way that they reinforce each other. By 
contrast, situations will exist where incapacity, and mutually exclusive 
projects are the main features. Associations are not formed. The necessary 
cohesion is missing, without which a society cannot survive for very long. 
Principally, it is the task of politics to establish and safeguard cohesion. 
Generally, this involves, the balance of the economic, the social, and the 
ecological. More specifically, it involves the balance and cohesion of 
various projects. However, there is little room for the political if cohesion 
is informed by an expert system that has produced mainly ignorance, if 
the civil service keeps slavishly following the expert system, and if 
agriculture makes unmanageability into a principle. The recent years are 
evidence of this. 
In the long term, it is inevitable that the superfluity of both the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the expert system will become obvious; the call for their 
abolition will become louder. Especially since those actively involved in 
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rural development increasingly ignore the ministry ('you can't arrange 
anything with them') and make the necessary arrangements with other 
partners (for example, provinces, nature-conservation organisations, and 
regional farmers unions). 
The Ministry of Agriculture increasingly finds itself playing the role of a 
prim junior school teacher who thinks she can still reprimand adolescents. 
They laugh at her (or say 'yes, miss' to her out of respect) but nevertheless 
go their own way. The same applies to the (now partly privatised) expert 
system: it will appear increasingly irrelevant. On the whole this is a pity. 
A renewed countryside and a renewed agriculture deserve a world-class 
ministry and knowledge organisations. However, if the latter lack any 
relation to the innovative RD current, they make themselves superfluous. 
This is in itself not a reason for sadness. The real danger is rather that we 
will lose the pearls called agriculture, cultural landscapes, countryside, 
and good food. However invisible these pearls have been made by the 
image of the virtual farmer, they do exist and remain a good that should 
not be lost. Once they are lost, they will be lost once and for all. 
Notes 
1 Alongside numerous other issues that have been discussed in this book. 
2 Structure is hidden behind the confusing amount of different, often contrasting, 
manifestations. Structures cannot be easily identified in everyday life. Academics and expert 
systems are indeed needed (at least within structuralist models) in order to find the real 
structures behind the confusion and immediacy. A rather creepy parallel with Marxism as 
scientific theory and the totalitarian forms of government that they gave rise to, surfaces 
here. Only the party could get to the very core of things by means of dialectic materialism, 
not the common people. 
3 Marshall characterises this by speaking of the 'death of the subject' (1994, p. 516) - that is, 
actors no longer matter in highly structuralist approaches. 
4 More precisely, structure is a set of expectations that guide actions. At the same time, it 
involves actions that are actively (that is, after an interpretation of selected facts) 
institutionalised into 'structure'. This duality can be defined accurately by the notion of 
'structural development', which has played such a crucial part in Dutch agriculture. 
'Structural development' is a dual concept. On the one hand, it includes the expected 
development of the agricultural structure: further development of larger farms (invariably 
called 'the leaders' in many of the texts of the Ministry of Agriculture), the elimination of 
'small farms', and the unfolding of the amorphous intermediate group of 'medium-sized 
farms' towards the 'leaders' or redundancy. On the other hand, the same concept of 
'structural development' refers to a causal complex from which the described development 
inevitably results. It is an expected development that is 'structurally' determined. Hence, it 
is an 'inevitable' development. Subsequently, the adjective 'expected' is superfluous. Both 
aspects are closely related: a certain development is set in motion by reference to 
inevitability. And the more it continues, the more the initially 'expected' inevitability is 
actually demonstrated. Developments that deviate from 'structural development' are kept 
outside of the research agendas. They concern matters that cannot take place in this virtual 
world - so why devote effort to (and waste time and person power on) investigating them? 
The answer already exists: it is impossible. In all my years of involvement with the expert 
system, my experience has always been that it is not able to conduct really innovative 
research. That is only possible via other avenues: universities, Brussels and other political 
circuits. Only if it becomes clear through series of publications, research studies, and 
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through a change in political climate that things can be approached differently, will the 
expert system address and subsequently look to re-capture a monopoly. 
5 During the 1990s, my research group has been involved in the realisation, analysis, and 
publication of five nation-wide surveys among farmers (see Ettema et al. 1994; Van der Ploeg 
et al. 1994; Ettema et al. 1995; Boerderij 1997). Inquiries were always made in these surveys 
about the future likelihood and possible reasons for farm closure. It appeared time and again 
that closure is rarely brought about by an acute or expected income problem. More 
important, if not decisive, is the lack of prospects, the feeling of no longer belonging. What 
we usually call economy operates only to a limited extent via the immediate impact of 
market and price relations. The actual degree of market dependency and the images about 
expected developments in and around the relevant markets are much more important 
factors. It is not so much the actual (economic) situation that is used as guiding principle in 
decisions about continuity or farm closure - it is expectations about 'whether the farm will 
be able to keep up' . These kinds of considerations become decisive in economic actions in 
the short term (whether to close the farm immediately, to cut back in the long term, to 'hold 
out', to grow carefully, to expand greatly, or to mark time). En passant, this emphasises 
again, although now at a completely different level, the extent to which socio-economic 
behaviour is ruled by considerations about the future. It is not so much history, or the 
currently prevailing constellation of relationships, that order this behaviour - such 
behaviour is concretised via the future. Time and again, the essential question is whether 
development opportunities exist, and if so which ones? At the same time, it becomes clear 
that it is impossible to investigate the definition of future prospects and, hence, the definition 
of one's own opportunities from the perspective of methodological individualism. The 
'future' is the most important arena within which different projects are unfolded and forged 
into a guiding 'compass', into a 'structure' that offers consistency, legitimacy, and prospect 
(or not) for today's actions. This intriguing, 'structuring' role of the future touches not only 
at the esoteric, but also and especially upon what we usually call economics: the hard rock 
bottom of producing, commercialising, investing, and farm development. If this set of 
'economic actions' is usually understood principally in structuralist terms (that is, as 
determined by the currently prevailing market and price relations), 'economics' appears 
above all to be dependent upon prevailing, future expectations. To the extent that 
'economics' operates in agriculture, it is through the future expectations that give direction, 
and lend colour, to interpretations of the current state of affairs. If certain interests, projects, 
and positions represent a certain 'power', this is because they are more able than others, to 
manipulate the definition of the future and arrange it according to their own models. Voilà, 
the strategic role of the expert system in repeatedly 'predicting' the halving of the number 
of farms in the coming years. One could say that 'economics', as understood by neo-classical 
economists in particular, does not exist. 'Economics' is a fiction, made real by exclusive 
claims made on the interpretation of the future (and by the widespread belief that such 
claims are right and convincing). 
6 See chapters 4, 5, and 9 of this book, respectively. 
7 Free-rider behaviour is partly caused by this: one is sometimes forced in practice to do this 
by the discrepancy between prescriptions and the practical situation. 
8 This is one of the most serious issues of the past decades. It was clear for about 20 years 
that a sizable sustainability problem would arise in Dutch agriculture. However, when the 
problem became so manifest in the early 1990s that political intervention was no longer 
avoidable, decision-making and the public debate were seriously frustrated by a lack of 
knowledge. Only guesses could be made at various issues. The term 'missing trajectory' 
became established during this period. The expert system had generated considerable 
knowledge about N use between 300 and 500 kg per ha. The previous 'trajectory' (of 
roughly 0-200 kg/ha) emerged suddenly as the 'missing trajectory', for which no 
knowledge was available. A similar story can be told about numerous other issues. There 
was no knowledge, only ignorance about paths that deviated from the dominant 
development trajectory. This issue is becoming acute once again, in respect of food security 
and quality, as well as with respect of 'rural development'. The first, influential studies 
about rural development were all produced outside of the expert system (see NRLO 1997). 
The publication of studies that later turned out to be very influential was often blocked in 
406 The Virtual Farmer 
the beginning by DWK (the core of the expert system). They could only be realized after 
political interventions by the minister. 
9 Following Szerszynski, 'the future is not a pre-existing land towards which we are all 
moving, and which it is our task to discern through the mist and prepare for, but something 
which is created and shaped through all the decisions we make' (1996, p. 10). However, the 
opposite happens in and through the expert system. The future is 'closed off', presented as 
one, inevitable destination. 
10 It could be said, with some irony, that the preference for 'traditional thinking' seems to 
support the continuation of the expert system. 
11 It is probably better to phrase this as 'thus generated'. 
12 There is more to this, of course. The expectations of the Ministry of Agriculture as expert 
system were and remain one of the most important ordering principles. Structure emerges, 
together with the way in which it is reacted against (the ordering principles inherent in 
various farming styles), as fluid, as motion, as an emergent whole. In the case of trust, 
structure does indeed coincide largely with the ordering principle. Distrust, however, in the 
future expectations articulated by the Ministry of Agriculture (and other ordering 
principles), leads to discongruity and non-agency, the 'organised irresponsibility' of which 
Mansholt spoke. 
13 It is not possible to explain social developments outside of social relations and practices. 
Social practices can only be explained through, and from within, the social. It is remarkable, 
however, that developments and practices in contemporary agriculture are structured by a 
fixation on (and the battle for) the future. In so far as a structure exists, it is situated around 
the definition of the future, around the organisations and positions that (are able to) claim 
the capacity for formulating such a definition, and around the means with which this takes 
place. Structure is the 'story' (the 'discourse') that is told about the way in which to 
continue. And hence, structure is the degree to which this 'story' is institutionalised and 
represents 'authority'. Structure is the dominance of a certain discourse. A structure is 
'stronger', more coercive (more 'structuring'), the more this discourse or 'story' is taken up 
and used by other actors. By attuning one's own projects to (that is, by coordinating and 
safeguarding them through) the dominant discourse and project, one's own 'success' 
becomes more assured, and the structure becomes durable, legitimized, and made into a 
convincing fact ('proved', not because it is the only possible structure but because it is made 
'right'). 
14 This would collide with the expert system as institutional interest. The inability implies 
that the 'new' can only be imagined in terms of coordination with the already developed 
model. To paraphrase Latour, the expert system has 'never been wrong'. Incidentally, it 
should be noted that the Minister for Agriculture, Van Aartsen, has tried to create such a 
distance. He criticised aspects of the former modernisation project several times. However, 
this view has not been taken on within the ministry nor within the expert system. 
15 I would like to remind the reader that this distrust is largely caused by the expert system 
itself, since research is increasingly disconnected from the practices, interests, perspectives, 
and insights that are held within the agricultural sector. Distrust is further reinforced since 
no adequate relationships, let alone coalitions, have been built by the Ministry of Agriculture 
with the growing group of innovators. 
16 The widespread feeling of crisis is directed mainly towards the Ministry of Agriculture. 
This is not surprising. For a long time, the ministry has been the axis around which revolved 
both the developments of and the debates about this issue. 
17 The discongruity can partly be attributed to the failings of the expert system, since the 
potential for combining different developmental trajectories have not been included as 
serious and researchable themes in the research agenda. From the outset, the expert system 
opted for juxtaposition. Hence, discongruity is probably a far bigger issue than it should or 
could be. 
18 Farming is impossible without clear projects, without a more or less coherent set of 
notions over the questions of how farming has to be conducted, how farms should be 
developed, by whom, to which ends and through what means this needs to happen. This 
applies not only at the micro-level but also, and perhaps even more so, at the macro-level. 
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The relationships between farms have to be ordered as do the relationships between farms 
and the supply and processing industries. Through these relationships, the relations 
between production and consumption, between imports and exports, between agriculture 
and industry, between food quality, ethics and mode of production, between landscape and 
farming, and so on have to be actively ordered. Such a project, spanning the whole sector, is 
necessary to produce the required coordination between micro- and macro-levels, to create 
convergence, in the long run, between the activities on the many thousands of farms with 
more general social, ecological and political interests and perspectives. 
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